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A

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

EPITOME

BY

ALBERT SCHWEGLER.

*TRANSLATED FROM THE FIRST EDITION OF THE ORIGINAL
GERMAN*

BY

JULIUS H. SEELYE.

*REVISED FROM THE NINTH GERMAN EDITION, WITH AN
APPENDIX,*

BY

BENJAMIN E. SMITH.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

SCHWEGLER'S History of Philosophy originally appeared in the "*Neue Encyklopädie für Wissenschaften und Künste*." Its great value soon awakened a call for its separate issue, in which form it has obtained a very wide circulation in Germany. It is found in the hands of almost every student in the philosophical department of a German university, and is highly esteemed for its clearness, conciseness, and comprehensiveness.

The present translation was commenced in Germany three years ago, and has been carefully finished. It was undertaken with the conviction that the work would not lose its interest or its value in an English dress, and with the hope that it might be of wider service in such a form to students of philosophy here. It was thought especially, that a proper translation of this manual would supply a want for a suitable text-book on this branch of study, long felt by both teachers and students in our American colleges.

The effort has been made to translate, and not

to paraphrase the author's meaning. Many of his statements might have been amplified without diffuseness, and made more perceptible to the superficial reader without losing their interest to the more profound student, but he has so happily seized upon the germs of the different systems, that they neither need, nor would be improved by any farther development, and has, moreover, presented them so clearly, that no student need have any difficulty in apprehending them as they are. The translator has therefore endeavored to represent faithfully and clearly the original history. As such he offers his work to the American public, indulging no hope, and making no efforts for its success beyond that which its own merits shall ensure.

J. H. S.

SCHENECTADY, N.Y., *January*, 1856.

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION.

AFTER this translation was first published, the ninth edition of the original work, containing some important revisions, appeared in Germany. These revisions, including some new matter and some modifications of the old, are here incorporated by my friend and former pupil, whose name appears upon the title-page, and who, at my request, has also added an appendix continuing the history in its more prominent lines of development since the time of Hegel. He has done his work thoroughly, and whatever value belonged to the translation as originally presented, will be found decidedly augmented in its present form.

J. H. S.

AMHERST COLLEGE, *June*, 1880.

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A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.



SECTION I.

OBJECT AND METHOD OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

TO philosophize is to reflect ; to examine things, in thought. This is not, however, a sufficiently exact definition of philosophy. Man also employs thought in those practical activities concerned in the adaptation of means to an end ; the whole body of sciences also, even those which do not belong to philosophy in the stricter sense, are products of reflective thought. By what, then, is philosophy distinguished from these sciences, *e.g.*, from that of astronomy, of medicine, or of jurisprudence ? Certainly not by its material, for this is identical with the material of the different empirical sciences. The constitution and disposition of the universe, the structure and functions of the human body, property, law, and the state, — all these are as truly the material of philosophy as of their appropriate sciences. That which is given in the world of experience, that which is real, is the content of both. It is not, therefore, in its material, but in its form, in its method, in its mode of knowledge, that philosophy is to be distinguished from the empirical sciences. These latter derive their material directly from experience ; they find it at hand and take it up just as they find it. Philosophy, on the

other hand, is never satisfied with receiving that which is given simply as it is given, but rather follows it out to its ultimate grounds; it examines each individual thing in its relations to a final principle, and considers it as one element of a complete system of knowledge. In this way philosophy removes from the particulars of experience their immediate, individual, and accidental character; from the sea of empirical individualities it brings out the universal, and subordinates the infinite and orderless mass of contingencies to necessary laws. In short, philosophy deals with the *totality* of experience under the form of an *organic system* in harmony with the laws of thought. From the above it is seen, that philosophy (in the sense we have given it) and the empirical sciences have a reciprocal influence; the latter conditioning the former, while they at the same time are conditioned by it. We shall, therefore, in the history of thought, no more find an absolute and complete philosophy, than a complete empirical science. On the contrary, philosophy exists only in the form of different philosophical systems, which have appeared successively in the course of history, advancing hand in hand with the progress of the empirical sciences and universal social and civil culture, and showing in their advance the different stages in the development and improvement of human knowledge. The history of philosophy has, for its object, to exhibit the content, the succession, and the inner connection of these philosophical systems.

The relation of these different systems to each other is thus already intimated. The historical and collective life of the race is bound together by the idea of a spiritual and intellectual progress, and manifests a regular order of advancing, though not always continuous, stages of development. In this, the fact harmonizes with what we should expect from antecedent probabilities. Since, therefore, every philosophical system is only the philosophical expression of the collective life of its time, it follows that the different systems which have appeared in history will disclose one organic movement

and form together one rational and internally articulated system, one order of development grounded in the constant endeavor of the human mind to raise itself to a higher point of consciousness and knowledge, and to recognize the whole spiritual and natural universe, more and more, as its outward being, as its reality, as the mirror of itself.

Hegel was the first to utter these thoughts and to consider the history of philosophy as a united process; but this view, which is, in its principle, true, he has applied in a way which tends to destroy not only the freedom of human action but even the very conception of contingency, *i.e.*, the possibility of the actual existence of the unreasonable. *Hegel's* view is, that the succession of the systems of philosophy which have appeared in history, corresponds to the succession of logical categories in a system of logic. According to him, if, from the fundamental conceptions of these different philosophical systems, we remove that which pertains to their outward form or particular application, etc., there will remain the different steps of the logical notion, being, becoming, existence, being *per se*, quantity, etc. And on the other hand, if we consider the logical process by itself, we find also in it all that is essential in the actual historical process.

This opinion, however, can be sustained neither in its principle nor in its historical application. It is defective in its principle, because history is a combination of contingency and necessity. If we consider its general movements and results, a rational (necessary) connection of events is clearly discernible; but if we look solely at its individual elements, it exhibits merely a play of numberless contingencies, just as nature, taken as a whole, reveals a rational plan in its successions, but viewed only in its parts, mocks at every attempt to reduce them to a preconceived order. In history we have to do with individuals capable of originating actions with free subjectivity, — a factor which does not admit of calculation. For however accurately we may estimate the controlling conditions which may attach to an individual, from the

general circumstances in which he may be placed, his age, his associations, his nationality, etc., a free will can never be calculated like a mathematical problem. History does not admit of strict arithmetical calculation. The history of philosophy, therefore, cannot be constructed *a priori*; the actual occurrences should not be joined together to illustrate a pre-conceived plan; but the facts, so far as they can be admitted, after a critical sifting, should be received as such, and their rational connection be analytically determined. The speculative idea can only supply the law for the arrangement and scientific connection of that which may be historically furnished.

A more comprehensive view, which contradicts the above-given Hegelian theory, is the following. The actual historical development is, very generally, different from the theoretical. Historically, *e.g.*, the State arose as a means of protection against violence and spoliation, while theoretically it is derived from the idea of rights. So also in the history of philosophy, while the logical (theoretical) process is an ascent from the abstract to the concrete, the historical development of philosophy is, quite generally, a descent from the concrete to the abstract, from intuition to thought, a separation of the abstract from the concrete in those general forms of culture and those religious and social circumstances, in which the philosophizing subject is placed. A *system* of philosophy proceeds synthetically, while the *history* of philosophy, *i.e.*, the history of the actual development of thought, proceeds analytically. We might, therefore, with great propriety, adopt directly the reverse of the Hegelian position, and say that what is theoretically the first, is for us, in fact, the last. The Ionic philosophy, for example, began not with *being* as an abstract conception, but with the most concrete, and most apparent, *i.e.*, with the material conception of water, air, etc. Even if we leave the Ionics and advance to the *being* of the Eleatics, or the *becoming* of the Heraclitics, we find that these, instead of being determinations of pure

thought, are only unpurified conceptions, and materially colored intuitions. Still farther, the attempt to refer every philosophy that has appeared in history to some logical category as its central principle is impracticable because the majority of these philosophies have taken for their object the idea, not as an abstract conception, but in its realization as nature and mind; and, therefore, for the most part, have to do, not with logical questions, but with those relating to natural philosophy, psychology, and ethics. Hegel should not, therefore, limit his comparison of the historical and systematic process of development to logic, but should extend it to the whole system of philosophical science. Granting that the Eleatics, the Heraclitics, and the Atomists may have made a particular category the centre of their systems, we may find thus far the Hegelian logic in harmony with the Hegelian history of philosophy. But if we go farther, how is it? How with Anaxagoras, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle? We cannot, certainly, without violence, reduce the systems of these men to one central principle; but if we should be able to do it, and could reduce, *e.g.*, the philosophy of Anaxagoras to the conception of *design*, that of the Sophists to the conception of *appearance*, and the Socratic Philosophy to the conception of *the good*, — yet even then we have the new difficulty that the historical does not correspond to the logical succession of these categories. In fact, Hegel himself has not attempted a complete application of his principle, and indeed gave it up at the very threshold of Greek philosophy. To the Eleatics, the Heraclitics, and the Atomists, the logical categories of *being*, *becoming*, and *being per se* may be successively ascribed, and so far, as already remarked, the parallelism extends, but no farther. Not only does Anaxagoras follow with the conception of reason working according to an end, but if we go back before the Eleatics, we find in the very beginning of philosophy a total diversity between the logical and historical order. If Hegel had carried out his principle consistently, he would have

thrown away entirely the Ionic philosophy, for *matter* is no logical category; he would have placed the Pythagoreans after the Eleatics and the Atomists, for in logic the categories of quantity follow those of quality; in short, he would have been obliged to set aside all chronology. If we are unwilling to do this, we must be satisfied with subjecting the course which the thinking spirit has taken in its history to a theoretical interpretation only when we can see in the grand stages of history a rational progress of thought; only when the philosophical historian, surveying a period of development, actually finds in it a philosophical acquisition, — the acquisition of a new idea: but we must guard ourselves against applying to the transition and intermediate steps, as well as to the whole detail of history, the postulate of an immanent conformity to law and logical connection. History often winds its way like a serpent in lines which appear retrogressive; and philosophy, especially, has not seldom withdrawn herself from a wide and already fruitful field, in order to settle down upon a narrow strip of land, if only to cultivate this latter the more assiduously. At one time we find a thousand years expended in fruitless attempts with only a negative result; — at another, a fulness of philosophical ideas are crowded together in the experience of a lifetime. There is here no sway of an immutable and regularly returning natural law; but history, the realm of freedom, will completely manifest itself as the work of reason only at the end of time.

SECTION II.

CLASSIFICATION.

A FEW words will suffice to define our problem and classify its elements. Where and when does philosophy begin? Manifestly, according to the analysis made in Sect. I., where a final philosophical principle, a final ground of being is first sought in a philosophical way, — and hence with Greek philosophy. The so-called Oriental philosophies, — the Chinese and Indian, — which are rather theologies or mythologies, and the mythic cosmogonies of Greece, in its earliest periods, are, therefore, excluded from our more limited problem. Like Aristotle, we shall begin the history of philosophy with Thales. For similar reasons we exclude also the philosophy of the Christian middle ages, or Scholasticism. This is not so much a philosophy, as a philosophizing or reflecting within the already prescribed limits of positive religion. It is, therefore, essentially theology, and belongs to the science of the history of Christian doctrines.

The material which remains after this exclusion, may be naturally divided into two periods; viz., ancient — Grecian and Græco-Roman — and modern philosophy. Since a preliminary comparison of the characteristics of these two epochs could not here be given without a subsequent repetition, we shall defer the discussion of their inner relations until we come to treat of the transition from the one to the other.

The first epoch can be still farther divided into three periods: (1) The Pre-Socratic philosophy, from Thales to the Sophists inclusive; (2) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; (3) The Post-Aristotelian philosophy, including Neo-Platonism.

SECTION III.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.

1. THE universal tendency of the Pre-Socratic philosophy is to find some principle for the explanation of nature. Nature, the most immediate, that which first met the eye and was the most palpable, was that which first aroused the spirit of inquiry. At the basis of its changing forms, beneath its manifold appearances, it was thought, must lie a first principle which abides the same through all change. What, then, it was asked, is this principle? What is the original ground of things? Or, more accurately, what element of nature is the fundamental element? To answer this inquiry was the problem of the earlier *Ionic natural philosophers*. One thought it to be water, another, air, and a third, an original chaotic matter.

2. The *Pythagoreans* attempted a higher solution of this problem. The proportions and dimensions of matter rather than its sensible concretion, seemed to them to furnish the true explanation of being. They, accordingly, adopted as the principle of their philosophy, that which expresses the external relations of bodies, *i.e.*, number. "Number is the essence of all things," was their thesis. Number is the mean between the immediate sensuous intuition and the pure thought. Number and measure have, to be sure, nothing to do with matter except as it possesses extension, and is capable of division in space and time; but yet we should have no numbers or measures if there were no matter, or sensuous intuition. This elevation above matter, which is at the same time a cleaving to matter, constitutes the essence and the position of Pythagoreanism.

3. Next come the *Eleatics*, who step absolutely beyond that which is given in experience, and make a complete

abstraction of every thing material. This abstraction, this negation of all division in space and time, they take as their principle, and call it pure being. Instead of the sensuous principle of the Ionics, or the quantitative principle of the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, therefore, adopt an intelligible principle.

4. Herewith, the first, or analytical period, in the development of Grecian philosophy closes, to make way for the second, or synthetic period. The Eleatics had sacrificed to their principle of pure being the existence of the world and every finite thing. But this denial of nature and the world could not be maintained. The reality of both forced itself upon the attention, and even the Eleatics themselves admitted it, though in guarded and hypothetical terms. But from their abstract being there was no passage back to the sensuous and concrete; their principle ought to have explained the actual facts of existence, but it did not. To find a principle for the explanation of these, a principle which would account for the fact of *becoming*, *i.e.*, of change, vicissitude, was now the problem. *Heraclitus* solved it by asserting that becoming, or the unity of being and not-being, is the absolute principle. He held that it belongs to the very essence of finite being to be in a continual flow, in an endless stream. "Every thing flows." We have here the conception of a primordial energy, instead of the Ionic original matter,—the first attempt to explain being and its motion from a principle analytically attained. From the time of *Heraclitus*, this inquiry after the cause of becoming remained the chief interest and the moving spring of philosophical development.

5. Becoming is the unity of being and not-being, and into these two elements is the Heraclitic principle consciously analyzed by the *Atomists*. *Heraclitus* had enunciated the principle of becoming, but only as a fact of experience. He had simply stated it as a law, but had not explained it. The necessity for this universal law yet remained to be proved.

Why is every thing in a perpetual flow, — in an eternal movement? From the dynamical combination of matter and the moving force, the next step was to a consciously determined distinction, to a mechanical division of the two. Thus *Empedocles* considered matter to be the abiding being, and force the ground of movement. We have here a combination of *Heraclitus* and *Parmenides*. But with *Empedocles* the motive forces were mythical powers, love and hate; while with the *Atomists* they were a pure, unconceived, and inconceivable natural necessity. The result of this mechanical method of explaining nature was, therefore, rather the restatement than the explanation of becoming.

6. Despairing of any merely materialistic explanation of the becoming, *Anaxagoras* placed a world-forming Intelligence by the side of matter. He recognized mind as the primal causality, to which the existence of the world, together with its determined arrangement and conformity to design must be referred. In this, philosophy gained an important ideal principle. But *Anaxagoras* did not know how to fully carry out his principles. Instead of a theoretical comprehension of the universe, instead of deriving being from the idea, he sought again for some mechanical explanation. His "world-forming reason" serves him only as a first impulse, only as a motive force. It is to him a *Deus ex machina*. Notwithstanding, therefore, his glimpse of something higher than matter, *Anaxagoras* was only a physical philosopher, like his predecessors. Mind had not manifested itself to him as a true force above nature, as an organizing soul of the universe.

7. The next step in the progress of thought is, therefore, to comprehend accurately the distinction between mind and nature, and to recognize mind as something higher and contra-distinguished from all natural being. This problem fell to the *Sophists*. They entangled the thinking which had been confined to the given object in contradictions, and brought that objectivity which had before been exalted above

the subject, into direct antagonism with the dawning consciousness of the superiority of subjective thought. The Sophists developed their principle of subjectivity (Egoism), though at first only negatively, into the form of a universal religious and political revolution. They stood forth as the destroyers of the whole edifice of thought that had been thus far built, until *Socrates* appeared, and opposed to this principle of *empirical* subjectivity, that of *absolute* subjectivity,—that of mind in the form of a free moral will,—and comprehended thought positively as something higher than existence, as the truth of all reality. With the Sophists closes our first period, for with them the oldest philosophy finds its self-destruction.

SECTION IV.

THE EARLIER IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.

1. **THALES** (640–550 B.C.)—At the head of the Ionic natural philosophers, and therefore at the head of philosophy, the ancients are generally agreed in placing Thales of Miletus, a cotemporary of Cræsus and Solon. The philosophical principle to which he owes his place in the history of philosophy is, that, “the principle (the primal, original ground) of all things is water; from water every thing arises, and into water every thing returns.” But the mere assumption that water is the original ground of things was no advance beyond his myth-making predecessors and their cosmologies. Aristotle, himself, when speaking of Thales, refers to the old “theologians,”—meaning, doubtless, primarily Homer,—who had ascribed to Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things. Thales, however, merits his place as the beginner of philosophy, because he made the first attempt to establish his physical principle, without resorting to a mythical exposition, and, therefore, introduced into philosophy a scientific

procedure. He was the first who attempted a logical explanation of nature. We cannot now say with certainty upon what grounds his theory was based, though he might have been led to it by perceiving that moisture is essential to the germination and nourishment of things; that warmth is developed from it; and that, generally, it might be the plastic, living, and live-giving principle. From the condensation and expansion of this fundamental matter, he derives, as it seems, the changes of things; though the way in which this is done, he did not accurately determine.

The philosophical significance of Thales does not appear to extend any farther. He was not a speculative philosopher in the modern sense of the word. Philosophical literature was at that time unknown, and he does not seem to have given any of his opinions a written form. On account of his ethico-political wisdom, he is numbered among the so-called "seven wise men," and the anecdotes which the ancients relate of him only testify to his practical understanding. He is said, *e.g.*, to have first calculated an eclipse of the sun, to have superintended the turning of the course of the Halys for Cræsus, etc. When subsequent narrators relate that he had asserted the unity of the world, had conceived the idea of a world-soul, and had taught the immortality of the soul, it is doubtless an unhistorical reference of later ideas to a much less developed standpoint.

2. ANAXIMANDER. — Anaximander of Miletus, sometimes represented by the ancients as a scholar and sometimes as a companion of Thales, but who was certainly a generation younger than the latter, sought to carry out still farther his principles. The original essence which he assumed, and which he is said to have been the first to name principle (*ἀρχή*), he defined as the "unlimited, eternal, and undetermined ground from which every thing proceeds, and into which all things, in order of time, return," as that which embraces all things and rules all things, and which, since it lies at the basis of all determinateness of the finite and the

changeable, is itself infinite and undeterminate. How we are to regard this original essence of Anaximander is a matter of dispute. Evidently it was not one of the four common elements; though we must not, therefore, think it was something incorporeal and immaterial. Anaximander probably conceived it as the original matter before it had separated into determined elements,—as that which was first in the order of time, or what is in our day called the chemical indifference of elementary opposites. In this respect his original essence is indeed “unlimited” and “undetermined,” *i.e.*, has no determination of quality nor limit of quantity; yet it is not, therefore, in any way, a pure dynamical principle, as perhaps the “friendship” and “enmity” of Empedocles might have been, but it is only a more philosophical expression for the same thought, which the old cosmogonies attempted to express in their representation of chaos. Accordingly, Anaximander suffers the original opposition of cold and heat (*i.e.*, the bases of the elements and of life), to be separated from his original essence by virtue of an eternal movement immanent in it,—a clear proof that this essence was only the undeveloped, unanalyzed, potential being of these elemental opposites.

3. ANAXIMENES. — Anaximenes, who is called by some the pupil, and by others the companion of Anaximander, returned very nearly to the view of Thales, in that he conceived the principle of all things to be “the unlimited, all-embracing, ever-moving air,” from which by expansion (fire) and condensation (water, earth, stone), every thing is formed. The perception that air surrounds the whole world, and that breath is the condition of vital action, seems to have led him to this hypothesis.

4. RETROSPECT. — The whole philosophy of the three earliest Ionic philosophers may be reduced to these three points: *viz.*, (1) they sought for the universal essence of concrete being; (2) they found this essence in a material substance or substratum; (3) they gave some intimations respecting the derivation of the fundamental forms of nature from this original matter.

SECTION V.

PYTHAGOREANISM.

1. ITS RELATIVE POSITION. — The development of the Ionic philosophy discloses a tendency to abstract from the immediately given, particular quality of matter. It is this same abstraction carried to a higher step, when we look away from the sensible concretion of matter in general, and no more regard its *qualitative* determinateness as water, air, etc., but direct our attention solely to its *quantitative* determinateness, to its quantitative measure and relations; when attention is directed not merely upon the substance of things, but also upon their *spatial* arrangement and form. But the peculiar nature of quantity is expressed by number, and this is the principle and stand-point of Pythagoreanism.

2. HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL. — The Pythagorean doctrine of number is referred to Pythagoras of Samos, who is said to have flourished between 540 and 500 B.C. He dwelt during the latter part of his life at Crotona, in Magna Grecia, where, in order to effect the political and social regeneration of the lower Italian cities, which were then wasted by the strifes of parties, he founded a society whose members bound themselves to purity and sanctity of life, to the closest friendship for one another, and to coöperation in maintaining the morality, discipline, order, and harmony of the whole community. What is related concerning the life of Pythagoras, his journeys, his political influence in the lower Italian cities, etc., is so thoroughly interwoven with traditions, legends, and palpable fabrications, that we can be certain at no point that we stand upon a historical basis. Not only the old Pythagoreans, who have spoken of him, delighted in the mysterious and esoteric, but even his Neo-Platonic biographers, Porphyry and Jamblichus, have treated his life as a

historico-philosophical romance. We have the same uncertainty in reference to his doctrines, *i.e.*, in reference to his share in the number-theory. Aristotle, *e.g.*, does not ascribe this to Pythagoras himself, but only to the Pythagoreans generally; from which we may suppose that it first received its complete development within the society which he founded. The accounts which are given respecting his school have no certainty till the time of Socrates, a hundred years after Pythagoras. Among the few sources of light which we have upon this subject, are the mention made in Plato's *Phædo* of the Pythagorean Philolaus and his doctrines, and the writings of Archytas, a cotemporary of Plato. We possess in fact the Pythagorean doctrine only in the manner in which it was taken up by Philolaus, Eurytus, and Archytas, since its earlier adherents left nothing in a written form.

3. THE PYTHAGOREAN PRINCIPLE. — The fundamental thought of the Pythagorean philosophy is that of proportion and harmony. This thought is, for it, both the principle of practical life, and the supreme law of the universe. The Pythagorean cosmology regards the universe as a symmetrically ordered whole, uniting harmoniously in itself all the differences and antitheses of being, — a view which is most clearly expressed in the Pythagorean doctrine, that all cosmical bodies or spheres (including the earth) revolve in fixed orbits about a common middle point, a central fire, from which light, warmth, and life stream forth into the whole universe. The more strictly metaphysical confirmation of this idea, that the world is a whole, harmoniously articulated in accordance with fixed forms and proportions, is the Pythagorean doctrine of number. Through number alone, the quantitative relations of things, extension, magnitude, figure (triangular, quadrangular, cubic, etc.), combination, distance, etc., obtain their peculiar character; the forms and proportions of things can all be reduced to number. Therefore, it was concluded, since without form and proportion nothing can exist, number must be the principle of things

themselves, as well as of the order in which they manifest themselves in the world. The accounts of the ancients are not at one as regards the question, whether the Pythagoreans supposed number to be an actual, material, or a purely ideal principle of things, *i.e.*, the archetype in accordance with which every thing is formed and ordered. Even the expressions of Aristotle seem to contradict each other. At one time he speaks of Pythagoreanism in the former, and, at another, in the latter sense. From this circumstance modern scholars have concluded that the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers had several forms of development; that some of the Pythagoreans regarded numbers as the substances and others as the archetypes of things. Aristotle, however, intimates how the two statements may be reconciled with each other. Originally, without doubt, the Pythagoreans regarded number as the material, the inherent essence of things, and therefore Aristotle places them together with the Hylicists (the Ionic natural philosophers), and says of them, that "they held things to be numbers" (*Metaph.* I., 5, 6). But, as even the Hylicists did not identify their matter, *e.g.*, water, immediately with the sensuous thing, but only assumed it to be the fundamental element, the original form of the individual thing, so, on the other side, numbers also might be regarded as similar fundamental types; and therefore Aristotle might say of the Pythagoreans, that "they held numbers to be a more adequate expression of the original form of being than water, air, etc." But, if there still remains a degree of uncertainty in the expressions of Aristotle respecting the sense of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, it can only have its ground in the fact that the Pythagoreans did not make any distinction between an ideal and material principle, but contented themselves with the undeveloped view, that number is the essence of things, — that every thing is number.

4. THE CARRYING OUT OF THIS PRINCIPLE. — From the very nature of the "number-principle," it follows that its complete application to the real world could only lead to a fruitless

and empty symbolism. By separating number into its two species, even and odd, as well as into the antithesis of limited and unlimited, which is inherent in the principle of all number, unity, and applying it in this form to astronomy, music, psychology, ethics, etc., there arose combinations like the following: one, is the point, two, the line, three, the superficies, four, extension in three dimensions, five, the constitution of a body, etc. Still farther, the soul is a musical harmony, as is also virtue, etc. Not only the philosophical, but even the historical interest here ceases, since the ancients themselves—as was unavoidable from the arbitrary nature of such combinations—have given the most contradictory accounts of them, some affirming that the Pythagoreans reduced righteousness to the number three, others, that they reduced it to the number four, others again to five, and still others to nine. Naturally, from such a vague and arbitrary philosophizing, there would early arise, in this, more than in other schools, a great diversity of views, one ascribing one signification to a certain mathematical form, and another another. In this mysticism of numbers, that which alone has truth and value, is the thought, which lies at the ground of it all, that there prevails in the phenomena of nature a rational order, harmony, and conformity to law, and that these laws of nature can be expressed by measure and number. But the Pythagorean school hid this truth under extravagant fancies, as vapid as they are unbridled.

The physics of the Pythagoreans possesses little scientific value, with the exception of their cosmological doctrine respecting the circular motion of the earth and stars. Their ethic is also defective. What we have remaining of it relates more to the Pythagorean life, *i.e.*, to the practice and discipline of their order, than to their philosophy. The whole tendency of Pythagoreanism was, in a practical respect, ascetic, and directed to a strict culture of the character. As showing this, we need only to cite their conception of the body as the prison of a soul which has descended from a

higher world ; their doctrine of the transmigration of souls into the bodies of brutes, from which only a pure and pious life afforded exemption ; their representations of the terrible torments of the lower world ; and their prescript that man should regard himself as the property of God, should obey God in all things, and strive to become like Him, — ideas to which Plato refers (particularly in the *Phædo*), and which he carried to a more complete development.

SECTION VI.

THE ELEATICS.

1. RELATION OF THE ELEATIC PRINCIPLE TO THE PYTHAGOREAN. — While the Pythagoreans had made matter, in so far as it is quantitative, manifold, and divisible, the basis of their philosophizing, and had in this only abstracted from the definite elementary constitution of matter, the Eleatics carried this process of abstraction to its ultimate limit, and made, as the principle of their philosophy, a total abstraction from every finite determinateness, from every change and vicissitude which belongs to concrete being. While the Pythagoreans had held fast to the form of being as it exists in space and time, the Eleatics reject this, and make the negation of all juxtaposition in space and succession in time their fundamental thought. “Only being is, and there is no not-being, nor becoming.” This being is the purely undetermined, changeless ground of all things. It is not being *in* becoming, but it is being as exclusive of all becoming ; in other words, it is pure being which can be apprehended only in thought.

Eleaticism is, therefore, Monism, in so far as it strove to refer the manifoldness of all being to a single ultimate princi-

ple; but on the other hand it becomes Dualism, in so far as it could neither carry out its denial of concrete existence, *i.e.*, the phenomenal world, nor yet derive the latter from its presupposed original ground. The phenomenal world, though it might be explained as only an empty appearance, did yet exist; and, since the sensuous perception of it could not be altogether ignored, there must be allowed it, hypothetically at least, the right of existence. Its origin must be explained, even though with reservations. This contradiction of an unreconciled Dualism between being and existence, is the point where the Eleatic philosophy is at war with itself, — though, in the beginning of the school, with *Xenophanes*, this does not yet appear. The principle itself, with its results, is only fully apparent in the lapse of time. It has three periods of formation which successively appear in three successive generations. The foundation of the Eleatic philosophy belongs to *Xenophanes*; its systematic development to *Parmenides*; its completion, and, in part, its dissolution, to *Zeno* and *Melissus*, — the latter of whom we can pass by.

2. *XENOPHANES*. — The originator of the Eleatic tendency was *Xenophanes*. He was born at Colophon in Asia Minor; emigrated to Elea, a Phocæan colony in Lucania, and was a younger cotemporary of *Pythagoras*. He appears to have first uttered the proposition, “all is one,” without, however, indicating by more exact definitions of this unity, whether it was intellectual or material. Turning his attention, says *Aristotle*, upon the world as a whole, he called the unity which he found there, God. God is the One. The Eleatic “One and All” (ἐν καὶ πᾶν) had, therefore, with *Xenophanes*, a theological and religious character. The idea of the unity of God, and opposition to the anthropomorphism of the popular religion, is his starting-point. He declaimed against the delusion that the gods were born, that they had a human voice or form, and railed at *Homer* and *Hesiod* for attributing to the gods robbery, adultery, and deceit. According to him, the Godhead is all eye, all ear,

all understanding, unmoved, undivided, calmly ruling all things by his thought, like men neither in form nor in understanding. In this way, thinking mainly of removing from the Godhead all finite determinations and predicates, and holding fast to its unity and unchangeableness, he declared this doctrine of its nature to be the highest philosophical principle, without, however, directing this principle polemically against finite being, or carrying it out in its negative application.

3. PARMENIDES. — The proper head of the Eleatic school is Parmenides of Elea, a pupil, or at least an adherent, of Xenophanes. Though we possess but little reliable information respecting the circumstances of his life, yet we have, in inverse proportion, the harmonious voice of all antiquity in an expression of reverence for the Eleatic sage, and of admiration for the depth of his mind, as well as for the earnestness and elevation of his character. The saying — “a life like that of Parmenides,” became afterwards a proverb among the Greeks.

Parmenides, like Xenophanes, embodied his philosophy in an epic poem, of which we have still important fragments. It is divided into two parts. In the first he discusses the conception of being. Rising far above the yet unmediated view of Xenophanes, he attains a conception of pure, simple being, which he posits as absolutely opposed to the manifold and changeable, inasmuch as this latter has no existence, and consequently cannot be thought. From this conception of being he not only excludes all becoming and departing, but also all relation to space and time, all divisibility, diversity, and movement. Being he explains as something which has not become and which does not depart, as complete and of its own kind, as unalterable and without limit, as indivisible and present though not in time, as completely and universally self-identical; and, since all these are only negative, he ascribes to it, also, as a positive determination — thought. “Being and thought” are, therefore, with Parmenides, “one

and the same." This pure thought, directed upon pure being, he declares to be the only true and undeceptive knowledge, in opposition to the deceptive notions which are based upon the manifoldness and mutability of the phenomenal. Nor does he hesitate to assert that to be non-existent and an illusion which mortals regard as truth, viz., becoming and departing, being and not-being, change of place and vicissitude of circumstance. We must, therefore, be careful not to mistake "the One" of Parmenides, for the collective unity of all concrete being.

So much for the first part of Parmenides' poem. After the principle that being alone *is* has been developed according to its negative and positive aspects, the system would seem to be completed. But there follows a second part, which is occupied solely with a hypothetical attempt to explain the phenomenal world, the "non-existent," and give it a physical derivation. Though firmly convinced that according to reason and conception "the One" alone exists, Parmenides was yet unable to avoid recognizing the manifoldness and mutability of the phenomenal. Forced, therefore, by sensuous perception to enter upon a discussion of the phenomenal world, he prefaces this second part of his poem with the remark, that he had now concluded what he had to say respecting the truth, and was thereafter to deal only with the opinion of a mortal. Unfortunately, this second part has been very imperfectly transmitted to us. Enough, however, remains to show, that he explained the phenomena of nature from the mingling of two unchangeable elements, which Aristotle designates as heat and cold, fire and earth. Concerning these two elements, Aristotle remarks still farther that Parmenides associated warmth with being, and the other element with not-being. All things are composed of these two opposites: the more fire, so much the more being, life, consciousness; the more cold and immobility, so much the more lifelessness. The principle of the unity of all being is retained only in the Parmenidean doctrine, that, in man, the

sensitive and rational principles, body and soul, are one and the same.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that between the two parts of the Parmenidean philosophy — between the doctrine of being and the doctrine of appearance — there can exist no inner scientific connection. What Parmenides absolutely denies in the first part, and indeed declares to be unutterable, viz., the non-existent, the many and the changeable, he yet in the second part admits to have an existence at least in the conceptions of men. But it is clear that the non-existent cannot exist even in conception, if it does not exist generally and everywhere, and that the attempt to explain a non-existent of conception is in complete contradiction with his exclusive recognition of being. This contradiction, this unexplained juxtaposition of being and not-being, of the one and the many, *Zeno*, a disciple of Parmenides, sought to remove, by dialectically annihilating sensuous conception, and with it the world of the non-existent, by means of the conception of being.

4. ZENO. — The Eleatic Zeno was born about 500 B.C., and was a disciple of Parmenides. He perfected, dialectically, the doctrine of his master, and carried out to its limit the abstraction of the Eleatic One, in opposition to the manifoldness and determinateness of the finite. He justified the doctrine of a single, simple, and unchangeable being indirectly, by showing up the contradictions in which the ordinary conceptions of the phenomenal world become involved. While Parmenides affirms that there is only the One, Zeno shows polemically that there can be neither (1) multiplicity, nor (2) movement, since these conceptions lead to contradictory results. (1) The *many* is the sum of the units of which it is composed; an actual unit (an absolute simple, which can never involve multiplicity), however, is indivisible; but that which is indivisible has no magnitude (magnitude being the condition of divisibility); therefore the many can have no magnitude and must be infinitely little. If this con-

clusion is rejected (on the ground that what has no magnitude is equal to zero — nothing) the component units of the many must be posited as independent *quanta*. But that alone is an independent *quantum*, which both itself possesses magnitude, and is separated from other *quanta* by something which also possesses magnitude (for otherwise it would coalesce with them). Moreover, these separating magnitudes must, for the same reason, be separated from those which they separate, and so on. Every thing, therefore, is separated from every thing else by infinitely numerous *quanta*; all limited and definite magnitude disappears; infinite magnitude alone is left. Further, if the many exists, it must be limited in number; for there must be in it just as many units as are in it, no more and no less. But the many must be just as truly unlimited in number; for between any two particular *quanta* (units) there must exist a third (the separating *quantum* or unit) and so on. (2) A moving body, in order to traverse a given space, must first pass through one-half of the distance, then through one-half of what is left, and so on; *i.e.*, it must pass through an infinite number of spaces — which is impossible. Therefore there can be no transition from one point in space to another, no movement. In fact, motion cannot even be begun, for every portion (including the first unit) of the space which is to be traversed is separable into an infinite number of parts. Again, *rest* signifies continued existence in one and the same place. Now, if we divide the time occupied by the flight of an arrow into instants (*nows*), during each of these instants the arrow will be in one place only; therefore it is continually at rest [transition from one position to another, in time, is impossible], and its motion must be merely apparent. On account of these arguments, which first pointed out, with at least approximate correctness, the difficulties and antinomies which lie in the thought of the infinite divisibility of matter, space, and time, Aristotle called Zeno the discoverer of dialectic. Zeno also exerted a strong influence upon Plato.

Although the philosophizing of Zeno is the completion of the Eleatic principle, it is at the same time the beginning of its dissolution. Zeno apprehended the opposition of being and existence, of the one and the many, so abstractly, and carried it so far, that with him the inner contradiction of the Eleatic principle comes forth still more boldly than with Parmenides ; for the more logical he is in the denial of the phenomenal world, so much the more striking must be the contradiction, of applying, on the one hand, his whole philosophical activity to the refutation of the sensuous representation, while, on the other, he sets over against it a doctrine which destroys the very possibility of a false representation.

SECTION VII.

HERACLITUS.

1. RELATION OF THE HERACLITIC PRINCIPLE TO THE ELEATIC. — Being and existence, the one and the many, could not be united by the principle of the Eleatics ; the Monism which they had striven for had resulted in an ill-concealed Dualism. Heraclitus reconciled this contradiction by affirming the truth of being and not-being, of the one and the many, to be the coexistence of both, — *becoming*. While the Eleatics could not extricate themselves from the dilemma that the world is either being or not-being, Heraclitus removes the difficulty by answering — it is neither being nor not-being, because it is both.

2. HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL. — Heraclitus, surnamed by later writers the obscure, was born at Ephesus, and flourished about 460 B.C., somewhat later than Xenophanes, and nearly coterminously with Parmenides. He was the profoundest of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. He embodied his

philosophical thoughts in a work "Concerning Nature," of which we possess only small fragments. Its rapid transitions, its expressions concise and full of meaning, the general philosophical originality of Heraclitus, and the antique character of the earliest prose writings, all combine to make this work so hard to understand that its difficulty very early became proverbial. Socrates said concerning it, that "what he understood of it was excellent, and he had no doubt that what he did not understand was equally good; but the book required an expert swimmer." Later writers, particularly the Stoics, have written commentaries upon it.

3. THE PRINCIPLE OF BECOMING.—The ancients unite in ascribing to Heraclitus the principle that the totality of things should be conceived to be in an eternal flow, in an uninterrupted movement and transition, and that all permanence is illusory. "Into the same stream," so runs a saying of Heraclitus, "we descend, and at the same time we do not descend. For into the same stream we cannot possibly descend twice, since it is always scattering and collecting itself again, or rather it at the same time flows to us and from us." Nothing, he said, remains the same; every thing comes and goes, vanishes and reappears under different forms; out of all comes all, from life death, from death life. There is eternally and everywhere only this one process of change, of origination and destruction. There is, therefore, ground for the assertion that Heraclitus had banished all rest and continuance from the totality of things; and it is doubtless in this very respect that he accuses the eye and the ear of deception, because they deceive men with an appearance of permanence where there is in reality only an uninterrupted change.

Heraclitus exhibits more clearly the nature of his principle, becoming, when he intimates that all becoming is to be thought of as the product (synthesis) of conflicting antitheses, as the harmonious union of opposing characteristics. If being did not continually separate itself into opposites which are distinct from one another and mutually antithetical, which

partly repel and destroy, partly attract and supplement one another, every thing would be destroyed, all reality and all life would cease. Hence the two well-known propositions: "strife is the father of things," and, "the one, separating itself from itself, reunites with itself like the harmony of the bow and the lyre," *i.e.*, unity exists in the world only so far as the world-life separates into antitheses in whose reunion and adjustment this very unity consists. Unity pre-supposes duality, harmony discord, attraction repulsion, and only through the latter can the former be realized. "Unite," — so runs another of his sayings, — "whole and part, centripetence and centrifugence, harmony and discord, then will the one become all and the all one."

4. THE PRINCIPLE OF FIRE. — In what relation does the principle of fire, which is also ascribed to Heraclitus, stand to the principle of the becoming? Aristotle says that he adopted fire as the principle of things in the same way that Thales adopted water, and Anaximenes air. But it is clear we must not interpret this to mean that Heraclitus regarded fire as the original material or fundamental element of things, after the manner of the Hylicists. If he ascribed reality only to becoming, it is impossible that he should have added to this becoming an elemental matter as fundamental substance. When, therefore, Heraclitus calls the world an ever-living fire, which in definite stages and degrees extinguishes and again enkindles itself, when he says that every thing can be exchanged for fire, and fire for every thing, just as we barter things for gold and gold for things, he can only mean thereby that fire, that restless, all-consuming, all-transforming, and yet, through heat, all-vivifying element, represents the abiding power of this eternal transformation and transposition, in other words, the conception of life, in the most obvious and effective way. We might call fire, in the Heraclitic sense, the symbol or the manifestation of becoming, if it were not also with him the substratum of movement, *i.e.*, the means of which the power of movement, which is antecedent to all

matter, avails itself in order to bring out the living process of things. In the same way Heraclitus goes on to explain the manifoldness of things, by affirming that they arise from certain hindrances and a partial extinction of this fire, in consequence of which it becomes condensed into material elements, first air, then water, then earth. But on the other hand the fire just as truly obtains the preponderance over these obstructions and enkindles itself anew. These two processes of the extinction and re-ignition of this fire-force, according to Heraclitus, interchange perpetually in an eternal alternation; and from this he concluded that at certain definite periods the world resolves itself into this primal fire, in order therefrom to reconstruct itself anew, and so on. Moreover he asserts fire to be also the principle of movement in individual things, of physical as well as of spiritual vitality. The soul itself is a fiery vapor; its power and perfection depend upon its freedom from all coarser and duller materials. Heraclitus, in his practical philosophy, bids us follow reason instead of the deceitful illusions of sensuous intuition and conception which fetter us to the transitory and perishable; he teaches us to perceive the true, the abiding, in the changeable, and leads us to yield quietly to the necessary order of the universe, and to recognize in that which appears to be evil an element coöperating for the harmony of the whole.

5. TRANSITION TO THE ATOMISTS.—The Eleatic and Heraclitic principles are diametrically opposed to one another. While Heraclitus destroys all abiding being in an absolutely flowing becoming, so, on the other hand, Parmenides destroys all becoming in an absolutely abiding being; and while the former charges the eye and the ear with deception, in that they transform the flowing becoming into a quiescent being, the latter also accuses these same senses of an untrue representation, in that they draw the abiding being into the movement of the becoming. We can therefore say that the being and the becoming are equally valid antitheses, which demand a further synthesis and reconciliation. Heraclitus regarded

the phenomenal world as an existing contradiction, and clung to this contradiction as to an ultimate fact. But the mere assertion that this becoming, which the Eleatics had thought themselves obliged to deny entirely, is the only true principle, was no explanation of it. The question continually returned — why is all being a becoming? Why does the one continually differentiate itself into the many? To give an answer to this question, *i.e.*, to explain becoming from the pre-supposed principle of being, forms the standpoint and problem of the *Empedoclean* and *Atomistic* philosophy.

SECTION VIII.

EMPEDOCLES.

1. GENERAL VIEW.—Empedocles of Agrigentum is extolled by the ancients as a statesman, orator, natural philosopher, physician, and poet, and also as a seer and worker of miracles. He flourished about 440 B.C., and was consequently younger than Parmenides and Heraclitus. He wrote a didactic poem concerning nature, which has been preserved to us in quite extensive fragments. His philosophical system may be characterized in brief, as an attempt to combine the Eleatic being and the Heraclitic becoming. Starting with the Eleatic thought, that neither can any thing which has previously existed become, nor any thing which now is depart, he assumed as unchangeable being, four eternal original materials, which, though divisible, are independent, and undervived from each other. In this we have what in our day are called the four elements. With this Eleatic thought he united also the Heraclitic view of nature, and conceived these four elements to become mingled together, and molded by the operation of two motive forces, — a unifying force, which

he names friendship, and a diremptive force, which he names strife. Originally, these four elements were absolutely alike and immovable, dwelling together in the *sphairos*, that is, in the pure and perfect, spherical divine primordial universe, where friendship united them, until gradually strife pressing from the circumference to the centre of the sphere (*i.e.*, attaining a separating activity), broke this union, whereupon the formation of the world of contrarieties immediately began as the result.

2. THE FOUR ELEMENTS.—With his doctrine of the four elements, Empedocles, on the one side, may be joined to the series of Ionic physicists; but, on the other hand, he is excluded from this by his assumption that the original elements are four in number. He is distinctly said by the ancients to have originated the theory of the four elements. He is more definitely distinguished from the Hylicists, from the fact that he ascribed to his four “root-elements” a changeless being, by virtue of which they neither arise from each other nor are transformed into each other, and are capable of no alteration in themselves, but only of a change in their mutual relations. Every thing which is called arising and departing, every change, rests therefore only upon the commingling and separation of these eternal original elements; the inexhaustible manifoldness of being rests upon the different proportions in which these elements are combined. All becoming is thus conceived to be only change of place. In this we have a *mechanical* in opposition to a *dynamical* explanation of nature.

3. THE TWO POWERS.—Whence now can becoming arise, if in matter itself there is found no principle which can afford an explanation of change? Since Empedocles did not, like the Eleatics, deny that there was change, nor yet, like Heraclitus, introduce it as an indwelling principle in matter, there was no other course left him but to place, by the side of matter, a moving power. The opposition of the one and the many which had been set up by his predecessors, and which demanded an explanation, led him to ascribe to this mov-

ing power two originally diverse directions, one separation, diremption (repulsion), the other attraction. The separation of the one into the many, and the union again of the many into the one, had indicated an opposition of powers which Heraclitus had already recognized. While now Parmenides starting from the one had made love his principle, and Heraclitus starting from the many had made strife his, Empedocles makes the combination of the two the principle of his philosophy. He did not, however, sufficiently define the spheres of action of these two forces in their mutual limitation. Although to friendship belongs peculiarly the attractive, and to strife the repelling function, yet Empedocles, on the other hand, suffers strife to have in the formation of the world a unifying, and friendship a dividing effect. In fact, the complete separation of a dividing and unifying power in the movement of the becoming, is an unmaintainable abstraction.

4. RELATION OF THE EMPEDOCLEAN TO THE ELEATIC AND HERACLITIC PHILOSOPHY.—Empedocles, by placing, as the principle of the becoming, a moving power by the side of matter, makes his philosophy a mediation, or more properly a collocation, of the Eleatic and Heraclitic principles. He has interwoven these two principles in equal proportions in his system. With the Eleatics he denied all arising and departing, *i.e.*, the transition of being into not-being, and of not-being into being; and with Heraclitus he endeavored to find an explanation for change. From the former he derived the abiding, unchangeable being of his fundamental matter, and from the latter the principle of the moving power. With the Eleatics, in fine, he conceived true being in an original and undistinguishable unity as a sphere, and with Heraclitus, he regarded the present world as a continuous product of contending forces and antitheses. He has, therefore, been properly called an Eclectic, who united the fundamental thoughts of his two predecessors, though not always in a logical way.

SECTION IX.

THE ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

1. ITS PROPOUNDERS.—Empedocles had sought to effect a combination of the Eleatic and Heraclitic principles,—the same was attempted, though in a different way, by the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus. Democritus, the younger and better known of the two, was the son of rich parents, and was born about 460 B.C. in Abdera, an Ionian colony. He travelled extensively, and no Greek before the time of Aristotle possessed such varied attainments. He embodied the wealth of his collected knowledge in a series of writings, of which, however, only a few fragments have come down to us. For rhythm and elegance of language, Cicero compared him with Plato. He died in a good old age.

2. THE ATOMS.—The Atomists did not, like Empedocles, derive all specific phenomenal quality from a certain number of qualitatively determined and distinguishable original materials, but they derived it from an originally unlimited number of constituent elements, or atoms, which were homogeneous in quality, but diverse in quantity. These atoms are unchangeable material particles, possessing indeed extension, but yet indivisible, and differing from one another only in size, form, and weight. As being, and without quality, they are entirely incapable of any transformation or qualitative change; and, therefore, all becoming is, as with Empedocles, only a change of place. The manifoldness of the phenomenal world is only to be explained from the different form, disposition, and arrangement of the atoms as they become, in various ways, united.

3. THE FULNESS AND THE VOID.—The atoms, in order to be atoms,—*i.e.*, undivided and impenetrable unities,—must be mutually limited and separated. There must be some-

thing set over against them which preserves them as atoms, and which is the original cause of their separateness and mutual independence. This is the void space, or more strictly the intervals which are found between the atoms, and which prevent their mutual contact. The atoms, as being and absolute fulness, and the interval between them, as the void and not-being, are two determinations which only represent in a real and objective way, what are in thought, as logical conceptions, the two elements in the Heraclitic becoming, viz., being and not-being. But since the void space is one determination of being, it must possess objective reality no less than the atoms; and Democritus even went so far as to expressly affirm, in opposition to the Eleatics, that "being is no more real than nothing."

4. THE ATOMISTIC NECESSITY.—Democritus, like Empedocles, though far more extensively than he, attempted to answer the question—Whence arise change and movement? Why do the atoms enter into these manifold combinations, and bring forth such a wealth of inorganic and organic forms? Democritus attempted to solve this problem by affirming that the ground of movement lies in the nature of the atoms themselves, which the void space permits alternately to unite and separate. Atoms of different weight, floating about in the void, impinge on one another. In this way there arises an ever-widening movement throughout the entire mass, by virtue of which, since atoms of similar form tend to group themselves together, different combinations of the atoms come into existence. These combinations again, by their very nature, tend to dissolution; hence the transitoriness of individual things. But this explanation of the formation of the world really explains nothing. It is merely a very abstract conception of an infinite causal series, but not a final ground of all the manifestations of becoming and of change. Such a final ground was still to be sought, and as Democritus expressly declared that it could not lie in reason (*voûs*), where Anaxagoras placed it, he could only find it in an absolute

necessity, or a necessary pre-determinateness (*ἀνάγκη*). This he adopted as his “final ground,” and is said to have named it chance (*τύχη*), in opposition to the inquiry after final causes, or the Anaxagorean teleology. Polemical attacks upon the popular deities,—the common belief in whose existence Democritus explained to be the result of fear occasioned by atmospheric and celestial phenomena,—and a more and more openly declared atheism and naturalism were the prominent characteristics of the later Atomistic school, which, with Diagoras of Melos, the so-called atheist, culminated in a complete sophistic.

5. RELATIVE POSITION OF THE ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY.—Hegel characterizes the relative position of the Atomistic Philosophy as follows: “In the Eleatic Philosophy being and not-being stand as antitheses, — being alone is, and not-being is not; in the Heraclitic idea, being and not-being are the same, and the unity of the two, *i.e.* the becoming, is the predicate of concrete being; but being and not-being, as objectively determined, or in other words, as appearing to the sensuous intuition, constitute the antithesis of the fulness and the void. Parmenides, Heraclitus, and the Atomists all sought for the abstract universal; Parmenides found it in *being*, Heraclitus in *process*, and the Atomists in being *per se*.” So much of this as ascribes to the Atomists the characteristic predicate of being *per se* is doubtless correct, — but the real thought of the Atomistic system is rather analogous with the Empedoclean, namely, to explain by the pre-supposition of these independent unqualified substances (atoms) the possibility of the becoming. To this end the not-being or the void, *i.e.*, the side which is opposed to the Eleatic principle, is elaborated with no less care than the side which harmonizes with it, *i.e.*, the view that the atoms are without quality and unchangeable. The Atomistic Philosophy is, therefore, a mediation between the Eleatic and the Heraclitic principles. It is Eleatic in affirming the indestructible individuality of the atoms; Heraclitic, in declaring their multitude and manifoldness. It is

Eleatic in its assumption of an absolute fulness in the atoms, and Heraclitic in maintaining the reality of not-being, *i.e.*, the void space. It is Eleatic in its denial of becoming, *i.e.*, of arising and departing, — and Heraclitic in its affirmation that to the atoms belong movement and a capacity for unlimited combinations. Democritus carried out his leading thought more logically than Empedocles, and we might even say that his system is the perfection of a purely mechanical explanation of nature, since all subsequent Atomists, even to our own day, have only repeated his fundamental conceptions. But the great defect which cleaves to every Atomistic system Aristotle has justly recognized, when he shows that it is a contradiction to set up that which is corporeal or space-filling as indivisible, and thus to derive the extended from that which has no extension; and that, finally, the unconscious and unintelligible necessity of Democritus is especially defective, in that it totally banishes from nature all conception of design. It is this latter fault, common to all previous systems, which Anaxagoras attempted to remove by his doctrine of an intelligence acting in accordance with design.

SECTION X.

ANAXAGORAS.

1. HIS PERSONAL HISTORY. — Anaxagoras was born at Clazomenæ, about 500 B.C., of a rich and influential family. Soon after the Persian war he removed to Athens and lived there until, having been accused of impiety, he fled to Lampascus, where he died at the age of seventy-two. He was another of those thinkers who recognized in the investigation of nature and its laws their life-problem. He it was who first planted philosophy at Athens, which from that time on

became the centre of intellectual life in Greece. Through his personal relations to Pericles, Euripides, and other important men, he exerted a marked influence upon the culture of the age. It was on account of this that the charge of defaming the gods was brought against him, doubtless by the political opponents of Pericles. Anaxagoras wrote a work "*Concerning Nature*," which in the time of Socrates was widely circulated.

2. HIS RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS.—The system of Anaxagoras rests wholly upon the presuppositions of his predecessors, and is simply another attempt at the solution of the same problem. Like Empedocles and the Atomists, Anaxagoras denied becoming, in the stricter sense. "The Greeks"—so runs one of his sayings—"maintain the reality of becoming and departing erroneously; for nothing can ever be said to become or depart, but each thing arises through the combination and perishes through the disintegration of pre-existent things; hence it is more correct to call becoming combination, and departing separation." From this view, that every thing arises through the mingling of different elements, and perishes through the separation of these elements, Anaxagoras, like his predecessors, was obliged to separate matter from the moving power. But it is just here that Anaxagoras adopts that line of thought which is peculiar to himself. It was evident that hitherto the moving power had been unsatisfactorily defined. The mythical powers love and hate, and the unconscious necessity of the purely mechanical comprehension of nature explained nothing, least of all the existence of design in the movements of nature. The conception of an activity which could thus work designedly, must, therefore, be brought into the conception of the moving power, and this Anaxagoras accomplished by setting up the idea of a world-forming intelligence (*νοῦς*), absolutely separated from all matter and working with design.

3. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE *νοῦς*.—Anaxagoras described this intelligence as spontaneously active, unmingled with any

thing, the ground of movement, but itself unmoved, every where active, and the most refined and pure of all things. Although these predicates rest partly upon a physical analogy, and do not exhibit purely the conception of immateriality, yet on the other hand the attributes of thought and of conscious action from design, which he ascribes to the *νοῦς*, admit no doubt to remain of the decided idealistic character of the Anaxagorean principle. Nevertheless, Anaxagoras went no farther than to enunciate his fundamental thought without attempting its complete application. The explanation of this is obvious from the reasons which first led him to adopt his principle. It was only the need of an original cause of motion, to which also might be attributed the capacity to work designedly, which had led him to the idea of an immaterial principle. His *νοῦς*, therefore, is primarily nothing but a mover of matter, and in this function nearly all its activity is expended. Hence the universal complaint of the ancients, especially of Plato and Aristotle, respecting the mechanical character of his doctrine. In Plato's *Phædo* Socrates relates that, in the hope of being directed beyond a simple occasioning, or mediate cause to a final cause, he had turned to the book of Anaxagoras, but had found there only a mechanical instead of a truly teleological explanation of being. Aristotle also finds fault with Anaxagoras for admitting mind to be the ultimate ground of things, and yet resorting to it for the explanation of phenomena only as to a *Deus ex machina*, i.e., only when he cannot show that they are the necessary results of natural causes. Anaxagoras, therefore, rather postulated than proved mind to be an energy above nature, and the truth and actuality of material being.

By the side of the *νοῦς*, according to Anaxagoras, and equally original with it, stands the mass of the primitive constituents of things. "All things were together, infinite in number and infinitesimal in size; then came the *νοῦς* and set them in order." These primitive constituents are not general elements, like those of Empedocles, fire, air, water, earth

(which, according to Anaxagoras, are composite and not simple materials); but they are the similar and infinitely numerous materials of which individual things are composed (stone, gold, bone, etc., and hence by later writers called *ὁμοιομέρεια*, *i.e.*, parts which are similar to the wholes which they compose); they are the infinitely minute and simple “germs of all things,” which exist prior to things themselves, though in a thoroughly chaotic intermixture. The *νοῦς* sets this in itself inert mass in a vortical, eternally perduring movement. Through this movement the homogeneous particles are differentiated from the general mass and aggregated together, not, however, to the exclusion of *all* dissimilar elements. “In every thing there is something of all;” each thing consists primarily of the homogeneous, but it contains also together with these something of all the remaining primitive elements of the universe. The matter-moving *νοῦς* is especially conspicuous in organization; it is immanent in all living beings (plants, animals, men), in different degrees of quantity and power, as their vital principle or soul. The *νοῦς*, therefore, arranges all things,—each in accordance with its peculiar nature,—into a universe which comprehends within itself the most diverse forms of existence, and also manifests itself in this universe as the vitality of individual organisms.

4. ANAXAGORAS AS THE CLOSE OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC REALISM.—With the Anaxagorean principle of the *νοῦς*, *i.e.*, with the acquisition of an immaterial principle, closes the realistic period of the old Grecian Philosophy. Anaxagoras combined together the principles of all his predecessors. The infinite matter of the Hylicists is represented in his chaotic original mingling of things; the Eleatic pure being appears in the idea of the *νοῦς*; the Heraclitic power of becoming and the Empedoclean moving energies are both seen in the creating and arranging power of the eternal mind, while the Democritic atoms come to view in the *homoiomeria*. Anaxagoras is the conclusion of the old and the beginning of a new course of

development,—the latter through the enunciation of his ideal principle, and the former through the defective and completely physical manner in which this principle was yet again applied.

SECTION XI.

THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

1. RELATION OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY TO THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHIES.—The preceding philosophers had tacitly assumed that subjective consciousness is dependent upon objective reality, that the objective world is the source of all our knowledge. But with the Sophists a new principle appeared, that, namely, of subjectivity,—the thought that things *are* only as they *appear* to the individual Ego, and that therefore universally valid truth has no existence. This standpoint was, however, the direct result of the preceding philosophy. The Heraclitic doctrine of the flux of all things, and Zeno's dialectic against the phenomenal world furnished weapons enough for a sceptical attack upon all fixed and objective truth; and even in the Anaxagorean doctrine of the *voûs*, thought was virtually declared to be a higher principle than objectivity. On this newly opened field the Sophists now hustled about, enjoying with childish delight the exercise of this new power of subjectivity, and destroying by means of a subjective dialectic all that had previously been objectively established. The subject recognized himself as superior to the objective world,—especially as higher than the laws of the state, customs, religious traditions, and popular creeds. He sought to apply his own laws to the objective world; and instead of seeing in the given objectivity the historical realization of reason, he recognized in it only a dead, unspiritual matter upon which his arbitrary will might be exercised.

The Sophistic philosophy should be characterized as the clearing up reflection. It is, therefore, no philosophical system, for its doctrines and affirmations exhibit often so popular and even trivial a character that for their own sake they would merit no place at all in the history of philosophy. It is also no philosophical school in the ordinary sense of the term,—for Plato cites a vast number of persons under the common name of “Sophists,”—but it is a widely spread intellectual movement of the age, which had struck its roots into the whole moral, political, and religious character of the Hellenic life of that time, and which may be called the Greek clearing-up period.

2. RELATION OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY TO THE GENERAL LIFE OF THAT AGE.—The Sophistic philosophy is theoretically, what the whole political life of Greece during the Peloponnesian war was practically. Plato justly remarks in his *Republic* that the doctrines of the Sophists only gave formal expression to the principles which guided the course of the great mass of men of that time in their civil and social relations, and the hatred with which they were pursued by the practical statesmen, clearly indicates the jealousy with which the latter saw in them their rivals and the destroyers of their policy. If the absoluteness of the empirical subject—*i.e.*, the theory that the individual Ego can arbitrarily determine what is true, right, and good—is in fact the theoretical principle of the Sophistic philosophy, the unlimited egoism which meets us everywhere in the public and private life of that age is merely its practical application. \ Public life had become an arena of passion and selfishness; those party struggles which racked Athens during the Peloponnesian war had blunted and stifled the moral feeling; every individual accustomed himself to set his own private interest above that of the state and the common weal, and to seek in his own arbitrary desires and advantage the standard for all his actions and the guide of his practical conduct. | The Protagorean *dictum*, “man is the measure of all things,” was only too

faithfully acted upon, and the influence of the orator in the assemblies of the people and the courts, the corruptibility of the great masses and their leaders, and the weak points which showed to the adroit student of human nature the covetousness, vanity, and factiousness of others around him, offered only too many opportunities for the practical application of this rule. Custom had lost its weight; civil ordinances were regarded as arbitrary restrictions, the moral feeling as the effect of shrewd political training, the faith in the gods as a human invention to intimidate free action, while piety was looked upon as a statute of human origin which every one is justified in using all his eloquence to change. This degradation of a necessity, which is conformable to nature and reason and of universal validity, to an accidental human ordinance, is the main point in which the Sophistic philosophy allied itself with the general consciousness of the more educated classes; and we cannot with certainty determine what share science and what share practical life may have had in producing this connection, — whether the Sophistic philosophy found only the theoretical formula for the practical life and tendencies of the age, or whether the moral corruption was rather a consequence of that destructive influence which the principles of the Sophists exerted upon the whole course of cotemporary thought.

It would be, however, to mistake the spirit of history to condemn the epoch of the Sophists without admitting for it a relative justification. These phenomena were in part the necessary product of the general historical development of the age. Faith in the popular religion was quickly destroyed simply because it possessed in itself no inner, moral support. The grossest vices and acts of baseness could all be justified and excused from the examples of mythology. Even Plato himself, though otherwise an advocate of a devout faith in the traditional religion, accuses the poets of his nation with leading the moral feeling itself astray, through the unworthy representations which they had given of the gods and the

hero world. It was moreover unavoidable that advancing science should clash with tradition. The physical philosophers had already long lived in open hostility to the popular religion, and the more convincingly they demonstrated by analogies and laws that many things which had hitherto been regarded as the immediate effect of Divine omnipotence were only the results of natural causes, so much the more easily would it happen that the educated classes would become perplexed in reference to all their previous convictions. It was no wonder then that the transformed consciousness of the time permeated all the provinces of art and poesy; that in sculpture, in close analogy to the rhetorical arts of the Sophists, the emotive should supplant the elevated style; that Euripides, the sophist among tragedians, should bring the whole philosophy of the time and its manner of moral reflection upon the stage; and that, instead of, like the earlier poets, bringing forward his actors to represent an idea, he should use them only as means of exciting a momentary emotion or some other stage effect.

3. TENDENCIES OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY.—To give a definite classification of the Sophistic philosophy, which should be derived from the conception of the general phenomena of the age, is exceedingly difficult, since, like the French “clearing up” of the last century, it entered into every department of knowledge. The Sophists rendered general culture universal. Protagoras was known as a teacher of virtue, Gorgias as a rhetorician and politician, Prodicus as a grammarian and teacher of synonyms, Hippias as a man of various attainments, who besides astronomical and mathematical studies busied himself with a theory of mnemonics; others took for their problem the art of education, and others still the explanation of the old poets; the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus gave instruction in the bearing of arms and military tactics; many among them, as Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias, were intrusted with embassies: in short, the Sophists, each one according to his

individual tendency, took upon themselves every variety of calling and entered into every sphere of science ; their method is the only thing common to all. Moreover, the relation of the Sophists to the educated public, their striving after popularity, fame, and money, disclose the fact that their studies and occupations were for the most part controlled, not by an objective scientific interest, but by some external motive. With that roving spirit which was an essential peculiarity of the later and more characteristic Sophists, travelling from city to city, and announcing themselves as thinkers by profession, and giving their instructions with prominent reference to a good recompense and the favor of the rich private classes, it was very natural that they should discourse upon the prominent questions of universal interest and of public culture, with occasional reference also to the favorite occupation of this or that rich man with whom they might be brought in contact. Hence their peculiar strength lay far more in a formal dexterity, in an acuteness of thought and a capacity of bringing it readily into exercise, in the art of discourse than in any positive knowledge ; their instruction in virtue was either disputatious quibbling or empty bombast, and even where the Sophistic philosophy became really poly-mathic, the art of speech still remained as the great thing. So we find in Xenophon, Hippias boasting that he can speak repeatedly upon every subject and say something new each time, while we hear it expressly affirmed of others, that they did not consider it necessary to have positive knowledge in order to discourse satisfactorily upon every thing, and to answer every question extemporaneously ; and when many Sophists made it a great point to hold a well-arranged discourse about something of the least possible significance (*e.g.*, salt), we see that with them the thing was only a means while the word was the end, and we ought not to be surprised that in this respect the Sophistic philosophy sunk to that empty technicality which Plato, in his *Phædrus*, on account of its want of character, subjects to so rigid a criticism.

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN ITS RELATION TO THE CULTURE OF THE AGE. — The scientific and moral defect of the Sophistic philosophy is self-evident ; and, since certain modern writers of history with over-officious zeal have painted its dark side in black, and complained loudly of its frivolity, immorality, and greediness for pleasure, its conceitedness and selfishness, its false show of wisdom and disputatiousness, — it needs here no farther elucidation. But the point most apt to be overlooked is the merit of the Sophists as regards their effect upon the culture of the age. To say, as is done, that they had only the negative merit of calling out the opposition of Socrates and Plato, is to leave the immense influence and the high fame of so many among them, as well as the revolution which they effected in the thought of a whole nation, an inexplicable phenomenon. It were inexplicable that, *e.g.*, Socrates should attend the lectures of Prodicus, and direct to him other students, if he did not acknowledge the value of his grammatical acquirements, or recognize his services in the promotion of a sound logic. Moreover, it cannot be denied that Protagoras also hit upon many correct principles of rhetoric, and satisfactorily established certain grammatical categories. It may in general be said of the Sophists that they gave the people a great profusion of general knowledge ; that they strewed about them a vast number of fruitful germs of development ; that they called out investigations in the theory of knowledge, in logic and in language ; that they laid the basis for the methodical treatment of many branches of human knowledge, and that they partly originated and partly assisted the wonderful intellectual activity which characterized Athens at that time. Their greatest merit is their service in the department of language. They may even be said to have created and formed Attic prose. They are the first who made style as such a separate object of attention and study, and who instituted rigid investigations respecting rhythm and the art of rhetorical expression. With them Athenian eloquence, which they first

incited, begins. Antiphon as well as Isocrates—the latter the founder of the most flourishing school of Greek rhetoric—are offshoots of the Sophistic philosophy. In all this there is ground enough for regarding this whole phenomenon as something more than a symptom of decay.

5. INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS.—The first, who is said to have been called, in the received sense, Sophist, is *Protagoras* of Abdera, who flourished about 440 B.C. He taught—and was the first who demanded payment for his services—in Sicily and in Athens, but was driven out of the latter place as a reviler of the gods, and his book concerning the gods was burnt by the herald in the public market-place. It began with these words: “I can know nothing concerning the gods, whether they exist or not; for we are prevented from gaining such knowledge not only by the obscurity of the thing itself, but by the brevity of human life.” In another writing he develops his doctrine of knowledge or nescience. Starting from the Heraclitic position that every thing is in a constant flow, and applying this preëminently to the thinking subject, he taught that man is the measure of all things, of being that it may be, and of not-being that it may not be, *i.e.*, that is true for the perceiving subject which he, in the constant movement of things and of himself, at each moment perceives and is sensible of—and that hence he has theoretically no other relation to the external world than sensuous intuition, and practically no other than sensuous desire. But, since perceptions and sensations are as diverse as the subjects themselves which experience them, and are in the highest degree variable at different times in the very same subject, there follows the farther result that nothing has objective validity and determination, that contradictory affirmations in reference to the same object must be received as alike true, and that error and contradiction cannot exist. This principle, that nothing exists *per se*, but that every thing is mere subjective conception, opinion, and arbitrariness, was applied, by the Sophists, especially to law and ethics. Nothing, they said, is by

nature (*φύσει*) good or bad, but merely through positive statute and agreement (*νόμῳ*). Hence we can decree to be law, and recognize as law whatever we please — whatever the interest of the moment induces, and we have the skill and power to maintain. Protagoras does not seem to have made any efforts to give these propositions a practical and logical application, since, according to the testimony of the ancients, a personal character worthy of esteem cannot be denied him; and even Plato, in the dialogue which bears his name, goes no farther than to object to his complete obscurity respecting the nature of morality, while, in his *Gorgias* and *Philebus*, he charges the later Sophists with affirming the principles of immorality and moral baseness.

Next to Protagoras, the most famous Sophist was *Gorgias*. During the Peloponnesian war (427 B.C.), he came from Leontini to Athens in order to gain assistance for his native city against the encroachments of Syracuse. After the successful accomplishment of his errand he still abode for some time in Athens, but resided the latter part of his life in Thesaly, where he died about the same time with Socrates. The pompous ostentation of his external appearance is often ridiculed by Plato, and his discourses display the same character, attempting, through poetical ornament, and florid metaphors, and uncommon forms of expression, and a mass of hitherto unheard-of figures of speech, to dazzle and delude the mind. As a philosopher he adhered to the Eleatics, especially to Zeno, and attempted to prove, upon the basis of their dialectic schematism, that, in general, nothing exists, or if something does exist, it is incognizable, or if cognizable, it is not communicable. Hence his writing bore characteristically enough the title, "*Concerning the Non-Existent or Nature.*" The proof of the first proposition — namely, that nothing exists, because that which is supposed to exist can, in reality, be neither an existent nor a non-existent, since existence presupposes one of two equally unthinkable alternatives, origination and non-origination — rests primarily upon the as-

sumption that all existence is spatial (local and corporeal), and is therefore the ultimate self-contradictory result, the self-destruction of the preceding physical philosophy.

The later Sophists with reckless daring carried their conclusions far beyond Gorgias and Protagoras. They were for the most part free thinkers, who pulled to the ground the national religion, laws, and customs. Among these should be named, prominently, the tyrant Critias, Polas, and Thrasy-machus. The two latter openly taught the right of the stronger as the law of nature, the unbridled satisfaction of desire as the natural right of the stronger, and the institution of restraining laws as a crafty invention of the weaker; and Critias, the most talented but the most abandoned of the thirty tyrants, wrote a poem, in which he represented the faith in the gods as an invention of crafty statesmen. Hippias of Elis, a man of great knowledge, bore an honorable character, although he did not fall behind the rest in bombast and boasting; but before all was Prodicus, in reference to whom it became a proverb to say, "wiser than Prodicus," and of whom Plato himself and even Aristophanes never spoke without veneration. Especially famous among the ancients were his parenetical (hortatory) lectures concerning the choice of a mode of life (Hercules at the parting of the ways, adopted by Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, II. 1), concerning external good and its use, concerning life and death, etc., discourses in which he manifests a refined moral feeling, and acute observation of life, although through the want of a higher ethical and scientific principle, he must be placed below Socrates, whose forerunner he has been called. The later generations of Sophists, as they are shown in the *Euthydemus* of Plato, sink to a common level of buffoonery and disgraceful strife for gain, and comprise their whole dialectic art in certain formulæ for constructing sophistical arguments.

6. TRANSITION TO SOCRATES AND CHARACTER OF THE FOLLOWING PERIOD.—That which is true in the Sophistic philosophy is the truth of subjectivity, of self-consciousness, *i.e.*,

the demand that every thing which I am to admit must be shown as rational before my own consciousness ; that which is false in it is its apprehension of this subjectivity as mere finite, empirical, egoistic subjectivity, *i.e.*, the demand that my accidental will and opinion should determine what is rational ; its truth is that it established the principle of freedom, of subjective conviction ; its untruth is that it made the accidental will and opinion of the individual supreme. To carry out now the principle of freedom and self-consciousness to its truth, to gain a true world of objective thought with a real and distinct content, by the same means of reflection which the Sophists had only used to destroy it, to establish objective will, rational thought, the absolute or ideal in the place of empirical subjectivity, was the problem which Socrates took up and solved. To substitute for empirical subjectivity absolute or ideal subjectivity as the first principle, is to affirm that the true measure of all things is not *my* (*i.e.*, the individual person's) opinion, fancy, and will ; that what is true, right, and good, does not depend upon my caprice and arbitrary determination, or upon that of any other empirical subject ; but that although it is *my* thinking, it is yet my *thinking*, the rational within me, which has to decide upon all these points. But my thought, my reason, is not something specially belonging to me, but something common to every rational being, something universal, and in so far as I am a rational and thinking being, is my subjectivity a universal one. But every thinking individual has the consciousness that what he holds as right, as duty, as good or evil, does not appear as such to him alone but to every rational being, and that consequently his thought has the character of universality, of universal validity, in a word — of objectivity. This then in opposition to the Sophistic philosophy is the standpoint of Socrates, and therefore with him the *philosophy of objective thought* begins. What Socrates could do in opposition to the Sophists was to attain by reflection the very same results which had previously rested upon mere unreflecting

faith or obedience, and to show that the philosopher guided by his free consciousness and his own convictions, would learn to form the same judgments and take the same course as that to which life and custom had already and unconsciously induced the ordinary man. The position, that while the individual is the measure of all things, he is so only by virtue of his universality, his capacity for thought, his reason, is the fundamental thought of the Socratic philosophy, which is, by virtue of this thought, the positive complement of the Sophistic principle.

With Socrates begins the second period of Greek philosophy. This period contains three philosophical systems, whose authors, standing to each other in the personal relation of teacher and pupil, represent three successive generations, — SOCRATES, PLATO, ARISTOTLE.

SECTION XII.

SOCRATES.

1. HIS PERSONAL CHARACTER. — The new philosophical principle which Socrates introduced is to be found in his personal character. His philosophy is his mode of action as an individual; his life and doctrine cannot be separated. His biography, therefore, forms the only complete representation of his philosophy; and what the narrative of Xenophon presents us as the definite doctrine of Socrates, is consequently nothing but an abstract of his inward character, as it found expression from time to time in his conversation. Plato yet more regarded his master as such an archetypal personality, and a luminous exhibition of the historical Socrates is the special object of his later and maturer dialogues, and of these again, the *Symposium* is a most brilliant apotheosis of the

Eros incarnated in the person of Socrates, of the philosophical impulse transformed into character.

Socrates was born in the year 469 B.C., the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phænarete, a midwife. In his youth he was trained by his father to follow his own profession, and in this he is said not to have been without skill. Three draped figures of the Graces, called the work of Socrates, were seen by Pausanias, upon the Akropolis. Little farther is known of his education. He may have profited by the instruction of Prodicus and the musician, Damon, but he stood in no personal connection with the philosophers proper, who flourished before, or coterminously with him. He became what he was by himself alone, and just for this reason does he form an era in ancient philosophy. Though the ancients call him a scholar of Anaxagoras, or of the natural philosopher, Archelaus, the first is demonstrably false, and the second, to say the least, is altogether improbable. He never sought other means of culture than those afforded by his native city. With the exception of one journey to a public festival, and the military campaigns which led him as far as Potidæa, Delion, and Amphipolis, he never left Athens.

The period when Socrates first began to devote himself to the education of youth, can be determined only approximately from the time of the first representation of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, which was in the year 423. The date of the Delphic oracle, which pronounced him the wisest of men, is not known. But in the traditions of his followers, he is almost uniformly represented as an old, or as a gray-headed man. His mode of instruction, wholly different from the pedantry and boastful ostentation of the Sophists, was altogether unconstrained, conversational, popular, starting from objects lying nearest at hand and most insignificant, and deriving the necessary illustrations and proofs from the most common matters of every-day life; in fact, he was reproached by his contemporaries for speaking ever only of drudges, smiths, cobblers, and tanners. So we find him at the market,

in the gymnasia, in the workshops, busy early and late, talking with youth, with young men, and with old men, on the proper aim and business of life, convincing them of their ignorance, and awakening in them the slumbering desires after knowledge. In every human effort, whether directed to the interests of the commonwealth, or to the private individual and the gains of trade, to science or to art, this master of helps to spiritual births could find fit points of contact for the awakening of a true self-knowledge, and a moral and religious consciousness. However often his attempts failed, or were rejected with bitter scorn, or requited with hatred and unthankfulness, yet, led on by the clear conviction that a real improvement in the condition of the state could come only from a proper education of its youth, he remained to the last true to his chosen vocation. Purely Greek in these relations to the rising generation, he designated himself, by preference, as the most ardent lover; Greek too in this, that with him, in comparison with these free relations of friendship, his own domestic life fell quite into the background. He nowhere shows much regard for his wife and children; the notorious, though altogether too much exaggerated ill-nature of Xantippe, leads us to suspect, however, that his domestic relations were not the most happy.

As a man, as a practical sage, Socrates is pictured in the brightest colors by all narrators. "He was," says Xenophon, "so pious, that he did nothing without the advice of the gods; so just, that he never injured any one even in the least; so completely master of himself, that he never chose the agreeable instead of the good; so discerning, that he never failed in distinguishing the better from the worse;" in short, he was "just the best and happiest man possible." (*Xen. Mem.* I. 1, 11; IV. 8, 11.) Still that which lends to his person such a peculiar charm, is the happy blending and harmonious connection of all its characteristic traits, the perfection of a universal and thoroughly original nature. In all this universality of his genius, in this force of character,

by which he combined the most contradictory and incongruous elements into a harmonious whole, in this lofty elevation above every human weakness, — in a word, as a perfect model, he is most strikingly depicted in the brilliant eulogy of Alcibiades, in the *Symposium* of Plato. In the scantier representation of Xenophon, also, we find everywhere a classic form, a man possessed of the finest social culture, full of Athenian politeness, infinitely removed from every thing like gloomy asceticism, a man as valiant upon the field of battle as in the festive hall, conducting himself with the most unconstrained freedom, and yet with entire sobriety and self-control, a perfect picture of the happiest Athenian time, without the acerbity, the one-sidedness, and contracted reserve of the later moralists, an ideal representation of the genuinely human virtues. A very characteristic peculiarity is the “demonism” which he professed. He believed that an inner divine voice was constantly forewarning him of the fortunes and results of human actions, and guiding and directing his practical conduct. It was the fine, profound, presaging tact and instinct of a pure soul, which looked clearly into life and perceived involuntarily what was right and judicious even in the most peculiar emergencies, which expressed itself in these admonitions; and nothing could be more perverse than the attempts of his accusers to construe this “demonism” as a denial of the popular gods, and an attempt to introduce new deities. It was indeed true that with Socrates this oracle of inward foreboding supplanted the traditional methods of divination and augury; it was an advance toward an inward self-direction which was altogether foreign to the older Greek civilization. This advance was, however, involuntary. Socrates himself retained the ancient form of belief in a transcendent revelation; he never opposed the prevalent popular conceptions, but was for the most part in complete accord with the popular religion, although, indeed, this latter assumed with him the philosophical form of a faith in the existence, in the universe, of a supreme, all-directing intelligence.

2. SOCRATES AND ARISTOPHANES.—Socrates seems early to have attained universal celebrity through the peculiarities attaching to his person and character. Nature had furnished him with a remarkable exterior. His crooked, turned-up nose, his projecting eye, his bald pate, his corpulent body, gave his form a striking similarity to the Silenic, a comparison which is carried out in Xenophon's *Feast*, in sprightly jest, and in Plato's *Symposium*, with as much ingenuity as profoundness. To this was added his miserable dress, his going barefoot, his posture, his habit of standing still and rolling his eyes. After all this, one will hardly be surprised that the Athenian comedy took advantage of such a remarkable character. But there was another and peculiar motive which influenced Aristophanes. He was a most ardent admirer of the good old times, an enthusiastic eulogist of the manners and the constitution, under which the fathers had been reared. As it was his great object to awaken anew in his people and to stimulate a longing after those good old times, his passionate hatred broke out against all modern efforts in politics, art, and philosophy, of that increasing sham-wisdom, which went hand in hand with a degenerating democracy. Hence comes his bitter railing at Cleon, the Demagogue (in the *Knights*), at Euripides, the sentimental play-writer (in the *Frogs*) and at Socrates, the Sophist (in the *Clouds*). The latter, as the representative of a subtle, destructive philosophy, must have appeared to him just as corrupt and pernicious, as the party of progress in politics, who trampled without conscience upon every thing which had come down from the past. It is, therefore, the main object of the *Clouds* to expose Socrates to public contempt, as the representative of the Sophistic philosophy, a mere semblance of wisdom, at once vain, profitless, corrupting in its influence upon the youth, and undermining all true discipline and morality. Seen in this light, and from a moral standpoint, the motives of Aristophanes may find some excuse, but they cannot be justified; and his representation of Socrates, into

whose character all the characteristic features of the Sophistic philosophy are interwoven, even the most contemptible and hateful, yet so that the most unmistakable likeness is still apparent, cannot be admitted on the ground that Socrates did really have the greatest formal resemblance to the Sophists. The *Clouds* can only be designated as a culpable misunderstanding, and as an act of gross injustice brought about by blinded passion; and Hegel, when he attempts to defend the conduct of Aristophanes, forgets, that, while the comic writer may caricature, he must do it without having recourse to public calumny. In fact all the political and social tendencies of Aristophanes rest on a gross misunderstanding of historical development. The good old times, as he fancies them, are a fiction. It lies just as little in the realm of possibility, that a morality without reflection, and a homely ingenuousness, such as mark a nation's childhood, should be forced upon a time in which reflection has utterly eaten out all immediateness and unconscious moral simplicity, as that a grown up man should become a child again in the natural way. Aristophanes himself attests the impossibility of such a return, when in a fit of humor, with cynic raillery, he gives up all divine and human authority to ridicule, and thereby, however commendable may have been the patriotic motive prompting him to this comic extravagance, demonstrates, that he himself no longer stands upon the basis of the old morality, that he too is the son of his time.

3. THE CONDEMNATION OF SOCRATES.—To this same confounding of his efforts with those of the Sophists, and the same tendency to restore by violent means the old discipline and morality, Socrates, twenty-four years later, fell a victim. After he had lived and labored at Athens for many years in his usual manner, after the storms of the Peloponnesian war and the despotism of the thirty tyrants had passed away, and democracy had been restored, in his seventieth year he was brought to trial and accused of denying the gods of the state, of introducing new deities, and also of corrupting the youth.

His accusers were Melitus, a young poet, Anytus, a demagogue, and Lycon, an orator, men in every respect insignificant, and acting, as it seems, without motives of personal enmity. The trial resulted in his condemnation. After a fortunate accident had enabled him to spend thirty days more with his disciples in his confinement, scorning to escape from his prison, he drank the poisoned cup in the year 399 B.C.

The first motive to his accusation, as already remarked, was his identification with the Sophists, the actual belief that his doctrines and activity were marked with the same character of hostility to the interests of the state, as those of the Sophists, which had already occasioned so much mischief. The three points in the accusation, though evidently resting on a misunderstanding, alike indicate this; they are precisely those by which Aristophanes had sought to characterize the Sophist in the person of Socrates. This "corruption of the youth," this bringing in of new customs, and a new mode of culture and education generally, was precisely the charge which was brought against the Sophists; moreover, in Plato's *Meno*, Anytus, one of the three accusers, is introduced as the bitter enemy of the Sophists and of their manner of instruction. So too in respect to the denial of the national gods: before this, Protagoras, accused of denying the gods, had been obliged to flee from Athens. Even five years after the death of Socrates, Xenophon, who was not present at the trial, felt himself called upon to write his *Memorabilia* in defence of his teacher, so wide-spread and deep-rooted was the prejudice against him.

Beside this there was also a second, probably a more decisive reason,—a political one. Socrates was no aristocrat, but his character was too firm to permit him to accommodate himself to the caprices of the sovereign mob, and he was too deeply convinced of the necessity of a lawful and intelligent management of state affairs to be on friendly terms with the Athenian democracy, as it was then constituted. Moreover his whole mode of life must have appeared to them to be that

of a bad citizen. He had never concerned himself in the affairs of the state, had never but once sustained an official character, and then, as chief of the Prytanes, had disagreed with the will of the people and the rulers. (Plat. *Apol.* Sect. 32; Xen. *Mem.* I. 1, 18.) In his seventieth year, he mounted the orator's stand for the first time in his life, on the occasion of his own accusation. We must also take into account the fact that he would have allowed only men of wisdom and penetration to possess power in the state, and found fault with the Athenian democracy upon every occasion, especially with the democratic institution of choice by lot; that he decidedly preferred the Spartan state to the Athenian; and that he excited the distrust of the democrats by his confidential relations with the former leaders of the oligarchic party. (Xen. *Mem.* I. 2, 9, sq.) Among others who were of the oligarchic interest, and friendly to the Spartans, Critias in particular, one of the thirty tyrants, had been his pupil, as also Alcibiades—two men who had been the cause of much evil to the Athenian people. If now we accept the uniform tradition, that two of his accusers were men of fair standing in the democratic party, and farther, that his judges were men who had fled before the thirty tyrants, and later had overthrown the power of the oligarchy, we find it much more easy to understand how they, in the case before them, should have supposed they were acting wholly in the interest of the democratic party, when they pronounced condemnation upon the accused, especially as enough to all appearance could be brought against him. The hurried trial presents nothing very remarkable, in a generation which had grown up during the Peloponnesian war, and in a people that adopted and repented of their passionate resolves with equal haste. Yea, more, if we consider that Socrates scorned to have recourse to the usual means and forms adopted by those accused of capital crime, and to gain the sympathy of the people by lamentations, or their favor by flattery, that he in proud consciousness of his innocence defied his judges, it becomes

rather a matter of wonder, that his condemnation was carried by a majority of only three to six votes. And even now he might have escaped the sentence to death, had he been willing to bow to the will of the sovereign people for the sake of a commutation of his punishment. But as he scorned to set a value upon himself, by proposing another punishment, a fine, for example, instead of the one moved by his accuser, because this would be the same as to acknowledge himself guilty, his disdain could not fail to exasperate the easily excited Athenians, and no farther explanation is needed to show why eighty of his judges who had before voted for his acquittal, now voted for his death. Such was the most lamentable result—a result, afterwards most deeply regretted by the Athenians themselves—of an accusation, which at the outset was probably only intended to humble the aristocratic philosopher, and to force him to an acknowledgment of the power and the majesty of the people.

Hegel's view of the fate of Socrates, that it was the result of the collision of equally just powers—the Tragedy of Athens as he calls it—and that guilt and innocence were shared alike on both sides, cannot be maintained on historical grounds, since Socrates can neither be regarded exclusively as the representative of the modern spirit, the principle of freedom, subjectivity, internality; nor his judges, as the representatives of the old Athenian unreflecting morality. The first is impossible, since Socrates, even though his principle was at variance with the old Greek morality, rested nevertheless so far on the basis of tradition, that the accusations brought against him in this respect were false and groundless; and the last is equally impossible, since at that time, after the close of the Peloponnesian war, the old morality and piety had long been wanting to the mass of the people, and given place to the modern culture; and the whole process against Socrates must be regarded rather as an attempt to restore by violence, in connection with the old constitution, the old defunct morality and modes of thought. The fault is not there-

fore the same on both sides, and it must be held, that Socrates fell a victim to a misunderstanding, and to an unjustifiable reaction of public sentiment.

4. THE SOURCES OF THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.—Well known is the old controversy, whether the picture of Socrates drawn by Xenophon or that drawn by Plato, is the more complete and true to history, and which of the two is to be considered the more reliable source for obtaining a knowledge of his philosophy. This question is being decided more and more in favor of Xenophon. Great pains have been taken in former as in later times, to bring Xenophon's *Memorabilia* into disrepute, as a shallow and insufficient source, because their plain, and any thing but speculative contents, seemed to furnish no satisfactory ground for such a revolution in the world of mind as is attributed to Socrates, or for the splendor which invests his name in history, or for the character which Plato assigns him; because again the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon have especially an apologetic aim, and their defence does not relate so much to the philosopher as to the man; and finally, because they have been supposed to have the appearance of carrying the philosophical over into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding. A distinction has therefore been made between an exoteric and an esoteric Socrates, obtaining the first from Xenophon, the latter from Plato. But the preference of Plato to Xenophon has in the first place no historical justification, since Xenophon appears as a proper historian and claims historical credibility, while Plato on the other hand never professes to be an historical narrator, save in a few passages, and by no means intends to have all the rest which he puts in the mouth of Socrates understood as his authentic expressions and discourse. There is, therefore, no historical reason for preferring the representation of Socrates which is given by Plato. In the second place, the under-valuation of Xenophon rests, for the most part, on the false notion, that Socrates had a proper philosophy, *i.e.*, a speculative system, and on an un-

historical mistaking of the limits by which the philosophical character of Socrates was conditioned and restricted. There was no proper Socratic doctrine, but a Socratic life; and, just on this ground, are the different philosophical tendencies of his disciples to be explained.

5. GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.—The philosophizing of Socrates was limited and defined by his opposition, partly to the preceding, and partly to the Sophistic philosophy.

Philosophy before the time of Socrates had been essentially an investigation of nature. But in Socrates, the human mind, for the first time, turned itself in upon itself, upon its own being, and that too in the most immediate manner, by conceiving itself as active, moral spirit. The positive philosophizing of Socrates is exclusively of an ethical character, exclusively an inquiry into the nature of virtue, so exclusively, and so one-sidedly, that, as is wont to be the case upon the appearance of a new principle, it even expressed a contempt for the strivings of the entire previous period, with its natural philosophy, and its mathematics. Subordinating every thing to the standpoint of direct moral advancement, Socrates was so far from finding any object in "irrational" nature worthy of study, that he rather, in a kind of general teleological manner, conceived it simply in the light of an external means for the attainment of external ends; he would not even go out to walk, as he says in the *Phædrus* of Plato, since one can learn nothing from trees and districts of country. Self-knowledge, the Delphic *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* appeared to him the only object worthy of man, the starting-point of all philosophy. Knowledge of every other kind, he pronounced so insignificant and worthless, that he was wont to boast of his ignorance, and to declare that he excelled other men in wisdom only in this, that he was conscious of his own ignorance. (Plat. *Ap. S.* 21, 23.)

The other side of the Socratic philosophizing, is its opposition to the philosophy of the time. His object, as is well

understood, could have been only this, to place himself upon the same position as that occupied by the philosophy of the Sophists, and overcome it on its own ground, and by its own principles. That Socrates shared the general position of the Sophists has been remarked above. Many of his assertions, particularly these propositions, that no man knowingly does wrong, and that if a man were knowingly to lie, or to do some other wrong act, still he would be better than he who should do the same unconsciously, at first sight bear a purely Sophistic stamp. The great fundamental thought of the Sophistic philosophy, that every moral act must be a conscious act, was also his. But while the Sophists made it their object, through subjective reflection to confuse and to break up all stable convictions, to make all objective standards impossible, Socrates had recognized thinking as the activity of the universal, and free objective thought as the measure of all things; and, therefore, instead of referring moral duties, and all moral action to the fancy and caprice of the individual, had rather reduced all morality to accurate knowledge, to the essence of spirit. It was this idea of knowledge that led him to seek, by the process of thought, to gain an intelligible objective ground, something real, abiding, absolute, independent of the arbitrary volitions of the subject, and to hold fast to unconditioned moral laws. Hegel expresses the same opinion, when he says that Socrates put morality from ethical grounds, in the place of the morality of custom and habit. Hegel distinguishes morality, as conscious right conduct, resting on reflection and moral principles, from the morality of unsophisticated, half-unconscious virtue, which rests on compliance with prevailing custom. The logical presupposition of this ethical striving of Socrates, was the establishment of conceptions, the method of their formation. To search out the "what" of every thing says Xenophon (*Mem.* IV. 6, 1) was the uninterrupted labor of Socrates; and Aristotle says expressly that a twofold merit must be ascribed to him, viz., the method of induction and strictly logical definitions,

—the two elements which constitute the basis of science. How these two elements stand connected with the principle of Socrates we shall at once see.

6. THE SOCRATIC METHOD.—We must not regard the Socratic method in the light of modern conceptions of method, *i.e.*, as something of which in its abstract clearness he was distinctly conscious; but it rather owed its origin immediately to the manner of his philosophizing, which was not designed for the communication of a system but for the education of the subject in philosophical thinking and life. It is only the subjective technique of his educational procedure, the peculiar manner of his actual philosophical life.

The Socratic method has two sides, a negative and a positive. The negative side is the well-known Socratic *irony*. The philosopher takes the attitude of ignorance, and would apparently let himself be instructed by those with whom he converses, but through the questions which he puts, the unexpected consequences which he deduces, and the contradictions in which he involves the opposite party, he soon leads them to see that their supposed knowledge is only a source of confusion and contradiction. In the embarrassment in which they now find themselves placed, and seeing that they do not know what they supposed, this supposed knowledge completes its own destruction, and the individual who had pretended to wisdom learns to distrust his previous opinions and firmly held notions. “What we knew, has contradicted itself,” is the refrain of the most of these conversations.

The result of this side of the Socratic method was only to lead the subject to know that he knew nothing, and a great part of the dialogues of Xenophon and Plato go no farther than to represent ostensibly this negative result. But there is yet another element in his method in which this irony loses its negative character.

The positive side of the Socratic method is the so-called *obstetrics* or art of intellectual midwifery. Socrates compares himself with his mother Phænarete, a midwife, because

his office was rather to help others bring forth thoughts than to produce them himself, and because he took upon himself to distinguish the birth of an empty thought from one rich in content. (Plato *Theatætus*, p. 149.) Through this art of midwifery the philosopher, by his assiduous questioning, by his interrogatory dissection of the notions of him with whom he might be conversing, knew how to elicit from him a thought of which he had previously been unconscious, and how to help him to the birth of a new thought. A chief means in this operation was the method of *induction*, or the reduction of particulars to general conceptions. The philosopher, thus, starting from some individual, concrete case, and seizing hold of the most common notions concerning it, and finding illustrations in the most ordinary and trivial occurrences, knew how to remove by his comparisons that which was individual, and by thus separating the accidental and contingent from the essential, could bring to consciousness a universal truth and a universal characteristic,—in other words, could form conceptions. In order, *e.g.*, to find the conception of justice or valor, he would start from individual examples of them, and from these deduce the general nature or conception of these virtues. From this we see that the aim of the Socratic induction was to gain logical *definitions*. I define a conception when I develop what it is, its essence, its content. I define the conception of justice when I determine the common property and logical unity of all its different modes of manifestation. Socrates sought to go no farther than this. “To inquire into the essence of virtue,” says an Aristotelian writing (*Eud. Eth.* I. 5), “Socrates regarded as the problem of philosophy, and hence, since with him all virtue is knowledge, he sought to determine in respect of justice or valor what they might really be, *i.e.*, he investigated their essence or conception.” From this it is very easy to see how his method of definitions or of forming conceptions was connected with his practical strivings. He went back to the conception of each individual virtue, *e.g.*, justice,

only because he was convinced that the knowledge of this conception, the knowledge of it for every individual case, was the surest guide for every moral relation. Every moral act, he believed, should be a conscious, intelligent act.

On this account we might characterize the Socratic method as the art by which from a certain sum of given homogeneous and individual phenomena, their logical unity, the universal principle which lies at their base, may be inductively found. This method presupposes the recognition of the fact that the essence of the objects can be comprehended in thought, that the conception of a thing is its true being. Hence we see that the Platonic doctrine of ideas is only the objectifying of this method which in Socrates appears to be only a subjective dexterity. The Platonic ideas are the universal conceptions of Socrates posited as real individual existences. Hence Aristotle (*Metaph.* XIII. 4) most fittingly characterizes the relation between the Socratic method and the Platonic doctrine of ideas with the words, "Socrates did not posit universal conceptions as separate, individual substances, while Plato does this, and names them ideas."

7. THE SOCRATIC DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE.—The only positive doctrinal statement which has been transmitted to us from Socrates is, that virtue is knowledge, wisdom, insight; *i.e.*, virtue is no mere inborn or mechanically acquired power or ability, but a virtuous act is one which proceeds from a clearly conscious perception of those things to which it relates, that is, of the end, means, and limitations by which it is conditioned. Action without perception and judgment is contradictory and self-destructive; action with perception and judgment is sure to realize its aim. Good and evil are therefore determined by the presence or absence of insight; men act wrongly only because they form erroneous judgments. Hence no one is willingly wicked; the wicked are what they are in direct opposition to their own inclinations. Moreover he who does wrong knowingly is better than he who does so unconsciously, because in the latter case, in the absence of

true knowledge, virtue must be altogether wanting, while in the former case (if indeed such a case were possible) virtue would suffer only temporary injury. Socrates would not admit that any one can know the good and not do it. He regarded the good, not, like the Sophists, as an arbitrary law, but as that upon which the welfare of individuals as well as of the human race unconditionally depends, since virtuous action is the only intelligent action; hence it seemed to him a logical contradiction that mankind, who seek above all things their own advantage, should at the same time knowingly reject it. Virtuous action seemed to him to follow from the cognition of the good as necessarily as a logical conclusion from its premises.

The proposition that virtue is knowledge, has for its logical consequence the unity and identity of all virtues, in so far as the intellectual insight which determines the rightness of an act is in all cases one and the same, without reference to the particular objects upon which it may be directed; and for its practical consequence the teachableness of virtue, whereby it becomes something universally human, something which every one can acquire through instruction and practice. With these three propositions, in which every thing is embraced which we can properly term the Socratic philosophy, Socrates has laid the first foundation stone for a scientific treatment of ethics, a treatment which must be dated from him. But he laid only the foundation, for on the one hand he neither attempted a detailed development of his principles, nor the establishment of a concrete doctrine of ethics, but only, after the ancient manner, referred to the laws of states and the unwritten laws of general usage; and on the other, he not seldom availed himself of utilitarian motives to establish his ethical propositions, in other words he referred to the external advantages and useful consequences of virtue, — a method in which the absence of a strict scientific treatment is strongly felt. Although in his opinion virtue is obligatory from the fact that man as a rational, intelligent being must

in all cases act designedly, that is, with rational insight, if he wishes to avoid self-degradation, still he stood completely on the level of his age in that he conceived virtue to be at the same time the way toward the realization of well-being, happiness, contentment, power, and honor, as definite aims. These he took just as they are given in experience, without reducing them to a higher collective aim. He demanded one and the same virtue in all spheres of action, yet he allowed these spheres themselves to retain that empirical contingency which characterizes them in the consciousness and thoughts of those who are immersed in the common, practical interests of life. In his own character, no doubt, he exhibited that elevation above sensuous appetites and affections, that freedom from desire, which brings man nearest to God, a spiritual peace which could never be disturbed, a free consciousness of unimpaired strength, and manifold intellectual capacities, as constituting the highest felicity, and thus directly identified the conceptions of virtue and happiness. But he expressed this not as a universal but as an individual principle. He himself retained too much of the old view of things to be willing to deny the validity of concrete aims, and sacrifice them to his personal ideal of happiness.

SECTION XIII.

THE PARTIAL DISCIPLES OF SOCRATES.

1. THEIR RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. — Socrates' death was the means of transforming his life into a universal or ideal type, which in various directions became the inspiring principle of philosophic progress. It is just this recognition of Socrates as an ideal type which constitutes the common characteristic of the immediately succeeding Socratic schools. That man ought to be guided by a universal, absolutely true aim is a necessary deduction from the Socratic principle that it is a man's duty to regulate and unify his action by means of conscious thought. But since for the solution of the problem, Wherein does this aim consist? there existed no completely developed Socratic doctrine, but only the tragically ended, many-sided Socratic life, every thing would necessarily be reduced to an individual estimate of Socrates' personal character, which would of course be judged differently by different persons. Socrates had many disciples but no school. Of these idealizations or reflections of the Socratic character, three have obtained a conspicuous place in history, — that of *Antisthenes* or the Cynic, that of *Aristippus* or the Cyrenaic, and that of *Euclid* or the Megarian. These three estimates of Socrates, each of which indeed embodied a real element of the Socratic character, agree in positing as the true essence of this character disjoined and isolated elements, which in the master himself were combined in harmonious unity. They are, therefore, each of them one-sided and give a false picture of Socrates. For this, however, they are not wholly responsible. The fact that Aristippus was obliged to turn back to Protagoras for a theory of cognition, and Euclid to the Eleatics for a metaphysic, shows clearly the undeveloped, unmethodical, subjective character of Socrates' philosophy. The errors and one-sidedness

of these philosophers exhibit, in fact, only the defects and weaknesses which adhered to the doctrines of their master.

2. ANTISTHENES AND THE CYNICS.—As a strictly literal adherent of the doctrine of Socrates, and zealously though grossly, and often with caricature imitating his method, Antisthenes stands nearest his master. In early life a disciple of Gorgias, and himself a teacher of the Sophistic philosophy, he subsequently became an inseparable attendant of Socrates, after whose death he founded a school in the Cynosarges, whence his scholars and adherents took the name of Cynics, though according to others this name was derived from their mode of life. The doctrine of Antisthenes is only an abstract expression of the Socratic ideal of virtue. Like Socrates he considered a virtuous life to be the chief aim of man, to be necessary to and alone sufficient for happiness: like Socrates also he asserted virtue to be insight or accurate knowledge, and therefore to be teachable and one; but the ideal of virtue as he had beheld it in the person of Socrates was realized, in his estimation, only in the absence of every desire (in his appearance he imitated a beggar with staff and scrip), and hence in the disregarding of all other intellectual interests; virtue with him is only the avoidance of evil, *i.e.*, of those desires and lusts which fetter us to wants and enjoyments, — and therefore has no need of dialectical demonstrations, but only of Socratic vigor; the wise man, according to him, is self-sufficient, independent of every thing, indifferent to marriage, family, society, and politics (a feature not at all characteristic of antiquity) as also to wealth, honor, and enjoyment. In this ideal of Antisthenes, which is more negative than positive, we miss entirely the genial humanity and the universal susceptibility of his master, and still more a cultivation of those fruitful dialectic elements which the Socratic philosophizing contained. With a more decided contempt for all knowledge, and a still greater scorn of all the customs of society, the later Cynicism became frequently a repulsive and shameful caricature of the Socratic spirit. This was espe-

cially the case with Diogenes of Sinope, the only one of his disciples whom Antisthenes suffered to remain with him. In their high estimation of virtue and philosophy these Cynics, who have been suitably styled the Capuchins of the Grecian world, preserved a trace of the original Socratic philosophy, but they sought virtue "in the shortest way," in a life according to nature as they themselves expressed it, that is, in shutting out the outer world, in attaining a complete independence, and absence of every need, and in renouncing art and science as well as every definite aim. The wise man, they said, should be master of all his wants and desires, without weakness, free from the restraints of civil law and custom, — co-equal with the gods. An easy life, said Diogenes, is assigned by the gods to that man who limits himself to his necessities, and this true philosophy may be attained by every one, through perseverance and the power of self-denial. Philosophy and philosophical interest there is none in this school of beggars. All that is related of Diogenes are anecdotes and sarcasms.

We see here how the ethics of the Cynic school lost itself in entirely negative statements, a consequence naturally resulting from the fact that the original Socratic conception of virtue lacked a concrete positive content, and was not systematically carried out. Cynicism is the negative side of the Socratic doctrine.

3. ARISTIPPUS AND THE CYRENAICS. — Aristippus of Cyrene, numbered till the death of Socrates among his adherents, is represented by Aristotle as a Sophist, and with propriety, since he received money for his instructions. He appears in Xenophon as a man devoted to pleasure. The adroitness with which he adapted himself to every circumstance, and the knowledge of human nature by which in every condition he knew how to provide means to satisfy his desire for good living and luxury, were notorious among the ancients. He kept himself aloof from the cares of government that he might not become dependent; he spent most of his time abroad in

order to free himself from every restraint ; he made it his rule that circumstances should be dependent upon him, while he should be independent of them. Though such a man seems little worthy of the name of a Socratic, yet has he two points of contact with his master which should not be overlooked. Socrates had called virtue *and* happiness coördinately the highest end of man, *i.e.*, he had maintained most strenuously the idea of moral action ; but because he stated this in an undeveloped and abstract form, he was only able in concrete cases to establish the obligation of the moral law in a utilitarian way, by appealing to the benefit resulting from the practice of virtue. This side of the Socratic principle Aristippus adopted for his own, affirming that pleasure is the ultimate end of life, and the highest good. Moreover, this pleasure, as Aristippus regards it, is not happiness as a condition embracing the whole life, but only immediate, particular sensations of physical pleasure ; moreover to him all moral restrictions and duties are, in comparison with this pleasure, of no account ; nothing which gives pleasure is wicked, shameful, or godless ; what opposes it is mere opinion and prejudice (as with the Sophists). But in that Aristippus recommends knowledge, self-government, temperance, the power of subjugating individual desires, and general intellectual culture as means for acquiring and preserving enjoyment, he shows that the Socratic spirit was not yet wholly extinguished within him, and that the name of pseudo-Socratic which Schleiermacher gives him, hardly belongs to him.

The remaining philosophers of the Cyrenaic school, *Theodorus*, *Hegesias*, *Anniceris*, can be only briefly mentioned. The further development of this school consists in the more accurate definition of the pleasure to be aimed at, *i.e.*, in answers to the questions whether it is a momentary state (a momentary sensation) or a permanent condition, and whether it is spiritual or physical, positive or negative (*i.e.*, the mere absence of pain). Theodorus declared that enjoyment to be the highest which the mind receives from its insight, from its

capacity for rational, unprejudiced self-direction in all the relations of life. Hegesias found a pure life of pleasure unattainable, and therefore not to be sought after. Prevention of pain, and the exertion of every faculty, is, according to him, the aim of the sage, the only aim, indeed, which is left to man, life being so full of evils. And, lastly, Anniceris taught, that a complete withdrawal from family and social relations is impossible, but that the true aim is rather to draw from action as much pleasure as possible, and to take the occasional pain which accompanies our efforts for our friends and our country, as a part of the bargain; *i.e.*, he sought to adjust the doctrine of pleasure to those requirements and relations of life to which it stood in such irreconcilable opposition.

4. EUCLID AND THE MEGARIANS.—The union of the dialectical and the ethical is a common characteristic of all the partial Socratic schools; the difference consists only in this, that in one the ethical is made to do service to the dialectical, while, in another, the dialectical stands in subjection to the ethical. The former is especially true of the Megarian school, whose essential peculiarity was stated by the ancients themselves to be a combination of the Socratic and Eleatic principles. The idea of the good is for ethics what the idea of being is for physics; it was, therefore, only a Socratic transformation of the Eleatic doctrine when Euclid of Megara asserted that only that which exists, which is self-identical and one with itself is good (absolutely true), and that this good alone *is*; while whatever is opposed to the good, whatever is changeable, manifold, and divisible is merely apparent. This self-identical good, however, is not sensuous but intellectual good, truth, reason; it is, moreover, for man the only good. Later the Megarian Stilpo taught that the only true aim is rationality, knowledge, and a complete, apathetic indifference to every thing which has nothing in common with the knowledge of the good. This again was an exaggeration of the Socratic tendency to reflection, with the accompanying

peace of mind, and is only a more refined, more spiritual Cynicism. What is farther related of Euclid is meagre and may here be omitted. The Megarian school was kept up under different leaders after his death, but without vital power, and without an independent principle of organic development. As hedonism (the philosophical doctrine of the Cyrenaics that pleasure is the chief good) led the way to the doctrine of Epicurus, and cynicism was the bridge toward the Stoic, so the later Megaric eristic formed the transition to scepticism. Its sophistries and paralogisms, which were, for the most part, its polemic, in the style of Zeno, against sensuous conception and experience, were widely known and noted among the ancients.

5. PLATO, AS THE COMPLETE SOCRATIC. — The attempts thus far to build upon the foundation of the Socratic doctrine, started without a vigorous germinating principle, and ended fruitlessly. Plato was the only one of his scholars who has approached and represented *the whole* Socrates. Starting from the Socratic idea of knowledge he brought into one focus the scattered elements and rays of truth which could be collected from his master or from the philosophers preceding him, and gave to philosophy a systematic completeness. The doctrine that thought is the true being, the only actual, had been apprehended by the Megarians only abstractly, and had been enounced by Socrates himself only as a principle ; cognition by means of conceptions remained with him merely an undeveloped postulate. His philosophy is not a system, but only the first impulse toward a philosophical development and method. Plato is the first who has approached a systematic representation and development of absolutely true conceptions, of the ideal world.

¶ The Platonic system is Socrates objectified, the blending and reconciling of preceding philosophy. ¶

SECTION XIV.

PLATO.

I. PLATO'S LIFE. 1. HIS YOUTH.—Plato, the son of Ariston, of a noble Attic family, was born in the year 429 B.C. It was the year of the death of Pericles, the second year of the Peloponnesian war, so fatal to Athens. - Born in the centre of Grecian culture and industry, and descended from an old and noble family, he received a corresponding education, although no information in regard to this has been transmitted to us, except the insignificant names of his teachers. That the youth growing up under such circumstances should choose the seclusion of a philosophic life rather than a political career may seem strange, since many and favorable opportunities for the latter course lay open before him. Critias, one of the thirty tyrants, was the cousin of his mother, and Charmides, who subsequently, under the oligarchic rule at Athens, met his death at the hands of Thrasybulus on the same day with Critias, was his uncle. Notwithstanding this, he is never known to have appeared a single time as a public speaker in the assembly of the people. In view of the rising degeneracy and increasing political corruption of his native land, he was too proud to court for himself the favor of the many-headed *Demos*; and more attached to Doricism than to the democracy and practice of the Attic public life, he chose to make science his chief pursuit, rather than as a patriot to struggle in vain against unavoidable disaster, and become a martyr to his political opinions. He regarded the Athenian state as lost, and to hinder its inevitable ruin he would not bring a useless offering.

2. HIS YEARS OF DISCIPLINE.—A youth of twenty, Plato came to Socrates, in whose intercourse he spent eight years. Besides a few doubtful anecdotes, nothing is known of this portion of his history. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (III. 6)

Plato is only once cursorily mentioned, but this in a way that indicates an intimate relation between the scholar and his master. Plato himself in his dialogues has transmitted nothing concerning his personal relations to Socrates; only once (*Phæd.*, p. 59) he names himself among the intimate friends of Socrates. But the influence which Socrates exerted upon him, how he recognized in him the complete representation of a wise man, how he found not only in his doctrine but also in his life and action the most fruitful philosophic germs, the significance which the personal character of his master as an ideal type had for him—all this we learn with sufficient accuracy from his writings, where he places his own incomparably more developed philosophical system in the mouth of his master, whom he makes the centre of his dialogues and the leader of his discourses.

3. HIS YEARS OF TRAVEL.—After the death of Socrates, 399 B.C., in the thirtieth year of his age, Plato, fearing lest he also should be met by the incoming reaction against philosophy, left, in company with other Socratics, his native city, and betook himself to Euclid, his former fellow-scholar, the founder of the Megaric school (*cf.* Sect. XIII. 4) at Megara. Up to this time a pure Socratic, he became greatly animated and energized by his intercourse with the Megarians, among whom a peculiar philosophical direction, a modification of Socraticism, was already asserted. We shall see farther on the influence of this residence at Megara upon the foundation of his philosophy, and especially upon the elaboration and dialectical confirmation of his doctrine of Ideas. One whole period of his literary activity and an entire group of his dialogues, can only be satisfactorily explained by the intellectual stimulus gained at this place. From Megara, Plato visited Cyrene, Egypt, Magna-Grecia, and Sicily. In Magna-Grecia he became acquainted with the Pythagorean philosophy, which was then in its highest bloom. His abode among the Pythagoreans had a marked effect upon him; as a man it made him more practical, and increased his zest for life and his interest

in public life and social intercourse; as a philosopher it furnished him with a new incitement to science, and new motives to literary labor. The traces of the Pythagorean philosophy may be seen through all the last period of his literary life; especially his aversion to public and political life was greatly softened by his intercourse with the Pythagoreans. While in the *Theatætus*, he affirmed most positively the incompatibility of philosophy with public life, we find in his later dialogues, especially in the *Republic* and also in the *Statesman*—upon which Pythagoreanism seems already to have had an influence—a returning favor for the actual world, and the well-known statement that the ruler must be a philosopher is an expression very characteristic of this change. His visit to Sicily gave him the acquaintance of the elder Dionysius and Dion his brother-in-law, but the philosopher and the tyrant had little in common. Plato is said to have incurred his displeasure to so high a degree, that his life was in danger. After about ten years spent in travel, he returned to Athens in the fortieth year of his age (389 or 388 B.C.)

4. PLATO AS HEAD OF THE ACADEMY; HIS YEARS OF INSTRUCTION.—On his return, Plato surrounded himself with a circle of pupils. The place where he taught was known as the Academy, a gymnasium outside of Athens where Plato had inherited a garden from his father. Of his school and of his later life, we have only the most meagre accounts. His life passed evenly along, interrupted only by a second and third visit to Sicily, where meanwhile the younger Dionysius had come to the throne. This second and third residence of Plato at the court of Syracuse abounds in vicissitudes, and shows us the philosopher in a great variety of circumstances (*cf.* Plutarch's *Life of Dion*); but to us, in estimating his philosophical character, it is of interest only for the attempt, which, as seems probable from all accounts, he there made to realize his ideal of a state, and, by the philosophical education of the new ruler, to unite philosophy and the reins of government in one and the same hand, or at least

in some way by means of philosophy to achieve a healthy change in the Sicilian state constitution, in an aristocratic direction. His efforts were however fruitless; the circumstances were not propitious, and the character of the young Dionysius, who was one of those mediocre natures who strive after renown and distinction, but are capable of nothing profound and earnest, deceived the expectations concerning him which Plato, from Dion's account, thought he had reason to entertain.

When we look at Plato's philosophical labors in the Academy, we are struck with the different relations to public life which philosophy had already assumed. Instead of carrying philosophy, like Socrates, into the streets and public places, and making it there a subject of social conversation with any one who desired it, he lived and labored entirely withdrawn from the movements of the public, satisfied to influence the disciples who surrounded him. In proportion as philosophy becomes a system, and systematic form is seen to be essential, it loses its popular character and begins to demand preparatory scientific training, and to become a topic for the school, an esoteric affair. Yet such was the respect for the name of philosopher, and especially for the name of Plato, that requests were made to him by different states to compose for them a code of laws, a work which in some instances it was said he actually performed. Attended by a retinue of devoted disciples, among whom were even women disguised as men, and receiving reiterated demonstrations of respect, he reached the age of eighty-one years, with his powers of mind unweakened to the latest moment.

The close of his life seems to have been clouded by disturbances and divisions which arose in his school, and for which Aristotle was mainly responsible. While engaged in writing, or as others state, at a marriage feast, death came upon him as a gentle sleep, 348 B.C. His remains were buried in the Ceramicus, not far from the Academy.

II. THE INNER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS. — That the Platonic philosophy is essentially a development; in other words, that it should not be apprehended as a perfectly finished system to which the different writings stand related as constituent elements, but that these are rather stages of its inner development, stages as it were passed over in the philosophical journeyings of the philosopher — is a view of the highest importance for the true estimate of Plato's literary labors.

Plato's philosophical and literary labors may be divided into three periods, which we can characterize in various ways. Looking at them chronologically or biographically, we might call them respectively the periods of his years of discipline, of travel, of instruction; or, if we view them in reference to the prevailing external influence under which they were formed, they might be termed the Socratic, Heraclitic-Eleatic, and the Pythagorean; or, if we looked at the content alone, we might term them the antisophistic-ethic, the dialectic or mediating, and the systematic or constructive periods.

THE FIRST PERIOD — the Socratic — is marked externally by the predominance of the dramatic element, and in reference to its philosophical standpoint, by an adherence to the method and the fundamental principles of the Socratic doctrine. Not yet accurately informed of the results of former inquiries, and rather repelled from the study of the history of philosophy than attracted to it by the character of the Socratic philosophizing, Plato confined himself to an analytical treatment of conceptions, particularly of the conception of virtue, and to a reproducing of his master, which, though something more than a mere recital of verbal recollections, had yet no philosophical independence. His Socrates exhibits the same view of life and the same scientific standpoint which the historical Socrates of Xenophon had had. His efforts were thus, like those of his contemporary fellow disciples, directed prominently toward practical wisdom. His struggles, like those of Socrates, were rather with the pre-

vailing want of science and the shallow sophisms of the day than with the antagonistic tendencies of science. The whole period bears an eclectic and hortatory character. The highest point in which the dialogues of this group culminate is the attempt, which at the same time is found in the Socratic doctrine, to determine the certainty of an absolute content the absolute existence (objective reality) of the good.

The history of the development of the Platonic philosophy would assume a very different form if the view of some modern scholars respecting the date of the *Phædrus* were correct. If, as they claim, the *Phædrus* were Plato's earliest work, this circumstance would betray from the outset an entirely different course of culture for him than we could suppose in a mere scholar of Socrates. The doctrine in this dialogue of the pre-existence of souls, and their periodical transmigrations, of the relation of earthly beauty with heavenly truth, of divine inspiration in contrast to human wisdom, the conception of love, the Pythagorean ingredients, are all so distinct from the original Socratic doctrine that we must transfer the most of that which Plato creatively produced during his whole philosophical career, to the beginning of his philosophical development. The improbability of this, and numerous other grounds of objection, claim a far later composition for this dialogue. Setting aside for the present the *Phædrus*, the Platonic development assumes the following form :

The earliest of his works (if they are genuine) are the small dialogues which treat of Socratic questions and themes in a Socratic way. Of these, *e.g.*, the *Charmides* discusses temperance, the *Lysis* friendship, the *Laches* valor, the lesser *Hippias* knowing and wilful wrong-doing, the first *Alcibiades* the moral and intellectual qualifications of a statesman, etc. The immaturity and the crudeness of these dialogues, the use of scenic means which have only an external relation to the content, the scantiness and want of independence in the content, the manner of investigation which is indirect and lacks a satisfactory and positive result, the formal and analytical

treatment of the conceptions discussed—all these features indicate the early character of these minor dialogues.

The *Protagoras* may be taken as a proper type of the Socratic period. Since this dialogue, though directing its whole polemic against the Sophistic philosophy, confined itself almost exclusively to the outward manifestation of this system, to its influence on its age and its method of instruction in opposition to that of Socrates, without entering into the ground and philosophical character of the doctrine itself; and, still farther, since, when it comes in a strict sense to philosophize, it confines itself to an indirect investigation of the Socratic conception of virtue according to its different aspects (virtue as knowledge, its unity and its teachableness, cf. Sect. XII. 8),—it represents in the clearest manner the tendency, character, and defects of the first period of Plato's literary life.

The *Gorgias* written soon after the death of Socrates, represents the third and highest stage of this period. Directed against the Sophistical identification of pleasure and virtue, of the good and of the agreeable, *i.e.*, against the affirmation of an absolute moral relativity, this dialogue attempts to prove that the good, far from owing its origin only to the right of the stronger, and thus to the arbitrariness of the subject, has in itself an independent reality and objective validity, and, consequently, alone is truly useful, and that, therefore, the standard of pleasure must be subordinate to the higher standard of the good. In this direct and positive polemic against the Sophistic doctrine of pleasure, in its tendency to view the good as something firm and abiding, and secure against all subjective arbitrariness, consists primarily the advance which the *Gorgias* makes beyond the *Protagoras*.

In the first Socratic period the Platonic philosophizing became ripe and ready for the reception of Eleatic and Pythagorean categories. To grapple by means of these categories with the higher questions of philosophy, and so to free the Socratic philosophy from its close connection with practical life, was the problem of the second period.

THE SECOND PERIOD—the dialectic or the Megaric—is marked externally, by a less prominence of form and poetic coloring, and not unfrequently indeed, by obscurity and difficulties of style, and internally, by the attempted mediation with the Eleatics through the complete exposition and dialectical establishment of the doctrine of ideas.

By his exile at Megara, and his journeys to Italy, Plato became acquainted with other and opposing philosophical tendencies, with which he was obliged to come to an understanding in order to elevate the Socratic doctrine to its true significance. It was now that he first learned to know the philosophic theories of the earlier sages, for the study of which the necessary means could not at that period, so wanting in literary publicity, be found at Athens. Through his comprehension of these varying standpoints, as his older fellow pupils had already striven to do, he attempted, overstepping the narrow limits of ethical philosophizing, to reach the final ground of knowledge, and to perfect the art of generalization as brought forward by Socrates to a science of conceptions, *i.e.*, to the doctrine of ideas. That all human action rests upon knowledge, and all thinking upon conceptions, were results to which Plato might already have attained through the scientific generalization of the Socratic doctrine itself; but now to bring this Socratic wisdom within the circle of speculative thought, to establish dialectically that the conception in its simple unity is that which abides in the change of phenomena, to disclose the fundamental principles of knowledge which had been evaded by Socrates, to grasp the scientific theories of opponents immediately in their scientific grounds, and follow them out in all their ramifications,—this is the problem which the Megaric group of dialogues attempts to solve.

The *Theatætus* stands at the head of this group. It is chiefly directed against the Protagorean theory of knowledge, against the identification of thought and sensuous perception, or against the claim of an absolute relativity of all knowl-

edge. As the *Gorgias* before it had sought to establish the independent being of the ethical, so does the *Theatætus*, ascending from the ethical to the theoretical, endeavor to prove an independent being and objective reality for the logical conceptions which lie at the ground of all representation and thinking, in a word, to prove the objectivity of truth, the fact that there lies a sphere of knowledge immanent in thought and independent of the perceptions of the senses. These conceptions, whose objective reality is thus affirmed, are those of a species, likeness and unlikeness, identity and difference, etc.

The *Theatætus* is followed by the trilogy of the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philosopher*, which completes the Megaric group of dialogues. The first of these dialogues examines the conception of appearance, that is of the not-being, the last (represented by the *Parmenides*) the conception of being. Both dialogues are attempts at a reconciliation with the Eleatic doctrine. After Plato had recognized the unity of thought and the logical categories as that which is permanent amid the alterations of phenomena, his attention was naturally turned towards the Eleatics, who in an opposite way had attained the similar result that in unity consists all true substantiality, and to multiplicity as such no true being belongs. In order more easily on the one side to carry out this fundamental thought of the Eleatics to its legitimate result, in which the Megarians had already preceded him, he was obliged to elevate his abstract conceptions of species, *i.e.*, ideas to the position of metaphysical substances. But on the other side, he could not agree with the inflexibility and exclusiveness of the Eleatic unity without wholly sacrificing the multiplicity of things; he was rather obliged to attempt to show by a dialectic development of the Eleatic principle that the one must be at the same time a totality, organically connected, and embracing multiplicity in itself. This double relation to the Eleatic principle is carried out by the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*; by the former polemically against the

Eleatic doctrine, in that it proves the being of the appearance or the not-being, *i.e.*, demonstrates the multiplicity of ideas and their antithetical character (which arises from the mutual negation of opposites); and by the latter ironically, in that it reduces the Eleatic one by its own logical consequences to a manifold. The inner progress of the doctrine of Ideas in the Megaric group of dialogues is therefore this, *viz.*, that the *Theatætus*, in opposition to the Heraclitico-Protagorean theory of the absolute becoming, affirms the objective and independent reality of ideas, and the *Sophist* shows their reciprocal relation and power of combination, while the *Parmenides* in fine exhibits their whole dialectic complex, their relation to the phenomenal world, and their self-mediation with the latter.

THE THIRD PERIOD begins with the return of the philosopher to his native city. It unites the completeness of form belonging to the first with the profounder philosophical content of the second. The memories of his youthful years seem at this time to have risen anew before the soul of Plato, and to have imparted again to his literary activity the long lost freshness and fulness of that period, while at the same time his abode in foreign lands, and especially his acquaintance with the Pythagorean philosophy, had greatly enriched his mind with a store of images and ideals. This reviving of old memories is seen in the fact that the writings of this group return with fondness to the personality of Socrates, and represent in a certain degree the whole philosophy of Plato as the exaltation of the doctrine and the ideal embodiment of the historical character of his early master. In opposition to both of the first two periods, the third is marked externally by an excess of the mythical form together with the growing influence of Pythagoreanism in this period, and internally by the application of the doctrine of ideas to the concrete spheres of psychology, ethics, and natural science. That ideas possess objective reality, and are the foundation of all essentiality and truth, while the phenomena of the sen-

sible world are only copies of these, was a theory whose vindication was no longer attempted, but which was presupposed as already proved, and as forming a dialectical basis for the pursuit of the different branches of science. With this was connected a tendency to unite the hitherto separate branches of science into a systematic whole, as well as to fuse together the previous philosophical developments, *i.e.*, the Socratic ethics, the Eleatic dialectic, and the Pythagorean physics.

Upon this standpoint, the *Phædrus*, Plato's inaugural to his labors in the Academy, together with the *Symposium*, which is closely connected with it (both proceeding from the conception of love as the true originating impulse to philosophy) attempts to subject the rhetorical theory and practice of that time to a thorough criticism, in order to show in opposition to this theory and practice that only in an exclusive reference to the idea, the true Eros, is found that conscious certainty and distinctness of a scientific principle which is the only means of escaping arbitrariness, absence of principle, and crudeness. On the same standpoint the *Phædo* attempts to prove the immortality of the soul from the doctrine of ideas; the *Philebus* to examine the conceptions of pleasure and the highest good in the light of the highest categories of the system; and finally the *Republic* and *Timæus*, which are his latest works, to unfold the essence of the state and of nature, of the physical and spiritual universe.

Having thus sketched the inner development of the Platonic philosophy, we now turn to a systematic statement of its principles.

III. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PLATONIC SYSTEM.—The philosophy of Plato, as left by himself, is without a systematic statement, and has no comprehensive principle of classification. He has given us only the history of his thought, the statement of his philosophical development; we are therefore limited in this regard to simple intimations. Accordingly, some have divided the Platonic system into theoretical

and practical science, and others into a philosophy of the good, the beautiful, and the true. Another classification, which has some support in old records, is more correct. Some of the ancients say that Plato was the first to unite in one whole the scattered philosophical elements of the earlier sages, and so to obtain for philosophy the three parts, logic, physics, and ethics. The more accurate statement is given by Sextus Empiricus, that Plato laid the foundation for this threefold division of philosophy, but that it was first expressly recognized and affirmed by his scholars, Xenocrates and Aristotle. The Platonic system may, however, without difficulty, be divided into these three parts. True, there are many dialogues which combine in different proportions the logical, the ethical, and the physical element, and though even where Plato treats of some special discipline, the three are suffered constantly to interpenetrate each other, still there are some dialogues in which this fundamental scheme can be clearly recognized. It cannot be mistaken that the *Timæus* is predominantly physical, and the *Republic* as decidedly ethical, and if dialectic is expressly represented in no separate dialogue, yet the whole Megaric group which closes with the *Parmenides*, and which was expressly declared by Plato to be a connected tetralogy, pursues the common end of bringing out the conception of science and its true object, being, and is, therefore, in its content decidedly dialectical. Plato must have been led to this threefold division by even the earlier development of philosophy, and since Xenocrates would scarcely have invented it, and Aristotle presupposes it as universally admitted, we need not scruple to make it the basis on which to present the Platonic system.

The order which these different parts should take, Plato himself has not declared. Manifestly, however, dialectic should have the first place as the ground of all philosophy, since Plato uniformly directs that every philosophical investigation should begin with accurately determining the *idea* (*Phæd.*, p. 99 ; *Phædr.*, p. 237), while he subsequently exam-

ines all the concrete spheres of science from the standpoint of the doctrine of ideas. The relative position of the other two parts is not so clear. Since, however, physics culminates in ethics, and ethics, on the other hand, has for its basis physical investigations into the animating principle of nature, we may assign the precedence to physics.

The mathematical sciences Plato has expressly excluded from philosophy. He considers them as helps to philosophical thinking (*Rep.* VII. 526), as necessary steps of knowledge, without which no one can come to philosophy (*Ib.* VI. 510); but mathematics with him is not itself philosophy, for it assumes its principles or axioms, without at all accounting for them, as though they were manifest to all, a procedure which is not permitted to pure science; it also for its demonstrations avails itself of illustrative figures, although it does not treat of these, but of that which they represent to the understanding (*Ib.*). Plato thus places mathematics midway between a correct opinion and science, clearer than the one, but more obscure than the other. (*Ib.* VII. 533.)

IV. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC. 1. CONCEPTION OF DIALECTIC.—The conception of dialectic or logic, is used by the ancients for the most part in a very wide sense, while Plato employs it in repeated instances interchangeably with philosophy, though at other times he treats it also as a separate branch of philosophy. He distinguishes it from physics as the science of the eternal and unchangeable from the science of the changeable, which never is, but is only ever becoming; he distinguishes also between it and ethics, so far as the latter treats of the good not absolutely, but in its concrete exhibition in morals and in the state; so that dialectic may be termed philosophy in a higher sense, while physics and ethics follow it as two less exact sciences, or as a not yet perfected philosophy. Plato himself defines dialectic, according to the ordinary signification of the word, as the art of evolving knowledge conversationally by questions and answers (*Rep.* VII. 534). But since the art of communicating correctly in

dialogue is, according to Plato, at the same time the art of thinking correctly, for thinking and speaking could not be separated by the ancients, but every process of thought was a living dialogue, Plato would more accurately define dialectic as the science which brings speech to a correct issue, and which combines or separates the species, *i.e.*, the conceptions of things correctly (*Soph.*, p. 253; *Phædr.*, p. 266). Dialectic with him has two divisions, to know what can and what cannot be connected, and to know how division or combination can be accomplished. But as with Plato these conceptions of species or ideas are the only actual and true existence, so have we, in entire conformity with this, a third definition of dialectic which is quite frequently employed by him (*Philebus*, p. 57), namely, the science of being, the science of that which is true and unchangeable, the science of all other sciences. We may therefore briefly characterize it as the science of absolute being or of ideas.

2. WHAT IS SCIENCE? (1) *As opposed to sensation and sensuous conception.*—The *Theatætus* is devoted to the discussion of this question in opposition to the Protagorean sensualism. That all knowledge consists in perception, and that the two are one and the same thing, was the Protagorean proposition. From this it followed, as Protagoras himself had inferred, that things are as they appear to me, that perception or sensation is infallible. But since perception and sensation are infinitely diversified with different individuals, and even vary greatly at different times in the same individual, it follows farther, that no determinations and predicates are objective, that we can never affirm what a thing is in itself, that all conceptions, great, small, light, heavy, to increase, to diminish, etc., have only a relative significance, and consequently that general conceptions, since they are combinations of the changeful many, are wholly wanting in constancy and stability. In opposition to this Protagorean thesis, Plato urges the following objections and contradictions. *First*, The Protagorean doctrine leads to

the most startling consequences. If being and appearance, knowledge and perception are one and the same thing, then is the irrational brute, which is capable of perception, as fully entitled to be called the measure of all things, as man, and if representation, as the expression of my subjective state at a given time is infallible, then need there be no more instruction, no more scientific conclusion, no more strife, and no more refutation. *Second*, The Protagorean doctrine is a logical contradiction; for according to it Protagoras must yield the question to every one who disputes with him, since, as he himself affirms, no one is incorrect, but all perceptions and conceptions are equally true; the pretended truth of Protagoras is therefore true for no man, not even for himself. *Third*, Protagoras destroys the knowledge of future events. That which is regarded as profitable by me does not, because I so regard it, necessarily prove itself such in the result. To determine that which is really profitable implies a calculation of the future, but since the ability of men to form such a calculation is very diverse, it follows from this that not man as such, but only the wise man can be the measure of things. *Fourth*, The theory of Protagoras destroys perception itself. Perception, according to him, rests upon a distinction of the perceived object and the perceiving subject, and is the common product of the two. But in his view the objects are in such an uninterrupted flow, that they can neither become fixed in seeing nor in hearing. This condition of constant change renders all knowledge from sense, and hence (the identity of the two being assumed), all knowledge in general impossible. *Fifth*, Protagoras overlooks the *a priori* element in knowledge. It is seen in an analysis of the sense-perception itself, that all knowledge cannot be traced to the activity of the senses, but that there must also be presupposed besides these, intellectual functions, and hence an independent province of supersensible knowledge. We see with the eyes, and hear with the ears, but to group together the perceptions attained through these

different organs, and to hold them fast in the unity of self-consciousness, is beyond the power of the activity of the senses. Again, we compare the different sense-perceptions with one another, a function which cannot belong to the senses, since each sense can only furnish its own distinctive perception. Still farther, we bring forward determinations respecting the perceptions which we manifestly cannot owe to the senses, in that we predicate of these perceptions, being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, etc. These determinations, to which also belong the beautiful and the odious, good and evil, constitute a peculiar province of knowledge, which the soul, independently of every sense-perception, brings forward through its own independent activity. The ethical consequences of this Protagorean doctrine are also exhibited by Plato, in other dialogues, by his polemic against sensualism. He maintains (in the *Sophist*), that men holding such opinions must be improved before they can be instructed, and that when made morally better, they will readily recognize the truth of the soul and its moral and rational capacities, and affirm that these are real things, though objects of neither sight nor of feeling.

(2) *The Relation of Knowledge to Opinion.* — Opinion is just as little identical with knowledge as is sense-perception. An incorrect opinion is certainly different from knowledge, and a correct one is not identical with it, for it can be engendered by the art of speech without therefore attaining the validity of true knowledge. Correct opinion, so far as it is true in matter though imperfect in form, stands rather midway between knowing and not-knowing, and participates in both.

(3) *The Relation of Science to Thought.* — In opposition to the Protagorean sensualism, there has been already established an energy of the soul independent of sensuous perception and sensation, competent in itself to examine the universal, and grasp true being in thought. There is, therefore, a double source of knowledge, sensation and conception,

and rational thinking. Sensation refers to that which is conceived in a constant becoming and perpetual change, to the pure momentary, which is in an incessant transition from the was, through the now, into the shall be (*Parm.*, p. 152) ; it is, therefore, the source of dim, impure, and uncertain knowledge ; thought on the other hand refers to the abiding, which neither becomes nor departs, but remains ever the same. (*Tim.*, p. 51.) Existence, says the *Timæus* (p. 27), is of two kinds, "that which ever is but has no becoming, and that which ever becomes but never is. The one kind, which is always in the same state, is comprehended through reflection by the reason, the other, which becomes and departs, but never properly is, may be apprehended by sensuous perception without the reason." True science, therefore, flows alone from that pure and thoroughly internal activity of the soul which is free from all corporeal qualities and every sensuous disturbance. (*Phæd.*, p. 65.) In this state the soul looks upon things purely as they are (*Phæd.*, p. 66) in their eternal nature and unchangeable condition. Hence the true state of the philosopher is announced in the *Phædo* (p. 64), to be a willingness to die, a longing to fly from the body, as from a hindrance to true knowledge, and become pure spirit. According to all this, science is the thinking of true being or of ideas ; the means to discover and to know these ideas, or the organ for their apprehension is dialectic, or the art of separating and combining conceptions ; the true objects of dialectic are ideas.

3. THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS IN ITS GENESIS. — The Platonic doctrine of ideas is the common product of the Socratic method of forming conceptions, the Heraclitic doctrine of absolute becoming, and the Eleatic doctrine of absolute being. To the first of these Plato owes the idea of knowledge through conceptions, to the second the recognition of the sensuous as mere becoming, to the third the positing of a sphere of absolute reality. Elsewhere (in the *Philebus*) Plato connects the doctrine of ideas with the Pythagorean thought

that every thing may be formed from unity and multiplicity, from the limit and the unlimited. The aim of the *Theatætus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Parmenides* is to determine its relations to the principles of the Eleatics and Heraclitics; this is effected in the *Theatætus* by combating directly the principle of an absolute becoming, in the *Sophist* by combating directly the principle of abstract being, and in the *Parmenides* ironically by taking up the Eleatic one and showing its true relations. We have already spoken of the *Theatætus*; we will now look for the development of the doctrine of ideas in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*.

The ostensible end of the former of these dialogues is to show that the Sophist is really but a caricature of the philosopher, but its true end is to establish the reality of phenomena, *i.e.*, of the not-being, and to discuss speculatively the relation of being and not-being. The doctrine of the Eleatics ended with the rejection of all sensuous knowledge, declaring that the multiplicity of things, or the becoming, which we think we perceive, is in reality a mere appearance. In this there was clearly a contradiction; the not-being was absolutely denied, and yet its existence in human thought was admitted. Plato at once draws attention to this contradiction, showing that a delusive opinion, which gives rise to a false image or representation, is not possible upon this theory which rests upon the assumption that the false, the not-true, *i.e.*, not-being cannot even be thought. This, Plato continues, is the great difficulty in thinking of not-being, that both he who denies and he who affirms its reality is driven to contradict himself. For though it is inexpressible and inconceivable either as one or as many, still, when speaking of it, we must attribute to it both being and multiplicity. If we admit that there is such a thing as a false opinion, we assume in this very fact the notion of not-being, for only that opinion can be said to be false which supposes either the not-being to be, or makes that, which is, not to be. In short, if there actually exists a false notion, so does there actually and truly exist a not-being.

After Plato had thus established the reality of not-being, he discusses the relation of being and not-being, *i.e.*, the relation of conceptions generally in their combinations and antitheses. If not-being has no less reality than being, and being no more than not-being, if, therefore, *e.g.*, the not-great is as truly real as the great, then every conception may in the same way be apprehended as one side of an antithesis, as being and not-being at the same time: it is a being in reference to itself, as something identical with itself, but it is not-being in reference to every one of the numberless other conceptions which can be referred to it, and with which, on account of its difference from them, it can have nothing in common. The conceptions of the same (τὰὐτὸν) and the different (θάτερον) represent the general form of an antithesis. These are the universal formulæ of combination for all conceptions. This reciprocal relation of conceptions as at the same time being and not-being, by virtue of which they can be arranged among themselves, forms the basis of the art of dialectic, which has to judge what conceptions can and what cannot be joined together. Plato illustrates this by taking the conceptions of being, motion (becoming), and rest (existence), and showing from them the results of the combination and reciprocal exclusion of ideas. The conceptions of motion and rest cannot well be joined together, though both of them may be joined with that of being; the conception of rest is therefore in reference to itself a being, but in reference to the conception of motion a not-being or different. Thus the Platonic doctrine of ideas, after having in the *Theætetus* attained its general foundation in fixing the objective reality of conceptions, becomes now still farther developed in the *Sophist* to a doctrine of the community of conceptions, *i.e.*, of their reciprocal subordination and co-ordination. The category which conditions these reciprocal relations is that of not-being or difference. This fundamental thought of the *Sophist*, that being is not without not-being and not-being is not without being, may be expressed in modern phraseology

thus: negation is not not-being but determinateness, and on the other hand all determinateness and concreteness of conceptions, all affirmation arises only through negation; in other words the conception of contradiction is the soul of a philosophical method.

The doctrine of ideas appears in the *Parmenides* as the positive consequence and progressive development of the Eleatic principle. Indeed in this dialogue, in that Plato makes Parmenides the chief speaker, he seems willing to allow that his doctrine is in substance that of the Eleatic sage. True, the fundamental thought of the dialogue — that the one is not conceivable in its complete singleness without the many, nor the many without the one, that each necessarily presupposes and reciprocally conditions the other — stands in the most direct contradiction to Eleaticism. Yet Parmenides himself, by dividing his poem into two parts, and treating in the first of the one and in the second of the many, postulates an inner mediation between these two externally so disjointed parts of his philosophy, and in this respect the Platonic theory of ideas might give itself out as the farther elucidation, and the true sense of the Parmenidean philosophizing. This dialectical mediation between the one and the not-one or the many Plato now attempts in four antinomies, which have ostensibly only a negative result in so far as they show that contradictions arise both whether the one be adopted or rejected. The positive sense of these antinomies, though it can be gained only through inferences which Plato himself does not expressly utter, but leaves to be drawn by the reader — is as follows. The first antinomy shows that the one is inconceivable as such if it is only apprehended in its abstract opposition to the many; the second, that in this case also the reality of the many is inconceivable; the third, that the one or the idea cannot be conceived as not-being, since there can be neither conception nor predicate of the absolute not-being, and since, if not-being is excluded from all fellowship with being, all becoming and departing, all

similarity and difference, every representation and explanation of it must also be denied; and lastly, the fourth affirms that the not-one or the many cannot be conceived without the one or the idea. What now is Plato's aim in this discussion of the dialectic relations between the conceptions of the one and the many? Would he use the conception of the one only as an example to explain his dialectic method with conceptions, or is the discussion of this conception itself the very object before him? Manifestly the latter, or the dialogue ends without result and without any inner connection of its two parts. But how came Plato to make such a special investigation of this conception of the one? If we bear in mind that the Eleatics had already perceived the antithesis of the actual and the phenomenal world in the antithesis of the one and the many, and that Plato himself had also regarded his ideas as the unity of the manifold, as the one and the same in the many—since he repeatedly uses “idea” and “the one” in the same sense, and places (*Rep.* VII. 537) dialectic in the same rank with the faculty of reducing a manifold to unity—then is it clear that the one which is made an object of investigation in the *Parmenides* is the idea in its general sense, *i.e.*, in its logical form, and that Plato consequently in the dialectic of the one and the many would represent the dialectic of the idea and the phenomenal world, or in other words would dialectically determine and establish the correct view of the idea as the unity in the manifoldness of the phenomenal. In that it is shown in the *Parmenides*, on the one side, that the many cannot be conceived without the one, and on the other side, that the one must be something which embraces in itself manifoldness, so have we the ready inference on the one side, that the phenomenal world, or the many, has a true being only in so far as it has the one or the conception within it, and on the other side, that since the conception is not an abstract one but manifoldness in unity, it must actually have manifoldness in unity in order to be able to be in the phenomenal world. The indirect re-

sult of the *Parmenides* is that matter as the infinitely divisible and undetermined mass has no actuality, but is in relation to the ideal world a not-being, and though the ideas as the true being are manifested in it, yet the idea itself is all that is actual in the appearance or phenomena; the phenomenal world derives its whole existence from the ideal world which appears in it, and has being only so far as it has a conception or idea for its content.

4. POSITIVE EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.— Ideas may be defined according to the different sides of their historical connection, as the common in the manifold, the universal in the particular, the one in the many, or the constant and abiding in the changing. Subjectively they are principles of knowledge which cannot be derived from experience, they are the intuitively certain and innate regulators of cognition. Objectively they are the immutable principles of being and of the phenomenal world, incorporeal and simple unities which have no relation to space, and which may be predicated of every thing which can in any way be posited as self-subsistent. The doctrine of ideas grew originally out of the desire to gain a definite conception of the inner essence of things, of what things are in themselves, to express by thought whatever of being is identical with thought, and to comprehend the real world as a harmoniously connected intellectual world. This desire for scientific knowledge Aristotle cites expressly as the motive to the Platonic doctrine of ideas. “Plato,” he says (*Metaph.* XIII. 4), “came to the doctrine of ideas because he was convinced of the truth of the Heraclitic view which regarded the sensible world as a ceaseless flowing and changing. His conclusion from this was, that if there be a science of any thing there must be, besides the sensible, other substances which have permanence, for there can be no science of the fleeting.” It is, therefore, the idea of science which demands the reality of ideas, a demand which cannot be met unless ideas or conceptions are also the ground of all being. This is the case

with Plato. According to him there can be neither true knowledge nor true being without ideas and conceptions which have an independent reality.

What now does Plato mean by idea? From what has already been said it is clear that he means something more than ideal conceptions of the beautiful and the good. An idea is found, as the name itself (εἶδος) indicates, wherever a universal conception of a species or kind is found. Hence Plato speaks of the idea of a bed, table, strength, health, tone, color, ideas of simple relations and properties, ideas of mathematical figures, and even ideas of not-being, and of that, which in its essence is merely a contradiction of the idea, baseness, and vice. In a word, we may put an idea wherever many things may be characterized by a common name (*Rep.* X. 596) : or as Aristotle expresses it (*Met.* XII. 3), Plato posits an idea for every class of being. In this sense Plato expresses himself in the beginning of the *Parmenides*. Parmenides asks the young Socrates what he calls ideas. Socrates answers by naming unconditionally the moral ideas, the ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, and then after a little delay he mentions some physical ones, as the ideas of man, of fire, of water ; he will not allow ideas to be predicated of that which is only a formless mass, or which is a part of something else, as hair, mud, and clay, but in this he is answered by Parmenides, that if he would be fully imbued with philosophy, he must not consider such things as these to be wholly despicable, but should look upon them as truly though remotely participating in the idea. Here at least the claim is asserted that no province of being is excluded from the idea, that even that which appears most accidental and irrational is yet a part of rational knowledge, in fact that every thing existing may be conceived as rational.

5. THE RELATION OF IDEAS TO THE PHENOMENAL WORLD. — Analogous to the different definitions of idea are the different names which Plato gives to the sensible and phenomenal world. He calls it the many, the divisible, the unbounded,

the undetermined and measureless, the becoming, the relative, great and small, not-being. But in what relation these two worlds of sense and of ideas stand to each other is a question which Plato has answered neither fully nor consistently with himself. If, as is most common, he characterizes the relation of things to conceptions as a participation, or calls things the copies and adumbrations, while ideas are the archetypes, these metaphorical definitions do not explain, but on the contrary merely hide the chief difficulties in the doctrine of ideas. The difficulty lies in the contradiction which grows out of the fact that while Plato admits the reality of the becoming and of the province of the becoming, he still affirms that ideas, which are substances ever at rest and ever the same, are the only actualities. Now in this Plato is indeed formally consistent with himself, in that he characterizes the *matériel* of matter not as a positive substratum but as not-being, and guards himself with the express affirmation that he does not consider the sensuous as being, but only as something similar to being. (*Rep.* X. 597.) The position laid down in the *Parmenides* is also consistent with this, that a perfect philosophy should look upon the idea as the cognizable in the phenomenal world, and should follow it out in the smallest particulars until every part of being should be known and all dualism removed. In fine, Plato in many of his expressions seems to regard the world of sensation only as a subjective appearance, as a product of subjective representation, as the result of a confused way of representing ideas. In this sense phenomena are entirely dependent on ideas; they are nothing but the ideas themselves in the form of not-being; the phenomenal world derives its whole existence from the ideal world which appears in it. But yet when Plato calls the sensuous a mingling of the same with the different or the not-being (*Tim.*, p. 35), when he characterizes the ideas as vowels which run through every thing like a chain (*Soph.*, p. 253), when he himself conceives the possibility that matter might offer opposition to the formative energy of ideas (*Tim.*,

p. 56), when he speaks of an evil soul of the world (*de Leg.* X. 896), and gives intimations of the presence in the world of a principle in nature hostile to God (*Polit.*, p. 268), when he in the *Phædo* treats of the relation between body and soul as one wholly discordant and malignant, — in all this there is evidence enough, even after allowing for the mythical form of the *Timæus*, and the rhetorical composition which prevails in the *Phædo*, to substantiate the contradiction mentioned above. This is most clear in the *Timæus*. Plato in this dialogue makes the sensible world to be formed by a Creator who uses ideas as patterns, but posits as a condition of the creative activity of this Demiurge or Creator a something which should be apt to receive and exhibit this ideal image. This something Plato compares to the matter which is fashioned by the artisan (whence the later name *hyle*). He characterizes it as wholly undetermined and formless, but possessing in itself an aptitude for every variety of form, an invisible and shapeless thing, a something which it is difficult to characterize, and which Plato even does not seem inclined very closely to describe. In this the actuality of matter is denied; even when Plato makes it equivalent to space it is only the place, the negative condition of the sensible; it possesses being only as it receives in itself the ideal form. Still matter remains the objective and phenomenal form of the idea: the visible world arises only through the mingling of ideas with this substratum, and if matter be metaphysically expressed as “the different,” then does it follow with logical necessity in a dialectical discussion that it is just as truly being as not-being. Plato does not conceal from himself this difficulty, and therefore attempts to represent with comparisons and images this presupposition of a *hyle* which he finds it as impossible to do without as to express in an intelligible form. If he would do without it he must rise to the conception of an absolute creation, or consider matter as an ultimate emanation from the absolute spirit, or else explain it as appearance only. Thus the Platonic system is only a fruitless struggle against dualism.

6. THE IDEA OF THE GOOD AND THE DEITY. — If the true is exhibited in general conceptions which are so related to each other that every higher conception embraces and combines under it several lower, so that any one starting from a single idea may eventually discover all (*Meno.*, p. 81), then must the sum of ideas form a connected organism and succession in which the lower appears as a stepping-stone and presupposition to a higher. This succession must end in an idea which needs no higher idea or presupposition to sustain it. This highest idea, the ultimate limit of all knowledge, and itself the independent ground of all other ideas, Plato calls the idea of the good, *i.e.*, not of moral but of metaphysical good. (*Rep.* VII. 517.)

What this good is in itself, Plato undertakes to show only in images. "In the same manner as the sun," he says in the Republic (VI. 506), "is the cause of sight, and the cause not merely that objects are visible but also that they grow and are produced, so the good is of such power and beauty, that it is not merely the cause of science to the soul, but is also the cause of being and reality to whatever is the object of science; and as the sun is not itself sight or the object of sight but presides over both, so the good is not science and truth but is superior to both, they being not the good itself but of a goodly nature." The idea of the good excludes all presupposition, in so far as the good has unconditioned worth and lends value to every thing else. It is the ultimate ground at the same time of knowing and of being, of the perceiver and the perceived, of the subjective and the objective, of the ideal and the real, though itself exalted above such a distinction. (*Rep.* VI. 508-517.) Plato, however, did not attempt a derivation of the remaining ideas from the idea of the good; his course here is wholly an empirical one; a certain class of objects are taken, and having been referred to their common essence, this latter is given out as their idea. He treated individual conceptions so independently, and made each one so complete in itself, that it is impossible to find a proper

division or establish an immanent continuation of one into another.

It is difficult to say precisely what relation, in the Platonic view, this idea of the good, and the ideal world in general, bore to the Deity. On the whole it seems clear that Plato regarded the two as identical, but whether he conceived this highest cause to be a personal being or not is a question which hardly admits of a definite answer. The logical result of his system would exclude the personality of God. If only the universal (the idea) truly exists, then must the only absolute idea, the Deity, be only the absolute universal; but that Plato was himself conscious of this logical conclusion we can hardly affirm, any more than we can say on the other hand that he was clearly a theist. For though in numberless mythical or popular statements he speaks of God and the gods, this only indicates that he is speaking in the language of the popular religion, and when he speaks in an accurate philosophical sense, he only makes the relation of the personal deity with the idea a very uncertain one. Most probable, therefore, is it that this whole question concerning the personality of God was not yet definitely before him, that he took up this idea and defended it in the interests of morality against the anthropomorphism of the mythic poets, and that he sought to establish it by arguments drawn from the evidences of design in nature, and the universal prevalence of a belief in a God, while as a philosopher he made no use of it.

V. THE PLATONIC PHYSICS. 1. NATURE.—The connection between the Physics and the Dialectic of Plato lies principally in two points,—the conception of becoming, which forms the chief characteristic of nature, and that of real being, which, when apprehended as the good, is the basis of every teleological explanation of nature. Since nature belongs to the province of irrational sensation it cannot claim the same accuracy of treatment as is exhibited in dialectic. Plato therefore applied himself with much less zest to physical investigations than to those of an ethical or dialectical

character, and indeed only attended to them in his later years. Only in one dialogue, the *Timæus*, do we find any extended evolution of physical doctrines, and even here Plato seems to have gone to his work with much less than his wonted independence, this dialogue being more strongly tinctured with Pythagoreanism than any other of his writings. The difficulty of the *Timæus* is increased by its mythical form, by which the old commentators themselves were puzzled. If we take the first impression that it gives us, it appears to posit as prior to the creation of the world, a Creator (or Demiurgus) as moving and reflecting principle, with on the one side the ideal world existing immovable as the eternal archetype, and on the other side, a chaotic, formless, irregular, fluctuating mass, which holds in itself the germ of the material world, but has no determined character nor substance. From these two elements the Creator now constructs the world-soul, *i.e.*, the invisible dynamical principle (which is, however, conceived as extended in space) of the order and movement of the world. The Demiurgus spreads out this world-soul like a vast net or frame throughout the entire space which the world when created is to occupy, dividing this space thus into two spheres, *viz.*, the region of the fixed stars and the planetary heavens, and sub-dividing the second into seven smaller circles corresponding to the orbits of the seven planets. The material world, which has become actual through the arrangement of the chaotic mass into the four elements, is built into this frame, and the process thus begun is completed in its internal structure by the formation of the organic world.

It is difficult to separate the mythical and the philosophical elements in this cosmogony of the *Timæus*, especially difficult to determine how far that which is historical in this construction, the succession of creative acts in time, belongs to the mere form. The significance of the world-soul is clearer. In the Platonic system the soul is, in general, a mean between the ideas and corporeal existence, the medium through

which matter is formed, individualized, animated, and governed; or, in a word, is raised from disorderly multiplicity to organic unity and maintained in this condition. In a similar way, with Plato, number is a mean between the idea and phenomena, in so far as through it the totality of material being is brought into the definite quantitative relations of multitude, magnitude, figure, parts, position, distance, etc., — in a word, articulated arithmetically and geometrically, instead of existing as a limitless and undifferentiated mass. In the world-soul both these functions are united. It is the universal medium between ideas and phenomena, the great world-schema which on a grand scale forms and articulates matter, the mighty world-force by which matter (*e.g.*, the heavenly bodies) is kept within this order, moved (revolved), and, through this ordered movement raised to a real copy of the idea. The Platonic view of nature, in opposition to the mechanical explanations of the earlier philosophers, is entirely teleological, and based upon the conception of the good. Plato conceives the world as the image of the good, as the work of divine munificence. Constructed by its Demiurgus in accordance with the eternal idea it is perfect, the ever-abiding, never-changing image of the good, vitalized and rationalized through the indwelling soul, — infinitely beautiful, nay divine. As it is the image of the perfect it is therefore only one, corresponding to the idea of the single all-embracing substance, for an infinite number of worlds is not to be conceived as actual. For the same reason the world is spherical, after the most perfect and uniform structure, which embraces in itself all other forms; its movement is in a circle, because this, by returning into itself, is most like the movement of reason. The particular points of the *Timæus*, the derivation of the four elements, the separation of the seven planets according to the musical scale, the opinion that the stars were immortal and heavenly substances, the affirmation that the earth holds an abiding position in the middle of the world, a view which subsequently became elab-

orated to the Ptolemaic system, the reference of all material figures to elementary geometrical forms, the division of inanimate nature, according to the four elements, into beings of fire and light (gods and demons), and of earth, water, and air, the discussions respecting organic nature, and especially respecting the construction of the human body—all these we need here only mention. Their philosophical worth consists not so much in their material content,—for they rather serve to show the entire worthlessness of the natural science of that age,—as in their fundamental idea, that the world should be conceived as the image and the work of reason, as an organism of order, harmony, and beauty, as the good actualizing itself.

2. THE SOUL.—The doctrine of the soul, considering it simply as the basis of moral action, and leaving out of view all questions of concrete ethics, is the completion, the keystone of the Platonic physics. The individual soul possesses the same nature and character as the world-soul. It is essential to the perfection of the world that it should contain a plurality of souls, through which the principle of rationality and vitality may be particularized in a plenitude of individuals. The soul is in itself indestructible, and by virtue of its rationality is of a divine nature; it is formed for the knowledge of the divine and eternal, for a pure and blessed life in the contemplation of the ideal world. But no less essential to it is its connection with a material, perishable body. A race of perishable beings must, for the sake of completeness in the genera of things, be represented in the universe; and this is accomplished by individual souls through their residence in the body. The soul, while it is united to the body, participates in its movements and changes; it is, thus, in this respect, related to the perishable, and subject to the changing conditions of sensuous life, to the influence of sensuous impressions and impulses. It cannot, therefore, retain its pure divinity; it sinks from the heavenly to the earthly, from the Godlike to the perishable. In the indi-

vidual soul is exhibited the conflict between the higher principle and the lower; intellect yields to the power of sense; the latent dualism between idea and reality, which in the universe taken as a whole is reduced to unity, finds here, in the soul, its complete actuality. Though on the one hand the souls rules and restrains the body, it is on the other hand just as truly swayed by the body, bound down by it to the lower sensuous life, to forgetfulness of its nobler origin, and to the finitude of perception and volition. This interaction of soul and body is mediated through an inferior, sensuous faculty of the soul; hence Plato distinguishes in the soul two constituents, the divine and the perishable, the rational and the irrational, between which is placed, as a mediating link, courage (*θυμὸς*), which, though nobler than sensuous impulse, yet, since it is exhibited by children and even by brutes, and often allows itself to be carried away blindly without reflection, belongs to man's sensuous nature, and must not be confounded with reason. Thus, according to the Platonic doctrine, the soul, during its connection with the body, is in a condition totally inadequate to its nature. Potentially it is divine, in possession of true knowledge, self-subsistent, free, — *actually* it is precisely the reverse, weak, sensuous, subject to the influence of its physical nature, entangled in evil and sin by all the disquietudes, impulses, passions, and conflicts which originate in the predominance of the sensuous principle, in the necessity of physical self-preservation, and in the struggle for possession and enjoyment. A dim consciousness of its loftier origin, a longing for its home, the ideal world, does indeed remain with it, and manifest itself as love of knowledge, enthusiasm for the beautiful (*Eros*), and in the endeavor of the spirit to become master of the body. But this very longing shows that the true life of the soul cannot be this present sensuous existence, but must lie in a future to be realized only after its separation from the body. The soul which has abandoned itself to sensuality is condemned to enter into other bodies or even into lower forms of existence from

which it is released only when in the course of time it has returned to its original purity. The pure soul which has endured unsoiled the test of association with the corporeal world returns at death immediately to its state of blessed rest; then, after a brief period of enjoyment, it resumes once more its life in the body. Plato's accounts of these future states of the soul do not always accord one with another; the statements of the *Phædrus* and *Phædo*, of the *Republic* and *Timæus*, differ in many respects. Plato is, however, like the Pythagoreans, really in earnest in the matter. It is really his opinion that the progress of the world, the history of the universe, has for its content just this perpetual transition of souls from the higher to the lower, from the divine to the human world. The soul is of too noble a nature to merely begin with this life and then vanish; it is divine and eternal. It is not, however, pure being, like the idea; it has in itself something of "the other"; it is at once spiritual and unspiritual, free and not free. These two contradictory elements are manifested in that change from the superior to the inferior state under the form of a succession in time. The soul exhibits the enigma of an equal inclination toward the ideal and the sensuous; and this enigma is solved, according to Plato, by just this doctrine of the constitution and destiny of the soul itself. All this appears to be very different from Socrates. The Socratic postulate that man ought not to act from sensuous impulses, but intelligently, seems to be transformed into a speculative philosopheme which endeavors to explain how the sensuous and rational are united in man. But it is just this fact, that the whole of Plato's philosophy is concentrated upon this point, *i.e.*, upon the ethical nature and character of the soul, which proves him to be a true disciple of the master who had aroused in him this lofty idea of the exaltation of spirit over sense.

VI. THE PLATONIC ETHICS. — The main problem of Plato's ethics (which is nothing but the practical application of his

theory of ideas), as with the ethics of the other Socratics, is to define the highest good, the end which all volition and action posit as their goal. From the definition of the *summum bonum* is deduced the theory of virtue, which in turn is the basis of the doctrine of the state, *i.e.*, of the objective realization of the good in human society.

(1) *The Highest Good.* What this supreme aim must be is at once evident from the general character of the Platonic system. Not life amid the nonentities, mortality, and vicissitudes of sensuous existence, but exaltation to the ideal, to the only true being, is both in itself and for man that which is absolutely good. The soul's problem and vocation is to flee from the internal and external evils of sense, to purify and free itself from the influences of the body, and to strive to become pure, upright, and thus godlike (*Theætetus*; *Phædo*). The way to attain this is to withdraw the mind from sensuous conceptions and desires, and direct it upon that cognition of the truth which reflection alone can give, — in a word, upon philosophy. Philosophy is with Plato as with Socrates, not something purely theoretical, but the return of the soul to its true nature, a spiritual regeneration in which the soul regains its lost knowledge of the ideal world, and thus the consciousness of its own higher origin, of its original superiority to the sensuous world. In philosophy the mind purifies itself from all admixture of sense; it comes to itself and re-obtains that freedom and rest of which its immersion in the material had deprived it. Such being Plato's conception of the highest good, it was natural that he should vehemently oppose the hedonism of the Sophistic-Cyrenaics. The *Gorgias* and *Philebus* are especially devoted to the refutation of their views. In these dialogues he endeavors to prove that pleasure is something insubstantial and indefinite, which can give to life neither order nor harmony; that it is altogether relative since it can readily be transformed into pain, and induces pain just in proportion to its own intensity; and that it is a contradiction to place

pleasure, which in itself is worthless, above the power and virtue of the soul. Yet on the other hand, Plato no more in his practical than in his theoretical philosophy approved of the Cynic-Megaric abstraction which would recognize nothing positive except cognition, no concrete spiritual activity, no special science or art, nor any refinement of life through pleasure. The concrete sciences and arts, and those kinds of pleasure which do not impair the harmony of the spiritual, those pure, painless, passionless, innocent delights which spring from the contemplation of spiritual and natural beauty, have their proper sphere as well as pure philosophy. The good is not a life of mere knowledge or mere pleasure, but the unity of the two; yet it is a life in which knowledge predominates, since it is the element through which volition and action are reduced to rationality, order, and measure. A certain vacillation in Plato's opinions in regard to the highest good must not, however, be overlooked. As sensuous existence is for him, at one time, a pure nonentity, the mere disturbance and distortion of ideal being, and at another a beautiful copy of the ideal archetype; so in the ethics we perceive sometimes a tendency towards a purely ascetic view of sense as the source of sin and evil (*Phædo*), and at others, a more positive view (*Symposium*; *Philebus*) which considers a life without pleasure to be too abstract, monotonous, and spiritless, and therefore permits the beautiful to maintain a position cöordinate with the good.

2. VIRTUE. — In his theory of virtue, Plato is at first wholly Socratic. He holds fast to the opinion that it is knowledge (*Protagoras*), and therefore teachable (*Meno*); and as to its *unity*, though it follows from his later dialectical investigations that the one can be manifold, or the manifold one, and that, therefore, virtue must both be regarded as one, and also as many, he nevertheless emphasizes prominently the unity and connection of all virtues, and is fond of painting, especially in the introductory dialogues, some single virtue as comprising in itself the sum of all the rest. Plato follows

for the most part the fourfold division of virtues, as popularly made; and only in the *Republic* (IV. 441) does he attempt a scientific derivation of them, by referring to each of the three faculties of the soul its appropriate virtue. The virtue of the reason he calls prudence or wisdom, the directing or measuring virtue, since reason must govern the soul; the virtue of the heart is valor, the helpmeet of reason, or it is the heart imbued with true knowledge, which in the struggle against pleasure and pain, desire and fear, asserts itself to be the correct judge of that which ought or ought not to be feared; the virtue of sensuous desire, whose function is to restrain this within its proper limits, is temperance; and, lastly, that virtue to which belong the due regulation and mutual adjustment of the several powers of the soul, and which, therefore, constitutes the bond and the unity of the three other virtues, is justice.

In this last conception, that of justice, all the elements of moral culture meet together and centre, exhibiting the moral life of the individual as a perfect whole, and then, by requiring an application of the same principle to communities, the moral consideration is advanced beyond the narrow circle of individual life. Thus is established the whole of the moral world — Justice “in great letters,” the moral life in its complete totality, is the state. In this is first realized the demand for the complete harmony of the human life. In and through the state comes the complete elaboration of matter for the reason.

3. THE STATE.—The Platonic state is generally regarded as an ideal or chimera, which it is impracticable to realize among men. This view of the case has even been ascribed to Plato, and it has been said that in his *Republic* he attempted to sketch only a fine ideal of a state constitution, while in the *Laws* he traced out a practicable philosophy of the state from the standpoint of the common consciousness. But in the first place, this was not Plato's own opinion. Although he acknowledges that the state he describes cannot be found

on earth, and is only a heavenly archetype adapted merely to the instruction of the philosopher (IX. 592), still he demands that efforts should be made to realize it here, and he even attempts to show the conditions and means under which such a state could be made actual, by adapting its particular institutions to counteract the defects arising from the different characters and temperaments of men. A constitution, dissociated from the idea, could only appear untrue to a philosopher like Plato, who saw the actual and the true only in the idea; and the common view which supposes that he wrote his *Republic* in the full consciousness of its impracticability, mistakes entirely the standpoint of the Platonic philosophy. Still farther the question whether such a state as the Platonic is attainable and the best, is in itself idle and irrelevant. The Platonic state is the Grecian idea of a state presented in the form of a narrative. But the idea, that which is rational in the world's history, — since it is absolutely actual, that in the existent which is essential and necessary, — is no inane and impotent ideal. The truly ideal is not *to be* actual, but *is* actual, and the only actual; if an idea were too good for existence, or the empirical actuality too bad for it, then were this a fault of the ideal itself. Plato has not given himself up merely to abstract theories; the philosopher cannot transcend his age, but can only see and grasp it in its true significance. This Plato has done. His standpoint is his own age. He looks upon the political life of the Greeks as then existing, and it is this life, exalted to its idea, which forms the real content of the Platonic *Republic*. Plato has here represented Greek morality on its substantial side. If the Platonic *Republic* seems prominently an ideal which can never be realized this is owing much less to its ideality than to the defects of the political life of the ancients. The most prominent characteristic of the Hellenic conception of the state, before the Greeks began to fall into unbridled licentiousness, was the constraint thrown upon personal subjective freedom, in the sacrifice of every individual interest to the

absolute sovereignty of the state. With Plato also, the state is all in all. His political institutions, so loudly ridiculed by the ancients, are only the undeniable consequences following from the very idea of the Grecian state, which in distinction from the modern state, allowed neither to the individual citizen nor to a corporation, any lawful sphere of action independent of itself. It did not recognize the principle of subjective freedom; and it is just this non-recognition of the subject, which Plato, in opposition to the ruinous tendencies of his age, made the fundamental principle of his state.

The grand feature of the Platonic state is, as has been said, the sacrifice of the individual to the universal state, the reduction of moral to political virtue. Plato desires that social ethics shall become universal and attain a firmly established existence; sense must everywhere be restrained and subordinated to intelligence. But if this is to be accomplished, a universal, *i.e.*, a political, authority must undertake the education of all in virtue, and the preservation of good morals, and all individual self-will and selfishness must be subordinated to the common will and the common good. The sensuous principle in man is so mighty that it can be rendered powerless only by the superior strength of social institutions, through the suppression of all selfish activity for private ends, and the merging of the individual in the universal. Only in this way is virtue, and thus true blessedness possible. Virtue must be realized first in the state and then in the individual citizen. Hence the severity and rigor of the Platonic theory of the state. In a perfect state all things, joy and sorrow, and even eyes, ears, and hands, must be common to all, so that the social life would be as it were the life of one man. This perfect universality and unity, can only be actualized when every thing individual and particular falls away. Private property and domestic life (in place of which comes a community of goods and of wives), education and instruction, the choice of rank and profession, the arts and sciences, all these must be subjected and placed under

the exclusive and absolute control of the state. The individual may lay claim only to that happiness which belongs to him as a constituent element of the state. From this point Plato goes down into the minutest particulars, and gives the closest directions respecting gymnastics and music, which form the two means of culture of the higher ranks; respecting the study of mathematics, and philosophy, the choice of stringed instruments, and the proper measure of verse; respecting bodily exercise and the service of women in war; respecting marriage settlements, and the age at which any one should study dialectic, marry, and beget children. The state with him is only a great educational establishment, a family in the mass. — Lyric poetry he would allow only under the inspection of competent judges. Epic and dramatic poetry, even Homer and Hesiod, should be banished from the state, since they rouse and lead astray the passions, and give unworthy representations of the gods. Exhibitions of physical degeneracy or weakness should not be tolerated in the Platonic state; deformed and sickly infants should be abandoned, and food and attention should be denied to the sick. — In all this we find the chief antithesis of the ancient to the modern state. Plato did not recognize the will and choice of the individual, and yet the individual has a right to demand this. The problem of the modern state has been to unite these two sides, to bring the universal end and the particular aims of the individual into harmony, to reconcile the highest possible freedom of the conscious individual will, with the highest possible supremacy of the state.

The political institutions of the Platonic state are decidedly aristocratic. Grown up in opposition to the extravagances of the Athenian democracy, Plato prefers an absolute monarchy to every other constitution, though this should have as its absolute ruler only the perfect philosopher. It is a well-known expression of his, that the state can only attain its end when philosophers become its rulers, or when its present rulers have prosecuted their studies so far and so accurately,

that they can unite philosophy with a superintendence of public affairs (V. 473). His reason for claiming that the sovereign power should be vested only in one, is the fact that very few are endowed with political wisdom. This ideal of an absolute ruler who should be able to govern the state perfectly, Plato abandons in the *Laws*, in which work he shows his preference for a mixed constitution, embracing both a monarchical and a democratic element. From the aristocratic tendency of the Platonic state, follows farther the sharp division of ranks, and the total exclusion of the third rank from a proper political life. In reality Plato makes but two classes in his state, the subjects and the sovereign, analogous to his twofold psychological division of sensible and intellectual, mortal and immortal; but as in psychology he had introduced a middle term, spirit, to stand between his two divisions there, so in the state he brings in the military class between the ruler and those intended to supply the physical wants of the community. We have thus three ranks, that of the ruler, corresponding to the reason, that of the warrior, answering to the heart (courage), and that of the craftsman, which is made parallel to appetite or sensuous desire. To these three ranks belong three separate functions: to the first, that of legislation and caring for the general good; to the second, that of defending the commonwealth from attacks of external foes; and to the third, the care of separate interests and wants, as agriculture, mechanics, etc. From each of these three ranks and its functions the state derives a peculiar virtue—wisdom from the ruler, bravery from the warrior, and temperance from the craftsman, so far as he lives in obedience to his rulers. In the proper union of these three virtues is found the justice of the state, a virtue which is thus the sum of all other virtues. Plato pays little attention to the lowest rank, that of the craftsman, who exists in the state only as means. He held that it was not necessary to give laws and care for the rights of this portion of the community. The separation between the

ruler and the warrior is not so broad. Plato suffers these two ranks to interpenetrate each other, and analogous to his original psychological division, as though the reason were but courage in its highest development, he makes the oldest and the best of the warriors rise to the dignity and power of rulers. The education of its warriors should therefore be a chief care of the state, in order that their spirit, though losing none of its peculiar energy, may yet be imbued with reason. The best endowed by nature and culture among the warriors, may be selected at the age of thirty, and put upon a course of careful training. When he has reached the age of fifty and looked upon the idea of the good, he may be bound to actualize this archetype in the state, provided always that every one wait his turn, and spend his remaining time in philosophy. Only thus can the state be raised to the unconditioned rule of reason under the supremacy of the good.

VII. RETROSPECT. — With Plato Greek philosophy reached the highest point of its development. The Platonic system is the first complete construction of the entire natural and spiritual universe in accordance with one single philosophical principle; it is the type of all higher speculation, of all metaphysical as well as ethical idealism. Based upon the comparatively simple foundation laid by Socrates philosophy here for the first time attained a complete realization; here, with Plato, the spirit of philosophy elevated itself to that full self-consciousness, which with Socrates was only a dim, uncertain instinct. Plato's soaring genius was required to completely realize that for which Socrates had prepared the way. But at the same time Plato placed philosophy in an idealistic opposition to the given actuality, which, springing more from his individual character and surroundings than from the nature of the Greek mind, needed to be supplemented by a realistic view of things. This was supplied by Aristotle.

SECTION XV.

THE OLD ACADEMY.

IN the old Academy we find no spirit of invention, and with few exceptions, no movements of progress, but rather a gradual retrogression of the Platonic philosophizing. After the death of Plato, Speusippus, his nephew and disciple, taught in the Academy during eight years. He was succeeded by Xenocrates, after whom came Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. It was a time in which schools for higher culture were established, and the older teacher yielded to his younger successor the post of instruction. The general characteristics of the old Academy, so far as can be gathered from the scanty accounts concerning it, were great attention to learning, the prevalence of Pythagorean elements, especially the doctrine of number, and lastly, the reception of fantastic and demonological notions, among which the worship of the stars played a part. The prevalence of the Pythagorean doctrine of number in the later instructions of the Academy, gave to mathematical sciences, particularly arithmetic and astronomy, a high place, and at the same time assigned to the doctrine of ideas a much lower position than Plato had given it. Subsequently, the attempt was made to get back to the unadulterated doctrine of Plato. Crantor is said to be the first editor of the Platonic writings.

As Plato was the only true Socratic, so was Aristotle the only genuine disciple of Plato, though often accused by his fellow-disciples of being unfaithful to his master's principles.

We pass on at once to him, without stopping now to inquire into his relation to Plato, or the advance which he made beyond his predecessor, since these points will come up before us in the exposition of the Aristotelian philosophy. (See Sect. XVI., III. 1.)

SECTION XVI.

ARISTOTLE.

I. LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE. — Aristotle was born 385 B.C. at Stagira, a Greek colony in Thrace. His father, Nicomachus, was a physician, and the friend of Amyntas, king of Macedonia. The former fact may have had its influence in determining the scientific tendencies of the son, and the latter may have procured his subsequent summons to the Macedonian court. Aristotle at a very early age lost both his parents. In his seventeenth year he came to Plato at Athens, and continued with him twenty years. On account of his indomitable zeal for study, Plato named him "the Reader," and said, upon comparing him with Xenocrates, that the latter required the spur, the former the bit. Among the many charges made against his character, most prominent are those of jealousy and ingratitude towards his master, but most of the anecdotes in which these charges are embodied merit little credence. It is certain that Aristotle, after the death of Plato, stood in friendly relations with Xenocrates; still, as a writer, he can hardly be absolved from a certain want of friendship and regard towards Plato and his philosophy, though all this can be explained on psychological grounds. After Plato's death, Aristotle went with Xenocrates to Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus, whose sister Pythias he married after Hermias had fallen a victim to Persian treachery. After the death of Pythias he is said to have married his concubine, Herpyllis, who was the mother of his son Nicomachus. In the year 343 he was called by Philip of Macedon, to take the charge of the education of his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. Both father and son honored him highly, and the latter, with royal munificence, subsequently supported him in his studies. When Alexander went to

Persia, Aristotle betook himself to Athens, and taught in the Lyceum, the only gymnasium then vacant, since Xenocrates had possession of the Academy, and the Cynics of the Cynosarges. From the shady walks (περίπατοι) of the Lyceum, in which Aristotle was accustomed to walk and expound his philosophy, his school received the name of the Peripatetic. Aristotle is said to have spent his mornings with his more mature disciples, exercising them in the profoundest questions of philosophy, while his evenings were occupied with a greater number of pupils in more general and preparatory instruction. The former investigations were called acroamatic, the latter exoteric. He abode at Athens, and taught thirteen years, and then, after the death of Alexander, whose displeasure he had incurred, he is said to have been accused by the Athenians of impiety towards the gods, and to have fled to Chalcis, in order to escape a fate similar to that of Socrates. He died in the year 322 at Chalcis, in Eubœa.

Aristotle left a vast number of writings, of which the smaller (perhaps a sixth), but unquestionably the more important portion have come down to us, though in a form which admits of many doubts and objections. The story of Strabo about the fate of the Aristotelian writings, and the injury which they suffered in a cellar at Scepsis in Troas is confessedly a fable, or at least limited to the original manuscripts; but the fragmentary and descriptive form of many among them, and especially of the most important (*e.g.*, the *Metaphysic*), the fact that scattered portions of one and the same work (*e.g.*, the *Ethics*) are repeatedly found in different treatises, the irregularities and striking contradictions in one and the same treatise, the disagreement found in other particulars among different works, and the distinction made by Aristotle himself between acroamatic and exoterical writings, all this gives reason to believe that we have, for the most part, before us only his oral lectures written down, and subsequently edited by his scholars.

II. GENERAL CHARACTER AND DIVISION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY. — With Plato, philosophy had been national in both its form and content, but with Aristotle it loses its Hellenic peculiarity, and becomes universal in scope and meaning; the Platonic dialogue changes into barren prose; a rigid, technical language takes the place of the mythical and poetical dress; the thinking which had been with Plato intuitive, is with Aristotle discursive; the immediate intuition of reason in the former, becomes reflection and conception in the latter. Turning away from the Platonic unity of all being, Aristotle prefers to direct his attention to the manifoldness of the phenomenal; he seeks the idea only in its concrete actualization, and consequently grasps the particular far more prominently in its peculiar determinateness and reciprocal differences, than in its connection with the idea. He embraces with equal interest the facts given in nature, in history, and in the inner life of man. But he ever tends toward the individual, he must ever have a fact given in order to develop his thought upon it; it is always the empirical, the actual, which solicits and guides his speculation; his whole philosophy is a description of the facts given, and only merits the name of a philosophy because it comprehends the empirical in its totality and synthesis, because it has carried out its induction to the farthest extent. Only because he is the absolute empiricist may Aristotle be called the truest philosopher.

This character of the Aristotelian philosophy explains at the outset its encyclopedic tendency, inasmuch as every thing given in experience is equally worthy of regard and investigation. Aristotle is thus the founder of many departments of science unknown before him; he is not only the father of logic, but also of natural history, empirical psychology, and the science of rights.

This devotion of Aristotle to the given facts will also explain his predominant inclination towards physics, for nature is the most immediate and actual. Connected also with this is the fact that Aristotle is the first among philosophers who

gave to history and its tendencies an accurate attention. The first book of the *Metaphysic* is also the first attempt at a history of philosophy, as his *Politics* is the first critical account of the different historical states and constitutions. In both these cases he brings out his own theory only as a deduction from historical *data*, basing it in the former case upon the works of his predecessors, and in the latter case upon the constitutions which lie before him.

It is clear that according to this, the method of Aristotle must be a different one from that of Plato. Instead of proceeding like the latter, synthetically and dialectically, he pursues for the most part an analytic and regressive course, that is, going backward from the concrete to its ultimate ground and determination. While Plato would take his standpoint in the idea, in order to explain from this position and set in a clearer light that which is given and empirical, Aristotle on the other hand, starts with that which is given, in order to find and exhibit the idea in it. His method is, hence, induction; that is, the derivation of certain principles and maxims from a sum of given facts and phenomena; his mode of procedure is, usually, argument, an impartial balancing of facts, phenomena, circumstances and possibilities. He appears to be for the most part only a thoughtful observer. Renouncing all claim to universality and necessity in his results, he is content to have brought out that which has an approximate truth, and the highest degree of probability. He often affirms that science does not simply relate to the changeless and necessary, but also to that which ordinarily takes place, that being alone excluded from its province, which is strictly accidental. Philosophy, consequently, has with him the character and worth of a computation of probabilities, and his mode of exposition assumes not unfrequently the form of a hesitating deliberation. Hence there is in him no trace of the Platonic ideals; hence, also, his repugnance to a glowing and poetic style in philosophy, a repugnance which, while it induces in him a fixed, philo-

sophical terminology, also frequently leads him to mistake and misrepresent the opinions of his predecessors. Hence, also, in whatever he treated, his thorough adherence to the actual facts.

Connected, in fine, with the empirical character of the Aristotelian philosophizing, is the fragmentary form of his writings, and their want of a systematic division and arrangement. Proceeding always from particular to particular, he considers every province of the actual by itself, and makes it the subject of a separate treatise; but he, for the most part, fails to indicate the lines by which the different parts are united and comprehended in a systematic whole. Thus he founded a number of co-ordinate sciences, each one of which has an independent basis, but he fails to give us the highest science which embraces them all. It is sometimes affirmed that all his writings follow the idea of a whole; but in their procedure there is such a want of all systematic connection, and every one of his writings is a monograph so thoroughly independent and complete in itself, that we are sometimes puzzled to know what Aristotle himself received as a part of philosophy, and what he excluded. We are never furnished with an independent scheme or outline, we rarely find definite results or summary explanations. Even the different divisions of philosophy which he gives, vary essentially from one another. At one time he divides science into theoretical and practical, at another, he adds to these two a poetical creative science, while still again he speaks of the three parts of science, ethics, physics, and logic. At one time he divides theoretical philosophy into logic and physics, and at another into theology, mathematics, and physics. But no one of these divisions has he expressly given as the basis on which to represent his system; he himself places no value upon this method of division, and, indeed, openly declares himself opposed to it. It is, therefore, only for the sake of uniformity that we can give the preference here to the threefold division of philosophy as already adopted by Plato.

III. LOGIC AND METAPHYSIC. 1. NATURE AND RELATION OF THE TWO. — The word metaphysic was first employed by the Aristotelian commentators. Plato had used the term dialectic, and Aristotle had characterized the same thing as “first philosophy,” while he calls physics the “second philosophy.” The relation of this first philosophy to the other sciences Aristotle determines in the following way. Every science, he says, must have for investigation a determined province and particular form of being, but none of these sciences reaches the conception of being itself. Hence there is needed a science which shall investigate that which the other sciences take up hypothetically, or through experience. This is done by the “first philosophy” which has to do with being as such, while the other sciences relate only to determined and concrete being. The metaphysic, which is this science of being and its primitive grounds, is the *first* philosophy, since it is presupposed by every other discipline. Thus, says Aristotle, if there were only a physical substance, then would physics be the first and the only philosophy, but if there be an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, then must there also be an antecedent, and because it is antecedent, a universal philosophy. The first ground of all being is God, whence Aristotle occasionally gives to the first philosophy the name of theology.

It is difficult to determine the relation between this “first philosophy” as the science of the ultimate ground of things, and that science which is ordinarily termed the logic of Aristotle, and which is exhibited in the writings bearing the name of the *Organon*. Aristotle himself has not accurately examined the relations of these two sciences, the reason for which is doubtless to be found in the incomplete form of the *Metaphysic*. But since he has embraced them both under the same name of logic; since the investigation of the essence of things (VII. 17), and the doctrine of ideas (XIII. 5), are expressly called logical; since he repeatedly attempts in the *Metaphysic* (Book IV.), to establish the logical principle of

contradiction as an absolute presupposition for all thinking and speaking and philosophizing, and employs the method of argument belonging to that science which has to do with the essence of things (III. 2, IV. 3) ; and since, in fine, the categories to which he had already devoted a separate book in the *Organon* are also discussed again in the *Metaphysic* (Book V.), it follows that this much at least may be affirmed with certainty, that he would not absolutely separate the investigations of the *Organon* from those of the *Metaphysic*, and that he would not approve the ordinary division of formal logic and metaphysic, although he has omitted to show their inner connection. *I suppose that he did not*

2. LOGIC. — The great problem both of the logical faculty and also of logic both as science and art, is to form and judge of syllogisms, and through syllogisms to be able to establish a proof. Syllogisms, however, arise from propositions, and propositions from conceptions. From this point of view, which arises from the very nature of the case, Aristotle has in the different books of the *Organon* discussed the details of his theory of logic and dialectic. The first treatise in the *Organon* is that containing the *categories*, a work which treats of the universal determinations of being, and is the first attempt at an ontology. Of these categories Aristotle enumerates ten ; substance, magnitude, quality, relation, the where, the when, position, possession, action, and passion. The second treatise (*De Interpretatione*) investigates speech as the expression of thought, and discusses the doctrine of the parts of speech, propositions and judgments. The third consists of the “*Analytics*,” which show how conclusions may be referred back to their principles and arranged in accordance with their premises. The first *Analytic* contains in two books the general theory of the syllogism. Syllogisms are according to their content and aim either apodictic, which possess a certain and incontrovertible truth, or dialectic, which are directed toward that which may be disputed and is probable, or, finally, sophistic, which lead deceptively to incorrect con-

clusions. The doctrine of apodictic syllogisms and thus of proofs is given in the two books of the second *Analytic*, that of dialectic is furnished in the eight books of the *Topic*, and that of sophistic in the treatise concerning "Sophistical Proofs."

A detailed statement of the Aristotelian logic would be familiar to every one, since the formal representations of this science ordinarily given, employ for the most part only the material furnished by Aristotle. Kant has remarked, that since the time of the Grecian sage, logic has made neither progress nor retrogression. Only in two points has the formal logic of our time advanced beyond that of Aristotle; first, in adding to the categorical syllogism, which was the only one Aristotle had in mind, the hypothetical and disjunctive, and second, in adding the fourth to the first three figures of the syllogism. But the incompleteness of the Aristotelian logic, which might be pardoned in the foundation of the science, still remains, and its thoroughly empirical method not only still continues, but has even been exalted to a principle by means of the un-Aristotelian antithesis between the form of a thought and its content. Aristotle, in reality, only attempted to collect the logical facts in reference to the formation of propositions, and the method of syllogisms; he has given in his logic only the natural history of finite thinking. However highly we may rate the correctness of his abstraction, and the clearness with which he brings into consciousness the logical operation of the understanding, we must make equally conspicuous with this the want of all scientific derivation and foundation. The ten categories which he, as already remarked, has discussed in a separate treatise, he simply mentions, without furnishing any ground or principle for this enumeration; that there are this number of categories is only a matter of fact to him, and he even cites them differently in different writings. In the same way also he takes up the figures of the syllogism empirically; he considers them only as forms and relations of formal thought, and

remains thus within the province of the logic of the understanding, although he declares the syllogism to be the only form of science. Neither in his *Metaphysic* nor in his *Physics* does he apply the rules of formal inference which he develops in the *Organon*, clearly proving that he has nowhere in his system properly elaborated either his categories or his analytic; his logical investigations do not influence generally the development of his philosophical thought, but have for the most part only the value of a preliminary investigation of language.

3. METAPHYSIC.—Among all the Aristotelian writings, the *Metaphysic* is least entitled to be called a connected whole; it is only a collection of sketches, which, though they follow a certain fundamental idea, utterly lack inner mediation and perfect development. We may distinguish in it seven distinct groups. (1) Criticism of the previous philosophic systems from the standpoint of the four Aristotelian principles, Book I. (2) Exposition of the apories or philosophical preliminary questions, III. (3) The principle of contradiction, IV. (4) Definitions, V. (5) Examination of the conception of essence (οὐσία) and intelligible being (the τί ἦν εἶναι) or the conception of matter (ὑλη), form (εἶδος), and that which arises from the connection of these two (σύνολον), VII., VIII. (6) Potentiality and actuality, IX. (7) The Divine Spirit moving all, but itself unmoved, XII. (8) To these we may add the polemic against the Platonic doctrine of ideas and numbers, which runs through the whole *Metaphysic*, but is especially carried out in Books XIII. and XIV.

(1) *The Aristotelian Criticism of the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas*.—In Aristotle's antagonism to the Platonic doctrine of ideas, we must seek for the specific difference between the two systems, a difference which Aristotle avails himself of every opportunity (especially *Metaph.* I. and XIII.) to express. Plato had beheld all actuality in the idea, but the idea was to him a rigid truth, which had not yet become interwoven with the life and the movement of existence. Such a view, however, had this difficulty; the idea, however little

Plato would have it so, found standing over against it in independent being the phenomenal world, while it furnished no principle on which the being of the phenomenal world could be affirmed. This Aristotle recognizes, and charges upon Plato, that his ideas were only "immortalized things of sense," from which the being and becoming of the sensible could not be explained. In order to avoid this consequence, he himself makes out an original reference of mind to phenomena, affirming that the relation of the two is that of the actual to the possible, or that of form to matter, and considering also mind as the absolute actuality of matter, and matter, as the potentially mind. His argument against the Platonic doctrine of ideas, Aristotle makes out in the following way:—

Passing by the fact that Plato furnished no satisfactory proof for the objective and independent reality of ideas, and that his theory is without vindication, we may affirm in the first place that it is wholly unfruitful, since it possesses no ground of explanation for being. The ideas have no proper and independent content. To see this we need only refer to their origin. In order to make science possible Plato posited certain substances independent of the sensuous particulars, and uninfluenced by their changes. But to serve such a purpose, there was offered to him nothing other than this individual thing of sense. Hence he gave to this individual a universal form, which was with him the idea. From this it resulted, that his ideas can hardly be separated from the sensible and individual objects which participate in them. The ideal duality and the empirical duality have one and the same import. The truth of this we can readily see, whenever we gain from the adherents to the doctrine of ideas a definite statement respecting the peculiar character of their unchangeable substances, in comparison with the sensible and individual things which participate in them. The only difference between the two consists in appending *per se* to the names expressing the respective ideas; thus, while the indi-

vidual things are, *e.g.*, man, horse, etc., the ideas are man *per se*, horse *per se*, etc. There is only this formal change for the doctrine of ideas to rest upon; the finite content is not removed, but is only *characterized* as eternal. This objection, that in the doctrine of ideas we have in reality only the sensible posited as a not-sensible and endowed with the predicate of immutability, Aristotle urges as above remarked when he calls the ideas "immortalized things of sense," not as though they were actually something sensible and spacial, but because in them the sensible individual merely loses its individuality, and becomes a universal. He compares them in this respect with the gods of the popular and anthropomorphic religion; as these are nothing but deified men, so the ideas are only things of nature endowed with a supernatural potency, the sensuous exalted to the non-sensuous. This identity between the ideas and their corresponding individual things amounts moreover to this, that the introduction of ideas doubles the objects to be known in a burdensome manner, and without any good results. Why set up the same thing twice? Why besides sensuous twofoldness and threefoldness, affirm a twofoldness and threefoldness in the idea? The adherents of the doctrine of ideas, when they posit an idea for every class of natural things, and through this theory set up two equivalent series of sensible and not-sensible substances, seem therefore to Aristotle like men who think they can reckon better with many numbers than with few, and who therefore go to multiplying their numbers before they begin their reckoning. Again the doctrine of ideas is tautological, and wholly unfruitful as an explanation of being. "The ideas do not assist us to the knowledge of the individual things participating in them, since the ideas are not immanent in these things, but separate from them." Equally unfruitful are the ideas when considered in reference to the arising and departing of the things of sense. They contain no principle of becoming, of movement. There is in them no causality which might bring about the event, or explain

the event when it had actually happened. Themselves without motion and process, if they had any effect, it could only be that of perfect repose. True, Plato affirms in his *Phædo* that the ideas are causes both of being and becoming, but in spite of the ideas, nothing ever *becomes* without a moving force; the ideas, by their separation from the becoming, have no such power of movement. This indifferent relation of ideas to the actual becoming, Aristotle brings under the categories, potentiality and actuality, and affirms that the ideas are only potential, are only bare possibility and essentiality because they are wanting in actuality. — The inner contradiction of the doctrine of ideas is in brief this, viz., that it posits an individual immediately as a universal, and at the same time pronounces the universal, the species, to be numerically an individual; the ideas are posited on the one side as separate individual substances, and on the other side as participant, and therefore as universal. Although the ideas, as the original conceptions of species, are universals which arise when being is fixed in existence, and the one brought out in the many, and the abiding given a place in the changeable, yet according to the Platonic notion, that they are individual substances, they are indefinable, for there can be neither definition nor derivation of an absolute individual, since even the word (and only in words is a definition possible) is in its nature a universal, and belongs also to other objects; consequently, every predicate by which I attempt to determine an individual thing cannot belong exclusively to that thing. The adherents of the doctrine of ideas, are therefore not at all in a condition to give an idea an intelligible definition; their ideas are indefinable. — In general, Plato has left the relation of individual objects to ideas very obscure. He calls the ideas archetypes, and allows that the objects may participate in them; yet are these only poetical metaphors. How shall we represent to ourselves this “participation,” this copying of the original archetype? We seek in vain for more accurate explanations of this in Plato. It

is impossible to conceive how and why matter participates in the ideas. In order to explain this, we must add to the ideas a still higher and wider principle, which contains the cause for this "participation" of objects, for without a moving principle we find no ground for "participation." Alike above the idea (*e.g.*, the idea of man), and the phenomenon (*e.g.*, the individual man), there must stand a third common to both, and in which the two are united, *i.e.*, as Aristotle was in the habit of expressing this objection, the doctrine of ideas leads to the adoption of a "third man." The result of this Aristotelian criticism is the immanence of the universal in the individual. The method of Socrates in trying to find the universal as the essence of the individual, and to give definitions according to conceptions was as correct (for no science is possible without the universal) as the theory of Plato in exalting these universal conceptions to an independent subsistence as real individual substances, was erroneous. Nothing universal, nothing which is a kind or a species, exists besides and separate from the individual; a thing and its conception cannot be separated from each other. With these principles Aristotle hardly deviated from Plato's fundamental idea that the universal is the only true being, and the essence of individual things; it may rather be said that he has freed this idea from its original abstraction, and given it a more profound mediation with the phenomenal world. Notwithstanding his apparent contradiction to Plato, the fundamental position of Aristotle is the same as that of his master, *viz.*, that the essence of a thing ($\tau\acute{o} \tau\acute{i} \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$, $\tau\acute{o} \tau\acute{i} \eta\nu \epsilon\acute{i}\nu\alpha\iota$) is known and represented in the conception; Aristotle however recognizes the universal, the conception, to be as little separated from the determined phenomenon as form from matter, and essence or substance ($\sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}$) in its most proper sense is, according to him, only that which cannot be predicated of another, but of which every other may be predicated; it is that which is a this ($\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon \tau\iota$), the individual thing and not a universal.

(2) *The four Aristotelian Principles or Causes, and the Relation of Form and Matter.*—From the criticism of the Platonic doctrine of ideas arose directly the groundwork of the Aristotelian system, the determinations of matter (ύλη), and form (εἶδος). Aristotle enumerates four metaphysical principles or causes: matter, form, efficient cause, and end. In a house, for instance, the matter is the wood, the form is the conception of the house, the efficient cause is the builder, and the end is the actual house. These four determinations of all being resolve themselves upon a closer scrutiny into the fundamental antithesis of matter and form. The conception of the efficient cause is involved with the two other ideal principles of form and of end. The efficient cause is that which secures the transition of the incomplete actuality or potentiality to the complete actuality, or induces the becoming of matter to form. But in every movement of the incomplete to the complete, the latter is the logical *prius*, the logical motive of the transition. The efficient cause of matter is therefore form. So is man the efficient cause of man; the form of the statue in the understanding of the artist is the cause of the movement by which the statue is produced; health must be in the thought of the physician before it can become the efficient cause of convalescence; so in a certain sense is medicine health, and the art of building the form of the house. But in the same way, the efficient or first cause is also identical with the final cause or end, for the end is the motive for all becoming and movement. The efficient cause of the house is the builder, but the efficient cause of the builder is the end to be attained, *i.e.*, the house. From such examples as these it is seen that the determinations of form and end may be considered under one, in so far as both are united in the conception of actuality (ἐνέργεια), for the end of every thing is its completed being, its conception or its form, the bringing out into complete actuality that which was potentially contained in it. The final cause of the hand is its conception, the final cause of the seed is the tree, which is at

the same time the essence of the seed. The only fundamental determinations, therefore, which cannot be wholly resolved into each other, are matter and form.

Matter when abstracted from form in thought, Aristotle regarded as that which is entirely without predicate, determination, and distinction. It is that abiding thing which lies at the basis of all becoming; but which in its own being is different from every thing which has become. It is capable of the widest diversity of forms, but is itself without determinate form; it is every thing in possibility, but nothing in actuality. There is a first matter which lies at the basis of every determinate thing, precisely as the wood is related to the bench and the marble to the statue. With this conception of matter Aristotle prides himself upon having conquered the difficulty so frequently urged of explaining the possibility that any thing can become, since being can neither come out of being nor out of not-being. For it is not out of not-being absolutely, but only out of that which as to actuality is not-being, but which potentially is being, that any thing becomes. Possible or potential being is no more not-being than actuality. Every existing object of nature is hence only a potential thing which has become actualized. Matter is thus a far more positive substratum with Aristotle than with Plato, who had treated it as absolutely not-being. From this is clearly seen how Aristotle could apprehend matter in opposition to form as something positively negative and antithetic to the form, and as its positive negation (*στέρησις*).

As matter coincides with potentiality, so does form coincide with actuality. It is that which makes a distinguishable and actual object, a this (*τόδε τι*) out of the undistinguished and indeterminate matter; it is the peculiar virtue, the completed activity, the soul of every thing. That which Aristotle calls form, therefore, is not to be confounded with what we perhaps may call shape; a hand severed from the arm, for instance, has still the outward shape of a hand, but according to the Aristotelian apprehension, it is only a hand

now as to matter and not in form : an actual hand, a hand in form, is only that which can do the proper work of a hand. Pure form is that which, in truth, is without matter ($\tauὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι$) ; or, in other words, the conception of being, the pure conception. But such pure form does not exist in the realm of determined being ; every determined being, every individual substance ($οὐσία$), every thing which is a this, is rather a totality of matter and form, a $σύνολον$. It is, therefore, owing to matter, that being is not pure form and pure conception ; matter is the ground of the becoming, the manifold, and the accidental ; and it is this, also, which gives to science its limits. For in precisely the measure in which the individual thing bears in itself a material element is it incognizable. From what has been said, it follows that the opposition between matter and form is a variable one, that being matter in one respect which in another is form ; building-wood, *e.g.*, is matter in relation to the completed house, but in relation to the unhewn tree it is form ; the soul in respect to the body is form, but in respect to the reason, which is the form of form ($εἶδος εἰδους$) is it matter. On this standpoint the totality of all existence may be represented as a ladder, whose lowest step is a prime matter ($πρώτη ὕλη$), which is not at all form, and whose highest step is an ultimate form which is not at all matter, but is pure form (the absolute, divine spirit). That which stands between these two points is in one respect matter, and in another respect form, *i.e.*, the former is ever translating itself into the latter. This position, which lies at the basis of the Aristotelian view of nature, is attained analytically through the observation that all nature exhibits the perpetual and progressive transition of matter into form, and shows the exhaustless and original ground of things as it comes to view in ever-ascending ideal formations. That all matter should become form, and all that is potential should be actual, and all that is should be known, is doubtless the demand of the reason and the end of all becoming ; yet is this actually impracticable, since Aristotle expressly affirms

that matter as the antithesis, or negation of form, can never become wholly actualized, and therefore can never be perfectly known. The Aristotelian system ends thus like its predecessors, in the unsubdued dualism of matter and form.

(3.) *Potentiality and Actuality* (δύναμις and ἐνέργεια).—The relation of matter to form, logically apprehended, is but the relation of potentiality to actuality. These terms, which Aristotle first employed according to their philosophical significance, are very characteristic of his system. We have in the movement of potential being to actual being the explicit conception of becoming, and in the four principles we have a distribution of this conception into its parts. The Aristotelian system is consequently a system of the becoming, in which the Heraclitic principle appears again in a richer and profounder apprehension, as that of the Eleatics had done with Plato. Aristotle in this has made no insignificant step towards the subjection of the Platonic dualism. If matter is the possibility of form, or reason becoming, then is the opposition between the idea and the phenomenal world potentially overcome, at least in principle, since there is one being which appears both in matter and form only in different stages of development. The relation of the potential to the actual Aristotle illustrates by the relation of the unfinished to the finished work, of the unemployed carpenter to the one at work upon his building, of the individual asleep to him awake. Potentially the seed is the tree, but the grown-up tree is it actually; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment in a philosophizing condition; even before the battle the better general is the potential conqueror; potentially space is infinitely divisible; in fact every thing is potentially which possesses a principle of motion, of development, or of change, and which, if unhindered by any thing external, will be of itself. Actuality or entelechy on the other hand indicates the perfected act, the end as gained, the completely actual (the grown-up tree, *e.g.*, is the entelechy of the seed), that activity in which the act and the completion of the act coincide,

e.g., seeing, thinking (he sees and he has seen, he thinks and he has thought, are identical), while in those activities which involve a becoming, *e.g.*, to learn, to go, to become well, the two are separated. In this apprehension of form (or idea) as actuality or entelechy, *i.e.*, in joining it with the movement of the becoming, is found the chief antagonism of the Aristotelian and Platonic systems. Plato considers the idea as at rest, self-subsistent, and opposed to becoming and motion; but with Aristotle the idea is the eternal product of the becoming, it is an eternal energy, *i.e.*, an activity in complete actuality, it is not perfect being, but is being produced in every moment and eternally, through the movement of the potential to its actual end.

(4) *The Absolute, Divine Spirit*.—Aristotle sought to establish from a number of points of view, the conception of the absolute spirit, or as he calls it, the first mover, and especially by connecting it with the relation of potentiality and actuality.

(a) *The Cosmological Form*.—The actual is ever antecedent to the potential not only in conception (for I can speak of potentiality only in reference to some activity) but also in time, for the possible becomes actual only through an acting; the uneducated becomes educated through the educated, and this leads to the assumption of a first mover which is pure activity. Or, again, motion, becoming, or a chain of causes is possible only through the prior existence of a principle of motion, a mover. But this principle of motion must be one whose essence is actuality, since that which only exists in possibility need not become actual, and therefore cannot be a principle of motion. All becoming postulates, thus, something which is eternal and which has not become, which itself unmoved is a principle of motion, a first mover.

(b) *The Ontological Form*.—In the same way it follows from the conception of potentiality, that the eternal and necessary being cannot be potential. For that which potentially is, may just as well either be or not be; but that which

possibly is not, is temporal and not eternal. Nothing therefore which is absolutely permanent, is potential, but only actual. Or, again, if potentiality be the first, nothing can exist: but this contradicts the conception of the absolute, which it is impossible should not be.

(c) *The Moral Form.*—Potentiality always involves a possibility of opposites. He who has the capacity to be well, has also the capacity to be sick, but actually no man is at the same time both sick and well. Therefore actuality is better than potentiality, and it alone can belong to the eternal.

(d) So far as the relation of potentiality and actuality is identical with the relation of matter and form, we may apprehend, in the following way, these arguments for the existence of a being which is pure actuality. The supposition of an absolute matter without form (the *πρώτη ὕλη*) involves also the supposition of an absolute form without matter (a *πρῶτον εἶδος*). And since the conception of form resolves itself into the three determinations of the efficient, the intelligible, and the final cause, so is the eternal one the absolute principle of motion (the first mover, *πρῶτον χινοῦν*), the absolute notion or pure intelligible (the pure *τί ἦν εἶναι*), and the absolute end (prime good).

All the other predicates of the first mover or the highest principle of the world, follow from these premises with logical necessity. Unity belongs to him, since the ground of the manifoldness of being lies in matter and he has no participation in matter; he is immovable and abiding ever the same, since otherwise he could not be the absolute mover and the cause of all becoming; he is life as active self-end and entelechy; he is at the same time intelligible and intelligence, because he is absolutely immaterial and independent of nature; he is active, *i.e.*, thinking intelligence, because his essence is pure actuality; he is self-contemplating intelligence, because the divine thought cannot attain its actuality in any thing external, since if it were the thought of any thing other than itself, it would depend upon some potential exist-

ence for its actualization. Hence the famed Aristotelian definition of the absolute that it is the thought of thought (*νόησις νοήσεως*), the personal unity of the thinking and the thought, of the knowing and the known, the absolute subject-object. In the *Metaphysic* (XII. 1) we have a statement in order of these attributes of the Divine Spirit, and an almost devout sketch of the eternally blessed Deity, knowing himself in his eternal tranquillity as the absolute truth, satisfied with himself, and wanting neither in activity nor in any virtue.

As would appear from this statement, Aristotle never fully developed the idea of his absolute spirit, and still less harmonized it with the fundamental principles and demands of his philosophy, although many consequences of his system would seem to drive him to this, and numerous principles which he has laid down would seem to prepare the way for it. This idea is unexpectedly introduced in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysic* simply as an assertion, without being farther and inductively substantiated. It is attended with important difficulties. We do not see why the ultimate ground of motion or the absolute spirit must be conceived as a personal being; we do not see how any thing can be a moving cause and yet itself unmoved; how it can be the origin of all becoming, that is of the departing and arising, and itself remain a changeless energy, a principle of motion with no potentiality to be moved, for the moving thing must stand in a relation of passivity and activity with the thing moved. Moreover, Aristotle, as would follow from these contradictory determinations, never thoroughly and consistently developed the relation between God and the world. He considered the absolute spirit only as contemplative and theoretical reason, from whom all action must be excluded because he is perfect end in himself, since every action presupposes an end not yet realized; we have thus no true motive for his activity in reference to the world. He cannot be truly called the first mover in his theoretical relation alone, and since he is in his essence extra-mundane and unmoved, he cannot once per-

meate the life of the world with his activity, and since also matter on one side never rises wholly to form, we have, therefore, here again the unreconciled dualism between the Divine Spirit and the unmistakable reality of matter. Many of the arguments which Aristotle brings against the god of Anaxagoras may be urged against his own theory.

IV. THE ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS. — The physics of Aristotle, which embraces the greater portion of his writings, follows the becoming and the building up of matter into form, the successive stages through which nature as a living being progresses in order to become individual soul. All becoming has an end; but end is form, and the absolute form is spirit. With perfect consistency, therefore, Aristotle regards the human individual of the male sex as the end and the centre of earthly nature in its realized form. All else beneath the moon is, as it were, an unsuccessful attempt of nature to produce the male human, and is a superfluity which arises from the impotence of nature to subdue the whole of matter and bring it into form. Every thing which does not attain the universal end of nature must be regarded as incomplete, and is properly an exception or abortion. For instance, he calls it an abortion when a child does not resemble its father; and the female child he looks upon as an abortion in a less degree, which he accounts for by the insufficient energy of the male as the forming principle. In general, Aristotle regards the female as imperfect in comparison with the male, an imperfection which belongs in a higher degree to all the inferior animals. If nature did her work consciously, all these mistakes, these incomplete and improper formations would be inexplicable, but she is an artist working only from an unconscious impulse, and does not complete her work with a clear rational insight.

1. The universal conditions of all natural existence, *motion*, *space*, and *time*, Aristotle investigates in the books of physics. These physical conceptions may, also, be reduced to the metaphysical notions of potentiality and actuality;

motion is accordingly defined as the activity of potential being, and is therefore a mean between the merely potential entity and the perfectly realized actuality, — space is the possibility of motion, and possesses, therefore, potentially, though not actually, the property of infinite divisibility; time is in the same way infinitely divisible, and, as expressing the measure of motion numerically, is the number of motion according to before and after. All three are infinite, but the infinite which is represented in them is only potentially but not actually a whole: it comprehends nothing, but is itself comprehended, — a fact mistaken by those who are accustomed to extol the infinite as though it comprehended and held every thing in itself, because it has some similarity to totality.

2. From his conception of motion Aristotle derives his view of the *collective universe*, as brought out in his books *De Cælo*. The most perfect motion is the circular, because this is constant, uniform, and ever returning into itself. The world as a whole is therefore conditioned by the circular motion, and being a whole complete in itself, it has a spherical form. But because the motion which returns into itself is better than every other, it follows, from the same ground, that in this spherical universe the better sphere will be in the circumference where the circular motion is most perfect, and the inferior one will arrange itself around the centre of the universal sphere. The former is heaven, the latter earth, and between the two stand the planetary spheres. Heaven, as the place of circular motion, and the scene of unchangeable order, stands nearest the first moving cause, and is under its immediate influence; it consists not of perishable matter but of the finer element ether; it is the place where the ancients, guided by the correct tradition of a lost wisdom, have placed the Divine abode. Its parts, the fixed stars, are passionless, unalterable, and eternal essences, which, having attained the best end, must be conceived as existing in an eternal, tireless activity, and which, though not clearly cognizable, are yet

much more divine than man. A lower sphere, next to that of the fixed stars, is the sphere of the planets, among which, besides the five known to the ancients, he reckons the sun and the moon. This sphere stands a little removed from the most perfect: instead of moving directly from right to left, as do the fixed stars, the planets move in contrary directions and in oblique orbits; they serve the fixed stars, and are ruled by their motion. Lastly, the earth is in the centre of the universe, farthest removed from the first mover, and hence partaking in the smallest degree of the Divine; it is the sphere, — under the influence of the planets, and especially of the sun, — of constant interchange of arising and departing, yet exhibiting throughout this endless process a picture of the eternity of heaven. There are thus three kinds of being, exhibiting three stages of perfection, necessary for the explanation of nature; first, the absolute spirit or God, an immaterial being, who, himself unmoved, produces motion; second, the super-terrestrial region of the heavens, a being which is moved and which moves, and which, though not without matter, is eternal and unchangeable, and possesses ever a circular motion; and, lastly, in the lowest course this earth, a changeful being, which has only to play the passive part of being moved.

3. *Nature in a strict sense*, the scene of elemental action, presents to us a constant and progressive transition of the elementary to the vegetable, and of the vegetable to the animal world. The lowest step is occupied by inanimate things, which are simple products of the union of the elements, and have their entelechy only in the determinate combinations of these elements, but whose energy consists only in striving after a place in the universe adapted to them, and in resting there so far as they reach it unhindered. But living bodies have no such merely external entelechy; within them dwells a motion as organizing principle by which they attain to actuality, and which as a preserving activity develops in them towards a perfected organization, — in a word they have a

soul, for a soul is the entelechy of an organic body. In plants we find the soul working only as a conserving and nourishing energy: the plant has no other function than to nourish itself and to propagate its kind; among animals — where progress is determined by their mode of reproduction — the soul appears as sensitive; animals have sense, and are capable of locomotion; lastly, the human soul is at the same time nutritive, sensitive, and cognitive.

4. *Man*, as the end of all nature, embraces in himself the different steps of development in which the life of nature is exhibited. The division of the faculties of the soul must therefore be necessarily regulated according to the division of living creatures. As nutrition is the sole property of vegetables, and sensation, of animals, while the more perfect animals are capable of locomotion, so are these three activities also functions of the human soul, the first being the necessary condition of, and presupposed by, the other two; while the soul itself is nothing other than the union of these different activities of an organic body in one common activity directed by design, as the entelechy of the organic body. The soul is related to the body as form to matter; it is its vital principle; but for this very reason it cannot be conceived to exist *per se*, apart from the body. The fourth faculty, thought or reason, which, added to the three others, constitutes the peculiarity of the human soul, forms alone an exception from the general law. It is not a simple product of the lower faculties of the soul, it does not stand related to them simply as a higher stage of development, nor simply as the soul to the body, as the end to the instrument, as actuality to possibility, as form to matter. But as pure intellectual activity, it perfects itself without the mediation of any bodily organ; as the reason comes into the body from without it is independent of all connection with the functions of the body; it is absolutely simple, immaterial, self-subsistent, — the divine in man; it is also separable from the body. True, there exists a connection between thought and sensa-

tion, for while the sensations are outwardly divided, according to the different objects of sense, yet internally they meet in one centre, as a common sense. Here they become changed into images and representations, which again become transmuted into thoughts, and so it might seem as if thought were only the result of the sensation, as if intelligence were passively determined; hence Aristotle distinguishes between the reason as active and the reason as passive (receptive), the latter being only gradually developed into cognition through reflection. (Here we might notice the proposition falsely ascribed to Aristotle: *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*, and also the well-known though often misunderstood comparison of the soul with an unwritten tablet, which only implies this much, viz., that as the unwritten tablet is potentially but not actually a book, so does knowledge belong potentially though not actually to the human reason; fundamentally and radically thought may have potentially in itself universal conceptions, in so far as it has the capacity to form them, but not actually nor in a determined or developed form). But this passivity presupposes rather an activity; for if the thought in its actuality, since it appears as knowledge, *becomes* all forms and therefore all things, then must the thought *constitute itself* that which it becomes, and therefore all passively determined human intelligence rests on an originally active intelligence, which exists as self-actualizing possibility and pure actuality, and which, as such, is wholly independent of the human body, and has not its entelechy in it but in itself, and is not therefore participant in the death of the body, but lives on as universal reason, eternal and immortal. The Aristotelian dualism here again appears. Manifestly this active intelligence stands related to the soul as God to nature. The two sides possess no essential relation to each other. As the Divine Spirit could not enter into the life of the world, so is the human spirit unable to permeate the life of sense; although it is determined as something passionless and immaterial, still must it as soul be

connected with matter ; and although it is pure and self-contemplative form, still it should be distinguished from the Divine Spirit which is its counterpart ; the want of a satisfactory mediation on the side of the human and on that of the Divine, is unmistakable.

V. THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS. 1. RELATION OF ETHICS TO PHYSICS.—Aristotle, guided by his tendency towards the natural, connected ethics and physics more closely than either of his predecessors, Socrates or Plato, had done. While Plato found it impossible to speak of the good in man's moral condition disconnected from the idea of the good in itself, Aristotle's principal object is to determine what is good for man solely ; and he supposes that the good in itself, the idea of the good, in no way facilitates the knowledge of that good which alone is attainable in practical life. It is only the latter, the moral element in the life of men, and not the good in the great affairs of the universe, with which ethics has to do. Aristotle therefore considers the good especially in its relation to the natural condition of men, and affirms that it is the end towards which nature herself tends. Instead of viewing the moral element as something purely intellectual, he rather apprehends it as only the bloom of the physical, which here becomes spiritualized and ethical ; instead of making virtue to be knowledge, he treats it as the normal perfection of natural instinct. That man is *by nature* a political animal, is the fundamental proposition of his theory of the state.

From this union of the ethical and the physical, arose the objections which Aristotle urged against the Socratic conception of virtue. Socrates had placed the essence of virtue in an intellectual activity superior to and dominant over sense, and had accordingly made virtue and knowledge one. But in this, said Aristotle, the pathological element which is associated by nature with every moral act, is destroyed. It is not reason, but the sensations, passions, and natural bias of the soul, without which no action is conceivable, which are the first ground of virtue. There is an instinct in the soul

which at first strives unconsciously after the good, which is only subsequently sought with the full moral insight. Morality arises only from natural virtue. It is on this ground, also, that Aristotle combats the notion that virtue may be learned. It is not through the perfection of knowledge, but by exercise, that we become acquainted with the good. It is by a practice of virtue that we become virtuous, just as by a practice of building and of music we become architects and musicians; for the habit which is the ground of moral constancy, is only a fruit of the abundant repetition of a moral action. Accurate insight is indeed essential to the perception of the good and to the realization of it in particular acts; insight, however, cannot make a virtuous will, but is rather itself conditioned by the will, since a perverted will corrupts and misleads the judgment. It is by three things, therefore, nature, habit, and reason, that man becomes good. The standpoint of Aristotle is in these respects directly opposed to that of Socrates. While Socrates regarded the moral and the natural as opposites, and made moral conduct to be the result of rational enlightenment, Aristotle treated both as different steps of development, and reversing the order of Socrates, made rational enlightenment in moral things consequent upon moral conduct.

2. THE HIGHEST GOOD. — Every action has an end; but every end cannot be itself only a means to some other end; there must rather be an ultimate, highest end, something after which we can strive for its own sake, and which is a good absolutely, or a best. What now is this highest good and supreme object of human pursuit? In name, at least, all men are agreed upon it, and call it happiness, but what happiness is, is a much disputed point. If it be asked in what human happiness consists, the first characteristic given would be that it is something altogether peculiar to man's nature; that it must consist in an activity which springs from this nature, and elevates it to a more perfect actuality, thereby inducing the feeling of complete satisfaction. But man's

peculiarity is not sensation, for he shares this with the brutes. A sensation of pleasure, therefore, which arises when some desire is gratified, may be the happiness of the brute, but certainly does not constitute the essential of human happiness. That which is peculiarly human is rational activity. Man is by virtue of his nature and intelligence adapted to rational action, to the rational exercise of his natural faculties and powers. This is his vocation and his happiness; for to the activity itself, the unrestrained, successful exercise to which its nature compels it, is always the highest and best. Happiness, therefore, is a well-being, which is at the same time a well-doing, and it is a well-doing which satisfies all the conditions of nature, and which finds the highest contentment or well-being in an unrestrained energy. Activity and pleasure are inseparably bound together by a natural bond, and happiness is the result of their union when they are sustained through a perfect life. Hence the Aristotelian definition of happiness. It is a perfect practical activity in a perfect life.

Although it might seem from this as though Aristotle placed the happiness of man in the natural activity of the soul, and regarded this as self-sufficient, still he is not blind to the fact that perfect happiness is dependent on other kinds of good whose possession is not absolutely within our power. It is true he expresses an opinion that outward things in moderation are sufficient, and that only great success or signal reverses materially influence the happiness of life; still he holds that wealth, the possession of friends and children, noble birth, beauty of body, etc., are more or less necessary conditions of happiness, which is therefore partly dependent on accidental circumstances. This element in the Aristotelian theory of happiness springs naturally from his empirical method of investigation. Careful in noting every thing which general experience seems to furnish, he expressly avoids making either virtue (rational activity) or pleasure his principle, because actual experience shows that each is conditioned by the other. He thus avoided the one-sidedness

of later philosophers, who considered happiness to be altogether independent of externals.

3. CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE. — As has already been seen in the Aristotelian Polemic against Socrates, virtue is the product of an oft-repeated moral action, a condition acquired through practice, a moral dexterity of the soul. The nature of this dexterity is seen in the following way: every action accomplishes something as its work; but if a work is imperfect when it has either a want or a superfluity, so also is every action imperfect in so far as there is in it either too little or too much; its perfection, therefore, consists in maintaining the due proportion, the true mean between too much and too little. Accordingly, virtue in general may be defined as the observance of the right mean in action; by which is meant not the arithmetical or absolute mean, but the one relative to ourselves. For what is enough for one individual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a woman, of a child, and of a slave is respectively different. Thus, virtue depends upon time, circumstance, and relation. The determination of this correct mean will therefore always be doubtful. An exact and exhaustive rule being impossible, we can only say respecting it that it is a question of correct practical insight: *i.e.*, that is the correct mean which is seen to be such by the intelligent man.

It follows from this general conception of virtue, that there will be as many separate virtues as there are circumstances of life, and as men are ever entering into new relations, in which it becomes difficult practically to determine the correct method of action, Aristotle, in opposition to Plato, would limit the separate virtues by no definite number. Only in so far as there exist certain constant relations in human life, can certain fundamental virtues be named. For instance, man has a fixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true moral mean is found in neither fearing nor courting it, and this is valor. In relation to pleasure, the true mean standing between greediness and indifference

is temperance. In social life, the moral mean is between doing and suffering wrong, which is justice. In a similar way many other virtues might be characterized, each one of them standing as a mean between two vices, the one of which expresses a want and the other a superfluity. A closer exhibition of the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue would have much psychological and linguistic interest, though but little philosophical worth. Aristotle forms his conception of virtue more from the use of language than from a thoroughly applied principle of classification. His catalogue of the virtues of practical life is, thus, devoid of all systematic deduction and arrangement. His classification of the virtues into the *ethical* and *dianoetic*, *i.e.*, into those which relate to the passions and affections, and those which relate to knowledge (practical and theoretical) is the most scientific. The latter class, since they are the virtues of the *voûs*, of that which is highest in man, are more elevated than the former. Wisdom, *θεωρία*, is the best and noblest; and philosophy, or the life in wisdom, is supreme happiness. But it is precisely in this class of virtues that the rule that virtue is the correct mean between two extremes, cannot be applied; for they exist independently, side by side, in the same dualistic relation which reason holds to the other faculties of the soul.

4. THE STATE.—The individual by himself, according to Aristotle, can attain neither virtue nor happiness. Ethical culture and moral activity, as well as the attainment of the external means necessary thereto, are conditioned through a regulated social life, within which the individual obtains education in the good, the protection of law, the assistance of others, and the opportunity for the practice of virtue. Moreover, since man is by nature destined for society, since he is a political animal, a truly *human* life is possible only in a community. The state is thus superior to the individual, superior even to the family; individuals are only accidental parts of the political whole. Still, Aristotle is so far from adopting Plato's abstract apprehension of this relation, that

he expressly controverts Plato's political theories. He agrees with Plato in believing that the prime object of the state is to make its citizens good men, to make human life perfect; but he saw that this could not be accomplished by destroying the natural rights of the individual and the family, personal freedom, and the distinction between *meum* and *tuum*. The state, he said, is not a unity, but is essentially a manifold of smaller communities and individuals. This fact the state must recognize, and must endeavor by means of its constitution and laws to make virtue and culture as general as possible, and to place political power in the hands of virtuous citizens. Of the different forms of government Aristotle preferred the limited monarchy and aristocracy; *i.e.*, the state which is governed not by wealth nor by the mere majority, but by those citizens, who through the possession of a competency have received a careful education in morals, and are, thus, fitted to direct and govern the whole. That state is the best in which virtue, whether it be that of one man or of more, rules. Aristotle, however, does not advocate any particular constitution as universally best. The question, he thinks, is not of an ideal state, but of what is most advisable under the given natural, climatic, geographic, economic, intellectual, and moral conditions. In this he is faithful to the character of his whole philosophy. Standing on the basis of the empirical, he advances here as elsewhere, critically and reflectively, and in despair of attaining the absolutely true and good, he seeks for these relatively, with his eye fixed only on the probable and the practicable.

VI. THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL.—The school of Aristotle, called the Peripatetic, can here only be mentioned; the want of independence in its philosophizing, and the absence of any great and universal influence, rendering it unworthy an extended notice. Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Strato are its most famous leaders. Like most philosophical schools, it confines itself chiefly to a more thorough elaboration and explanation of the system of its master. In some empirical

provinces, especially the physical, the attempt was made to carry out still further the system, while at the same time its speculative basis was set aside and neglected. This view was most fully developed by Strato the physicist, who abandoned the Aristotelian dualism between the intellectual and the natural principle of things, and declared nature to be the sole, all-producing and all-sustaining power of existence.

VII. TRANSITION TO THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
—The productive energy of Grecian philosophy expends itself with Aristotle, contemporaneously and in connection with the universal decay of Grecian life and spirit. Instead of the great and universal systems of a Plato and an Aristotle, we have now systems of a partial and one-sided character, corresponding to that universal breach between the subject and the objective world which characterized the civil, religious, and social life of this last epoch of Greece, the time succeeding Alexander the Great. That subjectivity, which had been first propounded by the Sophists, was at length, after numerous struggles, victorious, though its triumph was gained upon the ruins of the Grecian civil and artistic life; the individual has become emancipated from society and the state; his unquestioning belief in the given world is wholly destroyed; there remains only the problem of developing and satisfying a subjectivity which has become autonomic and self-centred. This general intellectual movement of the age appears also in philosophy. It lost both its purely scientific and its political interest; it became a mean for the subject, by which he endeavored to procure what the decaying religious life and morality of the state could no longer furnish, namely, a philosophic conviction in reference to the highest religious, metaphysical, and ethical problems, — a fixed theory of life and action attained through free thought alone. Every thing, even logic and physics, was viewed from this practical standpoint; the former afforded the subject a sure knowledge elevated above all disquieting doubts; the latter was expected to give the necessary explanations in reference to the

ultimate grounds of all existence, of God, nature, and the constitution of man, whereby man might know his relations to all things, what he ought to hope or fear, and how his individual happiness can be harmonized with the nature of things. In one respect, thus, the Post-Aristotelian systems indicate an intellectual advance. They are in earnest with philosophy; they would have it supplant religion and tradition; they would make it the truth of life, a faith, dogma, conviction, in accordance with which the subject must consistently direct his life and action, and in which he must seek peace and felicity. The result of this mode of thought was that men sought above all things certainty, ultimate knowledge; they strove to arrive at some fixed ground; they abandoned the transcendentalism of the Platonic idealism, and the hypothetical philosophizing of Aristotle, and establishing themselves upon the realistic basis of immediate external and internal experience sought from thence to attain a theory of things which should be logically developed and leave nothing undecided. In other words they sought to abolish the dualism of the Platonico-Aristotelian philosophy, and finally solve the problem of reducing all the differences and antitheses of being, of subject and object, mind and matter, to one ultimate ground. Philosophy was to explain every thing; no gap, uncertainty, halfness, should be allowed to remain. On the other hand, however, the Post-Aristotelian philosophy is wanting in true scientific devotion to the object; it is a dogmatism which aims only at truth for the subject and is therefore one-sided; it emphasizes not things nor thought, but the subjective consistency of thought. It sought to attain truth by the logical application of a single principle throughout the entire sphere of being. Hence there appeared in opposition to this dogmatism, and with equal positiveness, a scepticism which denied the possibility of real knowledge, and developed the negative tendencies of the Sophistic and Megaric eristic to their extremest consequences.

The most important system of the Post-Aristotelian period

is the *Stoic*. In it subjectivity appears as universal, thinking subjectivity (*cf.* Sect. XI. 6) ; and this superiority of the universality of subjectivity, of thought, to every thing special and particular is its theoretical and practical principle. All particular existences are only the product of the universal reason which lives and acts in all things : the one universal reason is the essence of things. Hence the vocation of man is no other than to realize this universal subjectivity which is elevated above all vicissitude of circumstance, and thus to seek his happiness not in external things and particular satisfactions, but in a life in harmony with nature and reason. A precisely opposite view was advocated by *Epicureanism*. In it the subject withdraws itself into the individuality of pleasure, into the happiness of philosophic repose, enjoying the present, keeping itself free from all care and inordinate passion, and occupying itself with the objective world only so far as it is a means for the enjoyment of its individuality. *Scepticism* coincides with these two systems in that it endeavors to render the subject indifferent to every thing external ; but it sought to attain this indifference negatively, by the renunciation of all definite knowledge and volition.

Finally, this subjectivity is also exhibited by the last of the philosophical systems of antiquity, *Neo-Platonism* ; for it also makes the elevation of the subject to the absolute its corner-stone. For if, on the other hand, Neo-Platonism speculates objectively in reference to God and his relation to the finite, this speculation had its motive in the desire to demonstrate a continuous transition from the absolute object to human personality. The predominant influence, therefore, even here, is the interest of subjectivity ; and the greater wealth of objective determinations was grounded upon the fact that subjectivity had been expanded into absoluteness.

SECTION XVII.

STOICISM.

ZENO, the founder of the Stoic school, was born about 340 B.C., in Citium, a city of Cyprus. He was not of pure Greek, but of Phœnician extraction. Deprived of his property by shipwreck, he took refuge in philosophy, incited also by an inner bias to such pursuits. He at first became a disciple of the Cynic Crates, then of Stilpo, one of the Megarians, and lastly he betook himself to the Academy, where he heard the lectures of Polemo. After twenty years had been occupied in this way, having become convinced of the necessity of a new philosophy, he opened a school at Athens, in the "variegated porch," so called from the paintings of Polygnotus, with which it was adorned, whence his adherents received the name of "philosophers of the porch" (Stoics). Zeno is said to have presided over his school for fifty-eight years, and at a very advanced age to have put an end to his existence. He was praised by the ancients for the temperance and the austerity of his habits, while his abstemiousness is proverbial. The monument in his honor, erected after his death by the Athenians, at the instance of Antigonus, bore the high but simple eulogium that his life had been in unison with his philosophy. *Cleanthes* of Assos, in Asia Minor, was the successor of Zeno in the Stoic school, and faithfully carried out the method of his master. *Cleanthes* was succeeded by *Chrysippus* (born at Soli, in Cilicia), who died about 208 B.C. He has been regarded as the chief support of the school; so much so, indeed, that it was said of him, that without a *Chrysippus* there never would have been a Stoa. At all events, as *Chrysippus* was an object of the greatest veneration, and of almost undisputed authority with the later Stoics, he ought to be considered as the princi-

pal founder of the school. He was a writer so voluminous, that his works have been said to amount to seven hundred and five, among which, however, were repeated treatises upon the same propositions, and citations without measure from poets and historians, given to prove and illustrate his opinions. Not one of all his writings has come down to us. Chrysippus closes the series of the philosophers who founded the Stoic school. The later heads of the school, as *Panætius*, the friend of the younger Scipio (his famous work *De Officiis*, Cicero has elaborated in his treatise of the same name), and *Posidonius*, may be classed with Cicero, Pompeius, and others, and were eclectic in their teachings. The Stoics connected philosophy most intimately with the duties of practical life. Philosophy is with them the practice of wisdom, the exercise of virtue, the training-school of virtue, the science of those principles in accordance with which a virtuous life must be guided. They asserted all science, art, culture, in so far as they are sought for their own sake to be superfluous; man should strive for nothing but wisdom, the knowledge of things human and divine, and should govern his life by this alone. Logic supplies the method for attaining true knowledge; physics comprehends the theory of nature and the order of the universe; ethics deduces from these those consequences which relate to practical life.

1. LOGIC.—The feature most worthy of notice in their logic, is the striving after a subjective criterion of truth, by which they might accurately distinguish true conceptions from false. All knowledge, according to the Stoics, originates in real impressions of external things upon the senses, in objective sensuous experiences, which are combined into conceptions by the understanding; knowledge comes not from the subject but from the object; this is the ground of its truth. Since, however, it is possible that representations of the subjective imagination may insinuate themselves among the true conceptions which are produced in us by external things, the question arises, how shall we distinguish them, how sep-

arate the false from the true? The criterion for this is the irresistible evidence, the strength of conviction with which the idea impresses itself upon the mind. Whenever a conception possesses this evidence, when it compels the mind involuntarily to recognize its validity, it may be assumed to be no mere figment of the imagination but the product of a real object. Other criterion than this "striking evidence" of a conception there is none since we know things only by means of conceptions. The Stoic theory of knowledge is thus a mean between empiricism and idealism. Sensuous experience alone is certain; but whether any thing is actually perceived is decided only by the irresistible subjective conviction of truth which a perception brings with it.

2. PHYSICS.—In their physics, where they follow for the most part Heraclitus, the Stoics are distinguished from their predecessors, especially from Plato and Aristotle, by their thoroughly carried out proposition that nothing incorporeal exists, that every thing essential is corporeal (just as in their logic they sought to derive all knowledge from the sensuous perception). This sensualism or materialism of the Stoics which, as we have seen in their logic, lies at the basis of their theory of knowledge, might seem foreign to all their moral and idealistic tendencies, but is clearly explained by their dogmatic standpoint; an ideal being is, for them, not objective, substantial enough; the relations and activities of things are ideal, but things themselves must have corporeal reality. In the same way it seemed to them impossible that there can be any interaction between the ideal and corporeal, between the spiritual and the material. Reciprocity can exist only between things which are like in kind; mind, the deity, the soul, are thus corporeal though different from the body and from matter. The most immediate consequence of this attempt to destroy the duality of mind and matter is their pantheism. Aristotle before them had separated the Divine Being from the world, as the pure and eternal form from the eternal matter; but so far as this separation implied a dis-

inction which was not simply logical, but actual and real, the Stoics would not admit it. It seemed to them impossible to dis sever God from matter, and they therefore considered God and the world in the relation of power and its manifestation, and thus as one. Matter is the passive ground of things, the original substratum for the divine activity: God is the active and formative energy of matter dwelling within it, and essentially united to it: the world is the body of God, and God is the soul of the world. The Stoics, therefore, considered God and matter as one identical substance, which, on the side of its passive and changeable capacity they call matter, and on the side of its active and changeless energy, God. The world has no independent existence, it is not self-subsistent finite being, but is produced, animated, and governed by God. It is a living thing (ζῶον) of which the Deity is the rational soul. Every thing in it is equally divine since the divine power pervades all things alike. God exists in it as the eternal necessity which directs all things in accordance with unalterable law; as the rational Providence which brings all things into harmony with its designs; as the perfect wisdom which maintains the order of the world, commands and rewards the good, and forbids and punishes the evil. Nothing in the world can isolate itself, or overstep its natural limitations; but each is unconditionally connected with the order of the whole whose principle and power is God. Thus even in the physics of the Stoics is displayed that stern regard for law which is the chief characteristic of their philosophy: they are, like Heraclitus, the sworn enemies of all arbitrariness and individuality. This principle of the unity of all being connects them in yet another way with Heraclitus. They apprehended the being of God, which according to their philosophical principles must be corporeal, just as he did, *i.e.*, as a fiery, heat-giving force, which is the life of the world, and into which all individual lives are merged in order to be renewed under new forms, and so on *ad infinitum* (*cf.* Sect. VII. 8). At one time they call God

the rational breath which passes through all nature ; at another, the artistic fire which fashions or begets the universe ; and still again the ether, which, however, they hardly distinguish from the fire. This identification of God and the world, according to which the Stoics regarded the whole formation of the universe as but the development of God, renders their remaining doctrine concerning the world very simple. All the world seemed to them to be vitalized by the divine life, coming into special existence out of the divine whole, and returning into it again, thus forming a necessary cycle of origination and destruction in which the whole alone is permanent and eternally renewed. On the other hand, nothing within this whole is in vain, nothing is without an end ; in every thing actual there is reason. Even the bad (within certain limits) is necessary to the perfection of the whole, since it is the condition of virtue : *e.g.*, injustice is the condition of justice. The world taken as a whole could have been no better than it is or more suited to its purpose.

3. THE ETHICS.—The ethics of the Stoics is most closely connected with their physics. In the physics was demonstrated the rational order of the universe as it exists through the divine thought. In the ethics, the highest law of human action, and thus the whole moral governance of life, is made to depend upon this rational order and conformity to law in universal nature, and the highest good, or the highest end of our strivings, is to shape our life according to this universal law, to live in conformity with the harmony of the world or with nature. “Follow nature,” or “live in harmony with nature,” is the moral maxim of the Stoics. More accurately : live in harmony with thy rational nature so far as this has not been distorted or corrupted by art, but is held in its natural simplicity ; be consciously and voluntarily what thou art by nature, a rational part of a rational universe ; be reason and in reason, instead of following unreason and thine own arbitrary desires. Herein consists thy vocation, herein thy felicity, since in this way thou avoidest every thing which is

in contradiction with thy nature and the order of things without thee, and securest for thyself a calmly flowing, undisturbed life.

From this moral principle, in which the Stoic conception of virtue is also expressed, the peculiarities of their theory of morals follow with logical necessity.

(1) *Respecting the Relation of Virtue to Pleasure.*—The demand that life should be in conformity with nature subordinates the individual wholly to the universal, and excludes every personal end. Hence pleasure, which of all ends is the most individual, must be disregarded. Pleasure, as the abatement of that moral energy of the soul, wherein all blessedness consists, could appear to the Stoics only as a hindrance to life, and therefore as an evil. Pleasure is not in conformity with nature, and is no end of nature, says Cleanthes; and though other Stoics relax a little the strictness of this opinion, and admit that pleasure may be according to nature, and is to be considered in a certain degree as a good, yet they all held fast to the doctrine, that it has no moral worth and is no end of nature, but is only something which is accidentally connected with the free and fitting activity of nature, while itself is not an activity, but a passive condition of the soul. In this lies the whole severity of the Stoic doctrine of morals; every thing personal is cast aside, every external end of action is foreign to morality; wise action is the only true aim. From this follows directly:

(2) *The View of the Stoics Concerning External Good.*—Virtue, as the sole aim of a rational being, is also his sole blessedness, his only good; since only inner rationality and strength of mind, a will and activity in harmony with nature, can make man happy and afford him a counterpoise to the accidents and restrictions of his outward life. From this it clearly follows that external goods, health, wealth, etc., are altogether indifferent: they add nothing to the rationality, force, and greatness of the soul; they can be used either rationally or irrationally, and in the end are as likely to prove

evil as good. They are, therefore, not really good ; virtue alone is advantageous. The loss of external possessions does not affect the happiness of the virtuous. Even the so-called external evils are not evils ; the only evil is baseness, which is both unnatural and irrational. The Stoics differ from their predecessors, the Cynics, inasmuch as they admit that there may be a distinction among indifferent things ; that while none of these can be called a moral good, yet some may be preferable to others, and that the preferable, so far as it contributes to a life in conformity to nature, should enter into the account of a moral life. Thus the sage will prefer health and wealth when these are balanced in the choice with sickness and poverty, but though these objects have been rationally chosen, he does not esteem them as really good, for they are not the highest, they are inferior to virtuous action, in comparison with which every thing else sinks to insignificance. In making this distinction between the good and the preferable, we see how the Stoics exclude from the good every thing relative, and hold fast to it alone in its highest significance.

(3) This abstract apprehension of the conception of virtue is still farther verified in the rigid antagonism which the Stoics affirmed between virtue and vice. Virtue is reasonableness, — right action in harmony with the nature of things ; vice is unreason, perversity, which is in contradiction to nature and truth. Either, they argue, the actions of a man are rational and uncontradictory or they are not. In the first case the man is good ; in the second, even though his act is but slightly opposed to reason and nature, he is bad. He alone is good who is perfectly good ; but he is bad who is in any degree irrational or vicious : *e.g.*, whoever yields to a desire, affection, passion, or commits a fault. Between virtue and vice there is no mean, no point of transition, any more than between truth and falsehood. From this the Stoics concluded that a perfectly moral act is possible only when the actor is altogether virtuous, *i.e.*, has a perfect knowledge of the good and the power to completely realize it. Virtue must be pos-

sessed wholly or not at all: the virtuous man must therefore be absolutely virtuous. To this may be added the farther paradox of the Stoics,—all good actions are equally right and equally good; all bad actions are equally faulty and therefore equally bad; there are no degrees of goodness and badness, virtuousness and viciousness, but the two are absolutely antithetical. The Stoics on this point conceded only that legal acts which are in substantial accordance with the law of virtue but have not perfect virtue for their source, are intermediate between the good and the bad but have no moral worth.

(4) *The Special Doctrine of Ethical Action* was most completely developed by the later Stoics, who were thus the founders of deontology. Virtue, according to the Stoics, consists in absolute correctness of judgment, in the soul's perfect control of pain, in its complete dominion over pleasure and desire, and in the absolute justice which estimates every thing in accordance with its worth in the universe. They divided duties into two classes, duties to self, and duties to others. The former relate to rational self-preservation and the avoidance of all that contradicts nature and reason; the latter to those relations of the individual to society which must be directed by man's social nature, and in which all the claims of justice and humanity toward others must be satisfied. The state is likewise a result of man's political nature. But the division of mankind into hostile peoples and states is a contradiction of human nature; the whole human race should form one great community with equal laws and equal rights. The Stoics, thus, originated the idea of cosmopolitanism.

The Stoic teachings conclude with the picture of the *wise man*,—the ideal type of virtue in its completest realization, which with its attendant subjective blessedness is set forth as a model and pattern for action. The wise man is he who actually possesses true knowledge of divine and human things, as well as the absolute moral insight and strength which flow

from it, and thus unites in himself all conceivable human perfections. The more special application of this thought appears paradoxical since such absolute perfection does not harmonize with the conception of individuality. The Stoics, however, valued it most highly precisely because the elevation of the individual to pure and perfect virtue is the postulate which supports their entire theory of ethics, and especially distinguishes it from the Aristotelian, which requires only isolated and relative virtues. The wise man, they said, knows every thing, and understands every thing better than any other because he possesses a perfect mind and the knowledge of the true nature of things. He alone is the true statesman, lawgiver, orator, educator, critic, poet, physician; while the unwise man remains ever rude and uncultured, even though he possesses great knowledge. The wise man is unerring and faultless, since he always acts rationally, and thinks all things in their rational connection; for this reason he fears and wonders at nothing, he is guilty of no weakness or passion. He alone is a true companion, neighbor, kinsman, and friend, because he alone perfectly knows and fulfils the duties which spring from these relations. Moreover, the wise man, since he has the good as a law within himself, is free from all subjection to external law and tradition; he is lord of his own actions and responsible to himself alone. No less is he by his character and virtue free in reference to all vocations and modes of life; he can move in any sphere. He is rich because he can obtain all that he needs and dispense with all that he lacks. He is joyous under all circumstances because in his virtue he has an ever present source of blessedness. But on the other hand all the external and internal goods which the unwise think they have, they in reality do not possess, since they lack the fundamental condition of true blessedness, — perfection of soul. In this thought, that inner moral integrity of mind is the necessary basis of all qualification for action and of all true happiness, lies the truth of this ideal of the Stoics. It also

exhibits the abstraction in which their whole system is involved; this wisdom is an empty ideal which as even the Stoics themselves admitted has no reality; it is a general conception of perfection which is inapplicable to life, and thus shows that the Stoics, in general, adopted a one-sided principle, the universality of subjectivity. The subject instead of being, as formerly, a mere accident of the state, was now to become absolute; but as a result of this his own reality vanishes in the clouds and mist of an abstract ideal. The merit of the Stoic philosophy, however, is that in an age of social ruin it held fast to the moral idea, and by separating politics from morals, established the latter as an independent science.

SECTION XVIII.

EPICUREANISM.

THE Epicurean school arose almost contemporaneously with the Stoic, though perhaps a little earlier. Epicurus, its founder, the son of an Athenian who had emigrated to Samos, was born 342 B.C., six years after the death of Plato. Of his youth and education little is known. In his thirty-sixth year he opened a philosophical school at Athens, over which he presided till his death, 270 B.C. His disciples and adherents formed a society, in which they were united by the closest friendship, illustrating the general condition of things in Greece after the time of Alexander, when the social took the place of the decaying political life. Epicurus himself compared his society to the Pythagorean fraternity, although the community of goods, which forms an element in the latter, Epicurus excludes, affirming that true friends can confide in one another. The moral character of Epicurus has been

repeatedly assailed, but, according to the testimony of the most reliable witnesses, his life was blameless in every respect, and his personal character was estimable and amiable. Moreover, it cannot be doubted that much of that, which is told by some, of the offensive voluptuousness of the Epicurean band, should be regarded as calumny. Epicurus was a voluminous writer, surpassing, in this respect, even Aristotle, and exceeded by Chrysippus alone. To the loss of his greater works he has himself contributed, by his practice of composing summaries of his system, which he recommended his disciples to commit to memory. These summaries have been for the most part preserved.

The end which Epicurus proposed to himself in science is distinctly revealed in his definition of philosophy. He calls it an activity which, by means of conceptions and arguments, procures the happiness of life. Its end is, therefore, with him essentially a practical one, and on this account the object of his whole system is to produce a scheme of morals which should teach us how we may certainly attain a happy life. It is true that the Epicureans adopted the usual division of philosophy into logic (which they called *canonics*), physics, and ethics; but they confined logic to the determination of the criterion of truth, and considered it only as an instrument and introduction to physics, while they treated physics as entirely subordinate to ethics, and necessary only in order to free men from superstitious fear, and deliver them from the power of fables and mythical fancies concerning nature, which might hinder the attainment of happiness. We have therefore in Epicureanism the three ancient divisions of philosophy, but in a reversed order, since logic and physics are here made ancillary to ethics. We shall confine ourselves in our exposition to the latter, since the Epicurean *canonics* and physics have little scientific interest, and since the physics especially is not only very incomplete and without any internal connection, but rests entirely upon the atomic theory of Democritus.

Epicurus, like Aristotle and the other philosophers of his day, placed the highest good in happiness, or a happy life. Happiness, however, in his opinion, consists solely in pleasure: virtue has no value in itself but only in so far as it increases our enjoyment, — renders life agreeable. But Epicurus goes on to give a more accurate determination of pleasure, and in this he differs essentially from his predecessors, the Cyrenaics (*cf.* Sect. XIII. 3.)

1. While with Aristippus the pleasure of the moment is made the end of human effort, Epicurus directs men to strive after a system of pleasures which will insure a permanent condition of happiness for the whole life. *True* pleasure is thus the object to be considered and weighed. Many a pleasure should be despised because it will result in pain, and many a pain should be rejoiced in because it will lead to a greater pleasure.

2. Since the sage will seek after the highest good, not simply for the present but for his whole life, he will hold the pleasures and pains of the soul, which like memory and hope extend to the past and the future, in greater esteem than those of the body, which relate only to the present moment. The pleasure of the soul consists in the untroubled tranquillity of the sage, who rests secure in the feeling of his inner worth and his exaltation above the strokes of destiny. Thus Epicurus would say that it is better to be miserable but rational than to be happy and irrational, and that the wise man might be happy though in torture. He would even affirm, like a true follower of Aristotle, that pleasure and happiness were most closely connected with virtue, that virtue is in fact inseparable from true pleasure, and that there can be no agreeable life without virtue, and no virtue without an agreeable life. On the same grounds he declares that friendship, which the Cyrenaics thought to be superfluous, is a chief means of happiness; and it is such, in so far as it is an enduring, life-gladdening, and beautifying union of congenial minds, and gives a happiness more lasting than any which sensuous enjoyment can afford.

3. While other Hedonists regarded the most positive and intense feeling of pleasure as the highest good, Epicurus, on the other hand, fixed his eye on a happiness which should be abiding and for the whole life. He would not seek the most exquisite enjoyments in order to attain to a happy life, but he rather recommends one to be satisfied with little, and to practise sobriety and temperance of life. He guards himself against such a false application of his doctrine as would imply that the pleasure of the debauchee is the highest good, and boasts that with a little barley-bread and water he would rival Zeus in happiness. He even expresses an aversion for all costly pleasures, not, however, in themselves, but because of the evil consequences which they entail. True, the Epicurean sage need not therefore live as a Cynic. He will enjoy himself where he can without harm, and will even seek to acquire means to live with dignity and ease. But though all these enjoyments of life may properly belong to the sage, yet he *can* deprive himself of them without misery — though he *ought* not to do so — since he enjoys the truest and most essential pleasure in the calmness of his soul and the tranquillity of his heart. In opposition to the positive pleasure of some Hedonists, the theory of Epicurus expends itself in negative conceptions, representing that freedom from pain is pleasure, and that hence the activity of the sage should be prominently directed to the avoidance of that which is disagreeable. All that man does, says Epicurus, he does in order that he may neither suffer nor fear pain; if he attains this, nature is satisfied. Positive gratifications can never increase pleasure, but only complicate it. Happiness is thus, according to Epicurus, simple and easily attained if we will but follow nature, and not ruin and embitter life itself by inordinate demands and a foolish fear of fancied evils. Among the evils which man fears, death holds the first place. But it is no evil not to live. Hence death, for which men have the greatest terror, the wise man does not fear. For while we live, death is not, and when death is, we are not; when

it is present we feel it not, for it is the end of all feeling, and that, which by its presence cannot affect our happiness, ought not to trouble us when thought of as future. The Epicurean doctrine thus results in the purely subjective endeavor of the individual to find rest and satisfaction in existence; it knows nothing of man's moral nature, but it has, so far as is possible, ennobled the ancient conception of pleasure.

Epicurus's view of the universe is completed by his doctrine of the gods, to whom he applied his ideal of happiness. To the gods belongs a human form, though without any fixed body or human wants. In the void spaces between the infinite worlds they lead an undisturbed and changeless life, whose happiness is incapable of increase. From the blessedness of the gods he inferred that they can have nothing to do with the management of our affairs; for blessedness is repose. They trouble neither themselves nor others; and therefore they need not be objects of superstitious, life-disturbing fear. These inactive gods of Epicurus, these indestructible but unstable forms, these bodies which are not bodies, have but little connection with the rest of his system; but even here he is thinking of the happiness of man; the thought of the gods is robbed of all its terrors, yet retained in a modified form which serves to establish rather than refute the Epicurean theory of happiness.

SECTION XIX.

SCEPTICISM AND THE NEW ACADEMY.

THIS subjective direction was carried out to its farthest extent by the Sceptics, who broke down completely the bridge between subject and object, denying all objective truth, knowledge and science, and wholly withdrawing the philosopher from every thing but himself and his own subjec-

tive estimates. In this direction we may distinguish between the old Scepticism, the new Academy, and the later Scepticism.

1. THE OLD SCEPTICISM. — *Pyrrho* of Elis, a cotemporary of Aristotle, was the head of the old Sceptics. He left no writings behind him, and all our knowledge of his opinions is derived from his disciple and follower, Timon of Phlius. The tendency of these sceptical philosophers, like that of the Stoics and Epicureans, was a practical one, for philosophy, said they, ought to lead us to happiness. But in order to live happily we must know how things are, and, therefore, how we are related to them. The first of these questions the Sceptics answered by attempting to show that we do not perceive things as they actually are, but only as they appear to us; our representations of them are neither true nor false; nothing definite can be predicated of any thing. Neither our senses nor our opinions concerning any thing teach us any truth; to every precept and to every position a contrary may be advanced; hence the contradictory views of men, and especially of the philosophies of the schools respecting one and the same thing. All objective knowledge and science being thus impossible, the true relation of the philosopher to things consists in the entire suspension of judgment, and the withholding of every positive assertion. In order to avoid every thing like a positive assertion, the Sceptics had recourse to a variety of artifices, and availed themselves of doubtful modes of expression, such as *it is possible*; *it may be so*; *perhaps*; *I assert nothing*, — cautiously subjoining to this last — *not even that I assert nothing*. By this suspension of judgment the Sceptics thought they could attain their practical end, happiness; for the abstinence from all positive opinion is followed by a freedom from all mental disturbance, as a substance is by a shadow. He who has embraced Scepticism lives thenceforward tranquilly, without inquietude, without agitation, in a mere apathy which excludes both the knowledge of good and of evil. *Pyrrho* is said to have

originated the doctrine which lies at the basis of sceptical apathy, viz., that there is no difference between sickness and health, or between life and death. The Sceptics, for the most part, derived the material for their theory from the previous investigations and polemic of the dogmatic schools. But the grounds on which they rested were far from being profound, and were for the most part either dialectic errors which could easily be refuted, or mere subtleties. The use of the following ten tropes is ascribed to the old Sceptics, though these were perhaps not definitely brought out by either Pyrrho or Timon, but were probably first collected by Ænesidemus, soon after the time of Cicero. The withholding of all decisive judgment may rest; (1) upon the differences of conception and sensation generally existing among individual living beings; (2) upon those physical and intellectual differences between men which cause them to view the same thing in different lights; (3) upon the varying testimony of sense itself, and the uncertainty whether the organs of sense are competent; (4) upon the circumstances under which objects appear; (5) upon their relative positions, intervals, and places; (6) upon the fact that we know nothing directly, but only through some extraneous medium (air, etc.); (7) upon the fact that our impressions of the same thing vary in quantity, temperature, color, motion, etc.; (8) upon the dependence of our conceptions upon custom, since that which is new and strange affects us differently from that which is familiar; (9) upon the relativity of all our conceptions, which is based upon the fact that predicates express merely the relations of things one to another, or to our faculty of representation; (10) upon the different ways of life, the varieties of customs and laws, the mythical representations and dogmatic opinions of men.

2. THE NEW ACADEMY. — Scepticism, in its conflict with the Stoics, as it appeared in the Platonic school established by *Arcesilaus* (316–241), has a far greater significance than belongs to the performances of the Pyrrhonists. In this

school Scepticism sought to support itself by its great respect for the writings and the traditions of the oral teachings of Plato. Arcesilaus could neither have assumed nor retained the chair of instruction in the Academy, had he not carefully cherished and imparted to his disciples the impression that his own view, respecting the withholding of a decisive judgment, coincided essentially with that of Socrates and of Plato, and if he had not also taught that he was only restoring the genuine and original significance of the Platonic dialectic when he set aside the dogmatic method of teaching. An immediate incitement to the efforts of Arcesilaus is found in his opposition to the rigid dogmatic system which had lately arisen in the Porch, and which claimed to be in every respect an improvement upon Platonism. Hence, as Cicero remarks, Arcesilaus directed all his sceptical and polemic attacks against Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. He opposed the Stoic theory of cognition by maintaining that even false conceptions can induce a feeling of intense conviction, and that all representation results only in opinion and never in knowledge. Accordingly Arcesilaus denied the existence of a criterion which could certify to us the truth of our knowledge. If there be any truth in our affirmations, said he, we cannot be certain of it. In this sense he taught that one can know nothing, not even that he does know nothing. But in morals, in choosing the good and rejecting the evil, he taught that we should follow that which is probable, that which is supported by the most and best reasons. In this way we may act rightly and be happy, since this method is in accord with reason and the nature of things.

Of the subsequent leaders in the new Academy, *Carneades* (214–129) alone need here be mentioned, whose whole philosophy, however, consists almost exclusively in a polemic against Stoicism. His positive performance is an attempt to bring out a philosophical theory of probabilities or a method of probable thought, a determination of the different degrees of probability, which Carneades thought to be a necessity of

practical life. The later Academicians fell back to an eclectic dogmatism.

3. THE LATER SCEPTICISM.—Once more we meet with a peculiar Scepticism at the time when Grecian philosophy had wholly fallen to decay. To this time belong *Ænesidemus*, *Agrippa*, whose date is also uncertain, though subsequent to *Ænesidemus* (he emphasized the necessity of proving every thing, but at the same time showed that every proof must itself be proved, and so on *ad infinitum*), and *Sextus Empiricus*, a Greek physician of the empiric sect, who probably flourished in the first half of the third century of the Christian era. These are the most significant names. Of these the last has the greatest interest for us, from two writings which he left behind him (the *Hypotyposes* of Pyrrho in three books, and a treatise against the mathematicians in nine books), which are sources of much historical information. In these he has profusely collected every thing which the Scepticism of the ancients could advance against the certainty of knowledge.

SECTION XX.

THE ROMANS.

THE Romans took no independent part in the progress of philosophy. After Greek philosophy and literature had begun to gain a foothold among them, and especially after three distinguished representatives of Attic culture and eloquence—Carneades the Academician, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Diogenes the Stoic—had appeared in Rome as envoys from Athens; and after Greece, a few years later, had become a Roman province, and thus outwardly in a close connection with Rome, almost all the more significant systems of Grecian philosophy, especially the Epicurean (Lucretius), and

the Stoic (Seneca), flourished and found adherents in Rome, though without gaining any real philosophical progress. The Roman philosophizing is wholly eclectic, as is seen in Cicero, the most important and influential philosophic writer among the Romans. But the popular philosophy of this man and of the minds akin to him cannot be strongly assailed, for, notwithstanding its want of originality and logical sequence, it gave philosophy a broad dissemination, and made it a means of universal culture.

SECTION XXI.

NEO-PLATONISM.

IN Neo-Platonism, the spirit of antiquity made its last and almost despairing attempt at a philosophy which should resolve the dualism between the subjective and the objective. This attempt was made on the one hand from a subjective standpoint, like the other Post-Aristotelian philosophies (*cf.* Sect. XVI. 7), and on the other with the design to bring out objective determinations in reference to the highest conceptions of metaphysics, and the absolute; in other words, to sketch a system of absolute philosophy. In this respect it sought to copy the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, and claimed to be a revival of the original Platonism. On both sides the new attempt formed the closing period of ancient philosophy. It represents the last struggle, but at the same time the exhaustion of the ancient thinking and the dissolution of the old philosophy.

The first, and also the most important, representative of Neo-Platonism, is *Plotinus* of Lycopolis in Egypt. He was a pupil of Ammonius Saccas, who taught the Platonic philosophy at Alexandria in the beginning of the third century, but left no writings behind him. Plotinus (A.D. 205-270)

from his fortieth year taught philosophy at Rome. His opinions are contained in a course of hastily written and not closely connected treatises, which, after his death, were collected and published in six *Enneads* by *Porphry* (who was born A.D. 233, and taught both philosophy and eloquence at Rome), his most noted disciple. From Rome and Alexandria, the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus passed over in the fourth century to Athens, where it established itself in the Academy. In the fourth century, *Jamblichus*, a scholar of Porphry, and in the fifth, *Proclus* (412-485), were prominent among the Neo-Platonists. With the triumph of Christianity and the consequent fall of heathenism, in the course of the sixth century, even this last bloom of Grecian philosophy faded away.

The common characteristic of all the Neo-Platonists is a tendency to mysticism, theosophy, and theurgy. The majority of them gave themselves up to magic and sorcery, and the most distinguished boasted that they were the subjects of divine inspiration and illumination, able to look into the future, and to work miracles. They professed to be hierophants as much as philosophers, and exhibited an unmistakable desire to establish a Pagan copy of Christianity, which should be at the same time a philosophy and a universal religion. In the following sketch of Neo-Platonism we confine ourselves mainly to Plotinus.

1. ECSTASY AS A SUBJECTIVE STATE. — The result of the philosophical strivings antecedent to Neo-Platonism had been Scepticism, which, seeing the impracticability of both the Stoic and Epicurean theory, had assumed a totally negative relation to every positive theoretical content. But the end which Scepticism had actually gained was the opposite of that for which it had striven. It had striven for the perfect apathy of the sage, but it had gained only the necessity of incessantly opposing every positive affirmation. Instead of the rest which they had sought, they found rather an absolute unrest. This absolute unrest of the consciousness

striving after an absolute rest, begat immediately a longing to be freed from this unrest, a longing for some conclusion which should be absolutely satisfying, and stripped of every sceptical objection. This longing after an absolute truth found its historical expression in Neo-Platonism. The subject sought to master and comprehend the absolute; and this, neither by objective knowledge nor dialectic mediation, but immediately, by an inner and mystical exaltation of the subject in the form of an immediate beholding, or ecstasy. The knowledge of the true, says Plotinus, is not gained by proof nor by any mediation; it cannot be found when the objects known remain separate from the subject knowing, but only when the distinction between knower and known disappears; it is a beholding of the reason in itself, not in the sense that we see the reason, but the reason beholds itself; in no other way can knowledge arise. Nay, even this self-intuition of reason, within which subject and object are still opposed to one another, must itself be transcended. The highest stage of knowledge is an intuition of the Highest, of the one principle of things, in which all separation between it and the soul vanishes; in which the soul with pure rapture touches the absolute itself, and feels itself filled and illumined by it. If any one has attained to such a beholding, to such a true unity with the divine, he will despise the pure thinking which he otherwise loved, for this thinking was only a movement which presupposed a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. This mystical absorption into the Deity, or, the One, this resolving the self into the absolute, is that which gives to Neo-Platonism a character so peculiarly distinct from the genuine Grecian systems of philosophy.

2. THE COSMICAL PRINCIPLES. — The doctrine of the three cosmical principles is most closely connected with the theory just named. To the two cosmical principles already assumed, viz., the world-soul and the world-reason, a third and higher one was added by the Neo-Platonists, as the ultimate unity

of all distinctions and antitheses, in which, therefore, all difference must vanish in pure simplicity of being. This simple unity cannot be reason, for in reason is the antithesis of thought and its object, and the movement from the first to the last; reason relates to the manifold. But the manifold presupposes the simple as its principle. If, therefore, there is to be a unity of the totality of being, reason must be transcended and the absolute One attained. To this primal essence Plotinus gives different names, as "the first," "the one," "the good," and "that which stands above being" (being is with him but a subordinate conception, which, united with the reason, forms but the second step in the series of highest conceptions). In all these names, Plotinus does not profess to have satisfactorily expressed the essence of this primal One, but only to have given a representation of it. In characterizing it still farther, he denies to it all thinking and willing, because it needs nothing and can desire nothing; it is not energy, but above energy; life does not belong to it; neither being nor essence nor any of the most general categories of being can be ascribed to it; in short, it is that which can neither be expressed nor thought. Plotinus has throughout striven to think of this first principle as absolute, as a simple, excluding all determinations which can restrict it, and therefore as existing *per se*, independent of all other being. This pure abstraction, however, he could not carry out. He set himself to show how every thing else, and especially the two other cosmical principles, could emanate from this first; but in order to have a principle for his emanation theory, he was obliged to consider the first in its relation to the second and as its producer.

3. THE EMANATION THEORY OF THE NEO-PLATONISTS. — Every emanation theory, and hence also that of the Neo-Platonists, considers the world as the effluence of God, and gives to the emanation a greater or less degree of perfection, according as it is nearer or more remote from its source, and thus represents the totality of being as a series of descending

gradations. Fire, says Plotinus, emits heat, snow cold, fragrant bodies odors, and every organic thing so soon as it matures begets something like itself. In the same way the all-perfect and the eternal, in the excess of his perfection sends out from himself that which is also eternal, and after him, the best, viz., the reason or world-intelligence, which is the immediate reflection and image of the primal One. Plotinus abounds in figures to show how the primal One need lose nothing nor become weakened by this emanation of reason. Next to the original One, reason is the most perfect. It contains in itself the ideal world, and the whole of true and changeless being. Some notion may be formed of its exaltation and glory by attentively considering the sensible world in its greatness, its beauty, and the order of its ceaseless motion, and then by rising to the contemplation of its archetype in the pure and changeless being of the intelligible world, and then by recognizing in intelligence the author and finisher of all. In it there is neither past nor future, but only an ever-abiding present. It is, moreover, as incapable of division in space as of change in time. It is the true eternity, of which time is only a copy. As reason flows from the primal One, so does the world-soul eternally emanate from reason, though the latter incurs no change thereby. The world-soul is the copy of reason, permeated by it, and actualizing it in an outer world. It gives ideas externally to sensible matter, which is the last and lowest step in the series of emanations and in itself is undetermined, and has neither quality nor being. In this way the visible universe is but the transcript of the world-soul, which forms it out of matter, permeates and animates it, and carries it forward in a circle. Here closes the series of emanations, and, as was the aim of the theory, we have been carried in a constant movement from the highest to the lowest, from God to the mere image of true being, or the sensible world.

Individual souls, like the world-soul, are linked both to the higher and the lower, to reason and the sensible; now

bound with the latter and sharing its destiny, and anon rising to their source in reason. Their original and proper home was in the rational world, from whence they have unwillingly descended, each one in its proper time, into the corporeal; not, however, wholly forsaking their ideal abode, but as a sunbeam touches at the same time the sun and the earth, so are they found alike in the world of reason and the world of sense. Our vocation, therefore, — and here we come back to the point from which we started in our exposition of Neo-Platonism, — can only be to direct our senses and aspirations towards our proper home, in the ideal world, and by asceticism and crucifying of the flesh, to free our better self from its participation with the body. But when our soul has once mounted up to the ideal world, that image of the originally good and beautiful, it then attains the final goal of all its longings and efforts, the immediate union with God, through the enraptured beholding of the primal One in which it loses its consciousness and becomes buried and absorbed.

According to all this, the Neo-Platonic philosophy would seem to be a monism, and thus the most perfect development of ancient philosophy, in so far as this had striven to carry back the sum of all being to one ultimate ground. But as it attained its highest principle from which all the rest was derived, by means of ecstasy, by a mystical self-destruction of the individual person, by asceticism and theurgy, and not by means of self-conscious thinking, nor by any natural or rational way, it is evident that ancient philosophy, instead of becoming perfected in Neo-Platonism, only overleaps itself to its own self-destruction.

SECTION XXII.

CHRISTIANITY AND SCHOLASTICISM.

1. THE CHRISTIAN IDEA. — The intellectual life of Greece at the period of its highest development was characterized by the immediate sacrifice of the subject to the object (nature, the state, etc.) : the complete severance of the two, of spirit and nature, had not yet arrived ; the subject had not yet so far reflected upon himself that he could apprehend his own absolute worth. This severance began with the decay of Grecian life, in the age immediately subsequent to Alexander the Great. As the objective world lost its influence, the thinking consciousness turned back upon itself ; but even in this very process, the bridge between subject and object was broken down. The self-consciousness had not yet become sufficiently absorbed in itself to look upon the true, the divine, in any other light than as separate from itself ; while a feeling of pain, of unsatisfied desire, took the place of that fair unity between spirit and nature which had been peculiar to the better periods of Grecian civil and artistic life. Neo-Platonism, by its extravagant speculation, and, practically, by its mortification of the sense, made a last and despairing attempt to overcome this separation, or to bury itself within it, by bringing the two sides forcibly together. The attempt was in vain, and the old philosophy, totally exhausted, came to its end. Dualism is therefore the rock on which it split. This problem, thus left without a solution, Christianity took up. It assumed for its principle the idea which ancient thought had not known how to carry out, affirming that the separation between God and man might be overcome, and that the human and the divine could be united in one. The speculative fundamental idea of Christianity is, that God has become incarnate, and this had its practical exhibition (for

Christianity was a practical religion) in the idea of the atonement and the demand of the new birth, *i.e.*, the positive purification of the sense from its corruptions, instead of a merely negative asceticism.

From the introduction of Christianity, monism has been the character and the fundamental tendency of all modern philosophy. In fact, the new philosophy started from the very point at which the old had stood still. The turning of the self-consciousness upon itself, which was the standpoint of the Post-Aristotelian speculations, forms in Descartes the starting-point of the new philosophy, whose whole course has been the mediation and reconciliation of that antithesis beyond which the old could not pass.

2. SCHOLASTICISM. — It very early resulted that Christianity came in contact with the contemporaneous philosophy, especially with Platonism. This arose first with the apologists of the second century, and the fathers of the Alexandrian church. Subsequently, in the ninth century, Scotus Erigena made an attempt to combine Christianity with Neo-Platonism, though it was not till the second half of the Middle Ages, from the eleventh century, that there was developed any thing that might be properly termed a Christian philosophy. This was the so-called Scholasticism.

The effort of Scholasticism was to mediate between the dogma of religion and the reflecting self-consciousness; to reconcile faith and knowledge. When the dogma passed over into the schools from the Church which had given it utterance, and theology became a science of the universities, the scientific interest asserted its rights, and undertook to bring the dogma which had hitherto stood over against the self-consciousness as an external power, into a closer relation to the thinking subject. A series of attempts was now made to bring out the doctrines of the Church in the form of a scientific system (the first complete dogmatic system was that of *Peter Lombard* (who died 1164) in his four books of sentences, and was voluminously commented upon by the

later Scholastics), all starting from the indisputable premise (beyond which scholastic thinking never went), that the faith of the church is absolute truth; but all guided likewise by the desire to make this revealed truth intelligible, and to show it to be rational. “*Credo ut intelligam*” — this expression of *Anselm*, the beginner and founder of Scholasticism (he was born about 1035, and made Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093), was the watchword of the whole movement. Scholasticism applied to the solution of its problem the most remarkable logical acumen, and brought out systems of doctrine like the Gothic cathedrals in their architecture. The extended study of Aristotle, called *par eminence* “the philosopher,” whom many of the most distinguished Scholastics wrote commentaries upon, and who was extensively studied at the same period among the Arabians (*Avicenna* and *Averroes*), furnished their terminology and most of their points of view. At the summit of Scholasticism we must place the two incontestably greatest masters of the Scholastic art and method, *Thomas Aquinas* (Dominican, who died 1274) and *Duns Scotus* (Franciscan, who died 1308), the founders of two schools, into which after them the whole Scholastic theology divides itself, — the former exalting the understanding (*intellectus*), and the latter the will (*voluntas*), as the highest principle, both being driven into essentially differing directions by this opposition of the theoretical and practical. Even with this began the downfall of Scholasticism; its highest point was also the turning-point to its self-destruction. The rationality of the dogma, the oneness of faith and knowledge, had been constantly their fundamental premise; but this premise fell away, and the whole basis of their metaphysics was given up in principle, the moment Duns Scotus placed the problem of theology in the practical. When the practical and the theoretical became divided, and still more when thought and being were separated by Nominalism (*cf.* 3), philosophy broke loose from theology and knowledge from faith; knowledge assumed its position above

faith and above authority (modern philosophy), and the religious consciousness broke with the traditional dogma (the Reformation).

3. NOMINALISM AND REALISM.—Hand in hand with the whole development of Scholasticism, there was developed the opposition between Nominalism and Realism, an opposition whose origin is to be found in the relation of Scholasticism to the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. The Nominalists were those who held that conceptions of the universal (*universalia*) were simple names, *flatus vocis*, representations without content and without reality. According to them there are no universal conceptions, no species, no classes; every thing which is, exists only as separate in its pure individuality; there is, therefore, no pure thinking, but only representation and sensuous perception. The Realists, on the other hand, taking pattern from Plato, held fast to the objective reality of universals (*universalia ante rem*). This opposition appeared first between *Roscellinus*, who took the side of Nominalism, and *Anselm*, who advocated the Realistic theory, and it is seen from this time through the whole period of Scholasticism, though from the age of *Abelard* (born 1079) a middle view, which was both Nominalistic and Realistic, held with some slight modifications the prominent place (*universalia in re*). According to this view the universal is only something thought and represented, though as such it is not simply a product of the representing consciousness, but has also its objective reality in objects themselves, from which, it was argued, we could not abstract it if it were not essentially contained in them. This identity of thought and being, is the fundamental premise on which the whole dialectic course of Scholasticism rests. All its arguments are founded on the claim, that that which has been syllogistically proved exists in reality as well as in logical thinking. If this premise is overthrown, so falls with it the whole basis of Scholasticism; and there remains nothing more for thought, thus at fault in reference to its own objectivity, but to fall back

upon itself. This self-dissolution of Scholasticism actually appears with *William of Occam* (died 1347), the most influential reviver of that Nominalism which had been so mighty in the beginning of Scholasticism, but which now, more victorious against a decaying than then against a rising form of culture, plucked away its foundation from the framework of Scholastic dogmatism, and brought the whole structure into inevitable ruin.

SECTION XXIII.

TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE emancipation of modern philosophy from the bondage of Scholasticism was a gradual process. It first showed itself in a series of preparative movements during the fifteenth century, and was completed negatively, in the course of the sixteenth, and positively in the first half of the seventeenth century.

1. FALL OF SCHOLASTICISM.—The immediate ground of this changed direction of the time, we have already seen in the inner decay of Scholasticism itself. Just so soon as the fundamental premise on which the Scholastic theology and method rested, the rationality of the dogma, was abandoned, the whole structure, as already remarked, fell to inevitable ruin. The conviction, directly opposed to the principle of Scholasticism, that what might be true dogmatically, might be false, or, at least, incapable of proof in the eye of the reason—a point of view from which, *e.g.*, the Aristotelian *Pomponatius* (1462–1530) treated the doctrines of the future state, and in whose light *Vanini* subsequently went over the chief problems of philosophy—kept gaining ground, notwithstanding the opposition of the Church, and even associated

with itself the opinion that reason and revelation could not be harmonized. The feeling became prevalent that philosophy must be freed from its previous condition of minority and servitude; a struggle after a greater independence of philosophic investigation was awakened, and though no one yet ventured to attack directly the doctrine of the Church, the effort was made to shatter the confidence in the chief bulwark of Scholasticism, the Aristotelian philosophy, or what at that period was regarded as such; (especially in this connection *Peter Ramus* (1515–1572), should be mentioned, who fell in the massacre of St. Bartholomew). The authority of the Church became more and more weakened in the faith of the people, and the great systems of Scholasticism came to an end.

2. THE RESULTS OF SCHOLASTICISM.—Notwithstanding all this, Scholasticism was not without its positively good results. Though wholly in the service of the Church, it had, nevertheless, grown out of a scientific impulse, and thus naturally awakened a free spirit of inquiry and a taste for knowledge. It made the objects of faith the objects of thought, it raised men from the sphere of unconditional faith to the sphere of doubt, of investigation and of knowledge, and by its very effort to demonstrate the principles of theology it established, though against its knowledge and design, the authority of reason. It thus introduced to the world another principle than that of the old Church, the principle of the thinking spirit, the self-consciousness of the reason, or at least prepared the way for the victory of this principle. Even the deformities and unfavorable side of Scholasticism, the many absurd questions upon which the Scholastics divided, even their thousand-fold unnecessary and accidental distinctions, their inquisitiveness and subtleties, all sprang from a rational principle, and grew out of a spirit of investigation, which could only utter itself in this way under the all-powerful ecclesiastical spirit of the time. Only when it was surpassed by the advancing spirit of the age, did Scholasticism, falsi-

ying its original meaning, make common cause and interest with the old ecclesiasticism, and become the most violent opponent of the improvements of the new period.

3. THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS.—The revival of classic literature contributed prominently to that change in the spirit of the age which marks the beginning of the new epoch of philosophy. The study of the ancients, especially of the Greeks, had almost wholly ceased in the course of the Middle Ages; even the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was known, for the most part, only through Latin translations or secondary sources; no one realized the spirit of classic life, and all sense for beauty of form and elegant composition had passed away. The change was chiefly brought about by means of the Greek scholars who fled from Constantinople to Italy; the study of the ancients in the original sources was renewed; the newly-discovered art of printing allowed the classics to be widely circulated; the Medicis drew classic scholars to their court; all this working for a far better understanding of the ancient philosophy. *Besarion* (died 1472) and *Ficinus* (died 1499) were prominent in this movement. The result was presently seen. The new scholars contended against the stiff and uncritical manner in which the sciences had hitherto been treated, new ideas began to circulate, and there arose once more the free, universal, thinking spirit of antiquity. In Germany, also, classic studies found a fruitful soil. *Reuchlin* (born 1454), *Melancthon* and *Erasmus*, labored in this direction, and the classic movement, hostile as it was to the Scholastic impulse, favored most decidedly the growing tendencies to the Reformation.

4. THE GERMAN REFORMATION.—All the elements of the new age, the struggle against Scholasticism, the revival of letters and the more enlarged culture thus secured, the striving after national independence, the attempts of the state to free itself from the Church and the hierarchy, and above all, the desire of the thinking self-consciousness for autonomy, for freedom from the fetters of authority—all these elements

found their focus and point of union in the German Reformation. Though having its root at first in practical, and religious, and national interests, and falling very early into erroneous courses, issuing in a dogmatic ecclesiastical one-sidedness, yet was the Reformation in principle and in its true consequences a rupture of the thinking spirit with authority, a protest against the fetters of the positive, a return of the mind from its self-estrangement to itself. From that which was without, the mind now came back to that which is within, and the purely human as such, the individual heart and conscience, subjective conviction, in a word, the rights of the subject now began to be of worth. While marriage had formerly been regarded, though not immoral, as yet inferior to continence and celibacy, it appeared now as a divine institution, a natural law ordained of God. While poverty had formerly been esteemed higher than wealth, and the contemplative life of the monk was superior to the manual labor of the layman supporting himself by his own toil, poverty now ceased to be desirable in itself, and labor was no longer despised. Ecclesiastical freedom took the place of spiritual bondage; monasticism and the priesthood lost their power. In the same way, on the side of knowledge the individual came back to himself, and threw off the restraints of authority. He was impressed with the conviction that the whole process of redemption must be experienced within himself, that his reconciliation to God and salvation was his own concern, for which he needed no mediation of priests, and that he stood in an immediate relation to God. He found his whole being in his faith, in the depth of his feelings and convictions.

Since thus Protestantism sprang from the same spirit in which modern philosophy had its birth, the two have the closest relation to each other, though of course there is a specific difference between the religious and the scientific principle. Yet in their origin, both kinds of Protestantism, that of religion and that of thought, are one and the same,

and in their progress they have also gone hand in hand together. For the reduction of religion to its simplest elements, which Protestantism began but allowed to stop at the Bible, must necessarily be carried farther, terminating only with the ultimate, original, supra-historical element, *i.e.*, with that rational knowledge which is the source of all religion as well as of all philosophy.

5. THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES. — To all these phenomena, which should be regarded both as causes and as symptoms of the intellectual revolution of this period, we must add yet another, which essentially facilitated and positively assisted in freeing thought from the fetters of authority, — the starting up of the natural sciences and the inductive method of examining nature. This epoch was a period of the most fruitful and influential discoveries in natural science. The discovery of America and the passage to the East Indies had already widened the circle of view, but still greater revolutions are connected with the names of *Copernicus* (died 1543), *Kepler* (died 1630), and *Galileo* (died 1642), revolutions which could not remain without an influence upon the whole mode of thinking of that age, and contributed prominently to break the faith in the prevailing ecclesiastical authority. Scholasticism had turned away from nature and the phenomenal world, and, blind towards that which lay before its eyes, had spent itself in a dreamy / intellectuality; but now nature rose again in honor; her glory and exaltation, her infinite diversity and fulness of life became again the immediate objects of observation; to investigate nature became an essential object of philosophy, and scientific empiricism was thus regarded as a universal and essential concern of the thinker. From this time the natural sciences date their historical importance, for only from this time have they had an uninterrupted history. The results of this new intellectual movement can be readily estimated. Such a scientific investigation of nature not only destroyed a series of traditional errors and prejudices, but, what was

of greater importance, it directed the intellectual interest towards that which is real and actual, it nourished and protected reflection and the feeling of self-dependence, the spirit of inquiry and doubt. The standpoint of observation and experiment presupposes an independent self-consciousness of the individual, a breaking loose from authority, — in a word, scepticism, with which, in fact, the founders of modern philosophy, *Bacon* and *Descartes*, began; the former by conditioning the knowledge of nature upon the removal of all prejudice and every preconceived opinion, and the latter by demanding that philosophy should be begun with universal doubt. No wonder that a bitter struggle should soon break out between the natural sciences and ecclesiastical orthodoxy, which could only result in breaking the power of the latter.

6. *BACON OF VERULAM*. — Francis Bacon was born in 1561, and was Lord High Chancellor of England and Keeper of the King's Seal under James I. From these offices he was subsequently expelled, and died in 1626, with a character which has not been without reproach. He took as his principle the inductive method, which he directed expressly against Scholasticism and the ruling scientific method. On this account he is frequently placed at the head of modern philosophy.

The sciences, says Bacon, have hitherto been in a most deplorable condition. Philosophy, wasted in empty and fruitless logomachies, has failed during so many centuries to bring out a single work or experiment of actual benefit to human life. Logic hitherto has subserved rather the establishment of error than the investigation of truth. Whence all this? Why this penury of the sciences? Simply because they have broken away from their root in nature and experience. The blame of this is chargeable to many sources; first, the old and rooted prejudice that the human mind loses somewhat of its dignity when it busies itself much and continuously with experiments and material things; next, superstition and a blind religious zeal, which has been the most

irreconcilable opponent of natural philosophy ; again, the exclusive attention paid to morals and politics by the Romans, and since the Christian era to theology, by every acute mind ; still farther, the great authority of certain philosophers and the great reverence paid to antiquity ; and, in fine, a want of courage and a despair of overcoming the many and great difficulties which lie in the way of the investigation of nature. All these causes have contributed to keep down the sciences. Hence they must now be renewed, and regenerated, and reformed in their most fundamental principles ; there must now be found a new basis for knowledge and new principles of science. This radical reformation of the sciences depends upon two conditions, — objectively upon the referring of science to experience and the philosophy of nature, and subjectively upon the purifying of the sense and the intellect from all abstract theories and traditional prejudices. These two conditions together furnish the correct method of natural science, which is nothing other than the method of induction. Upon correct induction depends all the soundness of the sciences.

In these propositions the Baconian philosophy is contained. The historical significance of its founder is, therefore, in general this, — that he directed the attention and reflection of his cotemporaries again upon the given actuality, upon nature ; that he affirmed the necessity of experience, which had been formerly only a matter of accident, and made it in and for itself an object of thought. His merit consists in having established scientific empiricism, and only in this. Strictly speaking, we can allow no *content* to the Baconian philosophy, although (in his treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*) he has attempted a systematic encyclopedia of the sciences on a new principle of classification, through which he has scattered an abundance of fine and fruitful observations, which are still used as apothegms.

7. THE ITALIAN PHILOSOPHERS OF THE TRANSITION EPOCH.
— Besides Bacon there were others who prepared and intro-

duced the new age of philosophy. First among these is a list of Italian philosophers of the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century. These philosophers are connected in a twofold manner with the movements of this transition period, first by an enthusiasm for nature which among them all partook in a greater or less degree of pantheism (Vanini, *e.g.*, gave to one of his writings the title "concerning the wonderful secrets of nature, the queen and goddess of mortals"), and second, by their connection with the systems of ancient philosophy. The best known of these philosophers are the following: *Cardanus* (1501-1575), *Campanella* (1568-1639), *Giordano Bruno* (1548-1600), *Vanini* (1586-1619). They were all men of a passionate, enthusiastic, and impetuous nature, unsteady and wild in character, restless and adventurous in life, men who were inspired by an eager impulse towards knowledge, but who were carried away by fantasy, wildness of imagination, and a tendency toward secret astrological and geomantic knowledge. For these reasons they also passed away, leaving no fruitful result. They were all persecuted by the hierarchy, and two of them (Bruno and Vanini) ended their lives at the stake. Their whole history is like the eruption of a volcano, and they are to be regarded more as forerunners and announcers than as beginners and founders of the new age of philosophy. The most important among them is *Giordano Bruno*. He revived the old idea of the Stoics, that the world is a living being, and that a world-soul penetrates it all. The content of his general thought is the profoundest enthusiasm for nature, and the plastic reason which is present in it. The reason is, according to him, the inner artist who shapes the matter and manifests himself in the forms of the universe. From the heart of the root or the germ he sends out the lobes, and from these again he evolves the shoots, and from the shoots the branches, until bud, and leaf, and blossom are brought forth. Every thing is inwardly arranged, adjusted, and perfected. Thus the universal reason calls back from within the

sap out of the fruits and flowers to the branches again, etc. The universe thus is an infinite living thing, in which every thing lives and moves after the most manifold ways.

The relation of the reason to matter, Bruno determines wholly in the Aristotelian manner; both stand related to each other as form and matter, as actuality and potentiality, neither is without the other; the form is the inner impelling might of matter, and matter, as the unlimited possibility, as the capability for an infinite diversity of form, is the mother of all forms. The other side of Bruno's philosophizing, his theory of the forms of knowledge, which occupies the greater part of his writings, has little philosophic interest, and we therefore pass it by.

8. JACOB BOEHME.—Like Bacon among the English and Bruno among the Italians, *Jacob Boehme* is among the Germans the exponent of this transition period. Each of these three deals with the matter in a way peculiar to his own nationality; Bacon as the herald of empiricism, Bruno as the representative of a poetic pantheism, and Boehme as the father of theosophic mysticism. If we consider solely the profoundness of his principle, Boehme should hold a much later place in the history of philosophy, but if we look chiefly at the imperfect form of his philosophizing, his rank would be assigned to the mystics of the Middle Ages, while chronologically we must associate him with the German Reformation and the protestant elements that were nourished at that time. His true position is among the forerunners and prophets of the new age.

Jacob Boehme was born in 1575, in old Seidenburg, a village of upper Lusace, not far from Goerlitz. His parents were poor peasants. In his boyhood he took care of the cattle, and in his youth, after he had acquired the rudiments of reading and writing in a village school, he was sent to Goerlitz to learn the shoemaker's trade. He finished his apprenticeship and settled down at Goerlitz in 1594 as master of his trade. Even in his youth he had received illuminations

or mysterious revelations, which were subsequently repeated when his mind, striving for the truth, had become profoundly agitated by the religious conflicts of the age. Besides the Bible, the only books which Boehme read were some mystical writings of a theosophic and alchemistic character, *e.g.*, those of Paracelsus. His entire want of culture is seen as soon as he undertakes to write down his thoughts, or, as he calls them, his illuminations. Hence the imperious struggle of the thought with the expression, which, however, not unfrequently rises to a dialectical acuteness and a poetic beauty. His first treatise, *Aurora*, composed in the year 1612, brought Boehme into trouble with the chief pastor in Goerlitz, Gregorius Richter, who publicly condemned the book from the pulpit, and even ridiculed the person of its author. The writing of books was prohibited him by a magistrate, a prohibition which Boehme observed for many years, till at length the command of the spirit was too mighty within him, and he took up again his literary labors. Boehme was a plain, quiet, modest, and gentle man. He died in 1624.

To give an exposition of his theosophy in a few words is very difficult, since Boehme, instead of clothing his thoughts in a logical form, uses only sensuous pictures and obscure analogies, and often availed himself of the most arbitrary and singular modes of expression. A twilight reigns in his writings, as in a Gothic cathedral where the light falls through variegated windows. Hence the magic effect which he has made upon many hearts. The chief thought of his philosophizing is, that self-distinction, self-diremption is the essential determination of spirit, and hence of God so far as God is to be apprehended as spirit. God, according to Boehme, is living spirit only at the time and in the degree in which he conceives within himself a different from himself, and is in this distinction object and consciousness. This self-differentiation of the Deity is the only source of his and of all actuality and spontaneity, the spring and fountain of that self-active life which produces consciousness out of itself. Boehme

is inexhaustible in images by which this negativity in God, his self-distinguishing and self-manifestation in the world, may be made conceivable. Great expansion without end, he says, needs limitation and a compass in which it may manifest itself, for in expansion without limit there could be no manifestation, there must be a contraction and an enclosing, in order that a manifestation may arise. See, he says in another place, if the will were only of one kind, then would the soul have only one quality, and were an immovable thing, which would always lie still and never do any thing farther than one thing; in this there could be no joy, as also no art nor science of other things, and no wisdom; every thing would be a nothing, and there would be neither heart nor will for any thing, for there would be only the single. Hence it cannot be said that the whole God is in one will and one being; there is a distinction. Nothing can ever become manifest to itself without resistance, for if it suffers no resistance, it expends itself and never comes to itself again; but if it does not come to itself again as to that from which it originally sprung, it knows nothing of its original condition. The above thought Boehme expresses when he says in his *Questionibus Theosophicis*: the reader should know that in yea and nay all things consist, whether divine, devilish, earthly, or whatever may be named. The one as the yea, is simple energy and love, and is the truth of God and God himself. But this were inconceivable, and there were neither delight, nor elevation, nor sensibility, without the nay. The nay is a reaction against the yea, or truth, in order that the truth may be manifest and something in which there may be a *contrarium*, where eternal love may work and become sensitive and willing. There is nothing in the one which is an occasion for willing until the one becomes duplicated, and so there can be no sensation in unity, but only in duality. In brief, according to Boehme, neither knowledge nor consciousness is possible, without distinction, without opposition, without duplication; a thing becomes clear and an object of

consciousness only through something else, through its own opposite (which is yet identical with itself). It was very natural to connect this thought of a unity distinguishing itself in itself, with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, as Boehme has, in fact, repeatedly done when treating of the Divine life and its process of duplication. Schelling afterwards took up these ideas of Boehme and philosophically elaborated them.

If we should assign to the theosophy of Boehme a position in the development of later philosophy corresponding to the inner content of its principle, it would most properly be placed as a complement to the system of *Spinoza*. If Spinoza taught the reflux of all finitude into the eternal one, Boehme, on the other hand, shows the procession of the finite from the eternal one, and the inner necessity of this procession, since the being of this one would be rather a not-being without such a self-duplication. Compared with Descartes, Boehme has at least more profoundly apprehended the conception of self-consciousness and the relation of the finite to God. But his historical position in other respects is far too isolated and exceptional, and his mode of statement far too impure, to warrant us in incorporating him anywhere in a series of systems developed continuously and in a genetic connection.

SECTION XXIV.

✓DESCARTES.

THE founder of modern philosophy is *Descartes*. While, like the men of the transition epoch just noticed, he broke loose entirely from the previous philosophizing, and began wholly *de novo*, he did not content himself, like Bacon, with merely bringing out a new method, or like Boehme and his

cotemporaries among the Italians, with affirming philosophical views without a methodical ground. He went further than any of these, and from the standpoint of universal doubt, affirmed a new, positive, and pregnant philosophical principle, from which he attempted logically to deduce the chief points of his system. The character and novelty of his principle makes him the beginner, and its inner fruitfulness the founder, of modern philosophy.

René Descartes (*Renatus Cartesius*) was born in 1596, at La Haye in Touraine. Very early dissatisfied with the prevalent philosophy, he became altogether sceptical in regard to it, and determined after the completion of his studies to bid adieu to all school learning, and thenceforward to learn only from himself and the great book of the world, from nature and the observation of human life. In his twenty-first year he exchanged the study of science for the life of the camp, serving as a volunteer first under Maurice of Orange and afterwards under Tilly. The impulse toward philosophical and mathematical investigations was, however, too powerful to permit him to abandon them permanently. In 1621 having, after long inward struggles, formed the design of reconstructing science upon a surer basis, he left the camp, made several long journeys, stayed for a long time in Paris, and finally in 1629 abandoned his native land and betook himself to Holland, that he might there, undisturbed and unknown, devote himself to philosophy and elaborate his scientific ideas. He spent twenty years in Holland, enduring much vexatious treatment from fanatical theologians, until in 1649 he accepted an invitation from Queen Christina of Sweden, to visit Stockholm, where he died in the following year.

The more important principles of the Cartesian system may be seen condensed in the following epitome.

1. If science is ever to attain any thing fixed and abiding, it must begin at the foundation; every presupposition which we may have cherished from infancy must be abandoned; in a word, we must doubt wherever doubt is possible. We

must therefore doubt not only the existence of the objects of sense, since the senses so frequently deceive, but also the truths of mathematics and geometry, — for, however evident the proposition may appear that two and three make five, or that the square has four sides, yet we cannot know whether valid knowledge is at all possible to finite beings, or whether God may not have designedly formed us for erroneous judgments. It is therefore advisable to doubt every thing, nay, even to deny every thing, to posit every thing as false.

2. But though we posit every thing as false to which the slightest doubt may be attached, yet we cannot deny one thing, viz., the truth that we, who so think, do exist. But rather from the very fact that I posit every thing as false, that I doubt every thing, is it manifest that I, the doubter, exist. Hence the proposition: I think, therefore I am (*cogito ergo sum*), is the first and most certain position which offers itself to every one attempting to philosophize. Upon this the most certain of all propositions, the certainty of all other knowledge depends. The objection of Gassendi, that existence may be inferred from any other activity of man as well as from thinking, that I might just as well say: I go to walk, therefore I exist, — has no weight; for, of all my actions, I can be absolutely certain only of my thinking.

3. From the proposition, I think, therefore I am, the whole nature of the mind may be determined. When we examine who we are who hold every thing to be false that is distinct from ourselves, we see clearly that without destroying our personality we can think ourselves to be without every thing which belongs to us, except only our thought. Hence, neither extension nor figure, nor any thing which can be predicated of body, but only thought, belongs to our nature. I am, therefore, essentially a thinking being, *i.e.*, mind, soul, intelligence, reason. Thought is my substance. Mind can therefore be apprehended clearly and completely for itself alone, without any of those attributes which belong to body. The conception of it contains nothing of that which

belongs to the conception of body. It is therefore impossible to apprehend it through any sensuous representation, or to make an image of it: it is apprehended through pure thought alone.

4. From the proposition *cogito ergo sum*, follows still farther the universal rule of all certainty. I am certain that because I think, I exist. Whence comes this certainty? Evidently from the clear discernment, that it is impossible that any one should think and yet not exist. From this is readily deduced the universal criterion of certainty in knowledge; every thing is certain which I perceive clearly and evidently to be true, which my reason apprehends as true with the same irresistible clearness as this *cogito ergo sum*.

5. This rule, however, is only a principle of certainty; it affords no knowledge of the truth itself. We merely apply it to our thoughts or ideas, in order to discover which of them are objectively true. But our ideas are partly innate, partly acquired, and partly self-originated. Among these ideas we find præëminent before all the idea of God. The question arises, whence have we this idea? Manifestly not from ourselves; this idea could only be implanted within us by a being who has the fulness of all perfection in himself, *i.e.*, only by an actually existing God. If I ask now, whence have I the faculty to conceive of a nature more perfect than my own? the answer must ever be, that I have it only from him whose nature is actually more perfect. All the attributes of God, the more I contemplate them, show that the conception of them could not have originated with myself alone. For though there might be in me the idea of substance because I am a substance, yet I could not of myself have the idea of an infinite substance, since I am finite; such an idea could only be given me through a substance actually infinite. Moreover, we must not think that the conception of the infinite is to be gained through abstraction and negation, as darkness, perhaps, is the negation of light; but I perceive, rather, that the infinite contains more reality than the finite, and that, therefore,

the conception of the infinite must be correspondingly antecedent in me to that of the finite. Since then I have a clear and determined idea of the infinite substance, and since this has a greater objective reality than every other, there is no other which I have so little reason to doubt. But now since I am certain that the idea of God has come to me from God himself, it only remains for me to examine the way in which I have received it from God. I have neither constructed it from the materials afforded by the senses, nor has it come to me therefrom involuntarily like the ideas of sensible objects, since these arise through affections of the external organs; neither have I invented it, since I can neither add any thing to it nor take any thing from it; it must, therefore, be innate as the idea of myself is innate. Hence the first proof we can assign for the existence of a God is the fact that we find the idea of a God within us, and that we must have a real cause for its being. Again, the existence of a God may be concluded from my own imperfection, and especially from the knowledge of my imperfection. For since I know that there is a perfection which is wanting in me, it follows that there must exist a being who is more perfect than I, on whom I depend and from whom I receive all I possess. — But the best and most evident proof for the existence of God is, in fine, that which is gained from the conception of a God. The mind among all its different ideas singles out the chiefest of all, that of the most perfect being, and perceives that this has not only the possibility of existence, *i.e.*, accidental existence like all other ideas, but that it involves necessary existence in itself. And as the mind knows that in every triangle its three angles are equal to two right angles, because this is implied in the very idea of a triangle, so does the mind necessarily conclude that since necessary existence is involved to the conception of the most perfect being, the most perfect being actually exists. No other idea which the mind finds within itself involves necessary existence, but from the idea of the Supreme Being existence cannot be separated without contra-

diction. It is only our prejudices which keep us from seeing this. Since we are accustomed in every thing to separate the conception of it from its existence, and since we often construct ideas arbitrarily, it readily happens, that when we contemplate the Supreme Being we are in doubt whether its idea may not also be one arbitrarily devised, or at least one in whose conception existence is not contained. — This proof is essentially different from that of Anselm of Canterbury, which was controverted by Thomas. His argument was as follows: “When we consider what the word God signifies, it is evident that we understand by it that which must be thought as the greatest; but to exist *actually* as well as *in thought* is greater than to exist in thought alone; therefore God exists not only in thought but in fact.” Here the defect in the syllogism is manifest, for the legitimate conclusion would be, God must therefore be *thought* as existing in fact; but from this the actuality of his existence does not at all follow. My proof on the other hand is this, — we may predicate of a thing what we clearly see belongs to its true and changeless nature, or to its essence, or to its form. But after we had examined what God is, we found existence to belong to his true and changeless nature, and therefore may we properly predicate existence of God. Necessary existence is contained in the idea of the most perfect being, not by a fiction of our understanding but because existence belongs to his eternal and changeless nature.

6. The result just obtained—the existence of God—is of the highest consequence. Before attaining this we were obliged to doubt every thing, and give up even every certainty, for we did not know but that it was the nature of the human mind to err, but that God had formed us for error. But so soon as we look at the necessary attributes of God in the innate idea of him, we know that he is veracious. It would, therefore, be a contradiction to suppose that he would deceive us, or that he could have made us to err; for though an ability to deceive might prove his skill, a willingness to

deceive would only demonstrate his frailty. Our reason, therefore, can never apprehend an object which might possibly be untrue so far as the reason apprehended it, *i.e.*, so far as it is clearly known. For God might justly be styled a deceiver if he had given us a reason so perverted as to mistake the false for the true. And thus the absolute doubt with which we began is dispelled. From the existence of God we derive every certainty. For to be assured of the certainty of any knowledge it is sufficient that we have known a thing clearly and distinctly, and are certain of the existence of a veracious God.

7. From the true idea of God follow the principles of a philosophy of nature or the doctrine of the two substances. Substance is that which so exists that it needs nothing else (for its existence. In this (highest) sense God is the only substance. God, as the infinite substance, has the ground of his existence in himself, is the cause of himself. The two created substances, on the other hand, the thinking and the corporeal substance, mind and matter, are substances only in a broader sense of the word; they may be apprehended under the common conception that they are things which for their existence need only the coöperation of God. Each of these two substances has an attribute which constitutes its nature and its essence, and to which all its other determinations may be referred. The attribute and essence of matter is extension, that of mind, thought. For every thing else which can be predicated of body presupposes extension, and is only a mode of extension, as every thing we can find in mind is only a modification of thought. A substance to which thought immediately belongs is called mind, and a substance, which is the immediate substratum of extension, is called body. Since thought and extension are distinct from each other, and since mind can not only be known without the attributes of body, but is in itself the negation of those attributes, we may say that the essence of these substances lies in their reciprocal negation. Mind and body are wholly distinct, and have nothing in common.

8. We pass by the physics of Descartes, which has only a subordinate philosophical interest, and notice next his views of anthropology. From this dualistic relation between mind and matter, there follows a dualistic relation between soul and body. If matter is essentially extension, and mind essentially thought, and if the two have nothing in common, then the union of soul and body can be conceived only as a mechanical one. The body is to be regarded as a skilfully constructed automaton, which God has made, — as it were a statue or machine formed by God from the earth. Within this body the soul dwells, closely but not internally connected with it. The union of the two is only a forcible collocation, since each is not only an independent factor, but is essentially distinct from and even opposed to the other. The body by itself is a perfected machine, in which nothing is changed by the entrance of the thinking soul, except that through the latter certain motions are originated; the wheel-work of the machine remains as it was. It is only the indwelling thought which distinguishes this machine from every other; hence brutes which are not self-conscious must be ranked with all other machines. From this standpoint arose the question concerning the seat of the soul. If body and soul are independent substances, each essentially opposed to the other, they cannot interpenetrate each other, and even if forcibly brought together can touch only at one point. This point where the soul has its seat, is, according to Descartes, not the whole brain but the pineal gland, a small gland in the middle of the brain. The proof for this assumption, that the pineal gland is the only place where the soul immediately exhibits its energy, is found in the circumstance that all other parts of the brain are twofold, which should not be the case in an organ where the soul has its seat, since such a structure would cause the soul to perceive two objects instead of one. There is, therefore, no other place in the body where impressions can be so well united as in this gland. The pineal gland is, therefore, the chief seat of the soul, and the place where all our thoughts are formed.

We have thus developed the fundamental thoughts of the Cartesian system, and will now recapitulate in a few words the features characteristic of its standpoint and historic position. Descartes was the founder of a new epoch in philosophy, *first*, from his postulate of absolute freedom from all preconceptions. This protest against every thing which is not posited by the thought, against taking any thing for granted, has remained from that time onward the fundamental principle of the new age. *Secondly*, Descartes introduced the principle of self-consciousness, the pure for-itself-existing Ego (the mind or the thinking substance is regarded by him as an individual self, a particular Ego) — a new principle, unknown under this form to the ancients. *Thirdly*, He has shown the opposition between being and thought, existence and consciousness, and declared the mediation of this opposition, which has been the problem of all modern philosophy, to be the true object of philosophical investigation. But with these ideas, which make an epoch in the history of philosophy, there are at the same time connected the defects of the Cartesian philosophizing. *First*, Descartes obtained the content of his system, particularly his three substances, empirically. True, the system which begins with a protest against all existence would seem to take nothing for granted, but to derive every thing from thought. But in fact this protest is not thoroughly carried out. That which seems to be cast aside is afterwards, when the principle of certainty is gained, taken up again unchanged. And so it happens that Descartes finds at hand not only the idea of God, but his two substances as something *immediately given*. True, in order to reach them, he abstracts from much which lies immediately before him, but in the end the two substances are seen as the residuum when all else is abstracted. They are received *empirically*. The *second* defect is, that Descartes separates wholly from each other the two sides of the antithesis, thought and being. He posits both as “substances,” *i.e.*, as forces which reciprocally repel and negate each other.

The essence of matter according to him consists *only* in extension, *i.e.*, in pure externality, and that of mind *only* in thought, *i.e.*, in pure internality. The two stand over against each other as centrifugal and centripetal. But with this apprehension of mind and matter, an inner mediation of the two is an impossibility; there must be a powerful creative act, there must be the divine assistance in order that the two sides may come together, and be united as they are in man. Nevertheless Descartes demands and attempts a mediation of the two sides. But the impossibility of truly overcoming the dualism of his standpoint is the *third*, and the chief defect of his system. In the proposition "I think, therefore I am," or "I exist thinking," the two sides, being and thought, are indeed connected together, but only that they may become fixed independently of each other. If the question is asked, how does the Ego stand related to the extended? the answer can only be: by thinking, *i.e.*, negatively, by excluding it. The idea of God, therefore, is all that remains for the mediation of these two sides. The two substances are created by God, and through the divine will may be bound together; through the idea of God, the Ego attains the certainty that the extended exists. God is therefore in a certain degree a *Deus ex machina*, necessary in order to effect the union of the Ego with the extended. It is obvious how external such a mediation is.

This defect of the Cartesian system operated as an impelling motive to the systems which follow.

SECTION XXV.

GEULINX AND MALEBRANCHE.

1. MIND and matter, consciousness and existence, Descartes had completely separated from each other. Both, with him, are substances, independent powers, reciprocally exclusive opposites. Mind (*i.e.*, in his view the simple self, the Ego) he regarded as essentially abstraction from the sensuous, the distinguishing of self from matter and the separating of matter from self; matter, on the other hand, he regarded as the complete opposite of thought. If the relation of these two powers be as has been stated, then the question arises, how can they ever be connected? How, on the one hand, can the affections of the body work upon the soul, and on the other hand, how can the volition of the soul direct the body, if the two are absolutely distinct and opposed to each other? At this point, *Arnold Geulinx* (a disciple of Descartes, born at Antwerp 1625, and died as professor of philosophy at Leyden 1669) took up the Cartesian system, and endeavored to give it a greater logical perfection. According to Geulinx neither does the soul work immediately upon the body, nor the body immediately upon the soul. Certainly not the former: for though *I* can determine and move my body in many respects arbitrarily, yet *I* am not the cause of this movement; for I know not how it happens, I know not in what manner motion is communicated from my brain to the different parts of my body, and it is impossible that I should do that in respect of which I cannot see how it is done. But if I cannot produce motion in my body, much less can I do this outside of my body. I am therefore simply a contemplator of the world; the only act which is peculiarly mine is contemplation. But even this contemplation arises in a singular manner. For if we ask how we

obtain our perceptions of the external world, we find it impossible that the external world should directly give them to us. For however much we may say that, *e.g.*, in the act of seeing, the external objects produce an image in the eye or an impression in the brain as in wax, yet this impression or picture is after all only something corporeal or material, and cannot therefore come into my mind, which is absolutely distinct from every thing material. There remains, therefore, only that we seek the mediation of the two sides in God. It is God alone who can unite the outer with the inner, and the inner with the outer; who can make the outer phenomena to become inner representations or notions of the mind; who can thus bring the world under the mind's observation, and transform the inner determinations of the will into external acts. Hence every operation, every act which unites the outer and inner, which brings the mind and the world into connection, is neither an activity of the mind nor of the world, but only an immediate act of God. The movement of my limbs does not follow from my will, but only because it is the will of God that these movements should follow when I will. My will is an *occasion* by which God moves my body — an affection of my body is an *occasion* by which God brings within me a representation of the external world: the one is only the occasional cause of the other (hence the name *occasionalism*). My will, however, does not move God to move my limbs, but He who has imparted motion to matter and given it its laws, created also my will, and has so connected together these most diverse things, the movement of matter and the arbitrium of my will, that when my will puts forth a volition, such a motion follows as it wills, and the motion follows the volition without any interaction or physical influence exerted by the one upon the other. But just as with two clocks which go exactly alike, the one striking precisely as the other, their harmony is not the result of any reciprocal interacting, but is the result of their similar construction and adjustment, — so is it with the movements of the body and

the will, they harmonize only because their sublime artificer has in some inexplicable way connected them together. We see from this that Geulinx carried to its limit the fundamental dualism of Descartes. While Descartes called the union of mind and matter a conjunction through power, Geulinx named it a miracle. There is consequently in this view no immanent, but only a transcendent mediation possible.

2. Closely connected with this view of Geulinx, and at the same time a real consequence and a wider development of the Cartesian philosophizing, is the philosophic standpoint of *Nicolas Malebranche* (born at Paris in 1638, chosen a member of the "*Congrégation de l'oratoire*" in his twenty-second year, won over to philosophy through the writings of Descartes, and died, after numerous feuds with theological opponents, in 1715).

Malebranche started with the Cartesian view of the relation between mind and matter. Both are strictly distinct from each other, and in their essence opposed. How now does the mind (*i.e.*, the Ego) gain a knowledge of the external world and have ideas of corporeal things? For only under the spiritual form of ideas can external, especially material, things be present in the mind; the mind does not possess the thing itself but only an idea of it; the thing itself remains always external. Now the mind can neither gain these ideas from itself, nor from the things themselves. Not from itself; for to the soul, as a limited being, a capacity for producing the ideas of things purely from itself, cannot be ascribed; that which is merely an idea of the soul does not, for that very reason exist *actually*, and that which exists actually does not depend for its existence and perception upon the choice of the soul; the ideas of things are given to us, they are not products of our thought. Just as little has the mind derived these ideas from things themselves; for it is unthinkable that material things should produce impressions upon the soul which is immaterial; not to mention that these infinitely numerous and various impressions would in their coinci-

dences reciprocally annul and destroy one another. It only remains, therefore, that the mind beholds things in a third that stands above the opposition of the two, viz., God. God, as the absolute substance comprehends all things in himself; in himself he sees all things according to their true being and nature. For the same reason, in him are also the ideas of all things; the whole world, as intellectual or ideal, is God. God is, therefore, the higher mean between the Ego and the external world. In him we behold ideas, we being so strictly united with him, that he may properly be called the place of minds. From him proceed also our volitions and sensations relative to things; he unites the objective and subjective worlds which in themselves are separate and disjointed.

The philosophy of Malebranche, whose simple thought is this, that we know and see all things in God,—shows itself to be, like the occasionalism of Geulinx, a special attempt to overcome the dualism of the Cartesian philosophy on its own ground and by means of its own fundamental assumptions.

3. Two defects or inner contradictions have manifested themselves in the philosophy of Descartes. He had considered mind and matter as substances, as mutually exclusive opposites, and had sought a mediation of the two. But with such presuppositions no mediation other than an external one is possible. If thought and existence are separate substances then they can only negate and exclude each other. Unnatural theories, like those which have been mentioned, are the inevitable result of this. The simplest way out of the difficulty is to give up the principle first assumed, to strip off their independence from the two opposites, and instead of regarding them as substances, view them as accidents of one substance. This way of escape is moreover indicated by a particular circumstance. According to Descartes, God is the infinite substance, the only substance in the proper sense of the word. Mind and matter are indeed substances, but only in relation to each other: in relation to God they are

dependent, and not substances. This is, strictly taken, a contradiction. The true consequence were rather to say that neither the Ego (*i.e.*, the individual thinker) nor the material things are self-subsistent, but that this can be predicated only of the one substance, God; this substance alone has a real being, and all the being which belongs to individual essences these latter possess not as a substantial being, but only as accidents of the one only true and real substance. Malebranche approached this conclusion. With him the corporeal world is ideally at least resolved and made to sink in God, in whom are the eternal archetypes of all things. But *Spinoza* most decidedly and logically adopted this consequence, and affirmed the accident of all individual being and the exclusive substantiality of God alone. His system is the perfection and the truth of the Cartesian.

SECTION XXVI.

✓ SPINOZA.

BARUCH or Benedict Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, Nov. 24, 1632. His parents who were Jews of Portuguese descent, and wealthy tradespeople, gave him a finished education. He studied with great diligence the Bible and the Talmud, but soon exchanged the pursuit of theology for the study of physics and the works of Descartes. He early became dissatisfied with Judaism, and presently came to an open rupture with it, though without going over formally to Christianity. In order to escape the persecutions of the Jews, who had excommunicated him, and who even went so far as to make an attempt upon his life, he left Amsterdam

and betook himself to Rhynsberg, near Leyden. He finally settled down at the Hague, where he spent his life in the greatest seclusion, devoted wholly to scientific pursuits. He supported himself by grinding optical glasses, which his friends sold for him. The Elector Palatine, Charles Louis, offered him a Professorship of Philosophy at Heidelberg, with the full permission to teach as he chose, but Spinoza declined the post. Naturally of a weak constitution, which consumption had for many years been undermining, Spinoza died at the age of 44, on the 21st of February, 1677. In his life there was mirrored the unclouded clearness and exalted serenity of the perfected sage. Abstemious in his habits, satisfied with little, the master of his passions, never intemperately sad or joyous, gentle and benevolent, with a character of singular excellence and purity, he faithfully illustrated in his life the doctrines of his philosophy. His chief work, the *Ethica*, appeared the year of his death. His design was probably to have published it during his life, but the odious report that he was an atheist restrained him. The friend he most trusted, Louis Mayer, a physician, attended to its publication after the author's death and according to his will.

The system of Spinoza rests upon three fundamental conceptions, from which all the rest may be derived with mathematical necessity. These conceptions are that of substance, of attribute, and of mode.

1. Spinoza starts from the Cartesian conception of substance: substance is that which needs nothing other for its existence. But this definition admits of the existence of only one substance. That which exists through itself alone is necessarily infinite, since it is neither conditioned nor limited by any thing else. Existence-through-self is the absolute power to exist which can neither depend upon any other, nor find in any other a limit or negation of itself; only an unlimited being is self-subsistent, substantial being. A plurality of infinities, however, is impossible since they would be indis-

tinguishable. The plurality of substances which Descartes assumed is, therefore, necessarily a contradiction. Only one absolutely infinite substance can exist. But such a self-existent substance is presupposed by the given finite reality. It would be contradictory to suppose that only the finite exists and not the infinite as well; that there exists only that which is conditioned and posited through another, and not also that which is self-subsistent. The absolute substance is rather the real cause of each and every existence; it alone is actual, unconditioned being; it is the sole power of being from which every finite thing derives its existence; without it there is nothing, with it every thing; in it is comprehended all reality, since beside it there can be no self-subsistent being; it is not only the cause of all being, but is itself all being; all particular existence is only a modification of the universal substance itself, which by virtue of an inner necessity expands its own infinite reality into an equally infinite quantity of being which includes within itself all conceivable forms of existence. This single substance Spinoza calls God. We must not, of course, understand by this the Christian idea of God, *i.e.*, the conception of an individual spiritual personality. Spinoza expressly declares that he entertains a conception of God which is entirely distinct from the Christian. He strenuously asserts that all existence, material existence as well, springs immediately from the nature of God as the one substance. He ridicules those who see in the world any thing else than an accident of the divine substance itself. In their views he detects a dualism which would destroy the necessary unity of all things, and an attribution of self-existence to the world, which would annul the universal causality of God. The world is not a product of the divine will, co-existent with God and free, but an emanation of the divine nature according to his infinite creative essence. God is, with him, only substance, and nothing more. The propositions that there is only one God, and that the substance of all things is only one, are with him identical.

What now peculiarly is this substance? What is its positive nature? This question is very difficult to answer directly from the standpoint of Spinoza, partly because a definition, according to him, must contain (*i.e.*, must be genetically) the immediate cause of that which is to be explained, but substance is uncreated and can have no cause besides itself; but prominently because Spinoza held that every determination is a negation, since it must indicate a want of existence, a relative not-being. (*Omnis determinatio est negatio* is an expression which, though he uses it only occasionally, expresses the fundamental idea of his whole system.) Hence, by endeavoring to determine it positively, we only take away from substance its infinity and make it finite. When, therefore, we affirm any thing concerning it, we only speak negatively, *e.g.*, that it has no external cause, that it is not a manifold, that it cannot be divided, etc. It is even reluctantly that Spinoza declares concerning it that it is one, for this predicate might readily be taken numerically, as implying that others, the many, stood over against it. Thus there can remain only such positive affirmations respecting it as express its absolute reference to itself. In this sense Spinoza says that substance is the cause of itself, *i.e.*, its essence involves existence. When Spinoza calls it eternal, it is only another expression for the same thought; for by eternity he understands existence itself, so far as it is conceived to follow from the definition of the thing, in a sense similar to that in which geometers speak of the eternal properties of figures. Still farther he calls substance infinite in so far as the conception of infinity expressed to him the conception of true being, the absolute affirmation of existence. So also the expression, God is free, affirms nothing more than those already mentioned, *viz.*, negatively, that every foreign restraint is excluded from him, and positively, that God is in harmony with himself, that his being corresponds to the laws of his nature.

The comprehensive statement for the above is, that there exists one infinite substance which excludes from itself all

determination and negation, the one being in all existence, and is named God.

2. Besides the infinite substance of God, Descartes had assumed two other substances created by God, viz., mind (thought) and matter (extension). These are also with Spinoza the two fundamental forms under which he subsumes all reality, the two "attributes" under which the one substance, in so far as it is the cause of all reality, reveals itself to us. What, now, is the relation of these attributes to the infinite substance? This is the severe question, the Achilles' heel of Spinoza's system. The essence of the substance itself cannot be wholly merged in them; for if it were, it would become finite, limited, — which contradicts the definition of substance as stated above. If then these two attributes do not exhaust the objective essence of the substance, they can only be the determinations in which the in itself infinite substance exhibits itself to the subjective understanding, for which every thing is either thought or extension. And this is, in fact, the opinion of Spinoza. Attribute, according to him, is that which the understanding perceives in the substance as constituting its essence. The two attributes are, therefore, determinations which manifest the substance in these precise forms only for the perceiving understanding. Since substance itself is not exhausted by such determinate modes of being, these attributes can express the essence of substance only for an understanding which exists apart from it. To the substance itself it is indifferent whether the understanding contemplate it under these two attributes or not; the substance in itself has an infinity of attributes, *i.e.*, every possible attribute which is not a limitation, may be predicated of it; it is only the human understanding which attaches these two attributes to the substance, and it affixes no more than these, because, among all the conceptions it can form, these alone are actually positive, or express a reality. God, or the substance, is therefore thinking, in so far as the understanding contemplates him under the attribute of thought,

and is extended in so far as the understanding contemplates him under the attribute of extension. In a word, the two attributes are empirically derived determinations which are inadequate to the nature of the substance itself: the substance remains behind them as the absolutely infinite which cannot be comprehended under such definite conceptions; they do not explain what substance is in itself, and hence, in reference to substance, appear accidental. Spinoza fails to establish any mediation between the notion of the absolute substance and the particular manner in which it manifests itself in the two attributes.

In relation to each other, the attributes are, as with Descartes, to be taken as antithetical. They are, it is true, attributes of one and the same substance; but each attribute is independent,—as completely independent as the substance itself whose essence it *realiter* manifests. Between thought and extension, between the spiritual and the material worlds, there is no reciprocal influence nor interaction: that which is material can have only a material, and that which is spiritual (*e.g.*, thoughts, volitions, etc.) can have only a spiritual source. Hence, neither can the mind work upon the body nor the body upon the mind. Thus far, therefore, Spinoza adheres to the Cartesian separation of matter and mind. But when referred to the notion of a single substance, both worlds, the spiritual and material, are just as truly one and the same; there exists between them a complete agreement, a perfect parallelism. It is one and the same substance which is conceived under each of the two attributes; and under whichever of the two it may be considered it is merely one and the same substance manifested under different forms of existence. “The idea of the circle and the circle itself are one and the same thing, only in the first case it is conceived under the attributes of thought, in the second under that of extension.” From the one substance there proceeds, in fact, only one infinite series of things; but it is a series of things existing under various

forms, as these are expressed in the attributes. Every thing exists, as does substance itself, as well under the ideal form of thought, as under the real form of extension. For every spiritual form there is a corresponding material one, and for every material form a corresponding spiritual one. Nature and spirit are indeed distinct, but not unrelated; they are everywhere united as type and antitype, as thing and conception, as object and subject,—in which latter the object mirrors itself, or the real *idealiter* reflects itself. The world could not be the product of one substance, if these two elements, being and thought, were not at each point united in it in inseparable identity. To this inseparable unity of the spiritual and material elements, which, according to him, pervades all nature, though in different degrees of perfection, Spinoza refers, in particular, the relation between the body and the soul of man. This problem which, from the Cartesian standpoint was so difficult, so insoluble, receives from him a very simple explanation. In man, as everywhere else, extension and thought (the latter, indeed, not merely as feeling and imagination, but as self-conscious, rational thought) are inseparably united. Mind is the consciousness which has for its object the body associated with it, and, through the medium of the body, the rest of the material world in so far as it affects the body. The body is the real organism whose states and affections are consciously reflected in the soul. But any interaction of the two is for this very reason impossible; soul and body are the same thing, viewed in different ways,—on the one hand as conscious thought, and on the other as material, extended being. They are only formally distinct, in so far as the being and life of the body, *i.e.*, the impressions, movements, activities, which are determined solely by the laws of the material organism, spontaneously coincide in the soul with the unity of consciousness, conception, and thought.

3. Individual things, which considered under the attribute of thought are ideas, and under the attribute of extension are

bodies, Spinoza comprehends under the conception of accident, or, as he calls it, *mode*. By modes we are therefore to understand the various individual forms of existence into which the universal being of the substance is sundered. The modes stand related to the substance as the rippling waves of the sea to the water of the sea, as forms constantly disappearing and never having a real being. The finite has no independent existence in itself; it exists because the unrestrained productive activity of the substance spontaneously produces an infinite variety of particular finite forms; it has, however, no proper reality, it exists only in and through the substance. Finite things are the most external, the last, the most subordinate forms of existence into which the universal life is specialized; and they manifest their finitude in that they are without resistance subjected to the infinite chain of causality which binds the world. The divine substance works freely according to the inner essence of its own nature; individuals, however, are not free but are subject to the influences of those things with which they come in contact. Their finitude consists in being determined not through themselves, but through something other than themselves. They constitute the sphere of pure necessity within which each individual is free and independent of the others only in so far as it has from nature the power to maintain its own existence and the stability of its own peculiar being.

Such are the fundamental thoughts and features of Spinoza's system. His *practical philosophy* yet remains to be characterized, and in a few words. Its chief propositions follow necessarily from the metaphysical grounds already cited. First, it follows from these, that what is called free will cannot be admitted. For since man is only a mode, he, like every other mode, stands in an endless series of conditioning causes, and no free will can therefore be predicated of him. The will like every other corporeal activity must be determined by something, either by impressions of external things (representations) or by its own inner nature (impulses).

Men regard themselves as free only because they are conscious of their actions and not of the determining causes. Just so the notions which one commonly connects with the words good and evil, rest on an error as follows at once from the conception of the absolute divine causality. Good and evil are not something actually in the things themselves, but only express relative conceptions which we have formed from a comparison of things with one another. Thus, by observing certain things we form a certain universal conception, which we thereupon treat as though it were the rule for the being and acting of all individuals, and if any individual varies from this conception we fancy that it does not correspond to its nature, and is incomplete. Evil or sin is therefore only relative, not positive, for nothing happens against God's will. It is only a simple negation or deprivation, which only seems to be a reality in our representation. With God there is no idea of the evil. What is therefore good and what evil? That is good which is useful to us, and that evil which hinders us from partaking of a good. That, moreover, is useful to us which brings us to a greater reality, which preserves and exalts our being. But our true being is knowledge; knowledge is the essence of our spirit; knowledge alone makes us free, *i.e.*, gives us the impulse and the power to counteract the influences which external things exert upon us, to determine our action according to the law of the rational preservation and promotion of our being, to place ourselves as regards all things in a relation adequate to our own nature. Hence that only is useful to us which aids us in knowing; the highest knowledge is the knowledge of God; the highest virtue of the mind is to know and love God. From the knowledge of God we gain the highest gladness and joy of the mind, the highest blessedness. Blessedness, therefore, is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself.

The grand feature of Spinoza's philosophy is that it buries every thing individual and particular, as finite, in the abyss of the divine substance. With its view unalterably fixed

upon the eternal one, it loses sight of every thing which seems actual in the ordinary notions of men. But its defect consists in its inability to transform this negative abyss of substance into the positive ground of all being and becoming. The substance of Spinoza has been justly compared to the lair of a lion, which many footsteps enter, but from which none emerge. The existence of the phenomenal world, though it be only the apparent and deceptive reality of the finite, Spinoza does not explain; we fail to see why this world of void appearances exists; a living connection between God and the world is lacking. Substance is merely a principle of unity and not also a principle of distinction. Reflection moves from the finite to the absolute, but not from the absolute to the finite; it comprehends the manifold in God as an impersonal unity; it sacrifices all individual existence to the negative thought of unity, instead of allowing this unity to negate its empty negativity by means of a living development into the concrete manifold. The system of Spinoza is the most abstract Monotheism that can be thought. It is not accidental that its author, a Jew, should have brought out again this view of the world, this view of absolute identity, for it is in a certain degree with him only a consequence of his national religion — an echo of the Orient.

SECTION XXVII.

IDEALISM AND REALISM.

WE have now reached a point of divergence in the development of philosophy. Descartes had affirmed and attempted to mediate the opposition between thought and being, mind and matter. This mediation, however, was hardly successful, for the two sides of the opposition he had fixed in their

widest separation, when he posited them as two substances or powers, which reciprocally negate each other. The followers of Descartes sought a more satisfactory mediation, but the theories to which they saw themselves driven, only indicated the more clearly that the premise from which they started must be altogether abandoned. At length Spinoza abandoned this false presupposition, and took away its substantiality from each of the two opposed principles. Mind and matter, thought and extension, are now one in the infinite substance. Yet they are not one *in themselves*, which would be the only true unity of the two. That they are one in the substance is of little avail, since they are indifferent to the substance, and are not immanent distinctions in it. Thus even with Spinoza the two remain strictly separate. The ground of this isolation we find in the fact that Spinoza himself did not sufficiently renounce the Cartesian postulate, and thus could not escape the Cartesian dualism. With him, as with Descartes, thought is *only* thought, and extension *only* extension, and in such an apprehension of the two, the one necessarily excludes the other. If we would find an inner mediation for the two, this abstraction must be overcome. The opposite sides must be mediated even in their strictest opposition. To do this, two ways alone were possible. A position could be taken either on the material or on the ideal side, and the attempt made to explain the ideal by the material, or the material by the ideal, comprehending one through the other. Both these attempts were in fact made, and at about the same time. The two parallel courses of a one-sided *idealism*, and a one-sided *realism* (Empiricism, Sensualism, Materialism), now begin their development.

SECTION XXVIII.

LOCKE.

THE founder of the realistic course and the father of modern Epiricism and Materialism, is *John Locke*, an Englishman. He had, indeed, in his countryman, *Thomas Hobbes* (1588–1679), a predecessor, whom, however, we need merely mention here, since his significance consists chiefly in his influence upon the history of political science.

John Locke was born at Wrington, 1632. His student years he devoted to philosophy and especially to medicine, though his weak health prevented him from practising as a physician. Few cares of business interrupted his leisure, and he devoted his time mostly to literary pursuits. His friendly relations with Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, exerted a weighty influence upon his course in life. At the house of this distinguished statesman and author he always found the most cordial reception, and intercourse with the most important men of England. In the year 1670 he sketched for a number of friends the first plan of his famous *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, though the completed work did not appear till 1690. Locke died aged 72 in the year 1704. His writings are characterized by clearness and precision, perspicuity and definiteness. More acute than profound in his philosophizing, he does not in this respect belie the peculiarities of his nation. The fundamental thoughts and results of his philosophy have now become common property, especially among the English; but it should not for this reason be forgotten that he is the first who has scientifically established them, and is, on this account, entitled to a true place in the history of philosophy, even though his principle was wanting in an inner capacity for development.

Locke's Philosophy (*i.e.*, his theory of knowledge, for his

whole philosophizing expends itself in investigating the faculty of cognition) rests upon two thoughts, to which he never ceases to revert: first (negatively), there are no innate ideas; second (positively), all our knowledge originates in experience.

Many, says Locke, suppose that there are innate ideas which the soul receives coetaneously with its origin, and brings with it into the world. In order to prove that these ideas are innate, it is said that they universally exist, and are universally valid with all men. But admitting that this were so, such a fact would prove nothing if this universal harmony could be explained in any other way. But men mistake when they claim this to be a fact. There are, in reality, no fundamental propositions, theoretical or practical, which are universally admitted. Certainly there is no such practical principle, for the example of different peoples and especially of different ages shows that there is no moral rule universally admitted as valid. Neither is there a theoretical one; for even those propositions which might lay the strongest claim to be universally valid, *e.g.*, the proposition, — “what is, is,” or — “it is impossible that one and the same thing should be and not be at the same time,” — receive by no means a universal assent. Children and idiots have no notion of these principles, and even uncultivated men know nothing of these abstract propositions. They cannot therefore have been imprinted on all men by nature. If ideas were innate, then they must be known by all from earliest childhood. For “to be in the understanding,” and “to become known,” is one and the same thing. The assertion, therefore, that these ideas are imprinted on the understanding while it does not know it, is a manifest contradiction. Just as little is gained by the subterfuge, that these principles come into the consciousness *so soon* as men use their reason. This affirmation is directly false, for these maxims which are called universal come into the consciousness much later than a great deal of other knowledge; and children,

e.g., give many proofs of their use of reason before they know that it is impossible that a thing should be and at the same time not be. It is only correct to say that no one becomes conscious of these propositions without reasoning, — but to say that they are all known with the first reasoning is false. Moreover, that which is first known is not universal propositions, but relates to individual impressions. The child knows that sweet is not bitter long before he understands the logical principle of contradiction. He who carefully bethinks himself, will hesitate before he affirms that particular dicta as “sweet is not bitter,” are derived from universal ones. If the universal propositions were innate, then must they be the first in the consciousness of the child; for that which nature has stamped upon the human soul must come into consciousness antecedently to any thing which she has not written there. Consequently, if there are no innate ideas, either theoretical or practical, there can be just as truly no innate art nor science. The understanding (or the soul) is essentially a *tabula rasa*, — a blank and void space, a tablet on which nothing is written.

How now does the understanding become possessed of ideas? Only through experience, upon which all knowledge rests, and on which as its principle all knowledge depends. Experience itself is twofold; either it arises through the perception of external objects by means of the senses, in which case we call it sensation; or it is a perception of the activities of our own understanding, in which case it is named the inner sense, or, better, reflection. Sensation and reflection give to the understanding all its ideas; they are the windows through which alone the light of ideas falls upon the naturally dark space of the mind; external objects furnish us with the ideas of sensible qualities, and the inner object, which is the understanding itself, offers us the ideas of its own activities. To show the derivation and to give an explanation of all the ideas derived from both is the problem of the Lockian philosophy. For this end Locke divides ideas (representations)

into *simple* and *compound*. *Simple ideas* are those which are impressed from without upon the understanding while it remains wholly passive, just as the images of objects are reflected in a mirror. These simple ideas are partly such as come to the understanding through a particular sense, *e.g.*, the ideas of color, which are furnished to the mind through the eye, or those of sound, which come to it through the ear, or those of solidity or impenetrability, which we receive through the touch; partly such as a number of senses have combined to give us, as those of space and of motion, of which we become conscious by means of the sense both of touch and of sight; partly such as we receive through reflection, as the idea of thought and of will; and partly, in fine, such as arise from both sensation and reflection combined, *e.g.*, power, unity, etc. These simple ideas form the material, as it were the letters of all our knowledge. But now as language arises from a manifold combination of letters, syllables, and words, so the understanding forms complex ideas by the manifold combination of simple ideas with each other. The complex ideas may be referred to three classes, *viz.*, the ideas of mode, of substance, and of relation. Under the ideas of mode, Locke considers the modifications of space (as distance, measurement, immensity, surface, figure, etc.), of time (as duration, eternity), of thought (perception, memory, abstraction, etc.), of number, power, etc. Special attention is given by Locke to the conception of *substance*. He explains the origin of this conception in this way, *viz.*, we find both in sensation and reflection, that a certain number of simple ideas seem often to be connected together. But as we cannot divest ourselves of the impression that these simple ideas have not been produced through themselves, we are accustomed to furnish them with a ground in some existing substratum, which we indicate with the word *substance*. Substance is something unknown, and is conceived of as possessing those qualities which are necessary to furnish us with simple ideas. But from the fact that substance is a product

of our subjective thinking, it does not follow that it has no existence outside of ourselves. On the contrary, this is distinguished from all other complex ideas in the fact that this is an idea which has its archetype distinct from ourselves, and possesses objective reality, while other complex ideas are formed by the mind at pleasure, and have no reality corresponding to them external to the mind. We do not know what is the archetype of substance, and of the substance itself we are acquainted only with its attributes. From considering the conception of substance, Locke next passes to the idea of *relation*. A relation arises when the understanding has connected two things with each other, in such a way, that from the consideration of one it is inevitably led to the consideration of the other. Every thing is capable of being brought by the understanding into relation, or what is the same thing, of being transformed into something relative. It is consequently impossible to enumerate the sum of possible relations. Hence Locke treats only of some of the more weighty conceptions of relation, among others, that of identity and difference, but especially that of cause and effect. The idea of cause and effect arises when our understanding perceives that any thing whatsoever, be it substance or quality, begins to exist through the activity of another. So much concerning ideas. The combination of ideas among themselves gives the conception of cognition. Hence knowledge stands in the same relation to the simple and complex ideas as a proposition does to the letters, syllables, and words which compose it. From this it follows that our knowledge does not pass beyond the compass of our ideas, and hence that it is bounded by experience.

These are the prominent thoughts in the Lockian philosophy. Its empiricism is clear as day. The mind, according to it, is in itself void, and only a mirror of the outer world, — a *camera obscura* which passively receives the images of external objects ; its whole content consists in the impressions furnished it by material things. *Nihil est in intellectu quod*

non fuerit in sensu—is the watchword of this standpoint. While Locke, by this proposition, expresses the undoubted preponderance of the material over the intellectual, he does so still more decisively when he declares that it is possible and even probable that the mind is a material substance. He does not admit the reverse possibility, that material things may be classed under the intellectual as a special kind. Hence with him mind is the secondary to matter;—and hence he is seen to take the characteristic standpoint of realism (cf. § XXVII.). It is true that Locke was not always logically consistent, and in many points did not thoroughly carry out his empiricism: but we can clearly see that the road which will be taken in the farther development of this direction, will result in a thorough denial of the ideal factor.

The empiricism of Locke, wholly national as it is, soon became the ruling philosophy in England. Standing on its basis we find *Isaac Newton*, the great mathematician (1642–1727), *Samuel Clarke*, a disciple of Newton, whose chief attention was given to moral philosophy (1675–1729), the English moralists of this period, *William Wollaston* (1659–1724), the Earl of *Shaftesbury* (1671–1713), *Francis Hutcheson* (1695–1747), and even some opponents of Locke, as *Peter Browne*, who died 1735.

SECTION XXIX.

HUME.

As already remarked, Locke had not been wholly consistent with the standpoint of empiricism. Though conceding to material objects a decided superiority above the thinking subject, there was yet one point, viz., the recognition of substance, where he claimed for thought a power above the objective world. Among all the complex ideas which are

formed by the subjective thinking, the idea of substance is, according to Locke, the only one which has objective reality ; all the rest being purely subjective, with nothing actually corresponding to them in the objective world. But in the very fact that the subjective thinking places the conception of substance, which it has formed, in the objective world, it affirms an objective relation of things, an objective connection of them one with another, and an existing rationality. The reason of the subject in this respect stands in a certain degree above the objective world ; for the relation of substantiality is not derived immediately from the world of sense, and is no product of sensation nor of perception through the sense. On a pure empirical standpoint — and such was Locke's — it was therefore illogical to allow the conception of substance to remain possessed of objective validity. If the understanding is essentially a bare and empty space, an unwritten tablet, if its whole content of objective knowledge consists in the impressions made upon it by material things, then must the conception of substance also be explained as a mere subjective notion, a union of ideas joined together at the mind's pleasure, and the subject itself, thus deprived of every thing on which it could base a claim to superiority, must become wholly subordinated to the material world. This stride to a logical empiricism Hume made in his criticism of the conception of causality.

David Hume was born at Edinburgh 1711. Devoted in youth to the study of law, then for some time a merchant, he afterwards gave his attention exclusively to philosophy and history. His first literary attempt was hardly noticed. A more favorable reception was, however, given to his "*Essays*," — of which he published different collections from 1742 to 1757, making in all five volumes. In these Hume treated philosophical themes as a thoughtful and cultivated man of the world, but without any strict systematic connection. In 1752 he was elected to the care of a public library in Edinburgh, and began in this same year his famous history of

England. Afterwards he was appointed secretary of legation at Paris, where he became acquainted with Rousseau. In 1767 he became under secretary of state, an office, however, which he filled for only a brief period. His last years were spent in Edinburgh, in a quiet and contented seclusion. He died 1776.

The centre of Hume's philosophizing is his criticism of the conception of causality. Locke had already expressed the thought that we attain the conception of substance only by the *habit* of always seeing certain modes together. Hume takes up this thought with earnestness. Whence do we know, he asks, that two things stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect? We do not know it *a priori*, for since the effect is different from the cause, while knowledge *a priori* embraces only that which is identical, the effect cannot be discovered in the cause; neither do we know it through experience, for experience reveals to us only the succession in time of two facts. All our conclusions from experience, therefore, rest simply upon habit. Because we are in the habit of seeing that one thing is followed in time by another, do we form the notion that the latter *must* follow the former: we transform the relation of succession into the relation of causality; but a connection in time is naturally something other than a causal connection. Hence, with the conception of causality, we transcend that which is given in perception and form for ourselves, notions to which we are properly not entitled.—That which is true of causality is true of every necessary relation. We find within us conceptions, as those of power and expression, and in general that of necessary connection; but let us note how we attain these: not through sensation, for though external objects seem to us to have coetaneousness of being, they show us no necessary connection. Do they then come through reflection? True, it seems as if we might get the idea of power by seeing that the organs of our body move in consequence of the dictate of our mind. But since we do not know the means through

which the mind works, and since all the organs of the body cannot be moved by the will, it follows, that we are pointed to experience in reference to this activity also; but since experience can show us only a frequent conjunction, but no real connection, it follows that we arrive at the conception of power, as of every necessary connection, only because we are *accustomed* to certain transitions in our ideas. All conceptions which express a relation of necessity, all knowledge presumptive of a real objective connection of things, rests therefore ultimately only upon the association of ideas. Having denied the conception of substance, Hume was led also to deny that of the Ego or self. If the Ego or self really exists, it must be a substance possessing inherent qualities. But since our conception of substance is purely subjective, without objective reality, it follows that there is no reality corresponding to our conception of the self or the Ego. The self or the Ego is, in fact, nothing other than a compound of many notions following rapidly upon each other; and under this compound we lay a conceived substratum, which we call soul, self, Ego. The self, or the Ego, rests wholly on an illusion. Of course, with such premises, nothing can be said of the immortality of the soul. If the soul is only the compound of our notions, it necessarily ceases with the notions—that which is compounded of the movements of the body dies with those movements.

There needs no further proof, than simply to utter these chief thoughts of Hume, to show that his scepticism is only a logical carrying out of Locke's empiricism. The determinations universality and necessity must fall away, if we derive our knowledge only from perceptions through the sense; for these determinations cannot be contained in sensation.

SECTION XXX.

CONDILLAC.

THE French took up the problem of carrying out the empiricism of Locke to its ultimate consequences in sensualism and materialism. Although this empiricism had sprung up on English soil, and had soon become universally prevalent there, it was reserved for France to push it to the last extreme, and show it to be destructive of the foundations of all moral and religious life. This final consequence of empiricism was not congenial to the English national character. On the contrary, both the empiricism of Locke, and the scepticism of Hume, found themselves opposed in the latter half of the eighteenth century, by a reaction in the Scotch philosophy (*Reid*, 1710-1796; *Beattie*, *Oswald*, *Dugald Stewart*, 1753-1828). The attempt was here made to establish certain principles of truth as innate and immanent in the subject, which should avail both against the *tabula rasa* of Locke, and the scepticism of Hume. These principles were taken in a thoroughly English way, as those of common sense, as facts of experience, as facts of the moral instinct and sound human understanding; as something empirically given, and found in the common consciousness by self-contemplation and reflection. But in France, on the other hand, there was such a public and social condition of things during the eighteenth century, that we can only regard the systems of materialism and egoistic morality which here appeared (as the ultimate practical consequences of the empirical standpoint) to be the natural result of the universal corruption. The expression of a lady respecting the system of Helvetius, that it uttered only the secret of all the world, is well known.

Most closely connected with the empiricism of Locke, is the sensualism of the Abbé *Condillac*. Condillac was born at

Grenoble, 1715. In his first writings he adhered to Locke, but subsequently passed beyond him, and sought to establish a philosophical standpoint of his own. He was elected a member of the French Academy in 1768, and died in 1780. His writings, which exhibit much moral earnestness and religious feeling, fill twenty-three volumes, and have their origin in a moral and religious interest.

Condillac, like Locke, started with the proposition that all our knowledge comes from experience. While, however, Locke had indicated two sources for this knowledge, sensation and reflection, the outer and the inner sense, Condillac referred reflection to sensation, and reduced the two sources to one. Reflection is, with him, only sensation; all intellectual occurrences, even the combination of ideas and volition, are to be regarded only as modified sensations. It is the chief problem and content of Condillac's philosophizing to carry out this thought, and derive the different functions of the soul from the sensations of the outer sense. He illustrates this thought by a statue, which has been made with a perfect internal organization like a man, but which possesses no ideas, and in which only gradually one sense after another awakens and fills the soul with impressions. In such a view man stands on the same footing as the brute, for all his knowledge and all his incentives to action he receives from sensation. Condillac consequently names men perfect animals, and brutes imperfect men. Still he revolts from affirming the materiality of the soul, and denying the existence of God. These ultimate consequences of sensualism were first drawn by others after him; though, indeed, they were sufficiently evident. As sensualism affirmed that truth or what actually is could only be perceived through the sense, so we have only to reverse this proposition, and have the thesis of materialism, viz., the sensible alone is, there is no other being but material being.

SECTION XXXI.

HELVETIUS.

HELVETIUS deduced the moral consequences of the sensualistic standpoint. While theoretical sensualism affirms that all our knowledge is determined by sensation, practical sensualism adds to this the analogous proposition that all our volition springs from the same source, and is regulated by sensuous desire. The satisfaction of this sensuous desire Helvetius affirmed to be the first principle of ethics.

Helvetius was born at Paris in 1715. Having in his twenty-third year obtained the position of Farmer-General, he found himself soon in possession of a large income, but after a few years this office became so vexatious that he abandoned it. The study of Locke determined the direction of his speculations. Helvetius wrote his famed work, *De l'Esprit*, in the rural seclusion which followed the resignation of his office. It appeared in 1758, and attracted great and often favorable attention at home and abroad, though it drew upon him a violent persecution, especially from the clergy. It was fortunate for him that the persecution satisfied itself with suppressing his book. The repose in which he spent his later years was interrupted only by two journeys which he made to Germany and England. He died in 1771. His personal character was wholly estimable, full of kindness and generosity. Especially in his place as Farmer-General he showed himself benevolent towards the poor, and resolute against the exactions of his subalterns. The style of his writings is easy and elegant.

Self-love or interest, says Helvetius, is the lever of all our mental activities. Even that activity which is purely intellectual, our instinct towards knowledge, our love of ideas, rests upon this. But since all self-love refers essentially only to bodily pleasure, it follows that every mental occurrence

within us has its peculiar source only in the striving after this pleasure; but in saying this, we have indicated where the principle of all morality is to be sought. It is an absurdity to require a man to do the good simply for its own sake. This is just as impracticable as to require him to do the evil simply for the sake of the evil. Hence if morality would not be wholly fruitless, it must return to its empirical basis, and venture to adopt the true principle of all action, viz., sensuous pleasure and pain, or, in other words, selfishness as an actual moral principle. Hence, as a correct legislation is that which secures obedience to its laws through reward and punishment, *i.e.*, through selfishness, so will a correct system of morals be that which derives the duties of men from self-love, which shows that that which is forbidden is something which is followed by disagreeable consequences. A system of ethics which does not involve the self-interest of men, or which wars against this, necessarily remains fruitless.

SECTION XXXII.

THE FRENCH CLEARING UP AND MATERIALISM.

1. It has already been remarked (Sect. XXX.) that the carrying out of empiricism to its extremes, as was attempted in France, was most intimately connected with the general condition of the French people and state, in the period before the revolution. The contradiction which was characteristic of the Middle Ages, the external and dualistic relation to the spiritual world, had developed itself in Catholic France till it had corrupted and destroyed all healthy social life. Morals, mainly through the influence of a licentious court, had become wholly corrupted; the state had sunk to an unbridled despotism, and the church to a hierarchy as hypo-

critical as it was powerful. Since, thus, all substance and worth had vanished from the spiritual world, nature alone remained, — nature, that is, in the form of a soulless mass, or matter, and related to man only as the object of sensation and desire. Yet it is not the materialistic extreme which constitutes the peculiar character and tendency of the period now before us. The common character of the French *philosophes* of the eighteenth century is rather, and most prominently, their opposition to all the tyranny and wrong then dominant in state, religion, and society. Their criticism and polemics, which were much more ingenious and eloquent than strictly scientific, were directed against the whole realm of traditional, given, and positive notions. They sought to show the contradiction between the existing elements in the state and the church, and the incontrovertible demands of the reason. They sought to overthrow in the faith of the world every fixed opinion which had not been established in the eye of reason, and to give the thinking man the full consciousness of his native freedom. In order that we may correctly estimate the merit of these men, we must bring before us the French world of that age against which their attacks were directed; the dissoluteness of a pitiful court, the slavish obedience exacted by a corrupt priesthood, a church sunken into decay yet seeking worldly honor, a state administration, a dispensation of justice, and a condition of society, which must be profoundly revolting to every thinking man and every moral feeling. It is the immortal merit of these men that they gave over to scorn and hatred the abjectness and hypocrisy which then reigned; that they brought the minds of men to look with indifference upon the idols of the world, and awakened within them a consciousness of their own autonomy.

2. The most famous and influential actor of this period is *Voltaire* (1694–1778). Though a writer of great versatility, rather than a professed philosopher, there was yet no philosopher of that time who exerted so powerful an influence upon

the whole thought of his country and his age. Voltaire was no atheist. On the contrary, he regarded the belief in a Supreme Being to be so necessary, that he once said that if there were no God we should be under the necessity of inventing one. He was just as little disposed to deny the immortality of the soul, though he often expressed his doubts upon it. He regarded the atheistic materialism of a La Mettrie as nothing but nonsense. In these respects, therefore, he is far removed from the standpoint of the philosophers who followed him. His whole hatred was expended against Christianity as a positive religion. To destroy hierarchical intolerance he considered to be his peculiar mission, and he left no means untried to attain this anxiously longed-for end. His unwearied warfare against every positive religion prepared the way and furnished weapons for the attacks against spiritualism which followed.

3. The *Encyclopedists* had a more decidedly sceptical relation to the principles and the basis of spiritualism. The philosophical Encyclopedia established by *Diderot* (1713–1784), and published by him in connection with d'Alembert, is a memorable monument of the ruling spirit in France in the time immediately previous to the revolution. It was the pride of France at that age, because it expressed in a brilliant and universally accessible form the inner consciousness of the French people. With the keenest wit it reasoned away law from the state, freedom from morality, and spirit and God from nature, though all this was done only in scattered, and, for the most part, timorous intimations. In *Diderot's* independent writings we find talent of much philosophic importance united with great earnestness. But it is very difficult to fix and accurately to limit his philosophic views, since they were very gradually formed, and *Diderot* expressed them always with some reserve and accommodation. In general, however, it may be remarked, that in the progress of his speculations he constantly approached nearer the extreme of the philosophical direction of his age. In his

earlier writings a Deist, he afterwards avowed the opinion that all is God. At first defending the immateriality and immortality of the soul, he expressed himself at a later period decidedly against these doctrines, affirming that the species alone has an abiding being while the individual passes away, and that immortality is nothing other than to live in the thoughts of coming generations. But Diderot did not venture to the real extreme of logical materialism; his moral earnestness restrained him from this.

4. The last word of materialism was spoken with reckless audacity by the physician *La Mettrie* (1709–1751), a cotemporary of Diderot: every thing spiritual is a delusion, and physical enjoyment is the highest end of man. Faith in the existence of a God, says *La Mettrie*, is as groundless as it is fruitless. The world will not be happy till atheism becomes universally established. Then only will there be no more religious strife, then only will theologians, the most odious of combatants, disappear, and nature, poisoned at present by their influence, will come again to its rights. In reference to the human soul, there can be no philosophy but materialism. All the observation and experience of the greatest philosophers and physicians declare this. Soul is nothing but a mere name, which has a rational signification only when we understand by it that part of our body which thinks. This is the brain, which has its fibres of cogitation, just as the limbs have their muscles of motion. That which gives man his advantage over the brutes is, first, the organization of his brain, and second, its capacity for receiving instruction. Otherwise, is man a brute like the beasts around him, though in many respects surpassed by these. Immortality is an absurdity. The soul perishes with the body of which it forms a part. With death every thing is over, *la farce est jouée!* The practical and selfish application of all this is—let us enjoy ourselves as long as we exist, and not throw away any satisfaction we can attain.

5. The *Système de la Nature* afterwards attempted to

elaborate with greater earnestness and scientific precision, that which had been uttered so superficially and so superciliously by La Mettrie, viz., the doctrine that matter alone exists, while mind is nothing other than matter refined.

The *Système de la Nature* appeared in London under a fictitious name in 1770. It was then published as a posthumous work of Mirabaud, late secretary of the Academy. It doubtless had its origin in the circle which was wont to assemble with Baron Holbach, and of which Diderot, Grimm, and others were leaders. Whether the Baron Holbach himself, or his tutor Lagrange is the author of this work, or whether it is the joint production of a number, cannot now be determined. The *Système de la Nature* is hardly a French book: the style is too heavy and tedious.

There is everywhere, says the *Système de la Nature*, nothing but matter and motion. Both are inseparably connected. If matter is at rest, it is only because it is prevented from moving, for in its essence it is not a dead mass. Motion is twofold, attraction and repulsion. The different motions which we perceive are the product of these two, and through these different motions arise the different connections and the whole manifoldness of things. The laws which direct in all this are eternal and unchangeable.—The most weighty consequences of such a doctrine are:

(1) *The materiality of man.* Man is no twofold being compounded of mind and matter, as is erroneously believed. If the inquiry is closely made what the mind is, we are answered, that the most accurate philosophical investigations have shown, that the principle of activity in man is a substance whose peculiar nature cannot be known, but of which we can affirm that it is indivisible, unextended, invisible, etc. But how can we form any definite conception of a being which is only the negation of that which constitutes knowledge, a being the idea of which is peculiarly only the absence of all ideas? Still farther, how can it be explained upon such a hypothesis, that a substance which itself is not material

can work upon material things, and set these in motion, when there is no point of contact between the two? In fact, those who distinguish their soul from their body, have only to make a distinction between their brain and their body. Thought is only a modification of our brain, just as volition is another modification of the same bodily organ.

(2) Another chimera, the belief in the being of a God, is connected with the twofold division of man into body and soul. This belief arises like the hypothesis of a soul-substance, because mind is falsely divided from matter, and nature is thus made twofold. The evil which men experienced, and whose natural cause they could not discover, they assigned to a deity which they imagined for the purpose. The first notions of a God have their source therefore in sorrow, fear, and uncertainty. We tremble because our forefathers for thousands of years have done the same. This circumstance awakens no auspicious prepossession. But not only the rude, but also the theological idea of God is worthless, for it explains no phenomenon of nature. It is, moreover, full of absurdities, for, since it ascribes moral attributes to God, it renders him human; while on the other hand, by a mass of negative attributes, it seeks to distinguish him absolutely from every other being. The true system, the system of nature, is hence atheistic. But such a doctrine requires a culture and a courage which neither all men nor most men possess. If we understand by the word atheist one who believes only in *dead* matter, or who designates the *moving power* in nature with the name God, then is there no atheist, or whoever would be one is a fool. But if the word means one who denies the existence of a spiritual being, a being whose attributes can only be a source of annoyance to men, then are there indeed atheists, and there would be more of them, if a correct knowledge of nature and a sound reason were more widely diffused. But if atheism is true, then should it be diffused. There are, indeed, many who have cast off the yoke of religion, who nevertheless think it is

necessary for the common people in order to keep them within proper limits. But this is just as if we should determine to give a man poison lest he should abuse his strength. Every kind of Deism leads necessarily to superstition, since it is not possible to continue on the standpoint of pure Deism.

(3) With such premises the freedom and immortality of the soul both disappear. Man, like every other substance in nature, is a link in the chain of necessary connection, a blind instrument in the hands of necessity. If any thing should be endowed with self-motion, that is, with a capacity to produce motion without any other cause, then would it have the power to destroy motion in the universe; but this is contrary to the conception of the universe, which is only an endless series of necessary motions spreading out into wider circles continually. The claim of an individual immortality is absurd. For to affirm that the soul exists after the destruction of the body, is to affirm that a modification of a substance can exist after the substance itself has disappeared. There is no other immortality than to live in the remembrance of posterity.

(4) The practical consequences of these principles are in the highest degree favorable for the *System of Nature*, the utility of any doctrine being ever the first criterion of its truth. While the ideas of theologians are productive only of disquiet and anxiety to man, the *System of Nature* frees him from all such unrest, teaches him to enjoy the present moment, and to quietly yield to his destiny, while it gives him that kind of apathy which every one must regard as a blessing. If morality would be active, it can rest only upon self-love and self-interest; it must show man whither his well-considered interest would lead him. He is a good man who gains his own interest in such a way that others will find it for their interest to assist him. The system of self-interest, therefore, demands the union of men among each other, and in this we have true morality.

The logical dogmatic materialism of the *Système de la Nature* is the farthest limit of an empirical direction in philoso-

phy, and consequently closes that course of the development of a one-sided realism which had begun with Locke. The attempt first made by Locke to explain and derive the ideal world from the material, ended in materialism with the total reduction of every thing spiritual to the material, with the total denial of the spiritual. We must now, before proceeding farther, according to the classification made Sect. XXVII., consider the idealistic course of development which ran parallel with the systems of a partial realism. At the head of this course stands *Leibnitz*.

SECTION XXXIII.

LEIBNITZ.

As empiricism sprang from the attempt to subordinate the intellectual to the material, to materialize the spiritual, so on the other hand, idealism had its source in the effort to spiritualize the material, or so to construct the conception of mind that matter could be subsumed under it. To the empiric-sensualistic philosophy, mind was nothing but refined matter, while to the idealistic, matter was only a grosser form of mind ("a confused notion," as Leibnitz expresses it). The former, in its logical development, was driven to the principle that only material things exist, the latter (as with Leibnitz and Berkeley) comes to the opposite principle, that there are only souls and their ideas. For the partial realistic standpoint, material things were the truly substantial. But for the idealistic standpoint, substantiality belongs alone to the intellectual world, to the Ego. Mind, to partial realism, was essentially void, a *tabula rasa*, its whole content came to it from the external world. But a partial idealism sought to carry out the principle that nothing can come into the mind which had not at least been preformed within it, that all its knowledge is

furnished it by itself. According to the former view knowledge was a passive relation; according to the latter it was wholly active. While, lastly, a partial realism had attempted to explain the becoming in nature for the most part through real, *i.e.*, through mechanical grounds (*L'Homme Machine* is the title of one of La Mettrie's writings), idealism had sought an explanation of the same through ideal grounds, *i.e.*, teleologically. While the former had made its prominent inquiry for moving causes, and had, indeed, often ridiculed the search for a final cause; it is final causes toward which the latter directs its chief aim. The mediation between mind and matter, between thought and being, will now be sought in the final cause, in the teleological harmony of all things (*pre-established harmony*). The standpoint of Leibnitz may thus be characterized in a word.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz was born in 1646, at Leipsic, where his father was professor. Having chosen the law as his profession, he entered the university in 1661, and in 1663 he defended for his degree of doctor in philosophy, his dissertation *De Principio Individui*, a theme very characteristic of the direction of his later philosophizing. He afterwards went to Jena, and subsequently to Altdorf, where he took the degree of Doctor of Laws. At Altdorf he was offered a professorship of jurisprudence, which he refused. The rest of his life was unsettled and desultory, spent for the most part in courts, where, as a versatile courtier, he was employed in the most varied duties of diplomacy. In the year 1672 he went to Paris, in order to induce Louis XIV. to undertake the conquest of Egypt, and thus to direct his military schemes from Germany. He subsequently visited London, whence he was afterwards called to Hanover, as councillor and librarian of the learned Catholic duke, John Frederic. Here he spent the most of his subsequent life, though interrupted by occasional journeys to Vienna, Berlin, etc. He was intimately associated with the Prussian Queen, Sophia Charlotte, a highly talented woman, who surrounded herself with a circle of the most dis-

tinguished scholars of the time, and for whom Leibnitz wrote, at her own request, his *Theodicée*. In 1700 an academy was established at Berlin, through his efforts, and he became its first president. Similar, but fruitless efforts were made by him to establish academies in Dresden and Vienna. In 1711 the title of imperial court councillor, and a baronage, was bestowed upon him by the emperor Charles VI. Soon after, he betook himself to Vienna, where he remained a considerable period, and wrote his *Monadology*, at the solicitation of Prince Eugene. He died in 1716. Next to Aristotle, Leibnitz was the most highly gifted scholar that had ever lived; with the richest and most extensive learning, he united the highest and most penetrating powers of mind. Germany has reason to be proud of him, since, after Jacob Boehme, he is the first philosopher of any note among the Germans. With him philosophy found a home in Germany. It is to be regretted that the great variety of his efforts and literary undertakings, together with his roving manner of life, prevented him from giving any connected exposition of his philosophy. His views are for the most part developed only in brief and occasional writings and letters, composed frequently in the French language. It is hence not easy to state his philosophy in its internal connection, though none of his views are isolated, but all stand strictly connected with each other. The following are the chief points:—

1. THE DOCTRINE OF MONADS.—The fundamental peculiarity of Leibnitz's theory is its opposition to Spinozism. Substance, as the indeterminate universal, was with Spinoza the only positive. With Leibnitz also the conception of substance lay at the basis of philosophy, but his definition of it was entirely different. While Spinoza had sought to exclude from his substance every positive determination, and especially all action, and had apprehended it simply as pure being, Leibnitz viewed it as living activity and active energy, an example of which might be found in a stretched bow, which moves and straightens itself through its own energy

as soon as the external hindrances are removed. That this active energy forms the essence of substance is a principle to which Leibnitz ever returns, and from which, in fact, all the other chief points in his philosophy may with strictest logical sequence be derived. From this there follow at once two determinations of substance directly opposed to Spinozism; first, that it is individual, a monad; and second, that there are a multiplicity of monads. Substance, in so far as it exercises an activity similar to that of an elastic body, is essentially an excluding activity, or repulsion; the conception of an individual or a monad being that which excludes another from itself. But this involves also the second determination,—that of the multiplicity of monads; one monad cannot exist alone, there must be others. The conception of one individual postulates other individuals, which stand over against the one as excluded from it. Hence the fundamental thesis of the Leibnitz philosophy in opposition to Spinozism is this, viz., there is a multiplicity of individual substances or monads. They are the elements of all reality, the basis of the whole universe, physical as well as spiritual.

2. THE MONADS MORE ACCURATELY DETERMINED.—The monads of Leibnitz are similar to atoms in their general features. Like these they are punctual units, independent of any external influence, and indestructible by any external power. But notwithstanding this similarity, there is an important and characteristic difference between the two. First, the atoms are not distinguished from each other, they are all qualitatively alike; but each one of the monads is different in quality from every other, every one is a peculiar world for itself, every one is different from every other. According to Leibnitz, there are no two things in the world which are exactly alike. Secondly, atoms can be considered as extended and divisible, but the monads are metaphysical points, and actually indivisible. Here, lest we should stumble at this proposition (for an aggregate of unextended monads can never give an extended world), we must take into considera-

tion Leibnitz's view of space, which, according to him, is not something real, but only confused, subjective representation. Thirdly, the monad is a living, sensitive being, a soul. Among the atomists such an idea has no place; but with Leibnitz it has a very important part to play. Everywhere in the world, according to him, there is life, individual vitality, and a vital connection of individual beings. The monads are not dead, not mere extended substance, but self-subsistent, self-identical, and determined by nothing external. (a) Considered in themselves, however, they are to be thought of as existing in living mutation and activity. As the human soul, a monad of a higher order, is never, even when unconscious, without some activity of obscure imagination and volition; so every monad continually undergoes various modifications or states, which accord with its peculiar quality. Everywhere there is motion, nowhere perfect rest. (b) And as the human soul sympathizes with all the varying conditions of nature, and mirrors the universe in itself, so do the monads universally. Each of the infinitely numerous monads is a microcosm, a centre, a mirror of the universe. Each in itself reflects every thing which is and happens; and it does so through its own spontaneous power, by virtue of which it holds ideally in itself, as it were in embryo, the totality of things. In each monad, therefore, an all-seeing eye might read every thing which is occurring, has occurred, or will occur in the universe. This vitality of the monads, and their vital connection with the rest of the world Leibnitz characterizes more definitely thus: the life of the monads consists in a continuous succession of perceptions, *i.e.*, obscure or clear conceptions of its own states and of the states of the others. The monads proceed from perception to perception. Every monad is a soul. In this consists the perfection of the world.

3. THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY. — The universe is thus the sum of all the monads. Every thing, every composite, is an aggregate of monads. Thus every bodily organ-

ism is not one substance, but many, it is a multiplicity of monads, like a machine which is made up of a number of distinct pieces of mechanism. Leibnitz compared bodies to a fish-pond, which might be full of living elements, though dead itself. The ordinary view of things is thus wholly reversed; true substantiality does not belong to bodies, *i.e.*, to the aggregates, but to their original elements. Matter in the vulgar sense, as something conceived to be without mind, does not at all exist. How now must the inner connection of the universe be conceived? In the following way. Every monad is a representative being, and at the same time, each one is different from every other. This difference, therefore, depends alone upon the difference of representation: there are just as many different degrees of representation as there are monads, and these degrees may be fixed according to some of their prominent stages. An important principle of classification is the distinction between confused and distinct cognition. Hence a monad of the lowest rank (a monad *toute nue*) will be one which *merely* represents, *i.e.*, which possesses only the most confused knowledge. Leibnitz compares this state with a swoon, or with our condition in a dreamless sleep, in which we are not without representations (notions), —for otherwise we could have none when awaking, —but in which the representations are so numerous that they neutralize each other and do not come into the consciousness. This is the stage of inorganic nature in which the life of the monads manifests itself only in the form of motion. In a higher rank are those monads in which the representation is active as a formative vital force, though still without consciousness. This is the stage of the vegetable world. Still higher ascends the life of the monad when it attains to sensation and memory, as is the case in the animal kingdom. The lower monads may be said to sleep, and the brute monads to dream. When still farther the soul rises to reason or reflection, we call it mind, spirit. — The distinction of the monads from each other is, therefore, this, that

each one, though mirroring the whole and the same universe in itself, does it differently, the one more, and the rest less perfectly. Each one contains the whole universe, the whole infinity within itself, and in this respect is like God (*parvus in suo genere deus*), the only difference being that God knows every thing with perfect distinctness, while the monad represents it confusedly, though one monad may represent it more confusedly than another. The limitation of a monad does not, therefore, consist in its containing less than another or than God, but only in its containing more imperfectly or in its representing less distinctly. — Upon this standpoint the universe, in so far as every monad mirrors one and the same universe, though each in a different way, represents a spectacle of the greatest possible difference, as well as of the greatest possible unity and order, *i.e.*, of the greatest possible perfection, or the *absolute harmony*. For variety in unity is harmony. — But in still another respect the universe is a system of harmony. Since the monads do not work upon each other, but each one follows only the law of its own being, there is danger lest the inner harmony of the universe may be disturbed. How is this danger removed? Through this, that each monad stands in a vital connection with the same universe (and with the whole of it): each reflects the universal life. The changes of the collective monads, therefore, run parallel with each other, and in this consists the harmony of all as pre-established by God.

4. THE RELATION OF THE DEITY TO THE MONADS. — What part does the conception of God play in the system of Leibnitz? An almost idle one. Following the strict consequences of his system, Leibnitz should have held to no proper theism, but the harmony of the universe should have taken the place of the Deity. Ordinarily he considers God as the sufficient cause of all monads. But he was also accustomed to consider the final cause of a thing as its sufficient cause. In this respect, therefore, he almost identifies God and the absolute final cause. Elsewhere he considers the Deity as

a simple primitive substance, or as the individual primitive unity. Again, he speaks of God as a pure immaterial actuality, *actus purus*, while to the monads belongs matter, that is, an actuality unfree, restricted, and obstructed through a principle of passive resistance to spontaneous movement (striving, *appetitio*). Once he calls him a monad, though this is in manifest contradiction with the determinations otherwise assigned him. It was for Leibnitz a very difficult problem to bring his monadology and his theism into harmony with each other, without giving up the premises of both. If he held fast to the substantiality of the monads, he was in danger of making them independent of the Deity, and if he did not, he could hardly escape falling back into Spinozism.

5. THE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY is readily explained on the standpoint of the pre-established harmony. This relation, taking the premises of the monadology, might seem enigmatical. If no monad can work upon any other, how can the soul work upon the body to lead and move it? The enigma is solved by the pre-established harmony. While the body and soul, each one independently of the other, follows the laws of its being, the body working mechanically, and the soul pursuing ends, yet God has established such a concordant harmony of the two activities, such a parallelism of the two functions, that there is in fact a perfect unity for body and soul. There are, says Leibnitz, three views respecting the relation of body and soul. The first and most common supposes a reciprocal influence between the two, but such a view is untenable, because there can be no interchange between mind and matter. The second, that of occasionalism (*cf.* Sect. XXV. 1), brings about this interchange through the constant assistance of God, which is nothing more nor less than to make God a *Deus ex machina*. Hence the only solution for the problem is the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony. Leibnitz illustrates these three views in the following example. Let one conceive of two watches,

whose hands ever accurately indicate the same time. This agreement may be explained, first (the common view), by supposing an actual connection between the hands of each, so that the hand of the one watch might draw the hand of the other after it, or second (the occasionalistic view), by conceiving of a watch-maker who continually keeps the hands alike, or lastly (the pre-established harmony), by ascribing to each a mechanism so exquisitely wrought that each one goes in perfect independence of the other, and at the same time in entire agreement with it. — That the soul is immortal (indestructible), follows at once from the doctrine of monads. There is properly no such thing as death. That which is called death is only the soul losing a part of the monads which compose the mechanism of its body, while the living element goes back to a condition similar to that in which it was before it came upon the theatre of the world.

6. The monadology has very important consequences in reference to *the theory of knowledge*. As, with reference to ontology, the philosophy of Leibnitz was determined by its opposition to Spinozism, so with reference to the theory of cognition it was determined by its opposition to the empiricism of Locke. Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* had attracted Leibnitz without satisfying him, and he therefore attempted a new investigation in his *Nouveaux Essais*, in which he defended the doctrine of innate ideas. But this hypothesis of innate ideas Leibnitz now freed from that defective view which had justified the objections of Locke. The innateness of the ideas must not be held as though they were explicitly and consciously contained in the mind, but rather the mind possesses them potentially and only virtually, though with the capacity to produce them out of itself. All thoughts are properly innate, *i.e.*, they do not come into the mind from without, but are rather produced by it from itself. Any external influence upon the mind is inconceivable, it even needs nothing external for its sensations. While Locke had compared the mind to an unwritten piece of paper, Leibnitz

likened it to a block of marble, in which the veins prefigure the form of the statue. Hence the common antithesis between rational and empirical knowledge disappears with Leibnitz in the degrees of greater or less distinctness.—Among these theoretically innate ideas, Leibnitz recognizes two of special prominence, which take the first rank as principles of all knowledge and all ratiocination;—the principle of contradiction (*principium contradictionis*), and the principle of sufficient cause (*principium rationis sufficientis*). To these, as a principle of the second rank, must be added the *principium indiscernibilium*, or the principle that there are in nature no two things wholly alike.

7. The most elaborate exposition of Leibnitz's theological views is given in his *Théodicée*. The *Théodicée*, is, however, his weakest work, and has but a loose connection with the rest of his philosophy. Written at the instigation of a woman, it belies this origin neither in its form nor in its content—not in its form, for in its effort to be popular it becomes diffuse and unscientific, and not in its content, for it accommodates itself to the positive dogmas and the premises of theology farther than the scientific basis of the system of Leibnitz would permit. In this work, Leibnitz investigates the relation of God to the world in order to show a conformity in this relation to a final cause, and to free God from the charge of acting without or contrary to an aim. Why is the world as it is? God might have created it very differently. True, answers Leibnitz, God saw an infinite number of worlds as possible before him, but out of all these he chose the one which actually is as the best. This is the famous doctrine of the best possible world, according to which no more perfect world is possible than the one which is.—But how so? Is not the existence of evil at variance with this? Leibnitz answers this objection by distinguishing three kinds of evil, the metaphysical, the physical, and the moral. The metaphysical evil, *i.e.*, the finiteness and incompleteness of things, is necessary because inseparable from finite existence, and is

thus unconditionally willed by God. Physical evil (pain, etc.), though not unconditionally willed by God, is often a good conditionally, *i.e.*, as a punishment or means of improvement. Moral evil or wickedness can in no way be charged to the will of God. Leibnitz took various ways to account for its existence, and obviate the contradiction lying between it and the conception of God. At one time he says that wickedness is only permitted by God as a *conditio sine qua non*, because without wickedness there were no freedom, and without freedom no virtue. Again, he reduces moral evil to metaphysical, and makes wickedness nothing real but merely a want of perfection, a negation, a limitation, playing the same part as do the shadows in a painted picture, or the discords in a piece of music, which do not diminish the beauty, but only increase it through contrast. Again, he distinguishes between the material and the formal element in a wicked act. The material of sin, the power to act, is from God, but the formal element, the wickedness of the act, belongs wholly to man, and is the result of his limitation, or, as Leibnitz here and there expresses it, of his eternal self-predestination. In no case can the harmony of the universe be destroyed through such a cause.

These are the chief points of Leibnitz's philosophy. The general characteristic of it as given in the beginning of the present section, will be found to have been substantiated by the specific exposition that has now been furnished.

SECTION XXXIV.

BERKELEY.

LEIBNITZ had not carried out the standpoint of idealism to its extreme. He had indeed, on the one side, explained space and motion and bodily things as phenomena which had their existence only in a confused representation, but on the other side, he had not wholly denied the existence of the corporeal world, but had recognized as a reality lying at its basis the world of monads. The phenomenal or corporeal world had its fixed and substantial foundation in the monads. Thus Leibnitz, though an idealist, did not wholly break with realism. The ultimate consequence of a pure subjective idealism would have been to wholly deny the reality of the objective, sensible world, and explain corporeal objects as *simply* phenomena, as nothing but subjective notions without any objective reality as a basis. This consequence, the idealistic counterpart to the ultimate realistic result of materialism — appears in *George Berkeley*, who was born in Ireland, 1684, made bishop of the Anglican Church in 1734, and died in 1753. Hence, though he followed the empiricism of Locke, and sustained no outward connection with Leibnitz, we must place him in immediate succession to the latter as the perfecter of a subjective idealism.

Our sensations, says Berkeley, are entirely subjective. We are wholly in error if we believe that we have a sensation of external objects or perceive them. That which we have and perceive is only our sensations themselves. It is, *e.g.*, clear, that by the sense of sight we can see neither the distance, the size, nor the form of objects, but that we only *conclude* that these exist, because our experience has taught us that a certain sensation of sight is always attended by certain sensations of touch. That which we see is only colors, clearness, obscurity, etc., and it is false therefore to say that

we see and feel one and the same thing. So also we never go out of ourselves for those sensations to which we ascribe most decidedly an objective character. The peculiar objects of our understanding are only our own affections; all ideas are therefore only our own sensations. But just as there can be no sensations outside of the sensitive subject, so no idea can have existence outside of him who possesses it. The so-called objects exist only in our notion, and have a being only as they are perceived. It is the great error of most philosophers that they ascribe to corporeal objects a being outside the conceiving mind, and do not see that they are only mental. It is not possible that material things should produce any thing so wholly distinct from themselves as sensations and notions. There is, thus, no such thing as a material external world; *minds alone exist, i.e.,* thinking beings, whose nature consists in thinking and willing. But whence then arise all our sensations which come to us without our agency, and which are not, thus, like the images of fancy, products of our will? They arise from a spirit superior to ourselves, — for only a spirit can produce conceptions within us, — even from God. God gives us ideas; but as it would be contradictory to assert that a being could give what it does not possess, so ideas exist *in God*, and we derive them from him. These ideas in God may be called archetypes, and those in us ectypes. — In consequence of this view, says Berkeley, we do not deny an independent reality of things, we only deny that they can exist elsewhere than in an understanding. Instead, therefore, of speaking of a nature in which, *e.g.*, the sun is the cause of warmth, etc., the accurate expression would be this: God announces to us through the sense of sight that we are soon to perceive a sensation of warmth. Hence by nature we are only to understand the succession or the connection of ideas, and by natural laws the constant order in which they proceed, *i.e.*, the laws of the association of ideas. This thorough-going subjective idealism, this complete denial of matter, Berkeley considered as the surest way to oppose materialism and atheism.

SECTION XXXV.

WOLFF.

THE idealism of Berkeley, as was to be expected from the nature of the case, remained without any farther development, but the philosophy of Leibnitz was taken up and subjected to a farther revision by *Christian Wolff*. He was born in Breslau in 1679. He was chosen professor at Halle, where he became obnoxious to the charge of teaching a doctrine at variance with the Scriptures, and drew upon himself such a violent opposition from the theologians of the university, that a cabinet order was issued for his dismissal on the 8th of November, 1723, and he was enjoined to leave Prussia within forty-eight hours on pain of being hung. He then became professor in Marburg, but was afterwards recalled to Prussia by Frederick II. immediately upon his accession to the throne. He was subsequently made baron, and died 1754. In his chief thoughts (though omitting the bolder ideas of his predecessor) he followed Leibnitz, a connection which he himself admitted, though he protested against the identification of his philosophy with that of Leibnitz, and objected to the name, *Philosophia Leibnitio-Wolfiana*, which was originated by his disciple Bilfinger. The historical merit of Wolff is threefold. First, and most important, he laid claim again to the whole domain of knowledge in the name of philosophy, and sought again to build up a systematic scheme of doctrine, and make an encyclopedia of philosophy in the highest sense of the word. Though he did not himself furnish much new material for this purpose, yet he carefully elaborated and arranged that which he found at hand. Secondly, he made again the philosophical method as such, an object of attention. His own method is, indeed, one altogether external to the content, namely, the mathematical or the mathematico-syllogistical, recommended by Leibnitz; and by the application of this his

whole philosophizing sinks to a flat formalism. (For instance, in his *Principles of Architecture*, the eighth proposition is — “a window must be wide enough for two persons to recline together conveniently,” — a proposition which is thus proved: “we are more frequently accustomed to recline and look out at a window in company with another person than alone, and hence, since the builder of the house should satisfy the owner in every respect (Sect. 1), he must make a window wide enough for two persons conveniently to recline within it at the same time, *q.e.d.*”) Still this formalism is not without its advantage, for it subjects the philosophical content to a logical treatment. Thirdly, Wolff taught philosophy to speak German, an art which it has not since forgotten. Next to Leibnitz, he is entitled to the merit of having made the German language for ever the organ of philosophy.

The following remarks will suffice for the content and the scientific classification of Wolff's philosophy. He defines philosophy to be the science of the possible as such. But that is possible which contains no contradiction. Wolff defends this definition against the charge of presumption. It is not affirmed, he says, in this definition that either he or any other philosopher knows every thing which is possible. The definition only claims for philosophy the whole province of human knowledge, and it is certainly proper that philosophy should be described according to the highest perfection which it can attain, even though it has not yet actually reached it. — In what now does this science of the possible consist? Relying upon the perception that there are within the soul two faculties, cognition and volition, Wolff divides philosophy into two great divisions, theoretical philosophy (an expression, however, which first appears among his followers), or metaphysic, and practical philosophy. Logic precedes both as a preliminary training for philosophical study. Metaphysic is still farther divided by Wolff into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology; practical philosophy he divides into ethics, whose object is man as man;

economics, whose object is man as a member of a family ; and politics, whose object is man as a citizen of the state.

1. ONTOLOGY is the first part of Wolff's metaphysic. Ontology treats of what are now called categories, or those fundamental conceptions which are applied to every object, and must therefore at the outset be investigated. Aristotle had already furnished a table of categories, but he had derived them wholly empirically. It is not much better with the ontology of Wolff ; it is laid out like a philosophical dictionary. At its head he places the principle of contradiction, viz., it is not possible for any thing to be, and at the same time not to be. The conception of the possible at once follows from this principle. That is possible which contains no contradiction. That is necessary, the opposite of which contradicts itself, and that is accidental, the opposite of which is possible. Every thing which is possible is a thing, though only an imaginary one ; that which neither is, nor is possible, is nothing. When many things together compose a thing, this is a whole, and the individual things comprehended by it are its parts. The magnitude of a thing consists in the multitude of its parts. If A contains that by which we can understand the being of B, then that in A by which B becomes understood is the ground of B, and the whole A which contains the ground of B is its cause. That which contains the ground of its properties is the essence of a thing. Space is the arrangement of things which exist conjointly. Place is the determinate way in which a thing exists in conjunction with others. Movement is change of place. Time is the arrangement of that which exists successively, etc. .

2. COSMOLOGY. — Wolff defines the world to be a series of changing objects, which exist conjointly and successively, but which are so connected together that one ever contains the ground of the other. Things are connected in space and in time. By virtue of this universal connection, the world is one united whole ; the essence of the world consists in the

mode of this connection. But this mode cannot be changed. It can neither receive any new ingredients nor lose any of those it possesses. From the essence of the world spring all its changes. In this respect the world is a machine. Events in the world are only hypothetically necessary in so far as previous events have had a given character; they are accidental in so far as the world might have been directed otherwise. In respect to the question whether the world had a beginning in time, Wolff does not express himself explicitly. Since God is independent of time, but the world has been from eternity in time, the world therefore is in no case eternal in the same sense that God is eternal. But according to Wolff, neither space nor time has any substantial being. Body is a thing composed of matter, and possessing a moving power within itself. The powers of a body taken together are called its nature, and the comprehension of all being is called nature in general. That which has its ground in the essence of the world is called natural, and that which has not is supernatural, or a miracle. At the close of his cosmology, Wolff treats of the perfection and imperfection of the world. The perfection of a world consists in this, that all things, whether simultaneous or successive, exist in perfect harmony. But since every thing has its separate rules, the individual must give up so much from its perfection as is necessary for the symmetry of the whole.

3. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.—The soul is that within us which is self-conscious. The soul is also conscious of other objects besides itself. Consciousness is either clear or indistinct. Clear consciousness is thought. The soul is a simple incorporeal substance. There dwells within it a power of perceiving a world. In this sense brutes also may have a soul, but a soul which possesses understanding and will is mind, and mind belongs alone to men. The soul of man is a mind joined to a body, and this is the distinction between men and superior spirits. The movements of the soul and of the body harmonize with each other by virtue of the pre-

established harmony. The freedom of the human soul is the power according to its own arbitrament, to choose of two possible things that which pleases it best. But the soul does not decide without motives; it ever chooses that which it holds to be the best. Thus the soul would seem impelled to its action by its representations; but the understanding is not constrained to accept any thing as good or bad, and hence also the will is not constrained, but free. As a simple being the soul is indivisible, and hence imperishable; the souls of brutes, however, have no understanding, and hence enjoy no conscious existence after death. This belongs alone to the human soul, and hence the human soul alone is immortal.

4. NATURAL THEOLOGY.—Wolff uses here the cosmological argument to demonstrate the existence of a God. God might have made different worlds, but has preferred the present one as the best. This world has been called into being by the will of God. His aim in its creation was the manifestation of his own perfection. Evil in the world does not spring from the Divine will, but from the limited being of human things. God permits it only as a means of good.

This brief aphoristic exposition of Wolff's metaphysics, shows how closely it is related to the doctrine of Leibnitz. The latter, however, loses much of its speculative profoundness by the abstract and logical treatment it receives in the hands of Wolff. For the most part with Wolff the specific elements of the monadology remain in the background; his simple beings are not representative like the Monads, but more like the Atoms. Hence there is in his doctrines much that is illogical and contradictory. His peculiar merit in metaphysic is ontology, which he elaborated far more accurately than his predecessors. A multitude of philosophical terminations owe to him their origin, and their introduction into philosophical language.

The philosophy of Wolff, comprehensible and distinct as it was, and by its composition in the German language more

accessible than that of Leibnitz, soon became the popular philosophy, and gained an extensive influence. Among the names which deserve credit for their scientific development of it, we may mention *Thümming*, 1687–1728; *Bilfinger*, 1693–1750; *Baumeister*, 1708–1785; *Baumgarten* the æsthetic, 1714–1762; and his disciple *Meier*, 1718–1777.

SECTION XXXVI.

THE GERMAN CLEARING UP.

UNDER the influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolff, though without any immediate connection with it, there arose in Germany during the latter half of the eighteenth century, an eclectic popular philosophy, whose different phases may be embraced under the name of the German clearing up. It has but little significance for the history of philosophy, though not without importance in other respects. Its great aim was to secure a higher culture; and hence a cultivated and polished style of reasoning is the form in which it philosophized. It is the German counterpart of the French clearing up. As the latter closed the realistic period of development by drawing the ultimate consequence of materialism, so the former closed the idealistic series by its tendency to an extreme subjectivism. To the thinkers who followed this direction, the empirical, individual Ego becomes the absolute; they forget every thing else for it, or rather every thing else has value in their eyes only in proportion as it refers and ministers to the subject by contributing to its demands and satisfying its inner cravings. Hence the question of immortality becomes now the great problem of philosophy (in this relation we may mention *Mendelssohn*, 1727–1786, the most important thinker in this movement); the eternal duration of the individual soul

is the chief point of interest; the objective ideas or articles of faith, *e.g.*, the personality of God, though not denied, cease to have an interest; it was held as an established article of belief that we can know nothing of God. In another current of this direction, it is moral philosophy and æsthetics (*Garve*, 1742–1798; *Engel*, 1741–1802; *Abbt*, 1738–1766; *Sulzer*, 1720–1779) which find a scientific treatment, because both these possess a subjective interest. In general, every thing is viewed in its reference to utility, its adaptation to an end; utility becomes the peculiar criterion of truth; that which is not useful to the subject, or which does not minister to his subjective ends, is set aside. In connection with this turn of mind stands the prevailing teleological direction which the investigations of nature assumed (*Reimarus*, 1694–1765), and the utilitarian character given to ethics. The happiness of the individual was considered as the highest principle and the supreme end (*Basedow*, 1723–1790). Even religion is contemplated from this point of view. Reimarus wrote a treatise upon the “*advantages*” of religion, in which he attempted to prove that religion was not subversive of earthly pleasure, but rather increased it; and *Steinbart* (1738–1809) elaborated, in a number of treatises, the theme that all wisdom consists alone in attaining happiness, *i.e.*, enduring satisfaction, and that the Christian religion, instead of forbidding this, was rather itself the true doctrine of happiness. In other particulars Christianity received only a moderate degree of respect; wherever it laid claim to any authority disagreeable to the subject (as in individual doctrines like that of future punishment), it was opposed, and in general the effort was made to counteract, as far as possible, the positive dogma by natural religion. Reimarus, for example, the most zealous defender of theism and of the teleological investigation of nature, is at the same time the author of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*. By criticizing the Gospel history, and every thing positive and transmitted, and by rationalizing the supernatural in religion, the subject displayed its new-found in-

dependence. In fine, the subjective standpoint of this period exhibits itself in the autobiographies and confessions then so prevalent, the isolated self is the object of admiring contemplation (*Rousseau*, 1712–1778, and his *Confessions*) ; it beholds itself mirrored in its particular conditions, sensations, and views — a sort of flirtation with itself, which often sinks to sickly sentimentality. According to all this, it is seen to be the extreme consequence of subjective idealism which constitutes the character of the German clearing up period, which thus closed the course of the idealistic development.

SECTION XXXVII.

TRANSITION TO KANT.

THE idealistic and the realistic developments to which we have been attending, each ended with a one-sided result. Instead of actually and internally reconciling the opposition between thought and being, they both issued in denying the one or the other of these factors. Realism had, one-sidedly, made matter absolute ; and idealism, with equal one-sidedness, had endowed the empirical Ego with the same attribute, — extremes in which philosophy was threatened with total destruction. It had, in fact, in Germany as in France, become degraded to the most superficial popular philosophy. Then *Kant* arose, and brought again into one channel the two streams which, when separate from each other, threatened to lose themselves amid the sands. Kant is the great renovator of philosophy ; he reduced once more to unity and totality the one-sided efforts of those who had preceded him. He stands in some special relation, either antagonistic or harmonious, to all others — to Locke no less than to Hume, to the Scottish philosophers no less than to the earlier Eng-

lish and French moralists, to the philosophy of Leibnitz and of Wolff, as well as to the materialism of the French and the utilitarianism of the German clearing up period. His relation to the development of a partial idealism and a one-sided realism may be stated somewhat as follows: Empiricism had made the Ego purely passive and subordinate to the sensible external world — idealism had made it purely active, and given it a sovereignty over the sensible world; Kant attempted to strike a balance between these two claims, by affirming that the Ego as practical is free and autonomic, an unconditioned lawgiver for itself, while as theoretical it is receptive, and conditioned by the phenomenal world; but at the same time the theoretical Ego contains the two sides within itself, for if, on the one side, empiricism may be justified upon the ground that the material and only field of all our knowledge is furnished by experience, so on the other side, idealism may be justified on the ground that there is in all our knowledge an *a priori* factor and basis, for in experience itself we make use of conceptions which are not furnished by experience, but are contained *a priori* in our understanding.

In order to obtain a general view of the very elaborate framework of the Kantian philosophy, let us briefly glance at its fundamental conceptions, and notice its chief positions and results. Kant subjected the activity of the human mind in knowing, and the origin of our experience, to his critical investigation. Hence his philosophy is called critical philosophy, or criticism, because it aims to be essentially an examination of our faculty of knowledge; it is also called transcendental philosophy, since Kant calls the reflection of the reason upon its relation to the objective world, a transcendental reflection (transcendental must not be confounded with transcendent), or, in other words, a transcendental knowledge is one “which does not relate so much to objects of knowledge, as to our mode of knowing them, in so far as knowledge is possible *a priori*.” The examination of the

faculty of knowledge, which Kant attempts in his "*Critique of Pure Reason*," shows the following results. All knowledge is a product of two factors, the knowing subject and the external world. Of these two factors, the latter lends to our knowledge its material, the matter of experience, while the former furnishes the form, namely, the conceptions of the understanding, through which a connected knowledge or a synthesis of our perceptions into a whole of experience first becomes possible. If there were no external world, then would there be no phenomena; if there were no understanding, then these phenomena, or perceptions, which are infinitely manifold, would never be brought into the unity of a conception, and thus no experience would be possible. Thus, while intuitions without conceptions are blind, and conceptions without intuitions are empty, cognition is a union of the two, since in it the form of conception is filled with the matter of experience, and the matter of experience is enmeshed in the net of the understanding's conceptions. Nevertheless, we do not know things as they are in themselves. *First*, because the categories, or the forms of our understanding prevent. By bringing that which is given as the material of knowledge into our own conceptions as the form, there is manifestly a change produced in the objects; they are thought of not as they are, but only as we apprehend them; they appear to us only as modified by the categories. But besides this subjective addition, there is yet another. *Secondly*, we do not know things as they are in themselves, because even the intuitions which we bring within the form of the understanding's conceptions, are not pure and uncolored, but are already penetrated by a subjective medium, namely, by the universal forms of all objects of sense, space and time. Space and time are also subjective additions, forms of sensuous intuition, which are just as originally present in our minds as the fundamental conceptions or categories of our understanding. That which we would represent intuitively to ourselves we must place in space and time, for without

these no intuition is possible. From this it follows that we know only phenomena, and not things in themselves separate from space and time.

A superficial apprehension of these Kantian principles might lead one to suppose that Kant's criticism did not essentially go beyond the standpoint of Locke's empiricism. But such a supposition disappears upon a careful scrutiny. Kant was obliged to recognize with Hume that the conceptions, cause and effect, substance and attribute, and the other conceptions which the human understanding finds itself necessitated to think in the phenomena, and which constitute the essential elements of all thought, do not arise from any experience of the sense. For instance, when we are affected through different senses, and perceive a white color, a sweet taste, a rough surface, etc., and predicate all these of one thing, as a piece of sugar, there come from without only the plurality of sensations, while the conception of unity cannot come through sensation, but is a category or conception added to the sensations by the mind itself. But instead of denying, for this reason, the reality of these conceptions of the understanding, Kant took a step in advance, assigning a peculiar province to this activity of the understanding, and showing that these forms of thought thus furnished to the matter of experience are immanent laws of the human intellect, the peculiar laws of the understanding's operations, which may be obtained by an accurate analysis of our thinking activity. (Of these laws or conceptions there are twelve, viz., unity, plurality, totality; reality, negation, limitation; substantiality, causality, reciprocal action; possibility, actuality, and necessity.) Kant's theory is thus not empiricism but idealism; not, however, a dogmatic idealism, transferring all reality to thought (conception), but a critical, subjective idealism, which distinguishes in the conception an objective and a subjective element, and vindicates for the latter a connection with knowledge just as essential as that of the former.

From what has been said can be deduced the three chief principles of the Kantian theory of knowledge:

1. WE KNOW ONLY PHENOMENA AND NOT THINGS IN THEMSELVES. — The matter of experience furnished us by the external world becomes so adjusted and altered in its relations (for we apprehend it at first under the subjective forms of space and time, and then under the equally subjective forms of our understanding's conceptions), that it no longer represents the thing itself in its original condition, pure, and unmixed.

2. NEVERTHELESS EXPERIENCE IS THE ONLY PROVINCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, AND THERE IS NO SCIENCE OF THE UNCONDITIONED. — This follows of course, for since all knowledge is the product of the matter of experience, and the form of the understanding, and depends thus upon the coöperation of the sense and the understanding, no knowledge is possible of objects for which one of these factors, experience, fails us; cognition through intellectual conceptions alone is illusory, since for the conception of the unconditioned posited by the understanding, the sense can furnish no corresponding object. Hence the questions which Kant places at the head of his whole *Critique*: how are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible? *i.e.*, can we widen our knowledge *a priori*, by thought alone, beyond the sensuous experience? is a knowledge of the supersensible possible? must be answered with an unconditional negative.

3. If, nevertheless, human knowledge persists in endeavoring to overstep the narrow limits of experience, *i.e.*, to become transcendent, it involves itself in the greatest contradictions. The three ideas of the reason, the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological, *viz.*, (a) the idea of an absolute subject, *i.e.*, of the soul, or of immortality, (b) the idea of the world as a totality of all conditions and phenomena, (c) the idea of a most perfect being — are so wholly without application to the empirical actuality, are so evidently mere products of the reason, regulative, and not constitutive principles, to which no object in experience corresponds, that whenever they are applied to experience, *i.e.*, are conceived

of as actually existing objects, they lead to mere logical errors, to the most obvious paralogisms, and sophisms. These errors, which are partly false conclusions and paralogisms, and partly unavoidable contradictions of the reason with itself, Kant undertook to demonstrate in reference to all the ideas of the reason. Take, *e.g.*, the cosmological idea. Whenever the reason applies to the universe any transcendent conception, *i.e.*, attempts to apply the forms of the finite to the infinite, it is at once evident that the antithesis of such a proposition can be proved just as well as the thesis. The affirmation that the world has a beginning in time, and limits in space, can be proved as well as, and no better than its opposite, that the world has no beginning in time and no spacial limits. Whence it follows that all speculative cosmology is an assumption by the reason. So also with the theological idea; it rests on mere logical paralogisms, and false conclusions, as Kant, with great acuteness, shows in reference to each of the proofs for the being of a God, which previous dogmatic philosophies had attempted. It is therefore impossible to prove and to conceive of the existence of a God as a Supreme Being, or of the soul as a real subject, or of a comprehending universe. The peculiar problems of metaphysic lie outside the province of philosophical knowledge.

Such is the negative part of the Kantian philosophy; its positive complement is found in the "*Critique of the Practical Reason*." While the mind as theoretical and cognitive is wholly conditioned, and ruled by the objective and sensible world, and thus knowledge is only possible through intuition; yet as practical it goes wholly beyond the given (the sense impulse), and is determined only through the categorical imperative, and the moral law, which is itself, and is therefore free and autonomic; the ends which it pursues are those which itself, as moral spirit, places before itself; objects are no more its masters and lawgivers, to which it must yield if it would know the truth, but its servants, which it may use for its own ends in actualizing its moral law. While the

mind as theoretical is united to a world of sense and phenomena, a world obedient to necessary laws, the mind as practical, by virtue of the freedom essential to it, by virtue of its direction towards an absolute aim, belongs to a purely intelligible and supersensible world. This is the practical idealism of Kant, from which he derives the three practical postulates of the immortality of the soul, moral freedom, and the being of a God, which, as theoretical truths, had been before denied.

With this brief sketch for our guidance, let us now pass to a more extended exposition of the Kantian Philosophy.

SECTION XXXVIII.

KANT.

IMMANUEL KANT was born at Königsberg in Prussia, April 22, 1724. His father an honest saddlemaker, and his mother a prudent and pious woman, exerted a good influence upon him in his earliest youth. In the year 1740 he entered the university as a student of theology, though he devoted the most of his time to philosophy, mathematics, and physics. He commenced his literary career in his twenty-third year, in 1747, with a treatise entitled "*Thoughts concerning the true Estimate of Living Force.*" He was obliged by his pecuniary circumstances to spend some years as a private tutor in different families in the neighborhood of Königsberg. In 1755 he settled at the university as "*privat-docent,*" which position he held for fifteen years, during which time he gave lectures upon logic, metaphysic, physics, mathematics, and also, during the latter part of the time, upon ethics, anthropology, and physical geography. At this period he adhered for the most part to the school of Wolff, though early expressing his doubts in

respect of dogmatism. From the publication of his first treatise he applied himself to writing with unwearied activity, though his great work, the "*Critique of pure Reason*," did not appear till his fifty-seventh year, 1781. His "*Critique of the practical Reason*" was issued in 1787, and his "*Religion within the Bounds of pure Reason*," in 1793. In 1770, in his forty-sixth year, he was chosen ordinary professor of logic and metaphysic, a chair which he continued to fill uninterruptedly till 1797, when the weakness of age obliged him to resign it. Invitations to professorships at Jena, Erlangen, and Halle, were given him and rejected. As soon as he became known, the noblest and most active minds flocked from all parts of Germany to Königsberg, to sit at the feet of the sage who was master there. One of his admirers, Reuss, professor of philosophy at Würzburg, who abode but a brief time at Königsberg, entered his chamber, declaring that he had come one hundred and sixty miles in order to see Kant and to speak with him. — During the last seventeen years of his life he occupied a little house with a garden, in a quiet quarter of the city, where his calm and regular mode of life might be undisturbed. His mode of life was very simple, though he enjoyed good living and society. He never left his native province even to go as far as Dantzic. His longest journeys were to visit some country-seats in the environs of Königsberg. Nevertheless, as his lectures upon physical geography testify, he acquired by reading a very accurate knowledge of the earth. He knew all of Rousseau's works; *Emile* at its first appearance detained him for a number of days from his customary walks. Kant died Feb. 12, 1804, in the eightieth year of his life. He was of medium stature, finely built, with blue eyes, and always enjoyed sound health till in his latter years, when he became childish. He was never married. His character was marked by an earnest love of truth, great candor, and simple modesty.

Though Kant's great epoch-making work, the "*Critique of pure Reason*," did not appear till 1781, yet had he previ-

ously shown an approach towards the same standpoint in several smaller treatises, and particularly in his inaugural dissertation which appeared in 1770, "*Concerning the Form and the Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds.*" Kant himself refers the inner genesis of his critical standpoint to Hume. "I freely confess," he says, "that it was David Hume who first roused me from my dogmatic slumber, and gave a different direction to my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy." The critical view, therefore, first became developed in Kant as he left the dogmatic metaphysical school, the Wolfian philosophy in which he had grown up, and went over to the study of a sceptical empiricism in Hume. "Hitherto," says Kant at the close of his *Critique of pure Reason*, "men have been obliged to proceed either dogmatically, like Wolff, or sceptically, like Hume. The critical road alone is yet open. If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to travel along this in my company, let him now contribute his aid in making this by-path into a highway, in order that that which many centuries could not effect may now be attained before the expiration of the present, namely, that the reason may be perfectly satisfied in respect of that which has hitherto, but in vain, engaged its curiosity." Kant had the clearest consciousness respecting the relation of his criticism to the previous philosophy. He compares the revolution which he himself had brought about in philosophy with that wrought by Copernicus in astronomy. "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must regulate itself according to its objects; but all attempts to make any thing out of them *a priori*, through notions whereby our knowledge might be enlarged, has proved, under this pre-supposition, abortive. Let us, then, try for once whether we do not succeed better with the problems of metaphysic by assuming that objects must be adapted to the nature of our knowledge, a mode of viewing the subject which accords much better with the desired possibility of a knowledge of objects *a priori*, which must decide

something concerning them before they are given us. The circumstances are, in this case, precisely the same as with the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, finding that his attempt to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies did not succeed, when he assumed the whole starry host to revolve around the spectator, tried whether he should not succeed better, if he left the spectator himself to move, and the stars on the contrary at rest." In these words we have the principle of a subjective idealism, most clearly and decidedly expressed.

In the succeeding exposition of the Kantian philosophy we shall most suitably follow the classification adopted by Kant himself. His principle of classification is a psychological one. All the faculties of the soul, he says, may be reduced to three, which are incapable of any farther reduction; cognition, emotion, volition. The first faculty contains the principles, the governing laws for all the three. In so far as the faculty of cognition contains the principles of knowledge itself, is it theoretical reason, and so far as it contains the principles of volition and action, is it practical reason, while, so far as it contains the principles which regulate the feelings of pleasure and pain, is it a faculty of judgment. Thus the Kantian philosophy (on its critical side) divides itself into three *critiques*, (1) Critique of pure, *i.e.*, theoretical Reason, (2) Critique of practical Reason, (3) Critique of the Judgment.

1. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. — The critique of pure reason, says Kant, is the inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, systematically arranged. What are these possessions? What do we contribute to the act of cognition? To answer this question, Kant explores the two chief fields of our theoretical consciousness, the two chief factors of all knowledge, the sense and the understanding. Firstly: what does sense or the faculty of intuition possess *a priori*? Secondly: what is the *a priori* possession of our understanding? The first of these questions is discussed in the *Transcendental Æsthetic* (a title which we must take not

in the sense now commonly attached to the word, but in its etymological signification as the “science of the *a priori* principles of the sense”); and the second in the *Transcendental Logic*, principally in the *Analytic*. Sense and understanding are thus the two factors of all knowledge, the two stems — as Kant expresses it — of our knowledge, which may spring from a common root, though this is unknown to us: sense is the receptivity, and understanding the spontaneity of our cognitive faculty; by the sense, which can only furnish intuitions, objects are *given* to us; by the understanding, which forms conceptions, these objects are *thought*. Conceptions without intuitions are empty; intuitions without conceptions are blind. Intuitions and conceptions constitute the reciprocally complemental elements of our intellectual activity. What now are the *a priori* principles respectively of our knowledge through the sense and through thought? The first of these questions, as already said, is answered by —

1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC. — To anticipate at once the answer, we may say that the *a priori* principles of our knowledge through the sense, the original forms of sensuous intuition, are space and time. Space is the form of the external sense, by means of which objects are given to us as existing outside of ourselves, and also outside of and beside one another; time is the form of the inner sense, by means of which the circumstances of our own soul-life become objects to our consciousness. If we abstract from every thing belonging to the matter of our sensations, space remains as the universal form in which all the materials of the external sense must be arranged. If we abstract from every thing which belongs to the matter of our inner sense, time remains as the form which the movement of the mind had filled. Space and time are the highest forms of the outer and inner sense. That these forms lie *a priori* in the human mind, Kant proves, first, directly from the nature of these conceptions themselves; and, secondly, indirectly by showing that without *a priori* presupposing these conceptions, certain sciences of undoubted

validity would be impossible. The first of these he calls the *metaphysical*, and the second the *transcendental exposition*.

(1) In the *metaphysical exposition* it is to be shown, (a) that space and time are given *a priori*, (b) that they both belong to the sense (and therefore to the *æsthetic*) and not to the understanding (and therefore not to the *logic*), *i.e.*, that they are intuitions and not conceptions. (a) That space and time are *a priori* is clear from the fact that every experience, before it can be, must presuppose already a space and time. I perceive something as external to me; but this externality presupposes space. Again, I have two sensations either simultaneous or successive; this presupposes time. (b) Space and time, however, are by no means conceptions, but forms of intuition, and intuitions themselves. For in every universal conception the individual is comprehended under it, but not as a part of it; but in space and time, all individual spaces and times are parts of and contained within the universal space and the universal time.

(2) In the *transcendental exposition* Kant draws his proof indirectly by showing that certain sciences, universally recognized as such, can only be conceived upon the supposition that space and time are *a priori*. The science of pure mathematics is possible only on the ground that space and time are pure and not empirical intuitions. Kant therefore comprehends the whole problem of the *Transcendental Æsthetic* in the question, How are pure mathematical sciences possible? The sphere, says Kant, within which pure mathematics moves, is space and time. But mathematics posits its principles as universal and necessary. Universal and necessary principles, however, can never come from experience; they must have an *a priori* ground; consequently it is impossible that space and time, from which mathematics takes its principles, should be first given *a posteriori*; they must be given *a priori* as pure intuitions. Hence we have a knowledge *a priori*, and a science which rests upon *a priori* grounds; and the matter simply resolves itself into this: whosoever would

deny that *a priori* knowledge can be, must also at the same time deny the possibility of mathematics. But if the fundamental truths of mathematics are intuitions *a priori*, we might conclude that there may be also *a priori* conceptions, out of which, in connection with these pure intuitions, a metaphysic could be formed. This is the positive result of the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, though with this positive side the negative is closely connected. Intuition or immediate perception can be attained by man only through the sense, whose universal intuitions are only space and time. But since these intuitions of space and time are not relations of objects themselves, but only the subjective forms under which they are perceived by us, there is something subjective mingled with all our intuitions; we can know things not as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us through these subjective media, space and time. This is the meaning of the Kantian principle, that we do not know things in themselves, but only phenomena. But if on this account we should affirm that all things are in space and time, this would be too much; they are in space and time only for us, — all phenomena of the external sense appearing both in space and in time, and all phenomena of the inner sense appearing only in time. By this, however, Kant in no way intended to admit that the world of sense is mere appearance. He affirmed, that he contended for the empirical reality as well as for the transcendental ideality of space and time: things external to ourselves exist just as certainly as do we and the circumstances within us, only they are not presented to us as they are in themselves and in their independence of space and of time. In regard to the thing-in-itself which stands back of the phenomena, Kant intimates in the first edition of his *Critique* that it is not impossible that the Ego and the thing-in-itself are one and the same thinking substance. This thought, which Kant threw out as a mere conjecture, was the source of all the wider developments of the latest philosophy. It was afterwards the fundamental idea of the Fichtian system,

that the Ego does not become affected through a thing-in-itself essentially foreign to it, but purely through itself. In the second edition of his *Critique*, however, Kant omitted this sentence.

The *Transcendental Æsthetic* closes with the discussion of space and time, *i.e.*, with the discovery of the *a priori* elements of sensation. But the human mind cannot be satisfied with the mere receptivity of sense; it does not simply receive objects, but it applies to these its own spontaneity, and attempts to think them through its conceptions, and embrace them in the forms of its understanding. It is the object of the *Transcendental Analytic* (which forms the first part of the *Transcendental Logic*), to examine these *a priori* conceptions or forms of thought which lie originally in the understanding, as the forms of space and time do in the intuitive faculty.

2. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. — It is the first problem of the *Analytic* to attain the pure conceptions of the understanding. Aristotle had already attempted to form a table of these conceptions or categories, but he had collected them empirically instead of deriving them from a common principle, and had numbered among them space and time, though these are no pure conceptions of the understanding, but only forms of intuition. But if we would have a complete and regularly arranged table of all the pure conceptions of the understanding, or all the *a priori* forms of thought, we must look for a principle from which we may derive them. This principle is the judgment. The general fundamental conceptions of the understanding may be accurately attained if we examine all the different modes or forms of judgment. For this end Kant considers the different kinds of judgment which are treated of in the science of common logic. Now logic shows that there are four kinds of judgment, *viz.*, judgments of—

<i>Quantity.</i>	<i>Quality.</i>	<i>Relation.</i>	<i>Modality.</i>
Universal,	Affirmative,	Categorical,	Problematical,
Particular,	Negative,	Hypothetical,	Assertory,
Singular.	Infinite or Limitative.	Disjunctive.	Apodictic.

From these judgments are obtained the same number of fundamental conceptions or categories of the understanding, viz. : —

<i>Quantity.</i>	<i>Quality.</i>	<i>Relation.</i>	<i>Modality.</i>
Totality,	Reality,	Substance and In-	Possibility and Im-
Plurality,	Negation,	herence,	possibility,
Unity.	Limitation.	Causality and De-	Being and Not-be-
		pendence,	ing,
		Reciprocity.	Necessity and Con-
			tingency.

From these twelve categories all the rest may be derived by combination. From the fact that these categories are shown to belong *a priori* to the understanding, it follows, (1) that these conceptions are *a priori*, and hence have a necessary and universal validity, (2) that by themselves they are empty forms, and attain a content only through intuition. But since our intuition is wholly through the sense, these categories have validity only in their application to sensuous intuition, which in turn is raised from mere perception to experience proper only when apprehended under the conceptions of the understanding. — Here we meet a second question : how does this happen? How do objects become subsumed under these forms of the understanding, which by themselves are so empty?

There would be no difficulty with this subsumption if the objects and the conceptions of the understanding were the same in kind. But they are not. Because objects come to the understanding from the sense, they are by nature sensuous. Hence the question arises : how can these sensible objects be subsumed under pure conceptions of the understanding? how can the categories be applied to objects? how can rules be established in reference to the manner in which we must think things in accordance with the categories? This application of the categories to objects cannot be immediate ; there must be a mean between the two, a third, which must have something in common with each, *i.e.*, which

is in one respect pure and *a priori*, and in another sensible. The two pure intuitions of the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, space and time, especially the latter, are of such a nature. A transcendently determined property of time, as for example, that of simultaneousness, is on the one hand homogeneous with the categories, since it is *a priori*, and on the other homogeneous with phenomena, since every phenomenon must be represented as existing in time. For this reason Kant calls the transcendental determinations of time transcendental *schema*, and the use which the understanding makes of them, he calls the transcendental *schematism* of the pure understanding. The schema is a product of the imaginative faculty, which spontaneously gives to the inner sense this determination, though the schema is something other than a mere image. An image is always merely an individual and determinate intuition; the schema on the other hand is a universal form which the imagination produces as the representation of a category, and which is the mean through which the category becomes applicable to sensuous phenomena. Hence the schema can only exist in the conception, and never suffers itself to be brought within the sensuous intuition. If, now, we consider more closely the schematism of the understanding, and seek the transcendental time-determination for every category, we find that:

(1) *Quantity* has for a universal schema *series in time* or number, *i.e.*, the successive addition of homogeneous units. I can represent to myself the pure understanding conception of magnitude only by bringing into the imagination a number of units one after another. If I stop this process at its beginning, the result is *unity*; if I let it go on farther I have *plurality*; and if I suffer it to continue without limit, *totality*. If I wish to apply this conception of magnitude to phenomena, I find it to be possible only by means of this movement from one part of the homogeneous to another.

(2) *Quality* has for its schema *the content of time*. If I would apply to any thing sensuous the pure conception of

reality, which is one of the categories of *quality*, I must represent to myself a filled time, a content in time. That is real which fills a time. If also I would represent to myself the pure understanding conception of negation, I bring into thought a void time.

(3) The categories of *relation* take their schemata from *the order of time*; for if I would represent to myself a determinate relation, I always bring into thought a determinate order of things in time. Substance appears as the persistence of the real in time; causality as regular succession in time; reciprocity as the regular coetaneousness of the determinations in the one substance, with the determinations in the other.

(4) The categories of *modality* take their schema from *the whole of time, i.e.*, from the manner in which an object belongs to time. The schema of possibility is the general harmony of a representation with the conditions of time; the schema of actuality is the existence of an object in a determined time; that of necessity is the existence of an object for all time.

We are now, then, furnished with all that we need for subsuming sensuous objects under the categories, or for applying the categories to phenomena in order to show how through this application experience — a coherent series of phenomena — arises. We have (1) the different classes of categories, which, since they are valid for the entire sphere of intuition, render possible the synthesis of perceptions into a whole of experience; and (2) the schemata by means of which we can apply these categories to the objects of sense. With every category and its schema is given a different method of bringing phenomena under a universally valid form of the understanding, through which unity is introduced into cognition. With every category, therefore, there are given principles of cognition, *a priori* rules, points of view, to which we subject phenomena in order to elevate them to experience. These principles, these most general, universally valid synthetic

judgments, correspond to the four classes of the categories and are as follows: (1) All phenomena, since they can be apprehended only under the forms of space and time, are in form magnitudes, *quanta*, manifolds, which the conception of a definite space or time gives, and thus *extensive* magnitudes or wholes constructed out of parts successively added. Intuition is possible only because our imagination apprehends phenomena as extensive *quanta* in space and time. For this reason, also, all intuitions are subject to the *a priori* laws of extensive quantity, *e.g.*, to the law of infinite divisibility, to the laws of construction in space as they are unfolded in geometry, etc. These laws are the *axioms of intuition*, the universally valid rules of all intuition. (2) In respect of their sensuous content, their reality, all phenomena are *intensive* magnitudes; since without a greater or less degree of impression on the sense no perception of a definite object, of a reality, would be possible. This magnitude of the real, which is the object of sensation, is merely intensive, *i.e.*, determinable in degree, since sensation (as such) contains nothing extended in space or time. All the objects of perception thus are intensive as well as extensive quantities filling space and time, and are therefore subject to the laws of both extension and intension. All the forces and qualities of things have an infinite number of degrees which may increase or decrease; whatever is real has always an intensive magnitude, however small; this intensive may be independent of extensive magnitude, etc. These principles are the *anticipations of perception*, rules which are given antecedently to all perception, and direct the investigation of it. (3) Experience is possible only through the conception of a necessary connection of perceptions. Without a necessary order of things and their relations in time there could be no knowledge of a determinate connection of phenomena, but only of accidental individual perceptions.

(a) The first principle which relates to this point is: *throughout all the changes of phenomena the substance remains*

unchanged. Where there is nothing permanent there is also no definite relation or duration of time. If I would posit one state of a thing as prior or subsequent to other states of the same thing, *i.e.*, if I would distinguish these states by their relation to time, I must opposit the thing itself to the states which it passes through, I must think of it as perduring through all the changes of its states, that is as a self-identical substance. (b) The second principle is: *all changes occur in accordance with the law of cause and effect.* The succession of different states in time is fixed and determinate only when I can posit one as the cause of the other, and as, therefore, necessarily (according to a rule or law) preceding it, and the other as effect of the first, and as, therefore, necessarily succeeding it. The relation of causality alone gives determinate succession in time; but without a determinate succession in time there could be no experience; hence the relation of causality is the foundation of all knowledge through experience; the dependence of one thing upon another through this relation is the basis of all connection between objects,—without it we should have only disconnected subjective representations. (c) The third principle is: *all co-existent substances are in complete reciprocity.* Only those things which reciprocally affect one another are determined, posited as inseparable in time. These three principles are the *analogies of experience*,—rules for apprehending the relations of things, without which there could be for us no whole, no nature of things, but merely individual, disconnected phenomena. (4) To the categories of modality correspond the *postulates of empirical thought*. These are: (a) that which conforms to the formal conditions of experience, is possible, and can become *phenomenon*; (b) that which agrees with the material conditions of experience is actual, and is *phenomenon*; (c) that, whose connection with the actual is determined according to the universal conditions of experience, is necessary, and must exist.

These are the only possible authentic synthetic judgments

a priori; they are the basis of all metaphysic. But it must not be forgotten that we are entitled to make only an empirical use of all these conceptions and principles, and that we must ever apply them only to things as objects of a possible experience, and never to things in themselves; for the conception without an object is an empty form, to which an object can be given only through pure intuition; and pure intuition again,—the pure forms, space and time,—itself needs to be filled by sensuous perception. Hence, without reference to human experience, these *a priori* conceptions and principles are nothing but a sporting of the imagination and the understanding, with their representations. Their peculiar function is that they enable us to spell perceptions, that we may read them as experiences. But here one is apt to fall into a delusion which can hardly be avoided. Since the categories are not grounded upon sensation, but have an *a priori* origin, it would seem as though their application would reach far beyond the sense; but such a view is a delusion; our conceptions are not able to lead us to a knowledge of things in themselves (*noumena*) since our intuition gives us only phenomena for the content of our conceptions, and the thing in itself can never be given in a possible experience; our knowledge remains limited to phenomena. The source of all confusions and errors and strife in previous metaphysic, was in confounding the phenomenal with the noumenal world.

Besides the categories or conceptions of the understanding, which have been considered, and which relate primarily to experience, though often applied erroneously beyond the province of experience, there are other similar conceptions whose peculiar function is only to deceive; conceptions whose chief characteristic is the transgression of the limits of experience, and which may consequently be called transcendent. These are the fundamental conceptions and principles of the previous metaphysic. To examine these conceptions, and destroy the appearance of objective science and knowledge, which they falsely exhibit, is the problem of the *Transcendental Dialectic* (the second part of the transcendental logic).

3. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. — The reason is distinguished from the understanding in its more restricted sense. As the understanding has its categories, the reason has its ideas; as the understanding forms fundamental maxims from conceptions, the reason forms principles from ideas, in which the maxims of the understanding have their highest confirmation. The peculiar work of the reason is, in general, to find the unconditioned for the conditioned knowledge of the understanding, and thus to reduce it to perfect unity. Hence the reason is the faculty of the unconditioned, or of principles; but since it has no immediate reference to objects, but only to the understanding and its judgments, its activity must remain an immanent one. Were the supreme unity of reason to be taken not merely in a transcendental sense, but considered as an actual object of knowledge, it would be transcendent, since it would involve the application of the categories of the understanding to the knowledge of the unconditioned. From this transcendent and false use of the categories arises the transcendental illusion which decoys us beyond experience, by the delusive pretext of widening the domain of the pure understanding. It is the problem of the transcendental logic to disclose this transcendental illusion.

The speculative ideas of the reason, derived from the three kinds of logical syllogism, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive, are threefold.

(1) The psychological idea, the idea of the soul, as a thinking substance (the object hitherto of rational psychology).

(2) The cosmological idea, the idea of the world as including all phenomena (the object hitherto of cosmology).

(3) The theological idea, the idea of God as the highest condition of the possibility of all things (the object hitherto of rational theology).

But with these ideas, in which the reason attempts to apply the categories of the understanding to the unconditioned, the reason becomes unavoidably entangled in a semblance and an

illusion. This transcendental semblance, or this optical illusion of the reason, exhibits itself differently in each of the different ideas. With the psychological idea the reason perpetrates a simple paralogism (paralogisms of pure reason) while with the cosmological it finds itself driven to contradictory affirmations or antinomies, and, with the theological, it wanders about in an empty ideal.

(1) *The psychological Idea, or the Paralogisms of the pure Reason.*

Kant has attempted, under this rubric, to overthrow all rational psychology as this had been previously apprehended. Rational psychology had considered the soul as a spiritual thing with the attribute of immateriality; as a simple substance with the attribute of incorruptibility; as a numerically identical, intellectual substance with the predicate of personality; as an unextended and thinking being with the predicate of immortality. All these principles of rational psychology, says Kant, are surreptitious; they are all derived from the one premise, "I think"; but this "I think" is neither intuition nor conception, but a simple consciousness, an act of the mind which attends, connects, and bears in itself all representations and conceptions. This thinking is now falsely taken as a real thing. For the Ego as subject is substituted the existence of the Ego as object, as soul; and what belongs analytically to the former is predicated synthetically of the latter. But in order to treat the Ego also as object, and to be able to apply to it categories, it must be given empirically, in intuition, which is not the case. From all this it follows that the proofs for immortality rest upon false conclusions. I can, indeed, separate my pure thinking *ideally* from the body; but obviously, it does not follow from this that my thinking can exist *really* when separate from the body. The result which Kant derives from his critique of rational psychology is this, viz., there is no rational psychology as a *doctrine* which can furnish us with any addition to our self-knowledge, but only as a *discipline*, which places im-

passable limits to the speculative reason in this field, in order that it may neither abandon itself to a soulless materialism, nor lose itself in the delusion of a, for us in life, groundless spiritualism. In this respect rational psychology would rather remind us, that this refusal of our reason to give a satisfactory answer to the questions which stretch beyond this life, should be regarded as an intimation of the reason for us to leave this fruitless and superfluous speculation, and apply our self-knowledge to some fruitful and practical use.

(2) *The Antinomies of Cosmology.*

The cosmological ideas cannot be completely enumerated without the aid of the categories. (1) So far as the quantity of the world is concerned, space and time are the original *quanta* of all intuition. In a quantitative respect, therefore, something must be established in reference to the totality of the times and spaces of the world. (2) In respect of quality something must be determined in reference to the divisibility of matter. (3) In respect of relation, the complete series of causes must be sought for the existing effects in the world. (4) In respect of modality, the accidental according to its conditions, or the complete dependence of the accidental in the phenomenal world, must be conceived. When, now, the reason attempts to establish determinations respecting these problems, it finds itself at once entangled in a contradiction with itself. Directly contrary affirmations can be made with equal validity in reference to each of these four points. We can show, upon grounds equally valid, (1) the *thesis*; the world has a beginning in time and limits in space; and the *antithesis*, the world has neither beginning in time nor limit in space. (2) The *thesis*: every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing else than the simple and that which it composes; and the *antithesis*: no compound thing exists of simple parts, and there exists nothing simple in the world. (3) The *thesis*: causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which the phenomena of the world may be

deduced, but these may be explained through a causality in freedom; and the antithesis: there is no freedom, but every thing in the world happens according to natural laws. Lastly, (4) the thesis: something belongs to the world either as a part of it or as its cause, which is an absolutely necessary being; and the antithesis: there exists no absolutely necessary being as cause of the world, either in the world or without it. From this dialectic conflict of the cosmological ideas, there follows at once the worthlessness of the whole struggle.

(3) *The Ideal of the pure Reason or the Idea of God.*

Kant shows at first how the reason comes in the idea of a most real being (*ens realissimum*), and then turns himself against the efforts of previous metaphysics to prove its valid existence. His critique of the arguments previously employed to prove the existence of a God, is essentially the following.

(a) *The Ontological proof.* — The argument here is as follows: it is possible that there is a most real being; now existence is implied in the conception of all reality: to deny, therefore, its real existence, is to deny the possibility of a most real being, — which is contradictory. But, answers Kant, existence is not at all a reality, or real predicate which can be added to the conception of a thing, but it is the position of a thing with all its properties. The conception of a thing loses none of its properties when the predicate of existence is taken from it. Hence though all its properties belong to it, it by no means follows that it possesses existence also. Hence if it have any property, it does not at all follow that it possesses existence. Being is nothing but the logical copula, which does not in the least enlarge the content of the subject. A hundred actual dollars, *e.g.*, contain no more than a hundred possible ones; there is only a difference between them in reference to my own wealth. Thus the most real being may with perfect propriety be conceived of as the most real, while at the same time it should only be conceived of as possible, and not as actual. It was therefore wholly unnatural, and a mere play of school wit, to take an idea which had

been arbitrarily formed, and deduce from it the existence of its corresponding object. Any effort and toil which might be spent upon this famous proof is thus only thrown away, and a man would from mere ideas become no richer in knowledge than a merchant would increase his property by adding a number of ciphers to the balance of his accounts.

(b) *The Cosmological proof.*—While the ontological proof *concludes* with the existence of an absolute being, the cosmological proof *begins* with necessary existence. If any thing exists there must also exist an absolutely necessary being as its cause. But now there exists at least I myself, and there must hence also exist an absolutely necessary being as my cause. The last cosmological antinomy is brought in to criticise the argument at this stage. The conclusion is erroneous, because from the phenomenal and the accidental a necessary being above experience is inferred. Moreover, if we allow the conclusion to be valid, it is still no God which it gives us. Hence the farther inference is made: that being can alone be necessary which includes all reality within itself. If now this proposition should be reversed, and the affirmation made that that being which includes all reality is absolutely necessary, then have we again the ontological proof, and the cosmological falls with this. In the cosmological proof, the reason uses the trick of bringing forth as a new argument an old one with a changed dress, that it might seem to have the power of summoning two witnesses.

(c) *The Physico-theological proof.*—If thus neither conception nor experience can furnish a proof for the divine existence, there still remains a third attempt, viz., to start from a determinate experience and endeavor to see whether the existence of a supreme being cannot be inferred from the arrangement and condition of things in the world. Such is the physico-theological proof, which starts from the evidences of design in nature, and directs its argument as follows: everywhere in the universe there exists conformity of means to ends (design), but this design is extraneous to the things of

the world, *i.e.*, it is so far as they are concerned accidental, and adheres to them only contingently; there exists therefore for this design a necessary cause which works with wisdom and intelligence; this necessary cause must be the most real being; the most real being has therefore necessary existence. — To this Kant answers: The physico-theological proof is the oldest, clearest, and most conformable to the common reason. But it is not demonstration (apodictic). It infers, from the form of the world, a proportionate and sufficient cause of this form; but in this way we only attain an originator of the form of the world, and not an originator of its matter, a world-builder, and not a world-creator. To help out with this difficulty the cosmological proof is brought in, and the originator of the form becomes conceived as the necessary being who is the ground of the content. Thus we have an absolute being whose perfection corresponds to that of the world. But in the world there is no absolute perfection; we have therefore only a very perfect being; to get the most perfect, we must revert again to the ontological proof. Thus the teleological proof rests upon the cosmological, while this in turn has its basis in the ontological, and from this circle the metaphysical modes of proof cannot escape.

From these considerations, it would follow that the ideal of a supreme being is nothing other than a regulative principle of the reason, by which it looks upon all connection in the world *as if* it sprang from an all-sufficient and necessary cause; in order that, in explaining this connection, it may establish thereon the rule of a systematic and necessary unity, it being also true that in this process the reason through a transcendental subreption cannot avoid representing to itself this formal principle as constitutive, and this unity as an absolute creative intelligence. But in truth this supreme being remains for the simply speculative use of the reason, a mere though faultless ideal, a conception which is the summit and the crown of human knowledge, whose objective reality, though it cannot be proved with apodictic certainty, can just as little be disproved.

With this critique of the ideas of the reason there is still another question. If these ideas have no objective significance, why are they found within us? Since they are necessary, they will doubtless have some good purpose to subserve. What this purpose is, has already been indicated in speaking of the theological idea. Though not constitutive, yet are they regulative principles. We cannot better order the faculties of our soul, than by acting "*as if*" there were a soul. The cosmological idea leads us to consider the world "*as if*" the series of causes were infinite, without, however, excluding an intelligent cause. The theological idea enables us to look upon the world in all its complexity as a regulated unity. Thus, while these ideas of the reason are not constitutive principles, by means of which our knowledge could be widened beyond experience, they are regulative principles, by means of which our experience may be ordered, and brought under certain hypothetical unities. These three ideas, therefore, the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological, do not form an organon for the discovery of truth, but only a canon for the simplification and systematizing of our experiences.

Besides their regulative significance, these ideas of the reason have also a practical importance. There is a sufficient certainty, not objective, but subjective, which is especially of a practical nature, and is called belief or confidence. If the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of a God, are three cardinal principles, which, though not in any way necessary to cognition, are yet pressed continually upon us by the reason, they must certainly find their peculiar significance in the practical sphere, in connection with moral conviction. This conviction is not logical, but moral certainty. Since it rests wholly upon subjective grounds, upon the moral character, I cannot say: it is morally certain that there is a God, but only: I am morally certain, etc. That is, the belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral character, that I am in just

as much danger of losing this character as of being deprived of this belief. We are thus brought to the standpoint of the PRACTICAL REASON.

II. CRITIQUE OF THE PRACTICAL REASON. — With the *Critique of the Practical Reason*, we enter a wholly different world, where the reason richly recovers that of which it was deprived in the theoretical province. The essential problem of the *Critique of the Practical Reason* is almost diametrically opposed to that of the critique of the theoretical reason. The object of investigation in the critique of the speculative reason, was, — whether the pure reason can know objects *a priori*; in the practical reason it is, — how can the pure reason determine *a priori* the will in respect of objects. The critique of the speculative reason inquired after the cognizableness of objects *a priori*: the practical reason has nothing to do with the cognizableness of objects, but only with those questions which relate to the grounds of the determination of the will (motives), and every thing which can be known in that connection. Hence, in the latter critique, we have an order directly the reverse of that which we find in the former. As the original determinations of our theoretical knowledge are intuitions, so the original determinations of our will are principles and conceptions. The critique of the practical reason must, therefore, start from moral principles, and only after these are firmly fixed, may we inquire concerning the relation in which the practical reason stands to the sense.

The results of the two critiques, also, are mutually opposed. If in the theoretical sphere the ideas of reason remained essentially negative, because the reason in seeking to attain to the thing-in-itself became transcendent, in the practical sphere the opposite is the case. In the practical sphere the ideas of reason demonstrate their certainty in a wholly immediate and immanent way, without once overstepping the bounds of self-consciousness and inner experience. In this sphere is considered the relation of reason,

not to external things, but to something internal, to the will, and it is demonstrated that the reason can determine the will purely from itself; from which fact the ideas of freedom and immortality obtain that certainty which the theoretical reason was unable to give them.

That there is a determination of the will through pure reason, or that the reason has practical reality, is not immediately certain, since human actions appear to proceed primarily from the sensuous motives of pleasure and pain, inclination or affection. The critique of practical reason must therefore inquire, whether these determinations of the will are the only ones, or whether there is yet a higher source of motives in which not sense but reason is the lawgiver, so that under its influence the will follows not incentives from without, but obeys, with absolute freedom, a higher practical principle of the reason. The exposition of these facts and principles is given in the *analytic* of the practical reason; while on the other hand it belongs to the *dialectic* of practical reason to consider and solve the antinomies which arise from the relation of the legislation of pure reason to the empirical determination of the will through sensuous motives.

1. THE ANALYTIC.—The reality of a higher faculty of motives within us is made certain by the fact of the *moral law*, which is nothing else than the law which reason of itself imposes upon the will. The moral law within us stands pre-eminent above all lower impulses, and with an inward irresistible necessity bids us follow it absolutely and unconditionally in utter independence of every sensuous motive. All other practical laws relate solely to the empirical ends of pleasure and pain; the moral law, however, has no reference to these, and demands that we pay no regard to them. The moral law is not a hypothetical imperative which promulgates mere rules of expediency, for the attainment of empirical ends; but a categorical imperative, a universal law valid for every rationally directed will. It can therefore originate only in the reason and not in any lower impulses or individual

desires; it can moreover originate only in *pure* reason and not in reason as empirically conditioned; it must be a commandment of the autonomous, one, and universal reason. In the moral law, therefore, reason demonstrates itself as practical; in it reason attains immediate reality; and through it, it is proved that the pure reason is no mere idea but a force actually determining volition and action. Moreover, through this law is determined the complete certainty and truth of another idea,—the idea of freedom. The moral law says, “Thou oughtest, therefore thou canst,” and thus assures us of our freedom; indeed it is in its essence nothing but the will freed from all sensuous content of desire, which thus constitutes for us the supreme law of volition and action.—But here the further question arises, what is it that the reason categorically enjoins? In order to answer this we must first consider the empirical will, the natural side of man.

The nature of an empirical will consists in this, that in it volition is directed upon an object to which the subject is driven by a feeling of pleasure to be derived from it; and this feeling, again, is rooted in the nature of the subject, in its susceptibility for this or that, in its natural wants, etc. Under this empirical volition belongs all striving for a definite object, or all *material* volition; for nothing can be an object of subjective volition except in so far as a susceptibility exists in the subject by virtue of which the object is not indifferent to it, but pleasing. All material motives fall under the principle of agreeableness or happiness, or, subjectively, under that of self-love. The will in so far as it follows these motives is not autonomic but heteronomic, limited, that is, through its dependence upon natural empirical ends. From this it follows that a law of reason which is to be unconditionally binding upon all rational beings must be absolutely distinct from all material principles, that is, must contain nothing material. Material motives are by nature empirical, accidental, variable. For men are not at one as regards pleasure and pain, but what is disagreeable to one may appear

pleasing to another ; and even if they did agree in this respect the agreement would be purely accidental. Consequently, these material motives can never act the part of laws binding upon every being, but each subject may select for himself a different object as a motive. Such rules of action Kant calls *maxims* of the will. He also censures those moralists who set up such maxims as universal principles of morality.

Nevertheless, these maxims, though not the highest principles of morality, are yet necessary to the autonomy of the will, because they alone furnish it a definite content. It is only by uniting the two sides, that we gain the true principle of morality. To this end the maxims must be freed from their limitation, and widened to the *form* of universal laws of the reason. Only those maxims should be chosen as motives of action which are capable of becoming universal laws of the reason. *The highest principle of morality* will therefore be this : act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time be valid as a principle of universal legislation ; *i.e.*, act so that no contradiction shall arise in the attempt to conceive the maxim of thy acting as a law universally obeyed. By this formal moral principle all material moral principles which can only be of a heteronomic nature are excluded ; in it there is a law which elevates the will above all lower incentives, a law which reduces all wills to unanimity, a law which is the one true law of reason itself since it is valid for all rational beings.

The question next arises—what impels the will to act conformably to this highest moral law? Kant answers : the moral law itself, apprehended and revered, must be the only moving spring of the human will. If an act which in itself might be conformable to the moral law, be done only through some impulse to happiness arising simply from an inclination of the sense, if it be not done purely for the sake of the law itself, then have we simply *legality* and not *morality*. That which is included in every inclination of the sense is self-love and self-conceit, and of these the former is restricted by the

moral law, and the latter wholly destroyed. But that which strikes down our self-conceit and humbles us must appear to us in the highest degree worthy of esteem. This is the effect of the moral law. Consequently the positive feeling which we shall cherish toward the moral law will be reverence. This reverence, though a feeling, is neither sensuous nor pathological, for it stands opposed to these; but is rather an intellectual feeling, since it arises from the notion of the practical law of the reason. On the one side as subordination to law, reverence involves pain; on the other side, since the coercion can only be exercised through the reason itself, it involves pleasure. Reverence is the only sentiment befitting man in reference to the moral law. Man, as creature of sense, cannot rest on any inner inclination to the moral law, for he has ever inclinations within him which resist the law; love to the law can only be considered as something ideal. — Thus the moral purism of Kant, or his effort to separate every impulse of the sense from the motives to action, merges into rigorism, or the gloomy view that duty can never be done except with reluctance. A similar exaggeration belongs to the well-known epigram of Schiller, who answers the following scruple of conscience —

The friends whom I love I gladly would serve,
But to this inclination incites me;
And so I am forced from virtue to swerve
Since my act, through affection, delights me —

with the following decision : —

The friends whom thou lov'st, thou must first seek to scorn,
For to no other way can I guide thee :
'Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform
The acts to which duty would lead thee.

(2) *The Dialectic.* — The pure reason has always its dialectic, since it belongs to the nature of the reason to demand the unconditioned for the given conditioned. Hence also the

practical reason seeks an unconditioned highest good for that conditioned good after which man strives. What is this highest good? If we understand by the highest good the fundamental condition of all other goods, then it is virtue. But virtue is not the perfect good, since finite rational beings as sensitive stand in need also of happiness. Hence the highest good is only perfect when the highest happiness is joined to the highest virtue. The question now arises : what is the relation of these two elements of the highest good to each other? Are they analytically or synthetically united? The former would be affirmed by most of the ancients, especially by the Greek moral philosophers. We might allow with the Stoics, that happiness is contained as an accidental element in virtue, or, with the Epicureans, that virtue is contained as an accidental element in happiness. The Stoics said : to be conscious of one's virtue is happiness ; the Epicureans said : to be conscious of the maxims leading one to happiness is virtue. But, says Kant, an analytic connection between these two conceptions is not possible, since they are wholly different in kind. Consequently there can be between them only a synthetic unity, and this unity more closely scanned is seen to be a causal one, so that the one element is cause, and the other effect. Such a relation must be regarded as its highest good by the practical reason, whose thesis must therefore be : virtue and happiness must be bound together in a correspondent degree as cause and effect. But this thesis is contradicted by the actual fact. Neither of the two is the direct cause of the other. Neither is the striving after happiness a moving spring to virtue, nor is virtue the efficient cause of happiness. Hence the antithesis : virtue and happiness do not necessarily correspond, and are not universally connected as cause and effect. The critical solution of this antinomy Kant finds in the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world. In the world of sense, virtue and happiness do not, it is true, correspond ; but the reason as *noumenon* is also a citizen of a supersen-

sible world, where the counter-strife between virtue and happiness has no place. In this supersensible world virtue is always adequate to happiness, and when man passes over into this he may look for the actualization of the highest good. But the highest good has, as already remarked, two elements, (1) highest virtue, (2) highest happiness. The necessary realization of the first of these elements postulates the *immortality of the soul*, and the second, the *existence of God*.

(a) To the highest good belongs in the first place perfect virtue or holiness. But no creature of sense can be holy: reason limited by sense can only approximate to holiness as an ideal in an endless progression. But such an endless progress is only possible in an endless continuance of personal existence. If, therefore, the highest good is ever to be actualized, the immortality of the soul must be presupposed.

(b) To the highest good belongs, in the second place, perfect happiness. Happiness is that condition of a rational creature in the world, in which every thing goes according to his desire and will. This can only occur when all nature is in accord with his purposes. But this is not the case; as acting beings we are not causes of nature, and there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for connecting morality and happiness. Notwithstanding this, we *ought* to endeavor to secure the highest good. It must therefore be possible. There is thus postulated the necessary connection of these two elements, *i.e.*, the existence of a cause of nature distinct from nature, and which contains the ground of this connection. There must be a being as the common cause of the natural and moral world, a being who knows our characters, an intelligence, who, according to this intelligence imparts to us happiness. Such a being is God.

Thus from the practical reason there issue the ideas of immortality and of God, as we have already seen to be the case with the idea of freedom. The reality of the idea of freedom is derived from the possibility of a moral law; that of the idea

of immortality is borrowed from the possibility of a perfect virtue ; that of the idea of a God follows from the necessary demand for a perfect happiness. These three ideas, therefore, which the speculative reason has treated as problems that could not be solved, gain a firm basis in the province of the practical reason. Still they are not even now theoretical dogmas, but as Kant calls them practical postulates, necessary premises of moral action. My theoretical knowledge is not enlarged by them : I only know now that there are objects corresponding to these ideas, but of these objects I can know no more. Of God, for instance, we possess and know no more than this very conception ; and if we should attempt to establish the theory of the supersensible grounded upon such categories, this would be to make theology like a magic lantern, with its phantasmagorical representations. Yet has the practical reason acquired for us a certainty respecting the objective reality of these ideas, which the theoretical reason had been obliged to leave undecided, and in this respect the practical reason has the primacy. This relative position of the two faculties of knowledge is wisely adapted to the nature and destiny of men. Since the ideas of God and immortality are theoretically obscure to us, they do not defile our moral motives by fear and hope, but leave us free space to act through reverence for the moral law.

Thus far Kant's Critique of the practical Reason. In connection with this we may here mention his views of religion as they appear in his treatise upon "*Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason*." The fundamental idea of this treatise is the reduction of religion to morality. Between morality and religion there may be the twofold relation, that either morality is founded upon religion, or else religion upon morality. If the first relation were real, it would give us fear and hope as principles of moral action ; but this cannot be ; there remains, therefore, only the second. Morality leads necessarily to religion, because the highest good is a necessary ideal of the reason, and this can only be realized through

a God; but in no way may religion first incite us to virtue, for the idea of God may never become a moral motive. Religion, according to Kant, is the recognition of all our duties as divine commands. It is revealed religion when I must first know that something is a divine command, in order to know that it is my duty: it is natural religion when I must first know that something is my duty, in order to know that it is a divine command. The Church is an ethical community, which has for its end the fulfilment and the most perfect exhibition of moral commands, — a union of those who with united energies purpose to resist evil and advance morality. The Church, in so far as it is no object of a possible experience, is called the invisible Church, which, as such, is merely the idea of the union of all the righteous under the divine moral government of the world. The visible Church, on the other hand, is that which represents the kingdom of God upon earth, so far as this can be attained through men. The requisites, and hence also the characteristics of the true visible Church (which are divided according to the table of the categories since this Church is given in experience) are the following: (a) In respect of *quantity* the Church must be total or *universal*; and though it may be divided in accidental opinions, yet must it be instituted upon such principles as will necessarily lead to a universal union in one single church. (b) The *quality* of the true visible Church is *purity*, as a union under no other than moral motives, since it is at the same time purified from the stupidity of superstition and the madness of fanaticism. (c) The *relation* of the members of the Church to each other rests upon the principle of freedom. The Church is, therefore, a *free state*, neither a hierarchy nor a democracy, but a voluntary, universal, and enduring spiritual union. (d) In respect of *modality* the Church demands that its constitution should be unchangeable. The laws themselves may not change, though one may reserve to himself the privilege of changing some accidental arrangements which relate simply to the administration. — That

alone which can establish a universal Church is the moral faith of the reason, for this alone can be shared by the convictions of every man. But, because of the peculiar weakness of human nature, we can never reckon enough on this pure faith to build a Church on it alone, for men are not easily convinced that the striving after virtue and an irreproachable life is every thing which God demands: they always suppose that they must offer to God a special service prescribed by tradition, which only amounts to this — that he is served.

To establish a Church, we must therefore have a statutory faith historically grounded upon facts. This is the so-called faith of the Church. In every Church there are therefore two elements — the purely moral, or the faith of reason, and the historico-statutory, or the faith of the Church. It depends now upon the relation of these two elements whether a Church shall have any worth or not. The statutory element should ever be only the vehicle of the moral element. Just so soon as this element becomes in itself an independent end, claiming an independent validity, will the Church become corrupt and irrational, and whenever the Church passes over to the pure faith of reason, it approximates to the kingdom of God. Upon this principle we may distinguish the true from the spurious service of the kingdom of God, religion from priestcraft. A dogma has worth alone in so far as it has a moral content. The apostle Paul himself would scarcely have given credit to the dicta of the creed of the Church without this moral faith. From the doctrine of the Trinity, *e.g.*, taken literally, nothing actually practical can be derived. Whether we have to reverence in the Godhead three persons or ten makes no difference, if in both cases we have the same rules for our conduct of life. The Bible also, with its interpretation, must be considered in a moral point of view. The records of revelation must be interpreted in a sense which will harmonize with the universal rules of the religion of reason. Reason is in religious things the highest interpreter of the Bible. This interpretation in reference to some texts may

seem forced, yet it must be preferred to any such literal interpretation as would contain nothing for morality, or perhaps go against every moral feeling. That such a moral signification may always be found without ever entirely repudiating the literal sense, results from the fact that the foundation for an ethical religion lay originally in the human reason. We need only to divest the representations of the Bible of their mythical dress (an attempt which Kant has himself made, by an ethical interpretation of some of the weightiest doctrines), in order to attain for them a rational meaning which shall be universally valid. The historical element of the sacred books is in itself of no account. The maturer the reason becomes, the more it can hold fast for itself the moral sense, so much the more unnecessary will be the statutory institutions of the faith of the Church. The transition from the creed of the Church to the pure faith of reason is the approximation to the kingdom of God, to which, however, we can only approach nearer and nearer in an infinite progress. The actual realization of the kingdom of God is the end of the world, the termination of history.

III. CRITIQUE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. — The conception of this science Kant gives in the following manner. The two faculties of the human mind hitherto considered were the faculty of knowledge and that of desire. It was proved in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that the understanding alone of the faculties of the mind possesses *a priori* constitutive principles of knowledge; while the fact that in reference to the faculty of desire the reason alone possesses *a priori* constitutive principles of action is shown in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Whether now the *faculty of judgment*, as the link between understanding and reason, can take its object — the feeling of pleasure and pain as the mean between cognition and desire — and furnish it *a priori* with principles which shall be constitutive and not simply regulative, is the problem with which the *Critique of Judgment* occupies itself.

The faculty of judgment is by virtue of its peculiar function, the mean between the understanding as the faculty of conceptions, and the reason as the faculty of principles. The speculative reason has taught us to consider the world as wholly subject to natural laws; the practical reason had inferred for us a moral world, in which every thing is determined through freedom. There was thus a gulf between the kingdom of nature and that of freedom, which could not be passed unless the faculty of judgment should furnish a conception which should unite the two sides. That it is entitled to do this lies in the very conception of the faculty of judgment. Since it is the faculty of conceiving the particular as contained under the universal, it thus refers the empirical manifoldness of nature to a supersensible, transcendental principle, which embraces in itself the ground for the unity of the manifold. The object of the faculty of judgment is, therefore, the conception of *design* in nature; for design is nothing but the supersensuous unity which contains the ground for the actuality of an object. And since all design and every actualization of an end is connected with pleasure, we may farther explain the faculty of judgment by saying, that it contains the laws for the feeling of pleasure and pain.

Conformity to design in nature can be represented either subjectively or objectively. In the first case I perceive pleasure and pain, immediately through the representation of an object, before I have formed a conception of it; my delight, in this instance, can only be referred to a designed harmony of relation between the form of an object, and my faculty of beholding. The faculty of judgment viewed thus subjectively, is called the *æsthetic faculty*. In the second case, I form for myself at the outset a conception of the object, and then judge whether the form of the object corresponds to this conception. In order to find a flower that is beautiful to my sense of vision, I do not need to have a conception of the flower; but, if I would see design in the

flower, then a conception is necessary. The faculty of judgment, viewed as capacity to judge of objective design, is called the *teleological faculty*.

1. CRITIQUE OF THE ÆSTHETIC FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.

(1) *Analytic*. — The analytic of the æsthetic faculty of judgment is divided into two parts, the analytic of the *beautiful*, and the analytic of the *sublime*.

In order to discover what is required in order to judge an object to be beautiful, we must analyze the judgments of taste, as the faculty for deciding upon the beautiful. (a) In respect of quality, the beautiful is the object of a pure, uninterested satisfaction. This disinterestedness enables us to distinguish between the satisfaction in the beautiful, and the satisfaction in the agreeable and the good. In the agreeable and the good I am interested; my satisfaction in the agreeable is connected with a sensation of desire; my satisfaction in the good is, at the same-time, a motive for my will to actualize it. My satisfaction in the beautiful alone is without interest. (b) In respect of quantity, the beautiful is that which universally satisfies. In respect of the agreeable, every one decides that his satisfaction in it is only a personal one; but when any one affirms of a picture, that it is beautiful, he expects that not only he, but every one else, will also find it so. Nevertheless, these judgments of taste do not arise from conceptions; their universal validity is therefore purely subjective. I do not judge that all the objects of a species are beautiful, but only that a certain specific object will appear beautiful to every beholder. All the judgments of taste are individual judgments. (c) In respect of relation, that is beautiful in which we find the form of design, without representing to ourselves any specific end designed. (d) In respect of modality, that is beautiful which is recognized without a conception, as the object of a necessary satisfaction. Of every representation, it is at least possible, that it may awaken pleasure. The representation of the agreeable actually awakens pleasure. The representation of

the beautiful, on the other hand, awakens pleasure necessarily. The necessity which is conceived in an æsthetic judgment, is a necessity for the agreement of all in a judgment, which can be viewed as an example of a universal rule, though the rule itself cannot be stated. The subjective principle which lies at the basis of the judgment of taste, is therefore a common sense, which determines what is pleasing, and what displeasing, only through feeling, and not through thought.

The *sublime* is that which is absolutely, or beyond all comparison, great, compared with which every thing else is small. But now in nature there is nothing than which there is not something greater. The absolutely great is only the infinite, and the infinite is only to be met with in ourselves, as idea. The sublime, therefore, is not properly found in nature, but is only carried over to nature from our own minds. We call that sublime in nature which awakens within us the idea of the infinite. As in the beautiful there is prominent reference to quality, so, in the sublime, the most important element of all is quantity; and this quantity is either magnitude of extension (the mathematically sublime), or magnitude of power (the dynamically sublime). In the sublime there is a greater satisfaction in the formless than in form. The sublime excites a vigorous movement of the heart, and awakens pleasure only through pain, *i.e.* through the feeling that the energies of life are for the moment restrained. The satisfaction in the sublime is hence not so much a positive pleasure, but rather an amazement and awe, which may be called a negative pleasure. The elements for an æsthetic judgment of the sublime are the same as in the feeling of the beautiful. (a) In respect of quantity, that is sublime which is absolutely great, in comparison with which every thing else is small. The æsthetic estimate of greatness does not lie, however, in enumeration, but in the simple intuition of the subject. The magnitude of an object, which the imagination attempts in vain to comprehend, implies a supersensible substratum,

which is great beyond all the measures of the sense, and to which the feeling of the sublime is properly related. It is not the object itself, as for example the surging sea, which is sublime, but rather the emotion in the mind of him who contemplates it. (b) In respect of quality, the sublime does not awaken pure pleasure, like the beautiful, but first pain, and through this, pleasure. The feeling of the insufficiency of our imagination, in the æsthetic estimate of magnitude, gives rise to pain; but, on the other side, the consciousness of our independent reason in its superiority to the imagination, awakens pleasure. In this respect, therefore, that is sublime which immediately pleases us, through its opposition to the interest of the sense. (c) In respect of relation, the sublime causes nature to appear as a power, indeed, but as one in reference to which we have the consciousness of superiority. (d) In respect of modality, the judgments concerning the sublime are as necessarily valid, as those in reference to the beautiful; only with this difference, that our judgment of the sublime finds an entrance to some minds, with greater difficulty than our judgment of the beautiful, since in order to perceive the sublime, culture, and developed moral ideas, are necessary.

(2) *Dialectic*.—A dialectic of the æsthetic faculty of judgment, like every dialectic, is only possible where we can meet with judgments which lay claim to universality *a priori*. For dialectic consists in the opposition of such judgments. The antinomy of the principles of taste rests upon the two opposite elements of the judgment of taste, viz., that it is purely subjective, and at the same time, lays claim to universal validity. Hence, the two commonplace sayings: “there is no disputing about taste,” and “there is a contest of tastes.” From these we have the following antinomy. (a) Thesis: the judgment of taste cannot be grounded on conception, else might we dispute it. (b) Antithesis: the judgment of taste must be grounded on conception, else, notwithstanding its diversity, there could be no contest respecting it.—This

antinomy, says Kant, is, however, only an apparent one, and disappears as soon as the two propositions are more accurately apprehended. The thesis should be: the judgment of taste is not grounded upon a definite conception, and is not strictly demonstrable; the antithesis should be: this judgment is grounded upon a conception, though an indefinite one, viz., upon the conception of a supersensible substratum for the phenomenal. Thus apprehended, there is no longer any contradiction between the two propositions.

In the conclusion of the investigation of the æsthetic faculty of judgment, we can now answer the question, whether the adaptation of things to our faculty of judgment (their beauty and sublimity), lies in the things themselves, or in us? Æsthetic realism claims that the supreme cause of nature designed to produce things which should affect our imagination, as beautiful and sublime; and the organic forms of nature strongly support this view. But on the other hand, nature exhibits even in her merely mechanical forms, such a tendency to the beautiful, that we might believe that she could produce also the most beautiful organic forms through mechanism alone; and that thus the design would lie not in nature, but in our mode of apprehension. This is the standpoint of idealism, upon which it becomes explicable how we can decide *a priori* in reference to beauty and sublimity. But the highest view of the æsthetical, is its use as a symbol of moral good. Thus Kant makes the theory of taste, like religion, to be a corollary of ethics.

2. CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. — In the foregoing, we have considered the subjective æsthetic conformity to design in natural objects. But natural objects stand to one another also in the relation of adaptation. This objective conformity to design is the object of the teleological faculty of judgment.

(1) *Analytic of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment.* — The analytic has to determine the kinds of objective adaptation. Objective, material conformity to design, is of two

kinds, external and internal. External conformity to design is only relative, since it simply indicates a usefulness of one thing for another. Sand, for instance, which borders the sea shore, is of use in bearing pine forests. In order that animals can live upon the earth, the earth must produce nourishment for them, etc. These examples of external design show that here the design never belongs to the means in itself, but only accidentally. We should never get a conception of the sand by saying that it is a means for pine forests ; it is conceivable for itself, without any reference to the conception of design. The earth does not produce nourishment, because it is necessary that men should dwell upon it. In brief, this external or relative conformity to design may be conceived as resulting from the mechanism of nature alone. Not so the inner adaptations, which show themselves prominently in the organic products of nature. In an organism, every one of its parts is end, and every one, means or instrument. In the process of generation, the natural product produces itself as species, in growth it appears as individual, and in the process of complete formation, every part of the individual develops itself. This natural organization cannot be explained from mechanical causes, but only through final causes, or teleologically.

(2) *Dialectic*. — The dialectic of the teleological faculty of judgment, has to adjust this opposition between this mechanism of nature and teleology. On the one side we have the thesis : the production of all material things, according to simple mechanical laws must be judged possible. On the other side we have the antithesis : certain products of material nature cannot be judged as possible, according to simple mechanical laws, but demand the conception of design for their explanation. If these two maxims are posited as constitutive (objective) principles for the possibility of the objects themselves, then do they contradict each other, but as simply regulative (subjective) principles for the investigation of nature, they are not contradictory. Earlier systems treated the con-

ception of design in nature dogmatically, and either affirmed or denied its essential existence in nature. But we, convinced that teleology is only a regulative principle, have nothing to do with the question whether an inner design belongs essentially to nature or not, but we only affirm that our faculty of judgment must look upon nature as designed. We envisage the conception of design in nature, but leave it wholly undecided whether to another understanding, which does not think discursively like ours, nature may not be understood, without any necessity for introducing this conception of design. Our understanding thinks discursively : it proceeds from the parts, and comprehends the whole as the product of its parts ; it cannot, therefore, conceive the organic products of nature, in which the whole is the ground and the prius of the parts, except from the point of view of the conception of design. If there were, on the other hand, an intuitive understanding, which could know the particular and the parts as co-determined in the universal and the whole ; such an understanding might conceive the whole of nature under one principle, and would not need the conception of design.

If Kant had thoroughly carried out this conception of an intuitive understanding as well as the conception of an immanent design in nature, he would have overcome, in principle, the standpoint of subjective idealism, which he made numerous attempts, in his critique of the faculty of judgment, to break through ; but these ideas he only propounded, and left them to be positively carried out by his successors.

SECTION XXXIX.

TRANSITION TO THE POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE Kantian philosophy soon gained in Germany an almost undisputed rule. The imposing boldness of its standpoint, the novelty of its results, the applicability of its principles, the moral severity of its view of the world, and above all, the spirit of freedom and moral autonomy which appeared in it, and which was so directly opposed to the efforts of that age, gained for it an assent as enthusiastic as it was extended. It aroused among the cultivated classes a wider interest and participation in philosophic pursuits, than had ever appeared in an equal degree among any people. In a short time it had drawn to itself a very numerous school: there were soon few German universities in which it had not had its talented representatives, while in every department of science and literature, especially in theology (it is the parent of theological rationalism), and in natural rights, as also in belles-lettres (*Schiller*), it began to exert its influence. Yet most of the writers who appeared in the Kantian school, confined themselves to an exposition or popular application of the doctrine as Kant had stated it, and even the most talented and independent among the defenders and improvers of the critical philosophy (*e.g.*, *Reinhold*, 1758–1813; *Schulze*, *Beck*, *Fries*, *Krug*, *Bouterweck*), only attempted to give a firmer basis to the Kantian philosophy as they had received it, to obviate some of its wants and deficiencies, and to carry out the standpoint of transcendental idealism more purely and consistently. Among those who carried out the Kantian philosophy, only two men, *Fichte* and *Herbart*, can be named, who made by their actual advance an epoch in philosophy; and among its opposers (*e.g.*, *Hamann*, *Herder*), only one, *Jacobi*, is of philosophic importance. These

three philosophers must therefore be first considered. In order to a more accurate development of their principles, we preface a brief and general characterization of their relation to the Kantian philosophy.

1. Dogmatism had been critically annihilated by Kant; his Critique of pure Reason had for its result the theoretical indemonstrableness of the three ideas of the reason, God, freedom, and immortality. True, these ideas which, from the standpoint of theoretical knowledge, had been thrust out, Kant had introduced again as postulates of the practical reason; but as postulates, as only practical premises, they possess no theoretic certainty, and remain exposed to doubt. In order to do away with this uncertainty, and this despairing of knowledge which had seemed to be the end of the Kantian philosophy, *Jacobi*, a younger cotemporary of Kant, placed himself upon the standpoint of philosophical faith in opposition to the standpoint of criticism. These highest ideas of the reason, the eternal and the divine, cannot indeed be reached and proved by means of demonstration; but it is the very nature of the divine to be indemonstrable and unattainable for the understanding. For attaining with certainty the highest, that which lies beyond the understanding, there is only one organ, viz., feeling. In feeling, therefore, in immediate knowledge, in faith, *Jacobi* thought he had found that certainty which Kant had sought in vain on the basis of discursive thinking.

2. While *Jacobi* stood in an antithetic relation to the Kantian philosophy, *Fichte* appears as its immediate consequence. The Kantian dualism, according to which the Ego, as theoretic, is subjected to the external world, while as practical, it is its master, or, in other words, according to which the Ego stands related to the objective world, now receptively and again spontaneously, *Fichte* removed by emphasizing the primacy of the practical reason. He allowed the reason to be exclusively practical, as will alone, and spontaneity alone, and apprehended its theoretical and respective relation to the

objective world as only a circumscribed activity, as a limitation prescribed to itself by the reason. But for the reason, so far as it is practical, there is nothing objective except what itself produces. The will knows no *being* but only an *ought*. Hence the objective being of truth is universally denied, and the thing-in-itself which is essentially unknown must fall away of itself as an empty shadow. "All that is, is the Ego," is the principle of the Fichtian system, and represents at the same time subjective idealism in its consequence and completion.

3. While the subjective idealism of Fichte was carried out in the objective idealism of Schelling, and the absolute idealism of Hegel, there arose coterminously with these systems a third offshoot of the Kantian criticism, viz., the philosophy of *Herbart*. Its relation to the Kantian philosophy was rather that of subjective origination than of objective historical connection. It has no relation to historic continuity, and holds an isolated position in the history of philosophy. Its general basis is Kantian, in so far as it takes for its problem a critical investigation of the subjective experience. We place it between Fichte and Schelling.

SECTION XL.

JACOBI.

FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI was born at Düsseldorf in 1743. His father destined him for a merchant. After he had studied in Geneva and become interested in philosophy, he entered his father's mercantile establishment; but afterwards abandoned this business, having been made chancellor of the exchequer and customs commissioner for Jülich and Berg, and also privy councillor at Düsseldorf. In this city,

or at his neighboring estate of Pempelfort, he spent a great part of his life devoted to philosophy and his friends. In the year 1804 he was called to the newly-formed Academy of Sciences in Munich. In 1807 he was chosen president of this institution, a post which he filled till his death in 1819. Jacobi had a rich intellect and an amiable character. Besides being a philosopher, he was also a poet and man of the world; and hence we find in his philosophizing an absence of strict logical arrangement and precise expression of thought. His writings are no systematic whole, but are occasional treatises written "rhapsodically and in grasshopper gait," for the most part in the form of letters, dialogues, and romances. "It was never my purpose," he says himself, "to set up a system for the schools. My writings have sprung from my innermost life, and were only historically consecutive. In a certain sense I did not make them voluntarily, but they were produced under the influence of a higher and by me irresistible power." This want of an inner principle of classification and of a systematic arrangement, renders a development of Jacobi's philosophy not easy. It may best be represented under the following three points of view: 1. Jacobi's polemic against mediate knowledge. 2. His principle of immediate knowledge. 3. His relation to the cotemporaneous philosophy, especially to the Kantian criticism.

1. Spinoza was the negative starting-point of Jacobi's philosophizing. In his work "*On the Doctrine of Spinoza, in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn*" (1785), he directed public attention again to the almost wholly forgotten philosophy of Spinoza. The correspondence originated thus: Jacobi made the discovery that Lessing was a Spinozist, and announces this to Mendelssohn. The latter will not believe it, and thence grew the farther historical and philosophical examination. The positive philosophic views which Jacobi expounds in this treatise can be reduced to the following three principles: (1) Spinozism is fatalism and atheism. (2) Every method of philosophic demonstration leads to fatalism and

atheism. (3) In order that we may not fall into these, we must set a limit to demonstration, and recognize faith as the element of all human knowledge.

(1) Spinozism is atheism, because, according to it, the cause of the world is not a person — is not a being working for an end, and endowed with reason and will — and hence is no God. It is fatalism, for, according to it, the human will regards itself only falsely as free.

(2) This atheism and fatalism is, however, only the necessary consequence of all strictly demonstrative philosophizing. To conceive a thing, says Jacobi, is to refer it to its proximate cause; it is to find a possible for an actual, the condition for a conditioned, the mediation for an immediate. We conceive only that which we can explain from another. Hence our conceiving moves in a chain of conditioned conditions, and this connection forms the mechanism of nature, in whose investigation our understanding has its immeasurable field. However far we may carry conception and demonstration, we must hold, in reference to every object, to a still higher one which conditions it; where this chain of the conditioned ceases, there do conception and demonstration also cease; unless we give up demonstrating we can reach no infinite. If philosophy determines to apprehend the infinite with the finite understanding, then must it cause the divine to become finite; and here is where every preceding philosophy has been entangled; and yet it is obviously absurd to attempt to discover the conditions of the unconditioned; and make the absolutely necessary a possible, in order that we may be able to construe it. A God who could be proved is no God, for the ground of proof is ever above that which is to be proved; the latter derives its whole reality from the former. If the existence of God should be proved, then God would be derived from a ground which were before and above him. Hence the paradox of Jacobi; it is for the interest of science that there be no God, no supernatural and no extra or supra-mundane being. Only upon the condition that nature alone

is, and is therefore independent and all in all, can science hope to gain its goal of perfection, and become, like its object itself, all in all. Hence the result which Jacobi derives from the "Drama of the history of philosophy" is this: "There is no other philosophy than that of Spinoza. He who considers all the works and acts of men to be the effect of natural mechanism, and who believes that intelligence is but an accompanying consciousness, which has only to act the part of a looker-on, cannot be contended with and cannot be helped; he must be let alone. No philosophical conclusion can reach him, for what he denies cannot be philosophically proved, and what he proves cannot be philosophically denied." Whence then is help to come? "The understanding, taken by itself, is materialistic and irrational; it denies spirit and God. The reason taken by itself is idealistic, and has nothing to do with the understanding; it denies nature and makes itself God."

(3) Hence we must seek another way of knowing the supersensible, which is faith. Jacobi calls this flight from cognition through conception to faith, the *salto mortale* of the human reason. Every certainty through a conception demands another certainty, but in faith we are led to an immediate certainty which needs no ground nor proof, and which is in fact absolutely exclusive of all proof. Such a confidence which does not arise from arguments, is called faith. We know the sensible as well as the supersensible only through faith. All human knowledge springs from revelation and faith.

These principles which Jacobi brought out in his letters concerning Spinoza, did not fail to arouse a universal opposition in the German philosophical world. It was charged upon him that he was an enemy of reason, a preacher of blind faith, a despiser of science and of philosophy, a fanatic and a papist. To rebut these attacks, and to justify his standpoint, he wrote in 1787, a year and a half after the first appearance of the work already named, his dialogue entitled

“*David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism*,” in which he develops more extensively and definitely his principle of faith or immediate knowledge.

2. Jacobi distinguished his faith at the outset from a blind belief in authority. A blind faith is one which supports itself on the authority of another, instead of on the grounds of reason. But this is not the case with his faith, which rather rests upon the inner necessity felt by the subject itself. Still farther: his faith is not arbitrary imagination: we can imagine to ourselves every possible thing, but in order to regard a thing as actual, there must be an inexplicable necessity of our feeling, for which we have no other name than faith. Jacobi was not consistent in his terminology, and hence did not always express himself alike in respect of the relation in which this faith stood to the different sides of the human faculty of knowledge. In his earlier terminology he placed faith (or as he also called it, the faculty of faith), on the side of the sense or the receptivity as opposed to the understanding and the reason, taking these two terms as equivalent expressions for the finite and mediate knowledge of previous philosophy; afterwards he followed Kant, and, distinguishing between the reason and the understanding, he called that reason which he had previously named sense and faith. According to him now, the faith or intuition of the reason is the organ for perceiving the supersensible. As such, it stands opposed to the understanding. There must be a higher faculty which can learn, in a way inconceivable to sense and the understanding, that which is true in and above phenomena. Over against the explaining understanding stands the reason, or the natural faith of the reason, which does not explain, but positively reveals and unconditionally decides. As there is an intuition of the sense, so is there a rational intuition through the reason, and a demonstration has no more validity in respect of the latter than in respect of the former. Jacobi justifies his use of the term, intuition of the reason, from the want of any other suitable

designation. Language has no other expression to indicate the way in which that, which is unattainable to the sense, becomes apprehended in the transcendental feeling. If any one affirms that he knows any thing, he may properly be required to state the origin of his knowledge, and in doing this, he must of necessity go back either to sensation or to feeling; the latter stands above the former as high as the human species above the brute. So I affirm, then, without hesitation, says Jacobi, that my philosophy starts from pure objective feeling, and declares the authority of this to be supreme. The faculty of feeling is the highest in man, and that alone which specifically distinguishes him from the brute. This faculty is identical with reason; or, reason may be said to find in it its single and only starting-point.

Jacobi had the clearest consciousness of the opposition in which he stood, with this principle of immediate knowledge, to previous philosophy. In his introduction to his complete works, he says: "There had arisen since the time of Aristotle an increasing effort in philosophical schools, to subject immediate knowledge to mediate, to make that faculty of perception which is the original ground of every thing, dependent on the faculty of reflection, which is conditioned through abstraction; to subordinate the archetype to the copy, the essence to the word, the reason to the understanding, and, in fact, to make the former wholly disappear in the latter. Nothing is allowed to be true which is not capable of a double demonstration, in the intuition and in the conception, in the thing and in its image or word; the thing itself, it is said, must truly lie and actually be known only in the word." But every philosophy which admits only the reflecting reason, must lose itself at length in an utter ignorance. Its end is nihilism.

3. From what has been already said, the attitude of Jacobi's principle of faith, toward the Kantian philosophy, can, partly at least, be seen. Jacobi had explained himself in reference to this philosophy, partly in the above-named dia-

logue "*David Hume*," (especially in an appendix to this, in which he discussed the transcendental Idealism), and partly in his essay "*On the Attempt of Criticism to bring the Reason to the Understanding*" (1801). His relation to it may be reduced to the following three general points :

(1) Jacobi does not agree with Kant's theory of sensuous knowledge. In opposition to this theory he defends the standpoint of empiricism, affirms the truthfulness of the sense-perception, and denies the apriority of space and time, for which Kant contends in order to prove that objects as well as their relations are simply determinations of our own self, and do not at all exist externally to us. For, however much it may be affirmed that there is something corresponding to our notions as their cause, yet does it remain concealed what this something is. According to Kant, the laws of our beholding and thinking are without objective validity, our knowledge has no objective significance. But it is wrong to claim that in the phenomena there is nothing revealed of the hidden truth which lies behind them. With such a claim, it were far better to give up completely the unknown thing-in-itself, and carry out to its results the consequent idealism. "Logically, Kant is at fault, when he presupposes objects which make impressions on our soul. He is bound to teach the strictest idealism."

(2) Yet Jacobi essentially agrees with Kant's critique of the understanding. Jacobi affirmed, as Kant had done, that the understanding is insufficient to know the supersensible, and that the highest ideas of the reason can be apprehended only by faith. Jacobi places Kant's great merit in having cleared away the ideas, which were simply the products of reflection and logical phantasms. "It is very easy for the understanding, when producing notions of notions from notions, and thus gradually mounting up to ideas, to imagine that, by virtue of these, which, though they carry it beyond the intuitions of the sense, are nothing but logical phantasms, it has not only the power to transcend the world of sense,

and to gain by its flight a higher science independent of intuition, a science of the supersensible, but that this transcendence is its most peculiar function. Kant discovers and destroys this error and self-deception. Thus there is gained, at least, a clear place for a *genuine* rationalism. This is Kant's truly great achievement, his immortal merit. But the sound sense of our sage did not allow him to hide from himself that this clear place must be transformed into a gulf, which would swallow up in itself all knowledge of the true, unless a God should be found to prevent it. Here Kant's doctrine and mine meet."

(3) But Jacobi does not fully agree with Kant, in wholly denying to the theoretical reason the capacity for objective knowledge. He blames Kant for complaining that the human reason cannot theoretically prove the reality of its ideas. He affirms that Kant is thus still entangled in the delusion, that the only reason why these ideas cannot be proved, is found not in the nature of the ideas themselves, but in the deficient nature of our faculties. Kant therefore attempts to seek, in the practical application of reason, a kind of scientific proof; a roundabout way, which, to every profound investigator, must seem folly, since every proof is as impossible as it is unnecessary.

Jacobi agreed better with Kant than with the post-Kantian philosophy. The pantheistic tendency of the latter was especially repulsive to him. "To Kant, that profound thinker and upright philosopher, the words God, freedom, immortality, and religion, signified the same as they have ever done to the sound human understanding; he never uses them deceptively. He caused offence by irresistibly showing the insufficiency of all proofs of speculative philosophy for these ideas. That which was wanting in the theoretical proof, he supplied by the necessary postulates of a pure practical reason. With these, according to Kant's assurance, philosophy was fully helped out of her difficulty, and the goal, which had been always missed, actually reached. But the first daughter

of the critical philosophy (Fichte's system) makes the living and working moral order itself to be God, a God expressly declared to be without consciousness and self-existence. These frank words, spoken publicly and without restraint, roused some attention, but the excitement soon subsided. Presently astonishment ceased wholly, for the second daughter of the critical philosophy (Schelling's system) gave up entirely the distinction which the first had allowed to remain between natural and moral philosophy, necessity and freedom, and without any further ado affirmed that the only existence is nature, and that there is nothing above; this second daughter is Spinozism transfigured and reversed, an ideal materialism." This latter allusion to Schelling, connected as it was with other and harder thrusts in the same essay, called out from this philosopher the well-known answer: "*Schelling's Memorial of the Treatise on Divine Things, 1812.*"

If we now take a critical survey of the philosophical standpoint of Jacobi, we shall find its peculiarity to consist in the abstract separation of understanding and feeling. These two Jacobi could not bring into harmony. "There is light in my heart," he says, "but it goes out whenever I attempt to bring it into the understanding. Which of these two is the true luminary? That of the understanding, which, though it reveals fixed forms, shows behind them only a bottomless gulf? Or that of the heart, which sends its rays promisingly upwards, though determinate knowledge escapes it? Can the human spirit grasp the truth unless it possesses these two luminaries united in one light? And is this union conceivable except through a miracle?" If now, in order to escape in a certain degree this contradiction between understanding and feeling, Jacobi gave to immediate knowledge the place of mediate (finite) knowledge, he was self-deceived. Even that knowledge, which is supposed to be immediate, and which Jacobi regards as the peculiar organ for knowing the supersensible, is also mediate, the result of a course of subjective mediations, and can only claim to be immediate when it wholly forgets its own origin.

SECTION XLI.

FICHTE.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE was born at Rammenau, in Upper Lusatia, 1762. A nobleman of Silesia became interested in the boy, and placed him first under the instruction of a clergyman, and afterwards at the high school at Schulpforte. In his eighteenth year, at Michaelmas, 1780, Fichte entered the university at Jena to study theology. He soon found himself attracted to philosophy, and became powerfully affected by the study of Spinoza. His pecuniary circumstances were straightened, but this only served to harden his will and his energy. During the year 1784, and subsequently, he was employed as a teacher in various families in Saxony. In 1787 he sought a place as country clergyman, but was refused on account of his religious opinions. He was now obliged to leave his fatherland, to which he clung with his whole soul. He repaired to Zurich, where, in 1788, he accepted a position as private tutor, and where also he became acquainted with his future wife, a niece of Klopstock. At Easter, 1790, he returned to Saxony and taught privately at Leipsic, where he became acquainted with the Kantian philosophy, by means of lessons which he was obliged to give to a student. In the spring of 1791 we find him as private tutor at Warsaw, and soon after in Königsberg, where he resorted, that he might become personally acquainted with the Kant he had learned to revere. Instead of a letter of recommendation he presented him his "*Critique of all Revelation*," a treatise which he composed in four weeks. In this he attempted to deduce, from the practical reason, the possibility of a revelation. This deduction is not purely *a priori*, but is limited by an empirical condition, viz., that humanity must be considered to be in a moral ruin so complete, that

the moral law has lost all its influence upon the will and all morality is extinguished. In such a case it might be expected that God, as moral governor of the world, would give to men, through the sense, some pure moral impulses, and reveal himself to them as lawgiver through a special manifestation determined for this end, in the world of sense. In such a case a particular revelation would be a postulate of the practical reason. Fichte sought also to determine *a priori* the possible content of such a revelation. Since we need to know nothing but God, freedom, and immortality, the revelation will contain naught but these, and these it must contain in a comprehensible form, yet so that the symbolical dress may lay no claim to unlimited veneration. This treatise, which appeared anonymously in 1792, at once attracted the greatest attention, and was at first universally regarded as a work of Kant. It procured for its author, soon after, a call to the chair of philosophy at Jena, to succeed Reinhold, who then went to Kiel. Fichte received this appointment in 1793 at Zurich, where he had gone to consummate his marriage. At the same time he wrote and published, also anonymously, his "*Aids to correct Views of the French Revolution*," an essay which the governments never looked upon with favor. At Easter, 1794, he entered upon his new office, and soon saw his public call confirmed. Taking now a new standpoint, which transcended Kant, he sought to establish it, and carry it out in a series of writings (the *Wissenschaftslehre* appeared in 1794, the *Naturrecht* in 1796, and the *Sittenlehre* in 1798), by which he exerted a powerful influence upon the scientific movement in Germany, aided as he was in this by the fact that Jena was then one of the most flourishing of the German universities, and the resort of all energetic minds. With Goethe, Schiller, the brothers Schlegel, William von Humboldt and Hufeland, Fichte was in close fellowship, though this was unfortunately broken after a few years. In 1795 he became associate editor of the "*Philosophical Journal*," which had been established by Niethammer. A fellow-laborer,

rector Forberg, of Saalfeld, offered for publication in this journal an article "on the determination of the conception of religion." Fichte advised the author not to publish it, but at length inserted it in the journal, prefacing it, however, with an introduction of his own, "*On the ground of our faith in a divine government of the world*," in which he endeavored to remove, or at least soften, the views in the article which might give offence. Both the essays raised a great cry of atheism. The elector of Saxony confiscated the journal in his territory, and sent a requisition to the Ernestine Dukes, who held in common the university of Jena, to summon the author to trial and punishment. Fichte answered the edict of confiscation and attempted to justify himself to the public (1799), by his "*Appeal to the Public. An essay which it is requested may be read before it is confiscated*"; while he defended his course to the government by an article entitled "*The Publishers of the Philosophical Journal justified from the Charge of Atheism*." The government of Weimar, being as anxious to spare him as it was to please the elector of Saxony, delayed its decision. But as Fichte, either with or without reason, had privately learned that the whole matter was to be settled by reprimanding the accused parties for their want of caution; and, desiring either a civil acquittal or an open and proper satisfaction, he wrote a private letter to a member of the government, in which he desired his dismissal in case of a reprimand, and which he closed with the intimation that many of his friends would leave the university with him, in order to establish together a new one in Germany. The government regarded this letter as an application for his discharge, indirectly declaring that the reprimand was unavoidable. Fichte, now an object of suspicion, both on account of his religious and political views, looked about him in vain for a place of refuge. The prince of Rudolstadt, to whom he turned, denied him his protection, and his arrival in Berlin (1799) attracted great notice. In Berlin, where he had much intercourse with Frederick Schlegel, and also with

Schleiermacher and Novalis, his views became gradually modified; the catastrophe at Jena had led him from the exclusive moral standpoint which he, resting upon Kant, had hitherto held, to the sphere of religion; he now sought to reconcile religion with his standpoint of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, and turned himself to a certain mysticism (the second form of the Fichtian theory). After he had privately taught a number of years in Berlin, and had also held philosophical lectures for men of culture, he was recommended (1805) by Beyme and Altenstein to the chancellor of state, Hardenberg, for a professorship of philosophy in Erlangen, an appointment which he received together with a permit to return to Berlin in the winter, and hold there his philosophical lectures before the public. Thus, in the winter of 1807-8, while a French marshal was governor of Berlin, and while his voice was often drowned by the hostile tumults of the enemy through the streets, he delivered his famous "*Addresses to the German Nation*." Fichte labored most assiduously for the foundation of the Berlin university; for only through a complete transformation of the system of education did he believe the regeneration of Germany could be secured. When the new university was opened 1809, he was made in the first year dean of the philosophical faculty, and in the second was invested with the dignity of rector. In the "war of liberation," then breaking out, Fichte took a most active part both in word and deed. His wife had contracted a nervous fever by her care of the sick and wounded, and though she recovered, he fell a victim to the same disease. He died Jan. 28, 1814, not having yet completed his fifty-second year.

In the following exposition of Fichte's philosophy, we distinguish between the two internally different periods of his philosophizing, that of Jena and that of Berlin. The first division will include two parts—Fichte's theory of knowledge and his practical philosophy.

I. THE FICTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM. 1. THE THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY OF FICHTE, HIS WISSEN-

SCHAFTSLEHRE, OR THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. — It has already been shown (Sect. XXXIX.) that the thorough-going subjective idealism of Fichte was only the logical consequence of the Kantian standpoint. It was wholly unavoidable that Fichte should entirely reject the Kantian *thing-in-itself*, which Kant had himself declared to be incognizable though real, and that he should posit as a proper act of the mind, that external influence which Kant had referred to the *thing-in-itself*. That the Ego alone is, and that what we regard as a limitation of the Ego by external objects, is rather the proper self-limitation of the Ego, — this is the grand feature of the Fichtian idealism.

Fichte himself supported the standpoint of his Theory of Knowledge as follows: In every perception there are given conjointly an Ego and a thing, the intelligence and its object. Which of these two sides must be reduced to the other? If the philosopher abstracts the Ego, he has remaining a thing-in-itself, and must then apprehend his representations or sensations as the products of this object; if he abstracts the object, he has remaining an *Ego-in-itself*. The former is the basis of dogmatism, the latter of idealism. Both are irreconcilable with each other, and there is no third possible. We must therefore choose between the two. In order to decide between the two systems, we must note the following: (1) That the Ego appears in consciousness, while on the other hand the thing-in-itself is a pure invention, since in consciousness we have only that which is perceived; (2) Dogmatism accounts for the origin of representations by assuming an *object-in-itself*; it starts from something which does not lie in the consciousness. But the effect of being is only being, and not representation. Hence idealism alone can be correct which does not start from being, but from intelligence. According to idealism, intelligence is only active, not passive, because it is a first and absolute: and on this account there belongs to it no being, but simply an activity. The forms of this activity, the system of the necessary modes of intellectual

activity must be deduced from the essential nature of intelligence. If we should take the laws of intelligence from experience, as Kant did his categories, we would err in two respects: (1) in so far as it is not shown why intelligence must so act, nor whether these laws are immanent laws of intelligence; (2) in so far as it is not shown how the object itself originates. Hence the fundamental principles of intelligence, as well as the objective world, must be derived from the Ego itself.

Fichte supposed that in these results he only expressed the true sense of the Kantian philosophy. "Whatever my system may properly be, whether the genuine criticism thoroughly carried out, *as I believe it is*, or howsoever it be named, is of no account." His system, Fichte affirms, had the same view of the matter as Kant's, while the numerous followers of this latter philosopher had wholly mistaken and misunderstood their master's idealism. In the second introduction to the *Theory of Knowledge* (1797), Fichte grants to these expounders of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that it contains some passages where Kant would affirm that sensations must be given to the subject from without as the material conditions of objective reality; but shows that the innumerably repeated declarations of the *Critique*, that there can be no discussion whatever in reference to the influence upon us of a real transcendental object outside of us, cannot at all be reconciled with these passages, if any thing other than a mere thought be understood as the ground of sensations. "So long," adds Fichte, "as Kant does not expressly declare that he derives sensations from an impression of a thing-in-itself, or, to use his terminology, that sensation must be explained from a transcendental object existing externally to us: so long will I not believe what these expounders tell us of Kant. But if he should give such an explanation, I should regard the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a work of chance rather than of design." For such an explanation the aged Kant did not suffer him long to wait. In the *Intelligenzblatt der Allgemeinen Litteraturzeitung* (1799), he formally, and

with much emphasis, rejects the Fichtian improvement of his system, and protests against every interpretation of his writings in accordance with an arbitrary theory of what he *intended* to say, and maintains the *literal* interpretation of his theory as laid down in the Critique of Reason. Reinhold remarks upon all this: "Since the well known and public explanation of Kant respecting Fichte's philosophy, there can be no longer a doubt that Kant himself would represent his own system, and desire to have it represented by his readers, entirely otherwise than Fichte has represented and interpreted it. But from this it indisputably follows, that Kant himself did not regard his system as illogical because it presupposed something external to subjectivity. Nevertheless, it does not at all follow that Fichte erred when he declared that this system, with such a presupposition, must be illogical." So much for Reinhold. That Kant himself did not fail to see this want of logical consistency, is evident from the changes he introduced into the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he suffered the idealistic side of his system to fall back decidedly behind the empirical.

From what has been said, we can see the general standpoint of the Theory of Knowledge; the Ego is made principle, and from the Ego every thing else is derived. It hardly needs to be remarked, that by this Ego we are to understand, not any individual, but the universal Ego, the universal rationality. Egohood (*Ichheit*) and the individual, the pure and the empirical Ego, are wholly different conceptions.

We have still to premise the following concerning the form of the *Theory of Knowledge*. A theory of knowledge, according to Fichte, must posit some supreme principle, from which every other must be derived. This supreme principle must be absolutely, and through itself, certain. If our human knowledge is to be coherent, a system, there must be such a supreme principle. But now, since such a principle does not admit of proof, we must determine its validity by experiment. Its test and demonstration can only be thus gained, viz., if

we find a principle to which all knowledge may be referred, then is this shown to be a fundamental principle. But besides the first fundamental principle, there are yet two others to be considered, the one of which is unconditioned as to its content, but as to its form, conditioned through and derived from the first fundamental principle; the other the reverse. Finally, these two principles are so related that though each is the opposite of the other, a third principle can be formed from their union. Hence, according to this plan and the preceding exposition, the first absolute principle starts from the Ego, the second opposes to the Ego a thing or a non-Ego, and the third brings forward the Ego again in reaction against the thing or the non-Ego. This method of Fichte (thesis, — antithesis, — synthesis) like that of Hegel, is a combination of the synthetical and analytical methods. Fichte has the merit of having brought the fundamental conceptions of philosophy into determinate connection, and deduced them from a common point, instead of taking them, as did Kant, merely empirically and placing them in juxtaposition. We start with a fundamental synthesis, from which through analysis we deduce two opposites, which are again united by another more definite synthesis. But in this second synthesis, analysis discovers still farther antitheses, which obliges us therefore to find another synthesis, and so onward in the process, till we come at length to antitheses which can no longer be perfectly but only approximately united.

We stand now upon the threshold of the *Theory of Knowledge*. It is divided into three parts. (1) General principles of a theory of knowledge. (2) Principles of theoretical knowledge. (3) Principles of practical (ethical) science.

As has already been said, there are three *supreme* fundamental principles, one absolutely unconditioned, and two relatively unconditioned.

(1) *The absolutely first and absolutely unconditioned fundamental principle* ought to express that act of the mind which lies at the basis of all consciousness, and alone makes con-

sciousness possible. Such is the principle of identity, $A = A$. This principle remains, and cannot be thought away, though every empirical determination be removed. It is a fact of consciousness, and must, therefore, be universally admitted : but at the same time it is by no means conditioned, like every other empirical fact, but unconditioned, because it is a free act. By affirming that this principle is certain without any farther ground, we ascribe to ourselves the faculty of *positing* something absolutely. We do not, therefore, affirm that A is, but only that if A is, it is. It is no matter now about the content of the principle, we need only regard its form. The principle $A = A$ is, therefore, conditioned (hypothetically) as to its content, and unconditioned only as to its form and its connection. If we would now have a principle unconditioned in its content as well as in its connection, we put Ego in the place of A , as we are fully entitled to do, since the connection of subject and predicate contained in the judgment $A = A$ is posited in the Ego, and through the Ego. Hence $A = A$ becomes transformed into $\text{Ego} = \text{Ego}$. This principle is unconditioned not only as to its connection, but also as to its content. While we could not, instead of $A = A$, say that \hat{A} is, yet we can, instead of $\text{Ego} = \text{Ego}$, say I am. All the facts of the empirical consciousness find their ground of explanation in this, viz., that before any thing else is posited in the Ego, the Ego itself is given. This fact, that the Ego is absolutely posited and grounded on itself, is the basis of all activity in the human mind, and shows the pure character of activity in itself. The Ego *is*, because it posits itself, and it is only because this simple positing of itself is wholly through itself. The being of the Ego is thus seen in the positing of the Ego, and on the other hand, the Ego is enabled to *posit* simply by virtue of its being. It is at the same time the acting, and the product of the action. I am, is the expression of the only possible original act. Logically considered we have, in the first principle of a theory of knowledge, $A = A$, the logical law of identity. From the

proposition $A = A$, we arrive at the proposition $Ego = Ego$. The latter proposition, however, does not derive its validity from the former, but contrarywise. The *prius* of all judgment is the Ego, which posits the connection of subject and predicate. The logical law of identity arises, therefore, from $Ego = Ego$. Metaphysically considered, we have in this same first principle of a theory of knowledge, the category of *reality*. We obtain this category by abstracting every thing from the content, and reflecting simply upon the mode of action of the human mind. From the Ego, as the absolute subject, every category is derived.

(2) *The second fundamental principle*, conditioned in its content, and only unconditioned in its form, which is just as incapable as the first of demonstration or derivation, is also a fact of the empirical consciousness: it is the proposition $non-A$ is not $= A$. This proposition is unconditioned in its form, because it is a free act like the first, from which it cannot be derived; but in its content, as to its matter it is conditioned, because if a $non-A$ is posited, there must have previously been posited an A . Let us examine this principle more closely. In the first principle, $A = A$, the form of the act was a positing, while in this second principle it is an opposing. There is an absolute opposition, and this opposition, in its simple form, is an act absolutely possible, standing under no condition, limited by no higher ground. But as to its matter, the opposition (antithesis) presupposes a position (thesis); the $non-A$ cannot be posited without the A . What $non-A$ is, I do not through this contraposition itself yet know: I only know concerning $non-A$ that it is the opposite of A : hence I only know what $non-A$ is under the condition that I know A . But A is posited through the Ego; there is originally nothing posited but the Ego, and nothing but this absolutely posited. Hence there can be an absolute opposition only to the Ego. That which is opposed to the Ego is the $non-Ego$. A $non-Ego$ is absolutely opposed to the Ego, and this is the second fact of the empirical consciousness.

In every thing ascribed to the Ego, the contrary, by virtue of this simple opposition, must be ascribed to the non-Ego. — As we obtained from the first principle $\text{Ego} = \text{Ego}$, the logical law of identity, so now we have, from the second proposition, $\text{Ego is not} = \text{non-Ego}$, the logical law of contradiction. And metaphysically, — if we wholly abstract the particular judgment concerned, and consider simply the form of inference from opposited being to not-being, — we obtain from this second principle the category of *negation*.

(3) *The third principle*, conditioned in its form, is almost capable of proof, since it is determined by two others. At each step we approach the province where every thing can be proved. This third principle is conditioned in its form, and unconditioned only in its content: *i.e.*, the problem, but not the solution of the act to be established through it, has been given through the two preceding principles. The solution is afforded unconditionally and absolutely by an arbitrary decision of the reason. The problem to be solved by this third principle is this, *viz.*, to adjust the contradiction contained in the other two. On the one side, the Ego is wholly suppressed by the non-Ego: there can be no positing of the Ego so far as the non-Ego is posited. On the other side, the non-Ego is only in the Ego, posited in the consciousness, and hence the Ego is not suppressed by the non-Ego: the Ego is both suppressed and not suppressed. Such a result would be $\text{non-A} = \text{A}$. In order to remove this contradiction, which threatens to destroy the identity of our consciousness, which is the only absolute foundation of our knowledge, we must find an *x* which will justify both of the first two principles, and leave the identity of our consciousness undisturbed. The two opposites, the Ego and the non-Ego, are to be united in the consciousness, are to be alike posited without either excluding the other; they are to be received in the identity of the proper consciousness. How shall being and not-being, reality and negation, be conceived together without destroying each other? They must reciprocally *limit* each other. Hence the

unknown quantity x , which we are seeking, stands for these limits: limitation is the sought-for act of the Ego; or if conceived as a category, it is the category of determination or *limitation*. But in limitation, there is also given the category of *quantity*, for when we say that any thing is limited, we mean that its reality is through negation, not *wholly*, but only *partially* suppressed.

Thus the conception of limit contains also the conception of divisibility and of quantitability in general, besides the conceptions of reality and negation. Through the act of limitation, the Ego, as well as the non-Ego, is posited as divisible. Still farther, we see how a logical law follows from the third fundamental principle as well as from the first two. If we abstract the definite content, the Ego and the non-Ego, and leave remaining the simple form of the union of opposites through the conception of divisibility, we have then the logical *principle of the ground or sufficient reason*, which may be expressed in the formula: A in part = non-A, non-A in part = A. Wherever two opposites are alike in one characteristic, we consider the ground to be a ground of relation, and wherever two similar things are opposite in one characteristic, we consider the ground to be a ground of distinction. — With these three principles we have now exhausted the measure of that which is unconditioned and absolutely certain. We can embrace the three in the following formula:

I posit in the Ego a divisible non-Ego over against the divisible Ego. No philosophy can go beyond this cognition, and every well-grounded philosophy should go back to this. Just so far as it does this, it becomes science (*Wissenschaftslehre*). Every thing which can appear in a system of knowledge, as well as a farther division of the *Theory of Knowledge* itself, must be derived from this. The proposition that the Ego and non-Ego reciprocally limit each other, may be divided into the following two: (1) the Ego posits itself as limited through the non-Ego (*i.e.*, the Ego apprehends itself as cognitive or passive); (2) the Ego posits the non-Ego as limit-

ed through the Ego (*i.e.*, the Ego apprehends itself as active). The former proposition is the basis of the theoretical, and the latter of the practical part of the *Theory of Knowledge*. The latter part cannot, at the outset, be brought upon the stage; for the non-Ego, which is to be limited by the activity of the Ego, does not at the outset exist, and we must wait and see whether it will find, in the theoretical part, a reality.

The elementary principles of theoretical knowledge are developed through an uninterrupted series of antitheses and syntheses. The fundamental synthesis of the theoretical part of the *Theory of Knowledge* is the proposition: *the Ego posits itself as determined (limited) by the non-Ego*. If we analyze this proposition, we find in it two subordinate propositions which are reciprocally opposed. (1) The non-Ego as active determines the Ego, which to this extent is passive; but since all activity must originate with the Ego, (2) the Ego determines itself through an absolute activity. Herein is a contradiction, that the Ego should be at the same time active and passive. Since this contradiction would destroy the above principle, and also suppress the unity of consciousness, we are forced to seek some point, some new synthesis, in which these given antitheses may be united. This synthesis is attained when we find that the conceptions of action and passion, which are contained under the categories of reality and negation, find their compensation and due adjustment in the conception of divisibility. The propositions: "the Ego determines," and "the Ego is determined," are reconciled in the proposition: "the Ego determines itself in part, and is determined in part." Both, however, should be considered as one and the same. Hence more accurately: as many parts of reality as the Ego posits in itself, so many parts of negation does it posit in the non-Ego; and as many parts of reality as the Ego posits in the non-Ego, so many parts of negation does it posit in itself. This determination is *reciprocal determination*, or *reciprocal action*. Thus Fichte deduces the last of the three categories under Kant's general

category of relation. In a similar way (viz., by a synthesis of previously discovered contradictories), he deduces the two other categories of this class, viz., that of cause, and that of substance. The process is as follows: So far as the Ego is determined, and therefore passive, the non-Ego has reality. The category of reciprocal determination, to which we may ascribe indifferently either of the two sides, reality or negation, may, more strictly taken, imply that the Ego is passive, and the non-Ego active. The notion which expresses this relation is that of *causality*. That to which activity is ascribed, is called *cause* (primal reality), and that to which passivity is ascribed, is called *effect*; both, conceived in connection, may be termed an *operation* or *action*. On the other side, the Ego determines itself. Herein is a contradiction; (1) the Ego *determines* itself; it is therefore that which determines, and is thus active; (2) it determines *itself*; it is therefore that which is determined, and is thus passive. Thus in one respect and in one action both reality and negation are ascribed to it. To resolve this contradiction, we must find a mode of action which is activity and passivity in one; the Ego must determine its passivity through activity, and its activity through passivity. This solution is attained by aid of the conception of quantity. In the Ego all reality is first of all posited as absolute quantum, as absolute totality, and thus far the Ego may be compared to a great circle. A definite quantum of activity, or a limited sphere within this great circle of activity, is indeed a *reality*; but when compared with the totality of activity, is it also a *negation* of the totality or passivity. Here we have found the mediation sought for; it lies in the notion of *substance*. In so far as the Ego is considered as the whole circumference, embracing the totality of all realities, is it substance; but so far as it becomes posited in a determinate sphere of this circle, is it accidental. No accident is conceivable without substance; for, in order to know that any thing is a definite reality, it must first be referred to reality in general, or to substance. In every

change we think of substance in the universal; accident is something specific (determinate), which changes with every changing cause. *There is originally but one substance, the Ego*; in this one substance all possible accidents, and therefore all possible realities, are posited. The Ego alone is the absolutely infinite. The intellectual and practical activity of the Ego implies limitation. The Fichtian theory is accordingly Spinozism, only (as Jacobi strikingly called it) a reversed and idealistic Spinozism.

Let us look back a moment. The objectivity which Kant had allowed to exist Fichte has destroyed. There is *only* the Ego. But the Ego presupposes a non-Ego, and therefore a kind of object. How the Ego comes to posit such an object, the theoretical theory of knowledge must now proceed to show.

There are two extreme views respecting the relation of the Ego to the non-Ego, according as we start from the conception of cause, or that of substance. (1) Starting from the conception of causality, we have posited through the passivity of the Ego an activity of the non-Ego. This passivity of the Ego must have some ground. This cannot lie in the Ego, which in itself posits only activity. Consequently it lies in the non-Ego. Here the distinction between action and passion is apprehended, not simply as quantitative (*i.e.*, viewing the passivity as a diminished activity), but the passion is in quality opposed to the action; a presupposed activity of the non-Ego is, therefore, a real ground of the passiveness in the Ego. (2) Starting from the conception of substance, we have posited a passivity of the Ego through its own activity. Here the passivity in respect of quality is the same as activity, it being only a diminished activity. While, therefore, according to the first view, the passive Ego has a ground distinct in quality from the Ego, and thus a real ground, yet here its ground is only a diminished activity of the Ego, distinct only in quantity from the Ego, and is thus an ideal ground. The former view is dogmatic realism,

the latter is dogmatic idealism. The latter affirms: all reality of the non-Ego is only a reality given it from the Ego; the former declares: nothing can be given, unless there be something to receive, unless an independent reality of the non-Ego, as thing-in-itself, be presupposed. Both views present thus a contradiction, which can only be removed by a new synthesis. Fichte attempted this synthesis of idealism and realism, by bringing out a mediating system of critical idealism. For this purpose he sought to show that the ideal ground and the real ground are one and the same. Neither is the simple activity of the Ego a ground for the reality of the non-Ego, nor is the simple activity of the non-Ego a ground for the passiveness in the Ego. Both must be conceived together in this way, viz., the activity of the Ego meets a *hindrance*, which is set up against it, not without some assistance of the Ego, and which circumscribes and reflects back upon itself this activity of the Ego. The hindrance consists in this, that the subjective can be no farther extended, and the expanding activity of the Ego is driven back into itself, producing as its result self-limitation. What we call objects are nothing other than the different impacts of the activity of the Ego on some incomprehensible hindrance, and these determinations of the Ego, we carry over to something external to ourselves, and represent them to ourselves as space-filling matter. That which Fichte calls a hindrance through the non-Ego, is thus in fact the same that Kant calls thing-in-itself, the only difference being that with Fichte it is made subjective. From this point Fichte then deduces the subjective activities of the Ego, which mediate, or seek to mediate, theoretically, the Ego with the non-Ego — as imagination, representation (sensation, intuition, feeling), understanding, faculty of judgment, reason, — and in connection with these the subjective projections of intuition, space and time.

We have now reached the third part of the *Theory of Knowledge*, viz., *the foundation of the practical*. We have

apprehended the Ego as a representing intelligence. But that it represents does not depend upon the Ego alone, but is determined by something external to it. We could in no way conceive of a representation, except through the presupposition that the Ego finds some hindrance to its undetermined and unlimited activity. Accordingly the Ego, as intelligence, is universally dependent upon an indefinite, and hitherto wholly indefinable non-Ego, and only through and by means of such non-Ego, is it intelligence. These limits, however, must be broken through. The Ego, according to all its determinations, should be posited absolutely through itself, and hence should be wholly independent of every possible non-Ego. But in so far as it is an intelligence it is finite, dependent. Consequently, the absolute Ego and the intelligent Ego, both of which should constitute but one, are opposed to each other. This contradiction is obviated, when we see that because the absolute Ego is capable of no passivity, but is absolute activity, therefore the Ego determines, through itself, that hitherto unknown non-Ego, to which the hindrance has been ascribed. The limits which the Ego, as theoretic, has set over against itself in the non-Ego, it must, as practical, seek to destroy, and absorb again the non-Ego into itself (or conceive it as the self-limitation of the Ego). The Kantian primacy of the practical reason is here made a truth. The transition of the theoretical part to the practical, the necessity of advancing from the one to the other, Fichte represents more precisely thus: The theoretical part of the *Theory of Knowledge* had to do with the mediation of the Ego, and the non-Ego. For this end it introduced one connecting link after another, without ever attaining its end. Then enters the reason with the absolute and decisive word: "there ought to be no non-Ego, since the non-Ego can in no way be united with the Ego;" and with this the knot is cut, though not untied. Thus it is the incongruity between the absolute (practical) Ego, and the finite (intelligent) Ego, which is carried over beyond the theoretical province into the practical.

True, this incongruity does not wholly disappear, even in the practical province, where activity is only an infinite striving to surpass the limits of the non-Ego. The Ego, so far as it is practical, has, indeed, the tendency to pass beyond the actual world, and establish an ideal world such as would exist were every reality posited by the absolute Ego; but this striving is always confined to the finite partly through itself, because it goes out towards objects, and objects are finite, and partly because the conscious self-positing of the Ego remains always confined by a non-Ego opposed to it and limiting its activity. We ought to seek to reach the infinite, but we cannot do it; this striving and inability is the impress of our destiny for eternity.

Thus — and in these words Fichte brings together the result of the *Theory of Knowledge* — the whole being of finite rational natures is comprehended and exhausted: an original idea of our absolute being; an effort to reflect upon ourselves, in accordance with this idea; a limitation, not of this striving, but of our own existence, which first becomes actual through this limitation, through an opposite principle, a non-Ego, or, in general, through our finiteness; a self-consciousness, and especially a consciousness of our practical strivings; a determination accordingly of our representations, and through these of our actions; a constant widening of our limits into the infinite.

2. FICHTE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. — The principles which Fichte had developed in his *Theory of Knowledge* he applied to practical life, especially to the theory of rights and morals. He sought to deduce here every thing with methodical rigidity, without admitting any unreasoned facts of experience. Thus, in the theory of rights and of morals, he will not presuppose a plurality of persons, but first deduces this: even that man has a body is first demonstrated, though, to be sure, not stringently.

The Theory of Rights (natural rights) Fichte founds upon the conception of the individual. First, he deduces the con-

ception of rights as follows: A finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing to itself a free activity. Through this assertion of its capacity for free activity, a rational being posits an external world of sense, for it can ascribe to itself no activity till it has posited an object towards which this activity may be directed. Still farther, this free activity of a rational being presupposes other rational beings, for without these it would never be conscious that it was free. We have therefore a plurality of free individuals, each one of whom has a sphere of free activity. This co-existence of free individuals is not possible without a relation of rights. Since through his own free determination no one passes beyond his sphere, and each one therefore limits himself, they recognize each other as rational and free. This relation of a reciprocal action through intelligence and freedom between rational beings, according to which each one has his freedom limited by the conception of the possibility of the other's freedom, under the condition also that this other limits his own freedom also through that of the first, is called a *relation of right*. The supreme maxim of a theory of rights is therefore this: limit thy freedom through the conception of the freedom of every other person with whom thou canst be connected. After Fichte has attempted the application of this conception of rights, and for this end has deduced the corporeity, the anthropological side of man, he passes over to a proper *theory of rights*. The theory of rights may be divided into three parts: (1) Rights which spring from the pure conception of personality are called *original rights*. Original right is the absolute right of a person to be only a cause in the sensuous world, *i.e.*, absolutely not an effect. In this are contained, (a) the right of personal (bodily) freedom, and (b) the right of property. But every relation of rights between individual persons is conditioned through each one's recognition of the rights of the other. Each one must limit the quantum of his free acts for the sake of the freedom of the other, and only so far as the other has respect to my freedom need I have

regard to his. In case, therefore, the other does not respect my original rights, some mechanical necessity must be sought in order to secure the rights of person, and this involves (2) the *right of coercion*. The laws of punishment have their end in securing that the opposite of that which is intended shall follow every unrighteous aim, that every vicious purpose shall be destroyed, and the right in its integrity be established. To establish such a law of coercion, and to secure a universal coercive power, the free individuals must enter into covenant among themselves. Such a covenant is only possible on the ground of a common nature. Natural right, *i.e.*, the rightful relation between man and man, presupposes thus (3) a *civil right*, viz., (a) a free covenant, a compact of citizens by which the free individuals guarantee to each other their reciprocal rights; (b) positive laws, a civil legislation, through which the common will of all becomes law; (c) an executive, a civil power which executes the common will, and in which, therefore, the private will and the common will are synthetically united. The ultimate view of Fichte's theory of rights is this: on the one side there is the state such as reason demands (philosophical theory of rights), and on the other side the state as it actually is (theory of positive rights and of the state). But now comes up the problem, to make the actual state ever more and more conformable to the rational state. The science which has this approximation for its aim, is politics. We can demand of no actual state a perfect conformity to the idea of a state. Every state constitution is according to right, if it only leaves possible an advancement to a better state, and the only constitution wholly contrary to right is that whose end is to hold every thing just as it is.

The absolute Ego of the *Theory of Knowledge* is separated in the theory of rights into an infinite number of persons endowed with rights: to bring it out again in its unity is the problem of *ethics*. Right and morals are essentially different. Right is the external necessity to omit or to do some-

thing in order not to infringe upon the freedom of another; the inner necessity to do or omit something wholly independent of external ends, constitutes the moral nature of man. And as the theory of rights arose from the conflict of the impulse of freedom in one subject with the impulse of freedom in another subject, so does the theory of morals or ethics arise from such a conflict, which, in the present case, is not external but internal, between two impulses in one and the same person. (1) The rational being is impelled towards absolute independence, and strives after freedom for the sake of freedom. This fundamental impulse may be called the pure impulse, and it furnishes the formal principle of ethics, the principle of absolute autonomy, of absolute indeterminableness through any thing external to the Ego. But (2) as the rational being is actually empirical and finite, as it by nature posits over against itself a non-Ego and posits itself as corporeal, so there is found beside the pure impulse another, the impulse of nature (instinct) which takes for its end not freedom but enjoyment. This impulse of nature furnishes the material, utilitarian (eudæmonistic) principle of striving after pleasure for the sake of pleasure. These two impulses seem to annihilate each other; but from a transcendental point of view they are one and the same primitive impulse of human nature. For even the instinct of self-preservation is an expression of the effort of the Ego after self-activity, and it cannot be repressed. If these natural instincts should be destroyed, all conscious action, all definite activity, would perish. Both impulses are, therefore, to be united in such a way that the *natural* shall be subordinated to the *pure*. This union can occur only in an act, which in content (matter) is based, as is the natural impulse, upon the sensuous world, but in its ultimate aim, like the pure impulse, endeavors to bring about a complete separation from the world of sense. The problem is neither a purely negative withdrawal from the world of objects, in order that the Ego may attain a purely independent existence, nor a struggle for

happiness ; but a positive act in the sensuous world through which the Ego shall become ever freer, and its power over the non-Ego, the supremacy of reason over nature, shall be more and more fully realized. This effort to act freely in order to become more free, is the ethical impulse, and it is formed from the union of the pure and the natural impulse. The ultimate aim of moral action, however, lies in infinitude ; it can never be attained, since the Ego can never be completely freed from all limitation, so long as it remains intelligence, self-conscious personality. The nature of a moral act is consequently to be defined thus : all action must constitute a series of acts in the prosecution of which the Ego can see itself approximating to absolute independence. Every act must be a term of this series : there are no indifferent acts. Our moral vocation is to be ever engaged in actions which belong to this series. The principle of morals is, therefore : *Always fulfil your vocation!* On its formal, subjective side it is essential to moral activity, that it should be an intelligent, free, rational activity : be free in all that you do in order to become free ! We ought to follow neither the pure nor the natural impulse, blindly. We should act only with the clear consciousness that what we do relates to our vocation or duty. We must do our duty for its own sake. The blind impulses of uncorrupted instinct, sympathy, pity, humanity, etc., do indeed, by virtue of the original identity of pure and instinctive impulse, promote the same ends as the former. But as mere natural impulses they have no ethical character. The ethical impulse possesses causality in a way which seems to indicate the lack of it, for it bids us, — *be free*. Only through free activity in accordance with the idea of absolute duty is a reasonable being absolutely independent ; only action from a sense of duty manifests pure rationality. The formal condition of the morality of our actions is : act always according to the conviction of thy duty ; or, act according to thy conscience. The absolute criterion of the correctness of our conviction of duty is a feeling of truth and certainty.

This immediate feeling never deceives, for it only exists with the perfect harmony of our empirical Ego with that which is pure and original. From this point Fichte develops his particular ethics, or theory of duties, which, however, we must here pass by.

Fichte's *theory of religion* is developed in the above-mentioned treatise: "*On the Ground of our Faith in a Divine Government of the World*," and in the writings which he subsequently put forth in its defence. The moral government of the world, says Fichte, we assume to be the Deity. This divine government becomes living and actual in us through right-doing: it is presupposed in every one of our actions which are only performed in the presupposition that the moral end is attainable in the world of sense. The faith in such an order of the world comprises the whole of faith, for this living and active moral order is God; we need no other God, and can comprehend no other. There is no ground in the reason to go outside of this moral order of the world, and by concluding from design to a designer, affirm a separate being as its cause. Is, then, this order an accidental one? It is the absolute First of all objective knowledge. But now if you should be allowed to draw the conclusion that there is a God as a separate being, what have you gained by this? This being should be distinct from you and the world; it should work in the latter according to conceptions; it should, therefore, be capable of conceptions, and possess personality and consciousness. But what do you call personality and consciousness? Certainly that which you have found in yourself, which you have learned to know in yourself, and which you have characterized by that name. But that you cannot conceive of this without limitation and finiteness, you might see by the slightest attention to the construction of this conception. By attaching, therefore, such a predicate to this being, you bring it down to a finite, and make it a being like yourself; you have not conceived God as you intended to do, but have only multiplied yourself in thought. The conception of

God, as a separate substance, is impossible and contradictory. God has essential existence only as such a moral order of the world. Every belief in a divine being, which contains any thing more than the conception of the moral order of the world, is an abomination to me, and in the highest degree unworthy of a rational being. — Religion and morality are, on this standpoint, as on that of Kant, naturally one; both are an apprehending of the supersensible, the former through action and the latter through faith. This “Religion of joyous right-doing,” Fichte farther carried out in the writings which he put forth to rebut the charge of atheism. He affirms that nothing but the principles of the new philosophy can restore the degenerate religious sense among men, and bring to light the inner essence of the Christian doctrine. He seeks to show this especially in his “appeal” to the public. In this he says: to furnish an answer to the questions, what is good? what is true? is the aim of my philosophical system. We must start with the affirmation that there is something absolutely true and good; that there is something which can hold and bind the free flight of thought. There is a voice in man which cannot be silenced, which affirms that there is a duty, and that it must be done simply for its own sake. Resting on this basis, there is opened to us an entirely new world in our being; we attain a higher existence, which is independent of all nature, and is grounded simply in ourselves. I would call this absolute self-satisfaction of the reason, this perfect freedom from all dependence, blessedness. As the single but unerring means of blessedness, my conscience points me to the fulfilment of duty. I am, therefore, impressed by the unshaken conviction, that there is a rule and fixed order, according to which the purely moral disposition necessarily produces blessedness. It is absolutely necessary, and it is the essential element in religion, that the man who would maintain the dignity of his reason, should repose on the faith in this order of a moral world, should regard each one of his duties as an enactment of this order, and joyfully submit

himself to, and find bliss in, every consequence of his duty. Thou shalt know God if thou canst only beget in thyself a dutiful character, and though to others of us thou mayest seem to be still in the world of sense, yet for thyself art thou already a partaker of eternal life.

II. THE LATER FORM OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY. — Every thing of importance which Fichte accomplished as a speculative philosopher, is contained in the *Theory of Knowledge* as above considered. Subsequently, after his departure from Jena, his system gradually became modified, and from different causes. Partly, because it was difficult to maintain the rigid idealism of the *Theory of Knowledge*; partly, because Schelling's natural philosophy, which now appeared, was not without an influence upon Fichte's thinking, though the latter denied this and became involved in a bitter controversy with Schelling; and, partly, his outward relations, which were far from being happy, contributed to modify his view of the world. Fichte's writings, in this second period, are for the most part popular, and intended for a mixed class of readers. They all bear the impress of his acute mind, and of his exalted manly character, but lack the originality and the scientific sequence of his earlier productions. Those of them which are scientific do not satisfy the demands which he himself had previously laid down with so much strictness, both for himself and others, in respect of genetic construction and philosophical method. His doctrine at this time seems rather a web of his old subjective idealistic conceptions and the newly added objective idealism, so loosely connected that Schelling might call it the completest syncretism and eclecticism. His new standpoint is chiefly distinguished from his old by his attempt to merge his subjective idealism into an objective pantheism (with many points of resemblance to Neo-Platonism), to transmute the Ego of his earlier philosophy into the absolute, or the thought of God. God, whose conception he had formerly placed only at the end of his system, in the doubtful form of a moral order of the world, be-

comes to him now the absolute beginning, and single element of his philosophy. This gives to his philosophy an entirely new color. Moral severity gives place to a religious mildness; instead of the Ego and the Ought, life and love are now the chief features of his philosophy; in place of the exact dialectic of the *Theory of Knowledge*, he now makes choice of mystical and metaphorical modes of expression.

This second period of Fichte's philosophy is especially characterized by its inclination to religion and Christianity, as exhibited most prominently in the essay "*Direction to a Blessed Life*." Fichte here affirms that his new doctrine is exactly that of Christianity, and especially of the Gospel according to John. He would make this gospel alone the clear foundation of Christian truth, since the other apostles remained half Jews after their conversion, and adhered to the fundamental error of Judaism, that the world had a creation in time. Fichte lays great weight upon the first part of John's prologue, where the formation of the world out of nothing is confuted, and a true view laid down of a revelation co-eternal with God, and necessarily given with his being. That which this prologue says of the incarnation of the Logos in the person of Jesus, has, according to Fichte, only a historic validity. The absolute and eternally true standpoint is, that at all times, and in every one, without exception, who is vitally sensible of his union with God, and who actually and in fact yields up his whole individual life to the divine life within him,—the eternal word becomes flesh in the same way as in Jesus Christ, and holds a personal, sensible, and human existence. The whole communion of believers, the first-born alike with the later born, coincides in the Godhead, the common source of life for all. And so then, Christianity having gained its end, disappears again in the eternal truth, and affirms that every man should come to a union with God. So long as man desires to be himself any thing whatsoever, God does not come to him, for no man can become God. But just as soon as he purely, wholly, and radically gives up

himself, God alone remains, and is all and in all. Man cannot make for himself a God, but he can give up himself as a proper negation, and thus he disappears in God.

The result of his advanced philosophizing, Fichte has briefly and clearly comprehended in the following lines, which we extract from two posthumous sonnets : —

The perennial One
Lives in my life and seeth in my sight.
God only *is* — and God is nought but life!
And yet thou knowest and I know with thee.
If such a thing as knowing then can be,
Must it not be a knowing of God's life?
“ Gladly to His *my* life I would resign:
But oh! how find it? If 'tis ever brought
Into my knowing, it becomes a thought,
Clad with thought's garb like other thoughts of mine.”
The obstacle, my friend, is very clear,
It is thy self. Whate'er can die, resign,
And God alone will hence breathe in thy breath.
Note well what may survive this partial death,
Then shall the hull to thee as hull appear,
And thou shalt see unveiled the life divine.*

SECTION XLII.

HERBART.

A PECULIAR, and in many respects noticeable, development of the Kantian philosophy, was attempted by *Johann Friedrich Herbart*, who was born at Oldenburg in 1776, chosen professor of philosophy in Göttingen in 1805; made Kant's successor at Königsberg in 1808, and recalled to Göttingen

* From the translation of A. E. Krøger. The lines here given include the last two lines of the second, and the whole of the third, of Fichte's sonnets. — B. E. S.

in 1833, where he died in 1841. His philosophy, instead of taking, like most other systems, for its principle, an idea of the reason, followed the direction of Kant, and expended itself mainly in a critical examination of subjective experience. It is essentially a criticism, but with results which are peculiar, and which differ wholly from those of Kant. Its position in the history of philosophy is from the very nature of its fundamental principle an isolated one; instead of regarding antecedent systems as elements of a true philosophy, it looks upon almost all of them as failures. It is especially hostile to the Post-Kantian German philosophy, and most of all to Schelling's philosophy of nature, in which it could only behold a phantasm and a delusion; sooner than come in contact with this, it would join Hegelianism, of which it is the opposite pole. We will give a brief exposition of its prominent thoughts.

1. *The Basis and Starting-point of Philosophy* is, according to Herbart, the common view of things, or a knowledge which accords with experience. A philosophical system is in reality nothing but an attempt by which some one thinker strives to solve certain questions which present themselves to him. Every question in philosophy should relate singly and solely to that which is given, and must arise from this source alone, because there is for man no original field of certainty, other than experience. Every philosophy should begin with it. Thought should yield itself to experience, which should lead it, and not be led by it. Experience, therefore, is the only object and basis of philosophy; that which is not given cannot be an object of thought, and it is impossible to establish any knowledge which transcends the limits of experience.

2. Though the material furnished by experience is the basis of philosophy, yet, since it is furnished (given ready-formed) it stands outside of philosophy. The question arises, what is the first act or beginning of philosophy? Thought should first separate itself from experience, that it may clearly see the difficulties of its undertaking. *The beginning of phi-*

losophy, where thought rises above that which is given, is accordingly doubt or *scepticism*. Scepticism is twofold, a lower and a higher. The lower scepticism simply doubts that things are so constituted as they appear to us to be; the higher scepticism passes beyond the form of the phenomenon, and inquires whether in reality any thing there exists. It doubts, *e.g.*, the succession in time; it asks in reference to the forms of the objects of nature which exhibit design, whether the design is perceived, or only attached to them in thought, etc. Thus the problems which form the content of metaphysic, are gradually brought out. The result of scepticism is therefore not negative, but positive. Doubt is nothing but the thinking of those conceptions of experience which are the material of philosophy. Through this reflection, scepticism leads us to the knowledge that these conceptions of experience, though they refer to something given, yet contain no content that is conceivable, *i.e.*, free from logical incongruities.

3. *Remodelling of the conceptions of experience.*—Metaphysic, according to Herbart, is the science of that which is intelligible in experience. Our view thus far has been a twofold one. On the one side we hold fast to the opinion that the sole basis of philosophy is experience, and on the other side scepticism has shaken the credibility of experience. The point now is to transform this scepticism into a definite knowledge of metaphysical problems. Conceptions from experience crowd upon us, which are incogitable, *i.e.*, they may indeed be thought by the ordinary understanding, but this thinking is obscure and confused, and does not separate nor compare opposing characteristics. But acute thought, logical analysis, will find in the conceptions of experience (*e.g.*, space, time, becoming, motion, etc.), contradictions, totally inconsistent characteristics. What now is to be done? We may not reject these conceptions, for they are given, and beyond the given we cannot step; we cannot retain them, for they are inconceivable and cannot logically be established.

The only way of escape which remains to us is to remodel them. *To remodel the conceptions of experience*, to eliminate their contradictions, is the proper act of speculation. Scepticism has brought to light the more definite problems which involve a contradiction, and whose solution it therefore belongs to metaphysics to attempt; the most important of these are the problems of inherence, change, and the Ego.

The relation between Herbart and Hegel is very clear at this point. Both are agreed respecting the contradictory nature of the determinations of thought, and the conceptions of experience. But from this point they diverge. It is the nature of these conceptions as of every thing, says Hegel, to be an inner contradiction; becoming, for instance, is essentially the unity of being, and not being, etc. This is impossible, says Herbart, on the other hand, so long as the principle of contradiction is valid; if the conceptions of experience contain inner contradictions, this is not the fault of the objective world, but of the representing subject who must rectify his false apprehension by remodelling these conceptions, and eliminating the contradiction. Herbart thus charges the philosophy of Hegel with empiricism, because it receives from experience these contradictory conceptions unchanged, and not only regards these as established, but even goes so far as to metamorphose logic on their account, and this simply because they are given in experience, though their contradictory nature is clearly seen. Hegel and Herbart stand related to each other as Heraclitus and Parmenides (*cf.* Sects. VI. and VII.).

4. From this point Herbart attains his "reals" as follows: The discovery of contradictions, he says, in all our conceptions of experience, might lead us to absolute scepticism, and to despair of the truth. But here we remember that if the existence of every thing real be denied, then phenomena, sensation, representation, and thought itself would be destroyed. We may, therefore, assume that the indications of reality increase with the increase of appearance. We cannot, indeed,

ascribe to the given any true and essential being *per se*; it is not *per se* alone, but only on, or in, or through something other. *True being* is an absolute being, which as such excludes all relativity and dependence; it is *absolute position*, which it is not for us first to posit, but only to recognize. In so far as this being is attributed to any thing, this latter possesses reality. True being is, therefore, ever a *quale*, a something which is considered as being. In order now that this posited may correspond to the conditions which lie in the conception of absolute position, the *what* of the real must be thought (a) as absolutely positive or affirmative, *i.e.*, without any negation or limitation, which might destroy its absoluteness; (b) as absolutely simple, *i.e.*, in no way, as a multiplicity or admitting of inner antitheses; (c) as undetermined by any conceptions of magnitude, *i.e.*, not as a quantum which may be divided and extended in time and space; hence, also, not as a continuous magnitude or continuity. But we must never forget that this being or this absolute reality is not simply something thought, but is something independent and resting on itself, and hence it is simply to be recognized by thought. The conception of this being lies at the basis of all Herbart's metaphysic. Take an example of this. The first problem to be solved in metaphysics is the problem of inherence, or the thing with its qualities. Every perceptible thing presents itself to the senses as a complex of several characteristics. But all the attributes of a thing which are given in perception are relative. We say, *e.g.*, that sound is a property of a certain body. It sounds — but it cannot do this without air; what now becomes of this property in a space without air? Again, we say that a body is heavy, but it is so only on the earth. Or again, that a body is colored, but light is necessary for this; what now becomes of such a property in darkness? Still farther, a multiplicity of properties is incompatible with the unity of an object. If you ask *what* is this thing, you are answered with the sum of its characteristics; it is soft, white, full-sounding, heavy, — but your question was of

one, not of many. The answer only affirms what the thing has, not what it is. Moreover, the list of characteristics is always incomplete. The what of a thing can therefore lie neither in the individual given properties, nor in their unity. In determining what a thing is, we have only this answer remaining, viz., the thing is that unknown, which we must posit before we can posit any thing as lying in the given properties ; in a word, it is the substance. For if, in order to see what the thing purely and essentially is, we take away the characteristics which it may have, we find that nothing more remains, and we perceive that what we considered as the real thing was only a complex of characteristics, and the union of these in one whole. But since every appearance indicates a definite reality, and since there must be as much reality as there is appearance, we have to consider the reality, which lies at the basis of the thing with its qualities, as a complex of many simple substances or monads, and whose quality is different in different instances. When our experience has led us to a repeated grouping together of these monads, we call the group a thing. Let us now briefly look at that modification of the fundamental conceptions of metaphysic which is involved in this fundamental conception of reality. First, there is the conception of causality, which cannot be maintained in its ordinary form. All that we can perceive in the act is succession in time, and not the necessary connection of cause with effect. The cause itself can be neither transcendent nor immanent ; it cannot be transcendent, because a real influence of one real thing upon another, contradicts the conception of absolute reality ; nor immanent, for then the substance must be thought as one with its qualities, which contradicts the results of the investigation concerning a thing with its qualities. We can just as little find in the conception of the real an answer to the question, how one determinate being can be brought into contact with another, for the real is the absolute unchangeable. We can therefore only explain the conception of causality on the ground that the different

reals which lie at the basis of the characteristics are conceived, each one for itself, as cause of the phenomenon, there being just as many causes as there are phenomena. The problem of change is intimately connected with the conception of cause. Since, however, according to Herbart, there is no inner change, no self-determination, no becoming and no life; since the monads are, and remain in themselves unchangeable, they do not *become* different in respect of quality, but they *are* originally different one from another, and each one exhibits its quality without ever any change. The problem of change can thus only be solved through the theory of the disturbances and self-preservations of these essences. But if that which we call not simply an apparent but an actual event, in the essence of the monads, may be reduced to a "self-preservation," as the last gleam of activity and life, still we have the question ever remaining, how to explain the appearance of change. For this it is necessary to bring in two auxiliary conceptions; first, that of accidental views, and second, that of intellectual spaces. The accidental views, an expression taken from mathematics, signify, in reference to the problem before us this much, viz., one and the same conception may often be considered in very different relations to different essences without the slightest change in its own nature, *e.g.*, a straight line may be considered as radius or as tangent, and a tone as harmonious or discordant. By help of these accidental views, we may now regard that which actually results in the monad, when other monads, opposite in quality, come in contact with it, as on the one side an actual occurrence, though on the other side, no actual change can be imputed to the original condition of the monads (a gray color, *e.g.*, seems comparatively white by the side of black, and comparatively black by the side of white, without changing at all its quality). A further auxiliary conception is that of intellectual space, which arises when we must consider these essences together as well as not together. By means of this conception we can eliminate the contradic-

tions from the conception of movement. Lastly, it can be seen that the conception of matter and that of the Ego (in psychologically explaining which, the rest of the metaphysic is occupied) are, like the preceding ones, no less contradictory in themselves than they are irreconcilable with the fundamental conception of the real; for neither can an extended being, like matter, be formed out of spaceless monads, — and with matter, therefore, fall also the ordinary (apparent) conceptions of space and time, — nor can we admit, without transformation, the conception of the Ego, since it exhibits the contradictory conception of a thing with many and changing qualities (conditions, powers, faculties, &c.).

We are reminded by Herbart's "*reals*" of the theory of the atomists (*cf.* Sect. IX. 2), of the Eleatic theory of being (*cf.* Sect. VI.), and of Leibnitz's monadology. His *reals* however are distinguished from the atoms by not possessing impenetrability. The monads of Herbart may be just as well conceived in the same space as a mathematical point may be conceived as co-existing with another in the same place. In this respect the "*real*" of Herbart has a far greater similarity to the "*one*" of the Eleatics. Both are simple, and to be conceived in intellectual spaces, but the essential difference is, that Herbart's substances are not only numerically distinct but are even opposed in quality. Herbart's simple quantities have already been compared to the monads of Leibnitz; but these latter have essentially a power of representation; they are beings with inner states, while, according to Herbart, representation belongs to the real itself just as little as every other state.

5. *The Philosophy of Nature and Psychology* are connected with metaphysic. In the first he shows how the most important phenomena of nature, attraction, repulsion, chemical affinity, etc., are explicable through his metaphysic, and through it alone. The second treats of the soul, but first of all of the Ego. The Ego is primarily a metaphysical problem, since it involves contradictions. It is also a psychological problem,

since its origination is to be explained. We must, therefore, first consider those contradictions which are involved in the identity of subject and object. The subject posits itself and is therefore itself object. But this posited object is nothing other than the positing subject. Thus the Ego is, as Fichte says, subject-object, and, as such, full of the hardest contradictions, for subject and object can never be affirmed as one and the same without contradiction. But now since the Ego is given it cannot be rejected, but must be purified from its contradictions. This occurs whenever the Ego is conceived as that which represents, and the different sensations, thoughts, &c., are embraced under the common conception of changing appearance. The solution of this problem is similar to that of inherence. As in the latter problem the thing was apprehended as a complex of as many reals as it has qualities, just so here the Ego; but with the Ego, inner states and representations correspond to its qualities. Thus that which we are accustomed to name Ego is nothing other than the soul. The soul as a monad, as absolutely being, is therefore simple, eternal, indissoluble, from which we may conclude its eternal existence. From this standpoint Herbart combats the ordinary course of psychology which ascribes certain powers and faculties to the soul. That which occurs in the soul is nothing other than self-preservation, which can only be manifold and changing in opposition to other reals. The causes of its changing states are therefore these other reals, which come variously in conflict with the soul-monad, and thus produce that apparently infinite manifoldness of sensations, representations, and affections. This theory of self-preservation lies at the basis of all Herbart's psychology. That which psychology ordinarily calls feeling, thinking, representing, &c., are only specific differences in the self-preservation of the soul; they indicate no proper condition of the inner reality itself, but only relations between the reals, relations, which, coming up together at the same time from different sides, are partly suppressed, partly in-

tensified, and partly modified. Consciousness is the sum of those relations in which the soul stands to other essences. But the relations to objects, and hence to the representations corresponding to these, are not all equally definite; one suppresses, restricts, and obscures another until a relation of equilibrium results which can be calculated according to the laws of statics. But the suppressed representations do not wholly disappear, but waiting on the threshold of consciousness for the favourable moment when they shall be permitted again to arise, they join themselves with kindred representations, and press forward with united energies. This movement of the representations (sketched in a masterly manner by Herbart) may be calculated according to the rules of mathematics, and this is Herbart's well-known application of mathematics to empirical psychology. The representations which were pressed back, which wait on the threshold of consciousness and only work in the darkness, and of which we are only half conscious, are feelings. They express themselves as desires, according as their struggle outward is more or less successful. Desire becomes will when united with the hope of success. The will is no separate faculty of the mind but consists only in the relation of the dominant representations to the others. The strength of decision and the character of a man depend upon the constant presence in the consciousness of a certain number of representations, while other representations are weakened, or denied an entrance over the threshold of consciousness.

6. *The Importance of Herbart's Philosophy.* — Herbart's philosophy is important mainly for its metaphysic and psychology. In the other spheres and activities of the human mind, *e.g.*, rights, morality, the state, art, religion, his philosophy is mostly barren of results, and though there are not wanting here striking observations, yet these have no connection with the speculative principles of the system. Herbart carefully isolates the different philosophical sciences, distinguishing especially and in the strictest manner between theo-

retical and practical philosophy. He charges the effort after unity in philosophy, with occasioning the greatest errors; for logical, metaphysical, and æsthetic forms are entirely diverse. Ethics and æsthetics have to do with objects in which an immediate evidence appears, but this is foreign to the whole nature of metaphysic, which can only gain its knowledge by the removal of errors. Æsthetic judgments on which practical philosophy rests, are independent of the reality of any object, and appear with immediate certainty in the midst of the strongest metaphysical doubts. The elements of morals, says Herbart, are pleasing and displeasing relations of the will. He thus grounds the whole practical philosophy upon æsthetic judgments. The æsthetic judgment is an involuntary and immediate judgment, which attaches to certain objects, without proof, the predicates of goodness and badness.—In this lies the greatest difference between Herbart and Kant.

We may characterize, on the whole, the philosophy of Herbart as a development of the monadology of Leibnitz, full of enduring acuteness, but without any inner fruitfulness or capacity of development.

SECTION XLIII.

SCHELLING.

SCHELLING sprang from *Fichte*. We may pass on to an exposition of his philosophy without any farther introduction, since that which it derives from *Fichte* forms a part of its historical development, and will therefore be treated of as this latter is unfolded.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling was born at Leonberg, in Würtemberg, Jan. 27, 1775. With a very precocious

development, he entered the theological seminary at Tübingen in his sixteenth year, and devoted himself partly to philology and mythology, but especially to Kant's philosophy. During his course as a student, he was in personal connection with Hölderlin and Hegel. Schelling came before the world as an author very early. In 1792 appeared his graduating thesis on the third chapter of Genesis, in which he gave an interesting philosophical significance to the Mosaic account of the Fall. In the following year, 1793, he published in Paulus' *Memorabilia* an essay of a kindred nature "*On the Myths and Philosophemes of the Ancient World.*" To the last year of his abode at Tübingen belong the two philosophical writings: "*On the Possibility of a Form for Philosophy as such,*" and "*On the Ego as a Principle of Philosophy, or on the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge.*" After completing his university studies, Schelling went to Leipsic as tutor to the Baron von Riedesel, but soon afterwards repaired to Jena, where he became the pupil and collaborer of Fichte. After Fichte's departure from Jena, he became himself, 1798, teacher of philosophy there, and now began, removing himself from Fichte's standpoint, to develop more and more his own peculiar views. He published in Jena the *Journal of Speculative Physics*, and also in company with Hegel, *The Critical Journal of Philosophy*. In the year 1803 he went to Würzburg as professor *ordinarius* of philosophy. In 1807 he repaired to Munich as member *ordinarius* of the newly-established academy of sciences there. The year after he became general secretary of the Academy of the Plastic Arts, and subsequently, when the university professorship was established at Munich, he became its incumbent. After the death of Jacobi, he was chosen president of the Munich Academy. In 1841 he removed to Berlin, where he sometimes held lectures particularly on the "*Philosophy of Mythology*" and on "*Revelation.*" During the last ten years of his life Schelling published nothing of importance. The publication of his complete works was begun soon after

his death (which occurred at Ragaz on the 20th of August, 1854) and completed in 1861. Ten volumes comprise his earlier writings, and four others, his later prelections. Schelling's philosophy is no completed system of which his separate works are the constituent elements; but, like Plato's, it has a historical development, a course of formative steps which the philosopher passed through in his own speculation. Instead of systematically elaborating the separate sciences from the standpoint of his fundamental principle, Schelling went back repeatedly to the beginning, seeking ever for new foundations and new standpoints, connecting these for the most part (like Plato) with some antecedent philosophemes (Fichte, Spinoza, Neo-Platonism, Leibnitz, Jacob Boehme, Gnosticism), which one after another he attempted to interweave with his system. We must modify accordingly our exposition of Schelling's Philosophy, and take up its different periods, in accordance with the succession of the different groups of his writings.

1. FIRST PERIOD. SCHELLING'S DERIVATION FROM FICHTE.

Schelling's starting-point was Fichte, whom he openly followed in his earliest writings. In his essay, "*On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy*," he shows the necessity of that supreme principle which Fichte had first propounded. In his essay, "*On the Ego*," Schelling shows that the ultimate ground of our knowledge can lie only in the Ego, and hence that every true philosophy must be idealism. If our knowledge is to possess reality, there must be one point in which ideality and reality, thought and being, can identically coincide; and if outside of our knowledge there were something higher which conditioned it, if itself were not the highest, then it could not be absolute. Fichte regarded this essay as a commentary on his *Theory of Knowledge*; yet it contains already indications of Schelling's subsequent standpoint, in its express affirmation of the unity of all knowledge, the necessity that in the end all the different sciences shall become merged into one. In the "*Letters on Dogmatism and Criti-*

cism" (1795), Schelling combated the notions of those Kantians who had left the critical and idealistic standpoint of their master, and fallen back again into the old dogmatism. It was also on the standpoint of Fichte that Schelling published in Niethammer's and Fichte's Journal (1797-98), a series of articles, in which he reviewed the philosophical literature of the day. Here he begins to turn his attention towards a philosophical deduction of nature, though in this he was still wholly Fichtian, since he attempted to deduce nature from the essence of the Ego. In the essay which was composed soon after, and entitled "*Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*," 1797, and the one "*On the World-soul*," 1798, he gradually unfolded more clearly his views. The chief points which are brought out in the three last-named essays are the following: The origin of the conception of matter lies in the nature of human intuition. Mind is the union of an unlimited and a limiting energy. If there were no limit to the mind, consciousness would be just as impossible as it would be if the mind were totally and absolutely limited. Feeling, perception, and knowledge are conceivable only on the supposition that the energy which strives for the unlimited becomes limited through an opposing force, and that this latter becomes itself freed from its limitations. Mind consists *actualiter* only in the antagonism of these two energies, and hence only in their ever approximate or relative unity. Just so is it in nature. The absolute *prius* is not matter, as such, but the forces of which it is the unity. Matter is only to be apprehended as the continual product of attraction and repulsion; it is not, therefore, a mere inert mass, as we are apt to represent it, but it is essentially force. But force in the material is as it were immaterial. Force in nature may be compared with mind. Since now mind exhibits precisely the same conflict of opposite forces as does matter, we must unite the two in a higher identity. But the organ of the mind for apprehending nature is the intuition which takes, as object of the external sense, the space which has been filled and limited by

the attracting and repelling forces. Thus Schelling was led to the conclusion that *the same absolute* appears in nature as in mind, and that the harmony of these is something more than a thought in reference to them. "Or if you affirm that we only *carry over* such an idea to nature, then have you utterly failed to apprehend what, for us, nature is and should be. For our view of nature is not that it accidentally coincides with the laws of our mind, — (perhaps through the mediation of a third), — but that it necessarily and originally not only expresses, but itself realizes, the laws of our mind, and that it is nature, and is called such only in so far as it does this." "Nature should be visible mind, and mind invisible nature. Here, therefore, in the absolute identity of the mind *within* us, and nature *without* us, must the problem: how it is possible for a nature outside of us to be, find its solution. This thought, that nature or matter is just as much the actual unity of an attracting and a repelling force, as mind is the unity of an unlimited and a limiting tendency, and that the repelling force in matter corresponds to the positive or unlimited activity of the mind, while the attracting force corresponds to the mind's negative or limiting activity, — this idealistic deduction of matter from the essence of the Ego, is the dominant thought in all that Schelling wrote upon the philosophy of nature during this period. Nature thus appears as the counterpart of mind, which mind itself produces, in order to return, by means of it, to pure self-intuition, to self-consciousness. Hence we have the successive stages of nature, in which all the stations of the mind in its way to self-consciousness are externally established. It is especially in the organic world that the mind can behold its own self-production. Hence, in every thing organic there is something symbolical, every plant bears some feature of the soul. The chief characteristics of organic growth, — the self-forming process from within outwards, the conformity to some end, the variety of interpenetration of form and matter, — are equally characteristic of the mind. Since now there exists

in our mind an endless striving to organize itself, so there must also be manifested in the external world a universal tendency to organization. The whole universe may thus be called a kind of organization which has developed itself from a centre, rising ever from a lower to a higher stage. From this point of view, it must be the chief effort of the philosophy of nature to unify that life of nature which physical science has broken up into an innumerable variety of forces. Many have needlessly troubled themselves, to show how very different is the working of heat and electricity, for every one knows this who has ever seen or heard of the two. But the mind strives after unity in the system of its knowledge; it will not endure that there should be pressed upon it a separate principle for every single phenomenon, and it will only believe that it sees nature where it can discover the greatest simplicity of laws in the greatest multiplicity of phenomena, and the highest frugality of means in the highest prodigality of effects. Therefore, every thought, even that which is now rough and crude, merits attention so soon as it tends towards the simplifying of principles, and if it serves no other end, it at least strengthens the impulse to investigate and trace out the hidden process of nature." The special tendency of the scientific investigation of nature which prevailed at that time, was to make a duality of forces the predominant element in the life of nature. In mechanics, the Kantian theory of the opposition of attraction and repulsion was adopted; in chemistry, by apprehending electricity as positive and negative, its phenomena were brought near those of magnetism; in physiology there was the opposition of irritability and sensibility, etc. In opposition to these dualities, Schelling now insisted upon the unity of all opposites, the unity of all dualities; and this not simply as an abstract unity, but as a concrete identity, as the harmonious coöperation of the heterogeneous. The world is the actual unity of a positive and a negative principle, "and these two conflicting forces taken together, or represented in their conflict, lead to the

idea of an organizing principle which makes of the world a system, in other words, to the idea of a world-soul."

In his above-cited essay on "*the world-soul*," Schelling makes a great advance toward apprehending nature as entirely autonomic. In the world-soul nature has a peculiar principle which dwells within it, and works intelligently. In this way the objective world, the independent life of nature, was recognized in a manner which the logical idealism of Fichte would not permit. Schelling proceeded still farther in this direction, and distinguished definitely, as the two sides of philosophy, the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy. By placing a philosophy of nature by the side of idealism, Schelling passed decidedly beyond the standpoint of the *Theory of Knowledge*, and we thus enter a second stadium of his philosophizing, though his method still remained that of Fichte, and he continued to believe that he was speculating in the spirit of the *Theory of Knowledge*.

II. SECOND PERIOD. STANDPOINT OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND OF MIND.

This standpoint of Schelling is chiefly developed in the following works: "*First Draft of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*," 1799; an introduction to this, 1799; articles in the "*Journal of Speculative Physics*," 1800, 1801; "*System of Transcendental Idealism*," 1800. Schelling distinguishes the two sides of philosophy as follows: All knowledge rests upon the agreement of a subject with an object. That which is simply objective is nature, and that which is simply subjective is the Ego or intelligence. There are two possible ways of uniting these two sides: we may either make nature first, and inquire how it is that intelligence is associated with it, *i.e.*, we may attempt to resolve it into pure determinations of thought (philosophy of nature); or we may make the subject first, and inquire how objects proceed from the subject (transcendental philosophy). The end of all philosophy must be to make either an intelligence out of nature, or a nature out of intelligence. As transcendental philosophy has to

subordinate the real to the ideal, so must the philosophy of nature attempt to explain the ideal from the real. Both, however, are only the two poles of one and the same knowledge which reciprocally attract each other; hence, if we start from either pole, we are necessarily drawn towards the other.

1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. — To philosophize concerning nature is, in a certain sense, to create nature, — to raise it from the dead mechanism in which it had seemed confined, to inspire it with freedom, and enable it to realize its own free development. And what, then, is matter, other than mind which has become extinct? According to this view, since nature is only the visible organism of our understanding, it can produce nothing but what is conformable to law and design. But you radically destroy every idea of nature just so soon as you allow its design to have come to it from without, from the understanding of some being external to it. The complete exhibition of the immanence of the intellectual world in the laws and forms of the phenomenal world, and, on the other hand, the complete comprehension of these laws and forms by means of the intellectual world, and therefore the exhibition of the identity of nature with the ideal world, is the work of the philosophy of nature. Immediate experience is indeed its starting-point; we know originally nothing except through experience; but just as soon as I gain an insight into the inner necessity of a principle of experience, it becomes a principle *a priori*. The philosophy of nature is empiricism extended until it becomes absolute.

Schelling expresses himself as follows, concerning the fundamental principles of a philosophy of nature. Nature is as it were an oscillation between productivity and product, which is always passing over into definite forms and products, just as it is always productively passing beyond these. This oscillation indicates a duality of principles, through which nature is held in a constant activity, and hindered from exhausting itself in its products. A universal duality is thus the principle of every explanation of nature; it is the first

principle of a philosophic theory of nature, to reduce all nature to polarity and dualism. On the other hand, the object of all our contemplation of nature is to know that absolute unity which comprehends the whole, but which suffers only one side of itself to be known in nature. Nature is, as it were, the instrument through which this absolute unity externally executes and actualizes that which is prefigured in the absolute understanding. The whole absolute is therefore cognizable in nature, though phenomenal nature only exhibits in a succession, and produces in an endless development, that which the true or real nature eternally possesses. Schelling treats of the philosophy of nature, in three divisions: (1) the proof that nature, in its original products, is *organic*; (2) the conditions of an *inorganic* nature; (3) the *reciprocal determination* of organic and inorganic nature.

(1) *Organic nature* Schelling deduces thus: Nature absolutely apprehended is nothing other than infinite activity, infinite productivity. If this were unhindered in the manifestation of itself, it would at once, with infinite celerity, produce an absolute product, which would afford no explanation of empirical nature. If this latter is to be explained — if there are to be finite products, we must consider the productive activity of nature as restrained by an opposite, a retarding activity, which lies in nature itself. Thus arises a series of finite products. But since the absolute productivity of nature tends towards an absolute product, these individual products are only phenomenal ones, beyond each one of which nature herself advances, in order to satisfy the absoluteness of her inner productivity through an infinite series of individual products. In this eternal producing of finite products, nature shows itself as a living antagonism of two opposite forces, a productive and a retarding tendency. And, indeed, the operation of this latter is infinitely manifold; the original productive impulse of nature has not only to combat a simple restraint, but it must struggle with an infinity of reactions, which may be called original quali-

ties. Hence every organic being is the permanent expression of a conflict of reciprocally destroying and limiting actions of nature. And from this, viz., from the original limitation and infinite restraint of the formative impulse of nature, we see the reason why every organism, instead of attaining to an absolute product, only reproduces itself *ad infinitum*. Upon this rests the special significance for the organic world, of the distinction of sex. The distinction of sex fixes the organic products of nature, it restrains them within their own processes of development, and suffers them only to produce their like. But in this production nature has no regard for the individual, but only for the species. The individual is contrary to nature; nature desires the absolute, and its constant effort is to exhibit this. Individual products, therefore, in which the activity of nature is arrested, can only be regarded as abortive attempts to represent the absolute. Hence the individual must be the means, and the species the end of nature. Just so soon as the species is secured, nature abandons the individuals and labors for their destruction. Schelling divides the dynamic gradation of organic nature according to the three grand functions of an organism: (a) Formative impulse (reproductive energy); (b) Irritability; (c) Sensibility. Highest in rank are those organisms in which sensibility has the preponderance over irritability; next are those in which irritability preponderates; and lastly, those in which reproduction first comes out in its entire perfection, while sensibility and irritability are almost extinct. Yet these three powers are interwoven together in all nature, and hence there is but one organization, descending through all nature from man to the plant.

(2) *Inorganic nature* is the antithesis to organic. The existence and essence of inorganic nature are conditioned through the existence and essence of organic nature. While the forces of organic nature are productive, those of inorganic nature are not productive. While organic nature aims only to establish the species, inorganic nature regards only the

individual, and offers no reproduction of the species through the individual. It consists in a great multitude of materials, which have no other connection than that of externality and juxtaposition. In a word, inorganic nature is simply a mass held together by some external cause as gravity. Yet it, like organic nature, has its gradations. The power of reproduction in the latter has its counterpart in the chemical processes of the former (*e.g.*, combustion); that which in the one case is irritability, in the other is electricity; and sensibility, which is the highest stage of organic life, corresponds to magnetism, the highest stage of the inorganic.

(3) *The reciprocal determination of the organic and inorganic world* is made clear by what has already been said. The result to which every genuine philosophy of nature must come, is that the distinction between organic and inorganic nature is only in nature as object, and that nature, as originally productive, transcends both. If the functions of an organism are only possible on the condition that a definite external world and an organic world exist, then must the external world and the organic world have a common origin. This can be explained only on the ground that inorganic nature presupposes in order to its existence a higher dynamical order of things, to which it is subject. There must be a third, which can reunite organic and inorganic nature; which can be a medium, maintaining the continuity of the two. Both must be identified in some ultimate cause, through which, as through one common soul of nature (world-soul), both the organic and inorganic, *i.e.*, universal nature, is animated; in some common principle, which, fluctuating between inorganic and organic nature, and maintaining the continuity of the two, contains the first cause of all changes in the one, and the ultimate ground of all activity in the other. We have here the idea of a universal organism. That it is one and the same organization which unites in one the organic and inorganic world would appear from what has already been said of the parallel gradations of the two worlds.

That which in universal nature is the cause of magnetism, is in organic nature the cause of sensibility, and the latter is only a higher potency of the former. Just as in the organic world through sensibility, so in universal nature through magnetism, there arises a duality from identity. In this way organic nature appears only as a higher stage of the inorganic; the very same dualism which is seen in magnetic polarity, electrical phenomena, and chemical differences, displays itself also in the organic world.

2. **TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.** — Transcendental philosophy is the philosophy of nature become subjective. The entire series of successive stages which have been described as exhibited in the object, is now repeated as a successive development of the beholding subject. It is the peculiarity of transcendental idealism, as we are told in the preface, that so soon as it is once admitted, it requires that the origin of all knowledge shall be sought for anew; that what has long been considered as established truth should be subjected to a new examination; and if it undergoes this examination successfully, it must at least appear under a new character and form. All parts of philosophy must be exhibited in one continuity, and the whole of philosophy must be regarded as the advancing history of consciousness, which can use only as memorial or document that which is laid down in experience. The exhibition of this connection is properly a succession of intuitions through which the Ego raises itself to consciousness in the highest potency. Neither transcendental philosophy nor the philosophy of nature can alone represent the parallelism between nature and intelligence; but, in order to this, both sciences must be united, the one being considered as a necessary counterpart to the other. The subdivision of transcendental philosophy follows from its problem, to seek anew the origin of all knowledge, and to subject to a new examination every prejudgment and every thing which had been held to be established truth. The prejudgments of the common understanding are principally two: (1) That a world

of objects exists independent of, and outside of, ourselves, which are presented to us just as they are. To explain this prejudgment, is the problem of the first part of the transcendental philosophy (*theoretical philosophy*). (2) That we can produce an effect upon the objective world in accordance with representations which arise freely within us. The solution of this problem is *practical philosophy*. But, with these two problems we find ourselves entangled, (3) in a contradiction. How is it possible that our thought should ever rule over the world of sense, if representation is conditioned in its origin by the objective? And conversely: how is harmony between our intellect and external things possible, if things are to be determined according to conceptions? The solution of this problem, which is the highest of transcendental philosophy, is the answer to the question: How can representations be conceived as directing themselves according to objects, and at the same time objects be conceived as directing themselves according to representations? This is only conceivable on the ground that the activity through which the objective world is produced, is originally identical with that which manifests itself in the will, hence only on the ground that the same activity which in volition is consciously productive, is unconsciously productive in the production of the external world. To show this identity of conscious and unconscious activity, is the problem of the third part of transcendental philosophy, or the science of design in nature and of art. The three parts of the transcendental philosophy correspond thus entirely to the three critiques of Kant.

(1) *Theoretical philosophy* starts from the highest principle of knowledge, the self-consciousness, and from this point develops the history of self-consciousness, according to its most prominent epochs and stages, viz., sensation, intuition, productive intuition (which produces matter), — outer and inner intuition (from which space and time, and all Kant's categories may be derived), abstraction (by which the intelligence distinguishes itself from its products), — absolute

abstraction, or absolute act of will. With the act of the will there is spread before us, —

(2) *The Field of Practical Philosophy.* — In practical philosophy the Ego is no longer intuitive, *i.e.*, unconscious, but is consciously productive, *i.e.*, realizing. As from the original act of self-consciousness nature in its entirety develops itself, so from the second act, or the act of free self-determination, there is produced a second nature, to deduce which is the object of practical philosophy. In his exposition of practical philosophy, Schelling follows almost wholly the theory of Fichte, but closes this section with some remarkable expressions respecting the philosophy of history, which show an advance beyond Fichte's position. The moral order of the world is not enough to secure to the free action of intelligence its legitimate results. For the moral order is itself the product of many acting subjects, and cannot exist if these subjects act contrary to the moral law. Nothing so subjective as the moral order of the world, nor yet the mere conformity to law in objective nature, can secure to free activity its adequate results, and effect that out of the completely lawless play of the freedom of individuals there should, in the end, arise for all free beings an objective, rational, and harmonious result. A principle superior at once to both subject and object must be the invisible root of that harmony between the two which is necessary for action. This superior principle is the Absolute, which is neither subject nor object, but the common root and uniting identity of the two. The free action of rational beings as it displays itself in that harmony of subjective and objective being which is eternally realized through the absolute, is history. History, therefore, is nothing but the continual realization of the harmony of the subjective and objective which is ever becoming more and more complete; the gradual revelation and manifestation of the absolute. In this revelation there are three periods. The first is that in which the governing power manifests itself as fate, as blind force, subduing freedom, and coldly and uncon-

sciously destroying whatever is greatest and noblest. This is the tragic period of history, a period of splendor, but also of the disappearance of the wonders of the old world with its empires and of the noblest humanity that ever flourished. The second period is that in which this blind force discloses itself as nature, and the obscure law of necessity is transformed into a clear law of nature which compels freedom and unrestrained caprice to subserve a plan of universal culture, leading in the end to the unity of nations and a universal state. This period appears to begin with the extension of the great Roman republic. The third period is that in which what in the earlier periods appeared as fate and nature develops itself as providence, and even the dominion of "fate" and "nature" is represented as providence in its first incomplete manifestation. When this period will begin we cannot say. But when this period is, God is.

(3) *Philosophy of Art.* — The problem of transcendental philosophy is to harmonize the subjective and the objective. In history, with which practical philosophy closes, the identity of the two is not exhibited, but only approximated in an infinite progress. But now the Ego must attain a position where it can actually behold this identity, which constitutes its inner essence. If now all conscious activity exhibits design, then a conscious and unconscious activity can only coincide in a product, which, though it exhibits design, was yet produced without design. Such a product is nature; we have here the principle of all *teleology*, in which alone the solution of the given problem can be sought. The peculiarity of nature is this, viz., that though it exhibits itself as nothing but a blind mechanism, it yet displays design, and represents an identity of the conscious subjective and the unconscious objective activity; in it the Ego beholds its own most peculiar essence, which consists alone in this identity. But in nature the Ego beholds this identity, as something purely objective, as existing only externally to it; it must also be enabled to perceive it as a somewhat whose principle lies

within the Ego itself. This perception is the art-intuition. As the production of nature is unconscious, though similar to that which is conscious, so the æsthetic production of the artist is a conscious production, similar to that which is unconscious. *Æsthetics* must therefore be joined to teleology. That contradiction between the conscious and the unconscious, which moves forward untiringly in history, and which is unconsciously reconciled in nature, finds its conscious reconciliation in a work of art. In a work of art, the intelligence attains a perfect intuition of itself. The feeling which accompanies this intuition, is the feeling of an infinite satisfaction; all contradictions being solved, and every riddle explained. The unknown, which unexpectedly harmonizes the objective and the conscious activity, is nothing other than that absolute unchangeable identity to which every existence must be referred. In the artist it lays aside the veil, which elsewhere surrounds it, and irresistibly impels him to complete his work. Thus there is no other eternal revelation but art, and this is also the miracle which should convince us of the reality of that supreme, which is never itself objective, but is the cause of all objectivity. Hence art holds a higher rank than philosophy, for only in art has the intellectual intuition objectivity. There is nothing, therefore, for the philosopher higher than art, because this opens before him, as it were, the holy of holies, where that which is separate in nature and history, and which in life and action, as in thought, must ever diverge, burns, as it were, in one flame, in an eternal and original union. From this we see also both the fact that philosophy, as philosophy, can never be universally valid, and the reason for it. Art is that alone to which is given an absolute objectivity, and it is through this alone that nature, consciously productive, concludes and completes itself within itself.

The “*Transcendental Idealism*” is the last work which Schelling wrote after the method of Fichte. In its principle he goes decidedly beyond the standpoint of Fichte. That which

was with Fichte the inconceivable limit of the Ego, Schelling derives as a necessary duality, from the simple essence of the Ego. While Fichte had regarded the union of subject and object, only as an infinite progression towards that which ought to be, Schelling looked upon it as actually accomplished in a work of art. With Fichte God was apprehended only as the object of a moral faith, but with Schelling he was looked upon as the immediate object of the æsthetic intuition. This difference between the two could not long be concealed from Schelling. He was obliged to see that he no longer stood upon the basis of subjective idealism, but that his real position was that of objective idealism. If he had already gone beyond Fichte in setting the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy opposite to each other, it was perfectly consistent for him now to go one step farther, and, placing himself on the point of indifference between the two, make the identity of the ideal and the real, of thought and being, as his principle. This principle *Spinoza* had already possessed before him. To this philosophy of identity Schelling now found himself peculiarly attracted. Instead of following Fichte's method, he now availed himself of that of *Spinoza*, the mathematical, to which he ascribed the greatest evidence of proof.

III. THIRD PERIOD : PERIOD OF SPINOZISM, OR THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE IDEAL AND THE REAL.

The principal writings of this period are: "*Exposition of my System of Philosophy*" (*Journal of Speculative Physics*, ii. 2) ; the second edition, with additions, of the "*Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*," 1803 ; the dialogue, "*Bruno, or concerning the Divine and the Natural Principle of Things*," 1802 ; "*Lectures on the Method of Academical Study*," 1803 ; three numbers of a "*New Journal of Speculative Physics*," 1802-3. The character of the new standpoint of Schelling, at which we now arrive, is clearly exhibited in the definition of reason, which he places at the head of the first of the above-named writings: I call reason absolute reason, or rea-

son, in so far as it is conceived as the total *indifference of the subjective and the objective*. Every one is supposed to be competent to think of reason; to think of it as absolute, and thus to reach the standpoint which I require, abstraction must be made from the thinking subject. To him who makes this abstraction, reason immediately ceases to be something subjective, as most men represent it; neither can it be conceived as something objective, since an objective, or that which is thought, is only possible in opposition to that which thinks. It becomes, therefore, through this abstraction a true *in-itself* (absolute), which is the indifference-point between subject and object. The standpoint of philosophy is the standpoint of reason; its knowledge is a knowledge of things as they are in themselves, *i.e.*, as they are in the reason. It is the nature of philosophy to destroy every distinction which the imagination has mingled with pure thought, and to see in things only that through which they express the absolute reason, not regarding in them that which is simply an object for that reflection which expends itself on the laws of mechanism and in time. Besides reason there is nothing, and in it is every thing. Reason is the absolute. All objections to this principle can only arise from the fact, that men are in the habit of looking at things not as they are in reason, but as they appear. Every thing which is, is in essence like the reason, and one with it. It is not the reason which posits something external to itself, but only the false use of reason, which is connected with the inability to forget the subjective in ourselves. The reason is absolutely *one* and self-identical. The highest law for the being of reason, and since there is nothing besides reason, the highest law for all being, is the law of identity. Between subject and object therefore—since it is one and the same absolute identity which displays itself in both—there can be no difference except a *quantitative* difference (a difference of more or less), so that nothing is either simple object or simple subject, but in all things subject and object are united, this union being in different proportions,

so that sometimes the subject and sometimes the object has the preponderance. But since the absolute is pure identity of subject and object, there can be no quantitative difference except outside of the identity, *i.e.*, in the finite. As the fundamental form of the infinite is $A = A$, so the scheme of the finite is $A = B$ (*i.e.*, the union of subjective with objective in different proportions). But, in reality, nothing is finite, because the identity is the only reality. So far as there is difference in individual things, the identity exists in the form of indifference. If we could see at one glance every thing which is, we should find in all the pure identity, because we should find in all a perfect quantitative equilibrium of subjectivity and objectivity. True, we find, in looking at individual objects, that sometimes the preponderance is on one side and sometimes on the other, but in the whole this is compensated. The absolute identity is the absolute totality, the universe itself. There is in reality no individual being or thing. There is in reality nothing beyond the totality; and if any thing beyond this is beheld, this can only happen by virtue of an arbitrary separation of the individual from the whole, which is done through reflection, and is the source of every error. The absolute identity is essentially the same in every part of the universe. Hence the universe may be conceived under the figure of a line, in the centre of which is the $A = A$, while at the end on one side is $\overset{+}{A} = B$, *i.e.*, a preponderance of the subjective, and at the end on the other side is $A = \overset{+}{B}$, *i.e.*, a preponderance of the objective, though this must be conceived so that a relative identity may exist even in these extremes. The one side is the real or nature, the other side is the ideal. The real side develops itself according to three potences (a potence, or power, indicates a definite quantitative difference of subjectivity and objectivity).

(1) The first potence is matter and gravity — the greatest preponderance of the object. (2) The second potence is light (A^2), an inner — as weight is an outer — intuition of

nature. Light is a higher ascent of the subjective. It is the absolute identity itself. (3) The third potency is organization (A^3), the common product of light and gravity. Organization is just as original as matter. Inorganic nature, as such, does not exist: it is actually organized, and is, as it were, the universal germ out of which organization proceeds. The organization of every sphere is but the externalization of the inner being of the sphere itself; the earth itself, by a process of self-evolution, becomes animal and plant. The organic world has not formed itself out of the inorganic, but has been at least potentially present in it from the beginning. That matter which lies before us, apparently inorganic, is the residuum of organic metamorphoses, which could not become organic. The human brain is the highest bloom of the whole organic metamorphosis of the earth. From the above, Schelling adds, it must be perceived that we affirm an inner identity of all things, and a potential presence of every thing in every other, and therefore even the so-called dead matter may be viewed only as a sleeping world of animals and plants, which, in some period, the absolute identity may animate and raise to life. At this point Schelling stops suddenly, without developing further the three potences of the ideal series, corresponding to those of the real. Elsewhere he completes the work by setting up the following three potences of the ideal series: (1) Knowledge, the potency of reflection; (2) Action, the potency of subsumption; (3) the Reason as the unity of reflection and subsumption. These three potences appear: (1) as the true, the assimilation of matter in form; (2) as the good, or the assimilation of form in matter; (3) as the beautiful, or the work of art, the absolute blending together of form and matter.

Schelling sought also to furnish himself with a new method for knowing the absolute identity. Neither the analytic nor the synthetical method seems to him suitable for this, since both afford only a finite knowledge. Gradually, also, he abandoned the mathematical method. The logical forms of

the ordinary method of knowledge, and even the ordinary metaphysical categories, were insufficient for him. Schelling now places the intellectual intuition as the starting-point of true knowledge. Intuition, in general, is an equipoise of thought and being. When I intuit an object, the being of the object and my thought of the object are for me absolutely the same. But in ordinary intuition, some particular sensuous thing is posited as one with the thought. But in the intellectual or rational intuition, being in general and every being is made identical with the thought, the absolute *subject-object* is beheld. The intellectual intuition is absolute knowledge, and as such it can only be conceived as that in which thought and being are not opposed to each other. It is the beginning and the first step towards philosophy to behold, immediately and intellectually within thyself, that same indifference of the ideal and the real which thou beholdest projected as it were from thyself in space and time. This absolutely absolute mode of knowledge is wholly and entirely in the absolute itself. That it can never be taught is clear. It cannot, moreover, be seen why philosophy is bound to have special regard to this inability. It seems much more fitting to make so complete a separation on every side between the entrance to philosophy and the common knowledge, that no road nor track shall lead from the latter to the former. The absolute mode of knowledge, like the truth which it contains, has no true opposition outside of itself, and as it cannot be demonstrated by any intelligent being, so nothing can be set up in opposition to it by any. — Schelling attempted to reduce the intellectual intuition to a method, and named this method construction. The possibility and the necessity of the constructive method is based upon the fact that the absolute is in all, and that all is the absolute. Construction is nothing other than the demonstration that the whole is absolutely expressed in every particular relation and object. To construe an object, philosophically, is to prove that in this object the whole inner structure of the absolute repeats itself.

In Schelling's "*Lectures on the Method of Academical Study*" (delivered 1802, and published in 1803), he sought to treat encyclopedically, every philosophical discipline from the given standpoint of identity or indifference. They furnish a connected and popular exposition of the outlines of his philosophy, in the form of a critical review of the studies of the university course. The most noticeable feature in them is Schelling's attempt at a historical construction of Christianity. The incarnation of God is an incarnation from eternity. The eternal Son of God, born from the essence of the father of all things, is the finite itself, as it is in the eternal intuition of God. Christ is only the historical and phenomenal pinnacle of the incarnation; as an individual, he is a person wholly intelligible from the circumstances of the age in which he appeared. Since God is eternally outside of all time, it is inconceivable that he should have assumed a human nature at any definite moment of time. The temporal form of Christianity, the exoteric Christianity does not correspond to its idea, and its perfection is yet to come. A chief hindrance to the perfection of Christianity was, and is, the so-called Bible, which, moreover, is far inferior to other religious writings, in a genuine religious content. The future must bring a new birth of esoteric Christianity, or a new and higher form of religion, in which philosophy, religion, and poesy shall melt together in unity. — This latter remark contains already an intimation of the "*Philosophy of Revelation*," a work subsequently written by Schelling, and which exhibited many of the principles current in the age of the Apostle John. In the work we are now considering, there are also many other points which correspond to this later standpoint of Schelling. Thus he places at the summit of history a kind of golden age. It is inconceivable, he says, that man as he now appears, should have raised himself through himself from instinct to consciousness, from animality to rationality. Another human race, must, therefore, have preceded the present, which ancient legends have im-

mortalized under the form of gods and heroes. The first origin of religion and culture is only conceivable through the instruction of higher natures. I hold a state of culture to have been the first condition of the human race, and consider the first foundation of states, sciences, religion, and arts as cotemporary, or rather as one thing: so that all these were not truly separate, but in the completest interpenetration, as it will be again in the final consummation. Schelling is no more than consistent when he accordingly apprehends the symbols of mythology which we meet with at the beginning of history, as disclosures of the highest wisdom. There is here also a step towards his subsequent "*Philosophy of Mythology*."

The mystical element revealed in these expressions of Schelling gained continually a greater prominence with him. Its growth was partly connected with his fruitless search after an absolute method, and a fitting form in which he might have satisfactorily expressed his philosophic intuitions. All noble mysticism rests on the inability to adequately express an infinite content in the form of a conception. So Schelling, after he had been restlessly tossed about from method to method, soon gave up also his method of construction, and abandoned himself wholly to the unlimited current of his fancy. But though this was partly the cause of his mysticism, it is also true that his philosophical standpoint was gradually undergoing a change. From the speculative science of nature, he was gradually passing over more and more into the philosophy of mind, whereby his conception and definition of the absolute became changed. While he had previously defined the absolute as the indifference of the ideal and the real, he now gives a preponderance to the ideal over the real, and makes ideality the fundamental determination of the absolute. The ideal is the first; secondly, the ideal determines itself in itself to the real; and the real as such is only third. The earlier harmony of mind and nature is dissolved: matter appears now as the negative of mind. Since

Schelling in this way distinguishes the universe from the absolute as its counterpart, we see that he leaves decidedly the basis of Spinozism on which he had previously stood, and places himself on a new standpoint.

IV. FOURTH PERIOD: THE MYSTICAL OR NEO-PLATONIC FORM OF SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY.

The writings of this period are: "*Philosophy and Religion*," 1804; "*Exposition of the true relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the improved Theory of Fichte*," 1806; "*Medical Annual*" (published in company with *Marcus*) 1805-1808. — As has already been said, the absolute and the universe were, on the standpoint of indifference, identical. Nature and history were immediate manifestations of the absolute. But now Schelling lays stress upon the difference between the two, and the independence of the world. This he expresses in a striking way in the first of the above-named writings, by placing the origin of the world wholly after the manner of Neo-Platonism, in a breaking away or a falling off from the absolute. From the absolute to the actual, there is no continuous transition; the origin of the sensible world is only conceivable as a complete breaking off *per saltum* from the absolute. The absolute is the only real, finite things are not real; they can, therefore, have their ground in no reality imparted to them from the absolute, but only in a separation and complete falling away from the absolute. The reconciliation of this fall, and the complete manifestation of God, is the final cause of history. With this idea there are also connected other conceptions borrowed from Neo-Platonism, which Schelling brings out in the same work. He speaks in it of the descent of the soul from intellectuality, to the world of sense, and like the Platonic myth he allows this fall of souls to be a punishment for their selfhood (pride); he speaks also in connection with this of a regeneration, or transmigration of souls, by which they either begin a higher life on a better sphere, or intoxicated with matter, are driven down to a still lower abode, according as they have in the

present life laid aside more or less of their selfhood, and become purified in a greater or less degree, to an identity with the infinite; but we are especially reminded of Neo-Platonism by the high place and the mystical and symbolical significance which Schelling gives in this work to the Greek mysteries (even in the *Bruno*), and the view that if religion would be held in its pure ideality, it can only exist esoterically, or in the form of mysteries. — This notion of a higher identification of religion and philosophy goes through all the writings of this period. All true experience, says Schelling in the "*Medical Annual*," is religious. The existence of God is an empirical truth, and the ground of all experience. True, religion is not philosophy, but the philosophy which does not unite in sacred harmony religion with science, were unworthy of the name. True, I know something higher than science. And if science has only these two ways to knowledge open before it, viz., that of analysis or abstraction, and that of synthetic derivation, then we deny all science of the absolute. Speculation is every thing, *i.e.*, a beholding, a contemplation of that which is in God. Science itself has worth only so far as it is speculative, *i.e.*, only so far as it is a contemplation of God as he is. But the time will come when sciences shall more and more cease, and immediate knowledge take their place. The mortal eye closes only in the highest science, where it is no longer the man who sees, but the eternal beholding which has now come to see in him.

With this theosophic view of the world, Schelling was led to pay attention to the earlier mystics. He began to study their writings. He answered the charge of mysticism in his controversy with Fichte as follows: Among the learned of the last century, there was a tacit agreement never to go beyond a certain height, and, therefore, the genuine spirit of science was given up to the unlearned. These, because they were uneducated and had drawn upon themselves the jealousy of the learned, were called fanatics. But many a philosopher by profession might well have exchanged all his rhetoric for

the fulness of mind and heart which abound in the writings of such fanatics. Therefore I am not ashamed of the name of such a fanatic. I will even seek to make this reproach true; if I have not hitherto studied the writings of these men correctly, it has been owing to negligence.

Schelling did not omit to verify these words. There were some special mental affinities between himself and *Jacob Boehme*, with whom he now became more and more closely joined. A study of his writings is indeed indicated in Schelling's works of the present period. One of the most famous of Schelling's writings, his theory of freedom, which appeared after this (*"Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Human Freedom,"* 1809), is composed entirely in the spirit of Jacob Boehme. With this begins the last period of Schelling's philosophizing.

V. FIFTH PERIOD: — ATTEMPT AT A THEOGONY AND COSMOGONY AFTER THE MANNER OF JACOB BOEHME.

Schelling had much in common with Jacob Boehme. Both considered speculative cognition to be a kind of immediate intuition. Both made use of forms which mingled the abstract and the sensuous, and interpenetrated the definiteness of logic with the coloring of fancy. Both, in fine, were speculatively in close contact. The self-duplication of the absolute was a fundamental thought of Boehme. Starting with the principle, that the divine essence was the indeterminable, infinite, and inconceivable, the ungrounded, Boehme conceives this essence, from a feeling of its own abstract infinitude, to project itself into the finite, *i.e.*, into the ground, or centre of nature, where in their gloomy torture-chamber the qualities are separated, from whose harsh collision the lightning streams forth, which, as mind or principle of light, is destined to rule and explain the struggling powers of nature, so that the God who has been raised from the absence of ground through a ground to the light of the mind, may henceforth move in an eternal kingdom of joy. This theogony of Jacob Boehme is in striking accord with the present standpoint of Schelling.

As Boehme had apprehended the absolute as the indeterminable absence of ground, so had Schelling in his earlier writings apprehended it as indifference. As Boehme had distinguished this absence of ground from a ground, or from nature, and from God as the light of minds, so had Schelling, in the writings of the last period, apprehended the absolute as a self-renunciation, and a return back from this renunciation into a higher unity with itself. We have here the three chief elements of that history of God, around which Schelling's essay on freedom turns: (1) God as indifference, or the absence of ground; (2) God as duplication into ground and existence, real and ideal; (3) reconciliation of this duplication, and elevation of the original indifference to identity. The first element of the divine life is that of pure indifference, or indistinguishableness. This, which precedes every thing existing, may be called the original ground, or the absence of ground. The absence of ground is not a product of opposites, nor are they contained *implicite* in it, but it is a proper essence separate from every opposite, and having no predicate but that of predicatelessness. Real and ideal, darkness and light, can never be predicated of the absence of ground as opposites; they can only be affirmed of it as not-opposites in a neither-nor. From this indifference now rises the duality: the absence of ground separates into two co-eternal beginnings, so that ground and existence may become one through love, and the indeterminable and lifeless indifference may rise to a determinate and living identity. Since nothing is before or external to God, he must have the ground of his existence in himself. But this ground is not simply logical, as conception, but real, as something which is actually to be distinguished in God from existence; it is nature in God, an essence inseparable indeed from him, but yet distinct. Hence we cannot assign to this ground understanding and will, but only a desire to attain these; it is the longing to produce itself. But in that this ground moves in its longing according to obscure and uncertain laws like a swelling sea, there

is, self-begotten in God, another and reflexive motion, an inner representation by which, since no other content than God himself is possible for it, he beholds himself in his image. This representation is God himself produced in himself, the eternal word in God, which rises as light in the darkness of the ground, and endows its blind longing with understanding. This understanding, united with the ground, becomes free creative will. Its work is to give order to nature, and to regulate the hitherto unregulated ground; and from this explanation of the real through the ideal, comes the creation of the world. The development of the world has two stadia: (1) the travail of light, or the progressive development of nature to man; (2) the travail of mind, or the development of man in history.

(1) The progressive development of nature proceeds from a conflict of the ground with the understanding. The ground originally sought to produce every thing solely from itself, but its products had no stability without the understanding, and reverted to the ground, a creation which we see exhibited in the extinct classes of animals and plants of the pre-historic world. But consecutively and gradually, the ground admitted the work of the understanding, and every such step towards light is indicated by a new class of beings. In every creature of nature we must, therefore, distinguish two principles: first, the obscure principle through which they are separate from God, and have a particular will; second, the divine principle of the understanding, of the universal will. With irrational creatures, however, these two principles are not yet brought to unity; but the particular will is simple passion and desire, while the universal will, without the individual will, reigns as an external natural force, as controlling instinct.

(2) The two principles, the particular and the universal will, are first united in man as they are in the absolute: but in God they are united inseparably; in man separably, in order that there may be a difference between man and God,

and that God, as opposed to man, may be revealed as the unity of both principles, as a spirit which overcomes the difference, as love. It is just this separableness of the universal will, and the particular will, which makes good and evil possible. The good is the subjection of the particular will to the universal will, and the reverse of this right relation is evil. Human freedom consists in this possibility of good and evil. The empirical man, however, is not free, but his whole empirical condition is posited by a previous act of intelligence. The man must act just as he does, but is nevertheless free, because he has from eternity freely made himself that which he now necessarily is. From the creation, the will of the self-subsisting ground has also incited to action the individual will of the creature, in order that there might exist an opposition, in the suppression of which God might realize himself as the reconciling unity. In this universal excitation of evil, man has become involved in self-assertion and self-seeking; hence all men are by nature evil, and yet in each this evil nature is the result of his own free acts. As the history of nature rests upon the conflict of the ground with the understanding, so does the history of humanity, taken as a whole, rest upon the conflict of the individual will with the universal will. The different stages through which evil, as a historical power, passes in its conflict with love, constitute the periods of the world's history. Christianity is the centre of history: in Christ, the principle of love came in personal contact with incarnate evil: Christ was the mediator to reconcile on the highest stage the creation with God; for that which is personal can alone redeem the personal. The end of history is the reconciliation of the particular will and love, the prevalence of the universal will, so that God shall be all in all. The original indifference is thus elevated to absolute identity.

Schelling has given a farther justification of this his idea of God, in his controversial pamphlet against Jacobi (1812). The charge of naturalism which Jacobi made against him, he

sought to refute by showing how the true idea of God is a union of naturalism and theism. Naturalism seeks to conceive of God as ground of the world (immanent), while theism would view him as the world's cause (transcendent); the true course is to unite both determinations. God is at the same time ground and cause. It no way contradicts the conception of God to affirm that, so far as he reveals himself, he develops himself from himself, advancing from the imperfect to the perfect: the imperfect is in fact the perfect itself, only in a state of becoming. It is necessary that this becoming should be by stages, in order that the fulness of the perfect may appear on all sides. If there were no obscure ground, no nature, no negative principle in God, we could not speak of a consciousness of God. So long as the God of modern theism remains the simple essence which ought to be purely essential, but which in fact is without essence, so long as an actual twofoldness is not recognized in God, and a limiting and denying energy (a nature, a negative principle) is not placed in opposition to the extending and affirming energy in God, so long will science be entitled to deny the existence of a personal God. It is universally and essentially impossible to conceive of a being with consciousness, which has not been brought into limitation by some negative energy within himself, — as universally and essentially impossible as to conceive of a circle without a centre.

Schelling's letter to Eschenmayer in the *Universal Journal of Germans for Germans*, may be regarded as an explanation of the views advanced in his essay on freedom, and in his reply to Jacobi. In this letter he expresses himself more clearly than in his previous writings in regard to the significance of the word *ground*, and in regard to the extent to which he is justified in speaking of a ground in God. After this letter there was a pause in Schelling's literary activity. It was, indeed, rumored that the publication of a great work entitled *The Ages of the World* had been begun, but that when partly printed, it had been withdrawn by Schelling and

destroyed. From this title the public was led to expect a philosophy of history. Moreover the short supplementary essay on *The Deities of Samothrace*, published in 1815, indicated that in the main work great emphasis was to be placed upon the development of the religious consciousness. Now, indeed, that the first book of *The Ages of the World* has appeared in the eighth volume of Schelling's collected writings in the form which he gave to it about the year 1815, we see that the first book treats of the *past* as that which is to be thought of as antecedent to nature, the second of the *present*, *i.e.*, of nature itself, and that the third was to contain anticipations of the *future*. For the rest, we see that at least the main features of the later doctrine of potences were even then firmly fixed in Schelling's mind. After Stahl and Sengler had directed public attention to the new direction of Schelling's doctrines, an extraordinary sensation was produced by the introduction which Schelling prefixed to H. Bekker's translation of a work of Cousin. This was caused not only by the bitterness of his expressions in reference to Hegel, who, he said, had entirely misunderstood the system of identity; but also by his open declaration that the system which he had hitherto developed was only one, and that the negative half of philosophy; that, as the complement of this, a second, positive side must be added, which should be constructed not purely *a priori*, but by a method which should not altogether exclude the most extreme empiricism. In a similar way, though with less bitterness toward Hegel, he expressed himself in the introductory lecture with which he opened his course in Berlin in 1841. Since the public was soon convinced that Schelling would hardly submit the doctrines expounded in his Berlin discourses to a larger circle of readers, attempts were made, — after the publication of extracts by Frauenstädt and others, and especially after the publication of Dr. Paulus' notes, which Schelling's own complaint of piracy seemed to authenticate, — partly to criticise, partly to expound his present doctrines. That these were only partially correct was made evident,

when, after Schelling's death, his sons made public not only the introduction to the *Philosophy of Mythology*, but also the *Philosophy of Revelation*. These works enable us to form a quite accurate conception of the later phase of Schelling's philosophy. Just as in the essay on freedom and in the subsequent publications, that which in the third period is called the absolute indifference, is designated as the *prius* of nature and mind, —and of God, in so far as it is that in God which is not (yet) God, —so now it is shown, how from this pre-conception of God, which pantheism substitutes in the place of the common conception of him, the transition is made to the true notion of God, that, namely, possessed by true monotheism, which vanquishes pantheism by rendering the latter latent within it. In this process of the explanation of the conception of God, three moments, or, —as Schelling in accordance with his earlier method would have expressed it, —potences are to be distinguished; first the *power-to-exist*, which, since it is not yet overt existence, is characterized by the minus sign, and commonly denoted by $-A$. It is the ground, or even nature, in God, the obscurity which awaits explanation, which earlier, in the essay on freedom, was called hunger for existence, and which may also be termed subject of being or potential being. Over against this mere ability to exist stands its opposite $+A$, *i.e.*, pure *being*, without potentiality. And as the former was mere subject, so the latter is mere predicate and object; as the former was a self and existent in-itself, so the latter is rather that which exists outside of itself, instead of withdrawing itself within itself. Both together constitute the presupposition for a third, $\pm A$, which is excluded from both, and in which potentiality and actuality, or subjectivity and objectivity are so united that it may be called that which *exists by itself*, or is master of itself. This *third*, which as $-A$ has the first and thus the highest claim to exist, is most appropriately designated spirit. Although the unity of these three is God, he is yet far from being triune; he is as yet only the all-one; a conception

which contains only the root of triunity. The progress toward the trinity, and at the same time also toward the universe as distinguished from God, proceeds so that —A is posited explicitly as the not-being. To this end, however, —since only that which is can be posited as not-being,—it is necessary to presuppose that it was previously posited as being, and was then overcome by an opposing +A. The appearance of this opposition (tension), which springs not from the nature, but from the will of God, has (since, properly, in it the relation of the two potences is reversed, —A having become the existent, and +A potentiality or power), for its result, the conversion of the original relation, and thus of the *unum versum* (universe); the same end is also subserved by this, that, above each as now transformed, $\pm A$ is God as self-possessed, actual spirit. Theogony and cosmogony here coincide. The latter displays successive stages in which the different relations of the two potences are deduced by the philosophy of nature. In the human consciousness, which is the final point of this development, the conflict of the two potences is terminated. The forces, from whose strife the world arose, repose within the human spirit, which just for this reason is the actual microcosm. By the Promethean act of the apprehension of self as Ego, the hitherto only ideal world becomes through its externality to God, real; and its vocation is to be subordinate to that from which it has separated itself; whereby this latter naturally becomes supramundane, instead of transmundane as formerly. The course to this end is through the different relations of the Ego, which being related theoretically to the laws of nature, and practically to the moral law through which it becomes free, raises itself finally to æsthetic and contemplative satisfaction, whose object is termed by Aristotle the thinking of thought, and by modern philosophy subject-object,—the final cause of the world, or God as principle of the same.

The course which Schelling here pursues is designated by him the progress toward God. Commencing with the pri-

mary conditions of all being, passing to the position, that these potences are the causes of a divided and in-itself-graduated being, proceeding thence to the self-assertion of the Ego as principle, and its consequent isolation from God, the result of his doctrine is that the Ego declares itself not to be principle, but subordinates itself to the excluded and isolated God, whom finally it recognizes as being himself the first principle. Finally: we have hitherto philosophized toward God, and therefore, without God: it has been shown that none of the steps hitherto considered, neither the knowledge of nature, nor life in the state, nor even contemplative absorption yield an absolute satisfaction; philosophy, therefore, by virtue of these negative results, must be termed negative philosophy. Since its development has been conditioned by thought alone, it may also be called rational philosophy. Moreover since thought has no power to give reality, to bestow existence, the end of rational philosophy is still only God as idea. But here what thought cannot accomplish is realized by will. The will demands an active God who is lord of all being, and is willing to actively oppose the schism which has actually appeared. This longing for an actual God is religion, and philosophy, when it arrives at this standpoint, has religion for its object, and attains a character entirely different from that which it previously possessed: it becomes positive philosophy. Since religion is based upon a free act of the will, philosophy, with religion for its object, is no longer purely rational, but its problem is: to explain religion as a given fact, and to show how all is adjusted when God, who appeared as the result of negative philosophy, is made the initial principle from which every thing must be deduced. The philosophy of religion, — which is not to be confounded with a so-called religion of reason, — has for its subject-matter partly the development of religion, and partly religion in its completed form. In the first case it is the philosophy of mythology, in the second the philosophy of revelation. In the philosophy of mythology, Schelling sought to determine

how it is that sane men can allow themselves to be governed by notions which represent the sacrifice of a son, for example, as a duty ; and, again, how it is that from the standpoint of Christianity even notions such as these seem to be better than the absence of all religion whatever. His explanation is, that the forces by which these men and peoples were dominated, and which were regarded by them as God, can be apprehended from the standpoint of the highest religion as being at least moments in God. The primitive form of religion, in which humanity is pervaded by God, and which, since no polytheism as yet existed, may be called monotheism (though an abstract one), is followed by the crisis which is one with the development of the nations, in which the consciousness of humanity repeats the same process of potences through which (externally and prior to consciousness) the progressive development of nature arose. Hence that parallelism between this latter and the stages of mythology which has caused many to make the mistake of supposing mythology to be only natural philosophy in disguise. Philosophy now shows that the mythological process consists in this, that instead of the all-one which in primitive monotheism dominates the consciousness, the individual potences take possession of it. The *first* step is that where the consciousness feels itself governed by the revolutions of the heavens, — a form of religion which may be called star-worship or Sabianism. Since mythology reached its bloom in Greece all the notions of its earlier stages appear there also. Thus Uranus represents that consciousness which appeared first in the development of mythology. The second stage, in which the first potency (—A) is reduced to passivity by the second, appears in the emasculation of Uranus. It is characteristic that the Greek historian Herodotus, where he mentions this moment of the mythological process (stereotyped among the Babylonians and Arabians), introduces Urania and her son Dionysus. On this second stage stand the most different religions, not only those which follow entirely the mythological process (the Phœnician,

Egyptian, Indian, &c.), but also those which endeavor to terminate it at some definite point, as the dualism of the Persians and Buddhism. The *highest* stage of philosophy is the Grecian, as displayed in those mysteries, in which mythology begins to make clear to itself its own nature, and thus to transcend its proper limits. Hence the study of the mysteries is a fitting introduction to the philosophy of revelation. The peculiar problem of the latter is to explain from its premises the person of Christ which is the proper content of all Christianity. The work of Christ before his incarnation, and the mediation accomplished by this act, are considered; but it is always kept in view, that the mythological development is the presupposition, and, in its last stage, the presage, of that which became actual in Christ. The completion of his work prepares the way for the activity of the third potency, the Spirit, through whom the church as the explication of Christ, exists. The periods of the church are typified by the three principal apostles, Peter, Paul, and John. Of these periods the first two, Catholicism and Protestantism, have passed, while the third, Johannine Christianity, is approaching.

There is undeniably something grand in this attempt to comprehend the world with its external and internal history as the self-mediation of God with himself, to unite pantheism and theism in the higher conception of a God who is both free and subject to development ("monotheism"). How closely this last phase of Schelling's philosophy coincides with the Hegelian, which in its own way also takes for its starting-point the conception of a process of the absolute mediated through negation, will become evident in the discussion of the Hegelian system to which we now proceed.

SECTION XLIV.

TRANSITION TO HEGEL.

THE radical defect of Schelling's philosophy, as seen in its earlier development in opposition to Fichte, was its abstract objective apprehension of the absolute. The absolute was pure indifference, identity; there was (1) no possibility of a transition from it to the definite and real,—hence Schelling maintained later a complete dualism between the absolute and the real world; and (2) in it the spiritual surrendered its primacy to the physical, the one was equated with the other, the pure objective indifference of the ideal and the real was placed above both, and therefore above the former. From reflection upon this one-sidedness arose the Hegelian philosophy. Hegel, in agreement with Schelling, and in opposition to Fichte, maintains that not the individual, the Ego, is the *prius* of all reality, but that this *prius* is a universal which comprehends all individuals in itself. But he apprehends this universal not as indifference, but as development; as a universal in which the principle of difference is immanent, and which unfolds itself into the entire complex of reality as exhibited in the natural and spiritual worlds. Similarly, according to Hegel, the absolute is not something objective, the negative extinction of being and thought, of the real and the ideal in a neutral third. The universal which is the ground of all things is rather one of the terms of this disjunction itself, namely, the ideal one; the idea is the absolute, and all actuality is only the realization of the idea. Hegel admits nothing higher than the idea; neither is there any thing apart from it, since every thing which exists is the actualization of the idea. The universe is no indifference of the ideal and the real, but it is the reality into whose manifold forms the idea (in order that it may not remain an unreal abstraction) dif-

ferentiates itself, without, however, losing itself in them, but rather returning again from them to itself in the thinking spirit, in order that as conscious, self-thinking idea it may exist in a form which is true and adequate to its nature. Hegel thus reinvests mind with its highest prerogatives. With him mind is not one of the different modes under which the absolute exists; but it is the absolute itself as self-conscious existence; it is the idea returned to itself, knowing itself as the truth of nature and the free power which governs it. The Hegelian system is thus diametrically opposed to that form of Schelling's philosophy which preceded it. As the latter became ever more and more realistic, Spinozistic, mystical, and dualistic, so the former became idealistic and rationalistic, — a pure monism of thought, a pure reconciliation of intelligence and actuality. As Schelling posited an objective in the place of subjective idealism, so Hegelianism lifts itself above both these opposites, striving after an absolute idealism which shall once more subordinate the natural to the spiritual, and yet at the same time comprehend both as inwardly one and the same.

As regards form, the *method* of the Hegelian philosophy is also essentially distinct from that of its predecessor. The absolute, according to Hegel, is not being, but development, the positing of distinctions and antitheses, which, however, are not independent of the absolute, nor altogether opposed to it, but constitute individually and collectively only moments in the self-evolution of the absolute. It must therefore be shown that the absolute has within itself a principle of progress by means of differences which are yet only moments of the absolute. We must not introduce differences into the absolute; but the absolute must evolve them from itself; while they, in turn, must resolve themselves into, and show themselves to be merely moments of, the whole. To exhibit this process is the object of the Hegelian method. It asserts that every conception has its proper antithesis, its own negation in itself, — is one-sided, and pushes forward to

a second conception, which is its opposite, but which itself is as one-sided as the first. In this way it appears that both are only moments of a third notion which is the higher unity of both, — which contains them in itself, but in a higher form which mediates their unity. But no sooner is this new notion posited than it shows itself to be also a one-sided moment which in turn advances through negation to a higher unity, etc. This self-negation of the notion is, according to Hegel, the genesis of all distinctions and antitheses; while these latter are not fixed and rigid as the reflecting understanding opines them to be, but unstable moments of the immanent movement of the notion. The same is true of the absolute itself. The universal which is the ground of all particulars becomes such only through the fact that the universal, as such, is a one-sided conception which advances spontaneously to the negation of its own abstract universality through concrete particularity. The absolute is not simple, but is a system of notions which owe their existence to this very self-negation of the original universal. This system of notions is itself collectively an abstraction, which advances to the negation of mere notional (ideal) being, to reality, to the real self-existence of the differences (in nature). To this latter, again, belongs equally the one-sidedness of being only a moment, and not the totality itself. And thus the independent existence of the real is also resolved; it returns to the universality of the notion in self-consciousness, in the thinking mind which embraces in itself ideal and real existence in a higher ideal unity of the universal and particular. This immanent self-movement of the notion is the Hegelian method. It is not, like the method of Fichte, a mere subjective positing of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, but it follows the course of the thing itself; it does not produce being, but that which in itself already is, it reproduces for the thinking consciousness; it strives to understand the whole through that immanent connection of its parts which results from this, that by virtue of an inner necessity there exists everywhere this pro-

duction of difference from unity and of unity from difference, the living pulsation of changing antitheses.

Hegel has himself, in his "*Phenomenology*," the first work in which he appeared as an independent philosopher, — having previously been considered an adherent of Schelling, — clearly expressed his difference from Schelling, which he comprehensively states in the following three hits. — In Schelling's philosophy, the absolute is, as it were, shot out of a pistol; it is only the night in which every cow looks black; when it is widened to a system, it is like the course of a painter, who has on his palette but two colors, red and green, and who would cover a surface with the former when a historical piece was demanded, and with the latter when a landscape was required. The first of these charges refers to the mode of attaining the idea of the absolute, viz., immediately, through intellectual intuition; this leap Hegel changes, in his *Phenomenology*, to a regular transition, proceeding step by step. The second charge relates to the way in which the absolute thus gained is conceived and expressed, viz., simply as the absence of all finite distinctions, and not as the immanent positing of a system of distinctions within itself. Hegel declares that every thing depends upon apprehending and expressing the true not as substance (*i.e.*, as negation of determinateness), but as subject (as a positing and producing of finite distinctions). The third charge has to do with Schelling's manner of carrying out his principle through the concrete content of the facts given in the natural and intellectual worlds, viz., by the application of a ready-made schema (the opposition of the ideal and the real) to the objects, instead of suffering them to unfold and separate themselves from themselves. The school of Schelling was especially given to this schematizing formalism, and that which Hegel remarks, in the introduction to his *Phenomenology*, may very well be applied to it: "If the formalism of a philosophy of nature should happen to teach that the understanding is electricity, or an animal nitrogen, the inexperienced might look upon

such instructions with deep amazement, and perhaps revere them as displaying the marks of profound genius. But the trick of such a wisdom is as readily learned as it is easily practised; its repetition is as insufferable as the repetition of a detected feat of legerdemain. This method of affixing to every thing heavenly and earthly, to all natural and intellectual forms, the two determinations of the universal scheme, makes the universe like a grocer's shop, in which a row of closed jars stand with their labels pasted on them.

The special object of the *Phenomenology* was to establish absolute knowledge, as Hegel apprehended it, upon the essential nature of consciousness as the highest stage of consciousness itself. Hegel furnishes in this work a history of the phenomenal consciousness (whence its title), a development of the formative epochs of the consciousness in its progress to philosophical knowledge. The inner development of consciousness consists in this, viz., that the peculiar condition in which it finds itself becomes objectified (or conscious), and through this knowledge of its own being the consciousness rises to a higher state. The "*Phenomenology*" seeks to show how, and out of what necessity the consciousness advances from step to step, from potentiality to being *per se*, from being to knowledge. The author begins with immediate consciousness as the lowest step. He entitled this section: "*Sensuous Certainty, or the This and the Opinion.*" At this stage the question is asked the Ego: what is *this*, or what is *here*? and it answers, *e.g.*, the tree; and to the question, what is *now*? it answers now is the night. But if we turn ourselves around, *here* is not a tree but a house; and if we write down the second answer, and look at it again after a little time, we find that *now* is no longer night but mid-day. The *this* becomes, therefore, a not-this, *i.e.*, a universal. And very naturally; for if I say: this piece of paper, yet each and every paper is a this piece of paper, and I have only said the universal. By such inner dialectic the whole field of the immediate certainty of the sense in perception is gone over.

In this way — since every formative step (every stage) of the consciousness of the philosophizing subject is involved in contradictions, and is carried by this immanent dialectic to a higher form of consciousness — this process of development goes on till the contradiction is destroyed, *i.e.*, till all strangeness between subject and object disappears, and the mind rises to a perfect self-knowledge and self-certainty. To characterize briefly the different steps of this process, we might say that the consciousness is first found as a certainty of the sense, or as the *this* and the *opinion*; next as perception, which apprehends the objective as a thing with its properties; and then as understanding, *i.e.*, apprehending the objects as being reflected in itself, or distinguishing between power and expression, essence and manifestation, outer and inner. From this point the consciousness, which has only recognized itself, its own pure being in its objects and their determinations, and for which therefore every other thing than itself has, as such, no significance, becomes the self-identical Ego, and rises to the truth and certainty of itself, to self-consciousness. The self-consciousness become universal self-consciousness or reason, now traverses also a series of development-steps, until it manifests itself as spirit, as the reason which, in accord with all rationality, and satisfied with the rational world without, extends itself over the natural and intellectual universe as *its* kingdom, in which it finds itself at home. Mind now passes through its stages of unconstrained morality, culture and refinement, ethics and the ethical view of the world to religion; and religion itself in its perfection, as revealed religion becomes absolute knowledge. At this last stage being and thought are no more separate, being is no longer an object for thought, but thought itself is the object of thought. Science is nothing other than the true knowledge of the mind concerning itself. In the conclusion of the "*Phenomenology*," Hegel casts the following retrospect on the course which he has laid down: "The goal which is to be reached, viz., absolute knowledge, or the mind which

knows itself as mind, has for its course the exposition of minds as they are in themselves and achieve the organization of their empire. These elements are preserved, and furnished to us either by history, where we look at the side of the mind's free existence as it accidentally appears, or by the science of phenomenal knowledge, where we look at the side of the mind's ideal organization. These two sources taken together, as ideal history, give us the real history and the true being of the absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he were lifeless and alone ; only 'from the cup of this kingdom of minds does there stream forth for him his infinitude.'"

On the other hand the progress of the *Phenomenology* is not strictly scientific. It is the first genial application of the "absolute method," suggestive in its criticism of the forms of phenomenal knowledge, but arbitrary in the arrangement and treatment of the abundant dialectical and historical material with which it deals.

SECTION XLV.

HEGEL.

GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born at Stuttgart, on the 27th of August, 1770. In his eighteenth year he entered the university of Tübingen, in order to devote himself to the study of theology. During his course of study there, he attracted no marked attention ; Schelling, who was his junior in years, shone far beyond all his cotemporaries. After leaving Tübingen, he took a situation as private tutor, first in Switzerland, and afterwards in Frankfort-on-the-Main till 1801, when he settled down at Jena. At first he was regarded as a disciple and defender of Schelling's philosophy, and as such he wrote in 1801 his first minor treatise on the

"*Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling.*" Soon afterwards he became associated with Schelling in publishing the "*Critical Journal of Philosophy*," 1802-3, for which he furnished a number of important articles. His labors as an academical teacher met at first with but little encouragement. Yet in 1805 he became professor in the university, though the political catastrophe in which the country was soon afterwards involved, deprived him of the place. Amid the cannonade of the battle of Jena, he finished the "*Phenomenology of Mind*," his first great and independent work, the crown of his Jena labors. He was subsequently in the habit of calling this book, which appeared in 1807, his "voyage of discovery." From Jena, Hegel for want of other means of subsistence went to Bamberg, where for two years he was editor of a political journal published there. In the fall of 1808, he became rector of the gymnasium at Nuremberg. In this situation he wrote his *Logic*, 1812-16. All his works were produced slowly, and he first properly began his literary activity as Schelling finished his. In 1816, he received a call to a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, where in 1817 he published his "*Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*," in which for the first time he expounded his system as a whole. But his peculiar fame, and his far-reaching activity, dates properly from his call to Berlin in 1818. It was at Berlin that he surrounded himself with an extensive and very actively scientific school, and through his connection with the Prussian government gained great political influence and acquired a reputation for his philosophy, as the philosophy of the State, though this neither speaks favorably for its inner purity, nor its moral credit. Yet in his "*Philosophy of Rights*," which appeared in 1821. Hegel does not reject the fundamental principles of modern political life; he declares in favor of popular representation, freedom of the press, and publicity of judicial proceedings, trial by jury, and an administrative independence of corporations.

In Berlin, Hegel gave lectures upon almost every branch of philosophy, and these have been published by his disciples and friends since his death. His manner as a lecturer was hesitating, clumsy, and unadorned, but was still not without a peculiar attraction as the immediate expression of profound thoughtfulness. His social intercourse was more with the uncultivated than with the learned; he was not fond of shining as a genius in social circles. In 1829 he became rector of the university, an office which he administered in a more practical manner than Fichte had done. Hegel died of the cholera, Nov. 14, 1831, the anniversary of Leibnitz's death. He rests in the same churchyard with Solger and Fichte, near by the latter, and not far from the former. His writings and lectures form eighteen volumes which have appeared since 1832; Vol. I. *Minor Articles*; II. *Phenomenology*; III.-V. *Logic*; VI., VII. *Encyclopædia*; VIII. *Philosophy of Rights*; IX. *Philosophy of History*; X. *Æsthetics*; XI., XII. *Philosophy of Religion*; XIII.-XV. *History of Philosophy*; XVI.-XVIII. *Miscellanies*. His life has been written by Rosenkranz.

The division of the Hegelian system is, in consequence of the course which thought pursues in it, threefold: (1) The development of those pure conceptions or determinations of thought, which lie at the basis of all natural and intellectual life; in other words, the logical unfolding of the absolute, — *the Science of Logic*. (2) The development of the real world or of nature, — *the Philosophy of Nature*. (3) The development of the ideal world, or of mind as it shows itself concretely in rights, morals, the state, art, religion, and science, — *Philosophy of Mind*. These three parts of the system represent the three elements of the absolute method, position, negation, and the unity of both. The absolute is at first pure, and immaterial thought; secondly, it is differentiation of the pure thought or its diremption in space and time, — nature; thirdly, it returns from this self-estrangement to itself, destroys the differentiation of nature, and thus becomes actual self-knowing thought or mind.

I. SCIENCE OF LOGIC. — The Hegelian logic is the scientific exposition and development of the pure conceptions of reason, those conceptions or categories which lie at the basis of all thought and being, and which determine subjective knowledge as truly as they form the indwelling soul of the objective reality; in a word, those ideas in which the ideal and the real have their point of coincidence. The domain of logic, says Hegel, is the truth, as it is unveiled in its native character. It is as Hegel himself figuratively expresses it, the representation of God as he is in his eternal being, before the creation of the world or a finite mind. In this respect it is, to be sure, a domain of shadows; but these shadows are, on the other hand, those simple essences freed from all sensuous matters, in whose diamond net the whole universe is constructed.

Different philosophers had already made a thankworthy beginning towards collecting and examining the pure conceptions of the reason, as Aristotle in his categories, Wolff in his ontology, and Kant in his transcendental analytic. But they had neither completely collected, nor critically sifted, nor derived them from one principle, but had only taken them up empirically, and treated them lexicologically. But in opposition to this course, Hegel attempted, (1) to make a complete collection of these notions; (2) to critically sift them (*i.e.*, to exclude every thing but pure thought); and (3) — which is the most characteristic peculiarity of the Hegelian logic — to derive these dialectically from one another, and carry them out to an internally-connected system of pure reason. Fichte had already claimed that the reason must deduce the whole system of knowledge purely from itself, without taking any thing for granted. Hegel holds fast to this thought but in an objective way. He does not begin by setting up certain highest principles in which all further development is *implicite* contained, and which serves, therefore, merely for their closer determination, without any actual progress of thought. But starting with the simplest conception of reason, that of pure being, which needs no farther establishing, he seeks from this,

by advancing from one conception ever to another and a richer one, to deduce the whole system of pure rational knowledge. The lever of this development is the dialectical method.

All position, says Hegel, is negation; every notion has in itself the opposite of itself, and is thus led forward to its own negation, — passes over into its opposite. All negation also is position, affirmation. If a conception is negated, the result is not the pure nothing, — a pure negative, but a concrete positive; there results a new conception whose significance is increased by the negation of the preceding one. The negation of unity, *e.g.*, is the conception of multiplicity. In this way Hegel makes negation a vehicle for dialectical progress. Every previously posited conception is negated, and from its negation a higher and richer conception is gained. This method, which is at the same time analytical and synthetical, Hegel has carried through the whole system of knowledge.

We now proceed to a brief survey of the Hegelian Logic. It is divided into three parts; the doctrine of *being*, the doctrine of *essence*, and the doctrine of *the notion*.

1. THE DOCTRINE OF BEING. (1) *Quality*. — Science begins with the immediate and indeterminate conception of *being*. This, in its want of content and emptiness, is nothing more than a pure negation, a *nothing*. These two conceptions are thus as absolutely identical as they are absolutely opposed; each of the two disappears immediately in its contrary. This oscillation of the two is the pure *becoming*, which, if it be a transition from nothing to being, we call *beginning*, or, in the reverse case, we call it *ceasing*. The still and simple precipitate of this process of beginning to be and ceasing to be, is *existence* (*Daseyn*). Existence is being with a determinateness, or *quality*; more closely, it is *reality* or limited existence. Limited existence excludes every other from itself. This reference to itself, which is seen through its negative relation to every other, we call being *per se* (*Fürsichseyn*).

Being *per se*, which refers itself only to itself, and repels every other from itself, is *the one*. But, by means of this repelling, the one posits immediately *many* ones. But the many ones are not distinguished from each other. One is what the other is. The many are therefore one. But the one is just as truly the manifold. For its exclusion is the positing of its contrary, or it posits itself thereby as manifold. By this dialectic of *attraction* and *repulsion*, quality passes over into quantity: for indifference in respect of distinction or qualitative determinateness is *quantity*.

(2) *Quantity*.—Quantity is determinateness in magnitude, which, as such, is indifferent in respect of quality. In so far as the *magnitude* contains many ones distinguishably within itself, it is a *discrete*, or has the element of *discretion*; but on the other hand, in so far as the many ones are similar, and the magnitude is thus without distinction, it is *continuous*, or has the element of *continuity*. Each of these two determinations is at the same time identical with the other; discretion cannot be conceived without continuity, nor continuity without discretion. The existence of quantity, or limited quantity, is the *quantum*. The quantum has also manifoldness and unity in itself; it is the enumeration of the unities, *i.e.*, *number*. Corresponding to the quantum or the extensive magnitude, is the intensive magnitude or *degree*. With the conception of degree, so far as degree is simple determinateness, quantity approaches quality again. The unity of quantity and quality is *measure*.

(3) *The measure* is a qualitative quantum, a quantum on which the quality is dependent. An example of this quantitative limitation as actually determining the quality of a definite object, is the temperature of water, which decides whether the water shall remain water or turn to ice or steam. Here the quantum of heat actually constitutes the quality of the water. Quality and quantity are, therefore, to be conceived as perpetually interchanging determinations *in a being*, in a *third*, which is itself distinct from its immediate quality and

quantity. This quality which is independent of immediate being, this negation of all immediateness, is the *essence*. Essence is being *in se*, being divided in itself, a self-separation of being. Hence the twofoldness of all determinations of essence.

2. THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE. — (1) *The essence as such.* The essence as reflected being is reference to itself only as it is a reference to something other. We apply to this being the term *reflected* analogously with the reflection of light, which, when it falls on a mirror, is thrown back by it. As now the reflected light is, through its reference to another, something mediated or posited, so the reflected being is that which is shown to be mediated or grounded through another. From the fact that philosophy makes its problem to know the essence of things, the immediate being of things is represented as a covering or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. If, therefore, we speak of the essence of an object, the immediate being standing over against the essence (for without this the essence cannot be conceived), is reduced to a mere negative, to an *appearance*. The being appears in the essence. The essence is, therefore, the being as *appearance in itself*. The essence when conceived in distinction from the appearance, gives the conception of the *essential*, and that which only appears in the essence, is the essenceless, or the *unessential*. But since the essential has a being only in distinction from the unessential, it follows that the latter is essential to the former, which needs the unessential just as much as the unessential needs it. Each of the two, therefore, appears in the other, or there takes place between them a reciprocal reference which we call *reflection*. We have, therefore, to do in this whole sphere with determinations of reflection, with determinations, each one of which refers to the other, and cannot be conceived without it (*e.g.*, positive and negative, ground and sequence, thing and properties, content and form, power and expression). We have, therefore, in the development of the essence, those same determinations which we found in the

development of being, only no longer in an immediate, but in a reflected form. Instead of being and nothing, we have now the forms of the positive and negative; instead of the there-existent (*Daseyn*), we now have existence.

Essence is reflected being, a reference to self, which, however, is mediated through a reference to something other which appears in it. This reflected reference to self we call *identity* (which is unsatisfactorily and abstractedly expressed in the so-called first principle of thought, that $A = A$). As a reference to self which is at the same time a distinction from self, this identity contains essentially the determination of difference. Immediate and external difference is *diversity*. Essential difference, the difference in itself, is *antithesis* (*positive and negative*). The self-opposition of the essence is *contradiction*. The antithesis of identity and distinction is reconciled in the conception of the ground. Since now the essence distinguishes itself from itself, we have the essence as identical with itself or the *ground*, and secondly, the essence as distinguished from itself or the *consequent*. In the category of ground and consequent the same thing, *i.e.*, the essence, is twice posited; the grounded and the ground are one and the same content, which makes it difficult to define the ground except through the consequent, or the consequent except through the ground. The two can, therefore, be divided only by a powerful abstraction; but because the two are identical, it is peculiarly a formalism to apply this category. If reflection would inquire after a ground, it is because it would see the thing as it were in a twofold relation, once in its immediateness, and then as posited through a ground.

(2) *Essence and Phenomenon*. — The *phenomenon* is the appearance which the essence fills, and which is hence no longer essenceless. There is no appearance without essence, and no essence which may not enter into phenomenon. It is one and the same content which at one time is taken as essence, and at another as phenomenon. In the phenomenal essence

we recognize the positive element which has hitherto been called ground, but which we now name *content*, and the negative element *form*. Every essence is a unity of content and form, *i.e.*, *it exists*. In distinction from immediate being, we call that being which has proceeded from some ground, *existence*, *i.e.*, grounded being. When we view the essence as existing, we call it *thing*. In the relation of a thing to its *properties* we have a repetition of the relation of form and content. The properties show us the thing in respect of its form, but it is properly thing only in respect of its content. The relation between the thing and its properties is commonly indicated by the verb *to have* (*e.g.*, the thing *has* properties), in order to distinguish between the two. The essence as a negative reference to itself, and as repelling itself from itself in order to a reflection in an *alterum*, is *power* and *expression*. In this category, as in all the other categories of essence, one and the same content is posited twice. Power can only be explained from expression, and expression only from power; consequently every explanation of which this category avails itself, is tautological. To regard power as uncognizable, is only a self-deception of the understanding respecting its own acts. — A higher expression for the category of power and expression is the category of *inner* and *outer*. The latter category stands higher than the former, because power needs some solicitation to express itself, but the inner is the essence spontaneously manifesting itself. Both of these, the inner and the outer, are also identical; neither is without the other. That, *e.g.*, which the man is internally in respect of his character, is he also externally in his action. The truth of this relation will be, therefore, the identity of inner and outer, of essence and phenomenon, *viz.* : —

(3) *Actuality*. — Actuality must be added as a *third* to being and existence. In the actuality, the phenomenon is a complete and adequate manifestation of the essence. The true actuality is, therefore (in opposition to *possibility* and *contingency*), a necessary being, a rational *necessity*. The well-

known Hegelian sentence that every thing actual is rational, and every thing rational is actual, is seen in this apprehension of "actuality" to be a simple tautology. The necessary, when posited as its own ground, identical with itself, is *substance*. The phenomenal side, the unessential in the substance, and the contingent in the necessary, are *accidents*. These are no longer related to the substance, as the phenomenon to the essence, or the outer to the inner, *i.e.*, as an adequate manifestation; they are only transitory affections of the substance, accidentally changing phenomenal forms, like waves on the surface of the sea. They are not produced by the substance, but rather disappear in it as their ground. The relation of substance leads to the relation of *cause*. In the relation of causality there is one and the same thing posited on the one side as *cause*, and on the other side as *effect*. The cause of warmth is warmth, and its effect is again warmth. Effect is a higher conception than accident, since it actually stands over against the cause, and the cause itself passes over into effect. So far, however, as each side in the relation of causality presupposes the other, we shall find the true relation one in which each side is at the same time cause and effect, *i.e.*, *reciprocal action*. Reciprocity is a higher relation than causality, because there is no pure causality. There is no action without counteraction. We leave the province of essence with the category of reciprocal action. All the categories of essence had shown themselves as a duplex of two sides, but when we come to the category of reciprocal action, the opposition between cause and effect is destroyed, and they meet together; unity thus takes again the place of duplicity. We have, therefore, again a being which dirempts itself into different self-subsistent factors, which are, however, immediately identical with it. This unity of the immediateness of being with the self-diremption of the essence is the *notion*.

3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION. — The notion is that in the other which is identical with itself. It is the substantial totality whose moments (singular, particular) are them-

selves the whole (the *universal*), — a totality which not only allows freedom to the difference, but reduces it again to unity in itself. The notion is (a) subjective, the unity of a manifold for itself, posited as form in abstraction from matter. (b) It is objectivity, — the notion in the form of immediateness, as the external unity of independent existences. (c) It is the Idea, the notion, which is itself objective, and reduces objective existence to a pure unity with itself, and which is no less immanent in the object than itself existent as the punctual unity of all reality.

(1) *The subjective notion* contains the elements of *universality* (self-identity in the difference), *particularity* (the difference which remains identical with the universal), and *singularity* (the self-subsistent being which unites in itself the universal and the particular, the genus and the species). The universal, independently expressed, is the notion as such. This one-sidedness is removed by the expression of the universal as actually inherent in a singular, as the predicate of a subject, or in the *judgment*. The judgment states the identity of the singular with the universal, and therefore the diremption of the universal into independent individuals which are identical with it, — the self-sundering of the notion. In the judgment the notion appears not as a mere abstraction, like substance, cause, and force; but as concrete, as immanent in individual existences, and maintaining a definite reality in a world of such. The one-sidedness of the judgment, as positing in itself the immediate identity of the individual and the universal, and hence, in reality, the separation of the two (the universal being more extensive than the individual, and the individual more concrete than the universal) is removed in the syllogism. In the syllogism the universal and the individual are mediated through the particular which appears as a notion intermediate between both.

The syllogism, therefore, exhibits the universal as realized in the individual by means of its particularization; or the singular as existing in the universal through the mediation

of the particular. The syllogism first completely expresses the nature of the notion, as being the differentiation of itself into a manifold, in which the singular through its particularity is as completely opposed to the universal, as it is joined to the universal through its identity with it. According to what precedes, the notion is not merely subjective, but possesses reality in the totality of being comprehended under it. Thus considered it is the objective notion.

(2) *Objectivity* is not being in general, but being which is complete in itself and ideally determined. Its first form is *mechanism*, the co-existence of independent individuals, which, though indifferent to one another, are held together in the unity of a whole (aggregate) by some common bond. This indifference is removed in *chemism*, which is the reciprocal attraction, interpenetration, and neutralization of the independent individuals, which thus constitute a unity. This unity, however, is only the negative resolution of individuals in a whole. The third form of objectivity is *teleology*, the *end* (corresponding to the syllogism), the notion which realizes itself, which reduces being to a mean for itself, and which preserves and completes itself in the process of the removal of the independence of the thing. The defect in the notion of end, or design, is that it is still in opposition to objectivity, as though this latter were something foreign to it. But when this defect is corrected there arises the conception of the end as immanent in objectivity, — of the notion which finds its own completion in objectivity, interpenetrating it and realizing itself in it; or, in other words, the *Idea*.

(3) The *Idea* is the highest logical definition of the absolute. It is neither merely subjective nor merely objective, but it is the notion which is immanent in the object, which allows the object complete independence, yet retains it just as completely in unity with itself. Its immediate form is life, organization, the immediate unity of the object with the notion which interpenetrates it as its *soul*, as the principle

of vitality. The notion, however, is not here at once posited for itself. The Idea as such, in contradistinction from the object, is *cognition*; the notion finding itself again in the object (idea of the *true*), and realizing itself in objectivity in order to remove the independence of the object, to reduce the real to conformity with the notion (idea of the *good*). This opposition of the Idea and the object is, however, one-sided. Cognition and action presuppose necessarily the identity of subjective and objective being. The supreme notion is, therefore, the *Absolute Idea*, the unity of life and cognition, the self-knowing and intelligently realized universal which is infinitely actual, yet distinguishes itself from this its immediate actuality.

The Idea realizing itself in immediate actuality is nature. As returning from nature to itself, and consciously closing itself together with itself, it is *spirit*.

II. THE SCIENCE OF NATURE. — Nature is the Idea in the form of differentiation, the notion which has advanced from its logical abstraction to real particularization, and has therefore become external to itself. The unity of the notion is therefore concealed in nature, and since philosophy makes it its problem to seek out the intelligence which is hidden in nature, and to follow out the process by which nature loses its own character and becomes mind, it should not forget that the essence of nature consists in being which has externalized itself, and that the products of nature neither have a reference to themselves, nor correspond to the notion, but grow up in unrestrained and unbridled contingency. Nature is a bacchanalian god who neither bridles nor checks himself. It therefore represents no intelligible succession, rising ever in regular order, but, on the contrary, it every where obliterates all essential limits by its doubtful structures, which always defy every fixed classification. Because it is thus impossible for nature to retain the strict determinations of the notion, the philosophy of nature is forced at every point, as it were, to capitulate between the world of concrete individual structures, and the regulative of the speculative idea.

The philosophy of nature has its beginning, its course, and its end. It begins with the first or immediate determination of nature, with the abstract universality of its being *extra se*, space and matter; its end is the dissevering of the mind from nature in the form of a rational and self-conscious individuality, — man; the problem which it has to solve is, to show the intermediate links between these two extremes, and to follow out successively the increasingly successful struggles of nature to raise itself to self-consciousness in man. In this process, nature passes through three principal stages.

1. MECHANICS, or matter and the ideal system of matter. Matter is the being *extra se* of nature, in its most universal form. Yet it shows at the outset that tendency to being *per se* which forms the guiding thread of natural philosophy, — gravity. Gravity is the being *in se* of matter; it is the desire of matter to come to itself, and shows the first trace of subjectivity. The centre of gravity of a body is *the one* which it seeks. This same tendency toward the reduction of multiplicity to being *per se* lies at the basis of the solar system and of universal gravitation. The centrality which is the fundamental conception of gravity, becomes here a system, which is in fact a rational system, so far as the form of the orbit, the rapidity of motion, or the time of revolution may be referred to mathematical laws.

2. PHYSICS. — But matter possesses no individuality. Even in astronomy it is not the bodies themselves, but only their geometrical relations which interest us. We have here at the outset to treat of quantitative and not yet of qualitative determinations. Yet in the solar system, matter has found its centre, itself. Its abstract and hollow being *in se* has resolved itself into form. Matter now, as possessing a quality, is an object of *physics*. In physics we have to do with matter which has particularized itself into a body, into an individuality. To this province belongs inorganic nature, its forms and reciprocal references.

3. ORGANICS. — Inorganic nature, which was the object of

physics, destroys itself in the chemical process. In the chemical process, the inorganic body loses all its properties (cohesion, color, lustre, resonance, transparency, &c.), and thus shows the evanescence of its existence and that relativity which is its being. This chemical process is overcome by the organic, the vital processes of nature. True, the living body is ever on the point of passing over to the chemical process; oxygen, hydrogen, and salts are always entering into a living organism, but their chemical action is always overcome; the living body resists the chemical process till it dies. Life is self-preservation, self-end. While therefore nature in physics had risen to individuality, in organics, it progresses to subjectivity. The idea, as life, presents itself in three stages.

(1) The general image of life in *geological* organism, or the *mineral kingdom*. Yet the mineral kingdom is the result, and the residuum of a process of life and formation already passed. The primitive rock is the stiffened crystal of life, and the geological earth is a giant corpse. The present life which produces itself eternally anew, breaks forth only as the first movement of subjectivity.

(2) In the organism of *plants* or the *vegetable kingdom*. The plant rises indeed to a formative process, to a process of assimilation and reproduction. But it is not yet a totality perfectly organized in itself. Each part of the plant is the whole individual, each twig is the whole tree. The parts are related indifferently to each other; the branch can become a root, and the root a branch. The plant, therefore, does not yet attain a true being *in se* of individuality; for, in order that this may be attained, an absolute unity of the individual is necessary. This unity, which constitutes an individual and concrete subjectivity, is first seen in, —

(3) The *animal* organism, the *animal kingdom*. An uninterrupted intussusception, free motion, and sensation, are first found in the animal organism. In its higher forms we find internal warmth and a voice. In its highest form, man, nature, or rather the spirit which works through nature, ap-

prehends itself as conscious individuality, as Ego. The spirit thus become a free and rational self, has now completed its self-emancipation from nature.

III. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. 1. THE SUBJECTIVE MIND.—The mind is the truth of nature ; the removal of its estrangement, the identification of itself with itself. Its formal essence, therefore, is freedom, the possibility of abstracting itself from every thing else ; its material essence is the capacity of manifesting itself as mind, as a conscious rationality, — of positing the intellectual universe as its kingdom, and of building a structure of objective rationality. In order, however, to know itself as the totality of reason, — in order to posit nature more and more negatively, the mind, like nature, must pass through a series of stages or emancipative acts. As it comes from nature and rises from its externality to being, *per se*, it is at first soul or spirit of nature, and as such, it is an object of *anthropology* in a strict sense. As this spirit of nature, it sympathizes with the general planetary life of the earth, and is in this respect subject to diversity of climate, and change of seasons and days ; it sympathizes with the geographical portion of the world which it occupies, *i.e.*, it is related to a diversity of race ; still farther, it bears a national type, and is moreover determined by mode of life, formation of the body, etc., while these natural conditions work also upon its intelligent and moral character. Lastly, we must here take notice of the way in which nature has determined the individual subject, *i.e.*, his natural temperament, character, idiosyncrasy, etc. To this belong the natural changes of life, age, sexual relation, sleep, and waking. In all this the mind is still buried in nature, and this middle condition between being *per se* and the sleep of nature, is sensation, the hollow forming of the mind in its unconscious and unenlightened (*verstandlos*) individuality. A higher stage of sensation is feeling, *i.e.*, sensation *in se*, where being *per se* appears ; feeling in its completed form is self-feeling. Since the subject, in self-feeling, is buried in the peculiarity of his sensations, but at

the same time comprehends himself within himself, as a subjective unity, the self-feeling is seen to be the preliminary step to consciousness. The Ego now appears as the shaft in which all these sensations, representations, cognitions, and thoughts are preserved, which is with them all, and constitutes the centre in which they all come together. The mind as conscious, as a conscious being *per se*, as Ego, is the object of the *phenomenology* of consciousness (which here within narrower limits, reappears as a division of psychology).

The mind was individual, so long as it was interwoven with nature ; it is consciousness or Ego when it has divested itself of nature. When distinguishing itself from nature, the mind withdraws itself into itself, and that with which it was formerly interwoven, and which gave it a peculiar (earthly, national, &c.) determination, stands now distinct from it, as its external world (earth, people, &c.). The awaking of the Ego is thus the act by which the objective world, as such, is created ; while on the other hand, the Ego awakens to a conscious subjectivity only *in* the objective world, and in distinction from it. The Ego, as contradistinguished from the objective world, is consciousness in the strict sense of the word. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness by passing through the stages of immediate sensuous consciousness, perception, and understanding, to the pure thought of personality, to the knowledge of itself as a free Ego. Again, self-consciousness becomes universal or rational self-consciousness as follows : In its strivings to appropriate objectivity and obtain for itself recognition as a free subject, it falls in conflict with other self-consciousnesses, and begins a war of extermination against them, but rises from this *bellum omnium contra omnes* (the violent beginning of the state), as common consciousness, as the discovery of the proper mean between command and obedience, *i.e.*, as truly universal, rational self-consciousness. The rational self-consciousness is actually free, because it no longer comports itself toward others selfishly, but recognizes the identity of others with itself ; in

others it beholds itself opposed to itself; it emancipates itself from the limitation of its own natural Egohood. We have now mind as mind, divested of its naturalness and subjectivity, and as such, it is an object of *Pneumatology*.

Mind is at first theoretical mind, or intelligence, and then practical mind, or will. It is theoretical in that it has to do with the rational as something given, and now posits it as its own; it is practical in that it immediately wills the subjective content (truth), which it has as its own, to be freed from its one-sided subjective form, and transformed into an objective. The practical mind is, so far, the truth of the theoretical. The theoretical mind, in its way to the practical, passes through the stages of intuition, representation, and thought; and the will on its side forms itself into a free will through impulse, desire, and inclination. The free will, as possessing existence, is the *objective mind*, right, and the state. In right, morals and the state, freedom, reason, the idea of the good are realized; the rational will is brought to external objectivity, to existence in real universal forms of life (institutions). Every natural determination and impulse now becomes moralized, and comes up to view again as ethical institute, as right and duty (the sexual impulse now appears as marriage and the family, and the impulse of revenge as civil punishment, &c.).

2. THE OBJECTIVE MIND. — (1) The immediate objective being of the free will as actual, and in its freedom actually and universally (legally) recognized, is (legal) *right*. The individual, so far as he is capable of rights, so far as he has rights and exercises them, is a person. The rule of right is, therefore, be a person and have respect to other persons. The person allows himself an external sphere for his freedom, a substratum in which he can exercise his will: as property, possession. As a person I have the right of possession, the absolute right of appropriation, the right to cast my will over every thing, which thereby becomes mine. But I have equally the right to dispossess myself of my property in favor

of another person. This happens in the case of possession through *contract*, in which freedom, the right to dispose of property arbitrarily is first realized. The relation of contract is the first step towards the state, but only the *first* step, for if we should define the state as a compact of all with all, this would sink it in the category of private rights and private property. It does not depend upon the will of the individual whether he will live in the state or not. The relation of contract refers to private property. In a contract, therefore, two wills merge themselves in a common will, which as such becomes a right. But just here lies also the possibility of a conflict between the individual will and the right or the universal will. The separation of the two is a wrong (civil wrong, fraud, crime). This separation demands a reconciliation, a restoration of the right or the universal will from its momentary suppression or negation by the particular will. The right restoring itself in respect of the particular will, and establishing a negation of the wrong, is punishment. Those theories, which found the right of punishment in some end of warning or improvement, mistake the essence of punishment. Threatening, warning, &c., are finite ends, *i.e.*, means, and moreover uncertain means : but an act of righteousness should not be made a means ; righteousness is not exercised in order that any thing other than itself shall be gained. The fulfilment and self-manifestation of righteousness is absolute end, self-end. The particular views we have mentioned, can only be considered in reference to the mode of punishment. The punishment which is inflicted on a criminal, is *his* right, *his* rationality, *his* law, under which he should be subsumed. His act comes back upon himself. Hegel also defends capital punishment, whose abolition seemed to him an untimely sentimentalism.

(2) The opposition of the universal and particular will transferred within the subject constitutes *morality*. In morality the freedom of the will becomes a self-determination of the subject ; it is the negation of the externality of the (legal)

right, — the will turned back upon itself, and determining its acts in accordance with ends and its own conviction of right and duty. The moral standpoint is the standpoint of conscience, it is the right of the subjective will, the right of a free ethical decision. In the consideration of strict right, it is no inquiry what my principle or my view might be, but in morality the question is at once directed towards the purpose and moving-spring of the will. Hegel calls this standpoint of moral reflection and of action determined in accordance with motives and duty, — morality, in distinction from a substantial, unconditioned, and reflecting observance of ethical rules. This standpoint has three elements ; (1) the element of resolution, where we consider the inner determination of the acting subject, which allows an act to be ascribed only to me, and the blame of it to rest only on my will (imputation) ; (2) the element of purpose and well-being, in so far as I recognize the act and its consequence as mine alone, as inwardly designed by me ; and in so far as I have the right to realize through my act the object of my desire (not to be sacrificed to abstract right) ; (3) the element of the good in so far as it is to be expected that the subjective will (just because being reflected in itself it is the deciding will) shall hold its subjective aims in harmony with the universal. The good is the unity of the particular subjective will with the universal will, or with the notion of the will ; in other words, to will the rational is good. Opposed to this is evil, or the elevation of the subjective will above the universal, the attempt to set up the peculiar and individual choice as absolute ; in other words, to will the irrational is evil.

(3) In morality we had the good and the will standing abstractly over against each other. The will as free is equally the possibility of evil. The good is merely an ought-to-be, not yet an actuality. Morality is thus a one-sided standpoint. The higher concrete identity of the good and the will, the union of subjective and objective good, is *ethics*. In ethics the good becomes an actuality ; it assumes the form of ethical

institutions within which the will lives; so that the good becomes for consciousness a second nature, and morality is converted into character, into sentiment and ethical principle.

The ethical mind is seen at first immediately, or in a natural form, as marriage and the *family*. Three elements unite in marriage, which should not be separated, and which are so often and so wrongly isolated. Marriage is (1) a sexual relation, and is founded upon a difference of sex, in which the ethical element is, that the subject instead of isolating himself, finds his true being in his natural universality, in his relation to the species; (2) it is a civil contract, particularly as regards community of property; (3) it is a spiritual communion of love and confidence. Yet Hegel lays no great stress upon subjective sentiment in concluding upon marriage, for a reciprocal affection will spring up in the married life. It is more ethical when a determination to marry is first, and a definite personal affection follows afterwards; for marriage is most prominently duty. Hegel would, therefore, place the greatest obstacles in the way of a dissolution of marriage. He has also developed and described in other respects the nature of the family with a profound ethical feeling.

When the family becomes separated into a multitude of families, it is a *civil society*, in which the members, though still independent individuals, are bound in unity by their wants, by the restrictions of law as a means of security for person and property, and by an outward administrative arrangement. Hegel distinguished civil society from the state, in opposition to most modern theorists upon the subject, who, regarding it as the great end of the state to give security of property and of personal freedom, reduce the state to a civil society. But from the standpoint of civil society, which is a union from necessity and for the preservation of mutual rights, war, for example, is inconceivable. On the ground of civil society each one stands for himself, is independent, and makes himself end, while every thing else is a means for him. But the state, on the contrary, knows no independent individuals, each

one of whom may regard and pursue only his own well-being ; but in the state, the whole is the end, and the individual is the means. — For the administration of justice, Hegel, in opposition to those of our time who deny the right of legislation, would have written and intelligible laws, which should be within reach of every one ; still farther, justice should be administered by a public trial by jury. — In respect of the organization of civil society, Hegel expresses a great preference for corporate life. Sanctity of marriage, he says, and honor in corporations, are the two elements around which the disorganization of civil society turns.

Civil society passes over into the *state* when the interest of the individual loses itself in the idea of an ethical whole. The state is the ethical idea actualized, it is the ethical mind as it rules over the action and knowledge of the individuals comprehended in it. Finally, states themselves, since they appear as individuals in an attracting or repelling relation to each other, represent, in their destiny, in their rise and fall, the process of the *world's history*.

In his apprehension of the state, Hegel approached very near the ancient notion, which merged the individual and the right of individuality wholly in the will of the state. He held fast to the omnipotence of the state in the ancient sense. Hence his opposition to modern liberalism, to the claims, criticisms, and assertions of superior wisdom on the part of individuals. The state is with Hegel the rational and ethical substance in which the individual has to live ; it is the existing reason to which the individual has to submit himself with a free insight. He regarded a limited monarchy as the best form of government, after the manner of the English constitution, to which Hegel was especially inclined, and in reference to which he uttered his well-known saying that the king was but the dot upon the i. There must be an individual, Hegel supposes, who can *affirm* for the state, who can prefix an “ *I will* ” to the resolves of the state, and who can be the head of a formal decision. The personality of a state, he

says, "is only actual as a person, as monarch." Hence Hegel defends hereditary monarchy, but he places the nobility by its side as a mediating element between people and prince, — not, indeed, to control or limit the government, nor to maintain the rights of the people, but only that the people may be sure that they are well governed, that the consciousness of the people may be with the government, and that the state may enter into the subjective consciousness of the people.

States and the minds of individual races pour their currents into the stream of the world's history. The strife, the victory, and the subjection of the spirits of individual races, and the passing over of the world spirit from one people to another, is the content of the world's history. The development of the world's history is generally connected with some ruling race, which carries in itself the world spirit in its present stage of development, and in distinction from which the spirits of other races have no rights. Thus these race-spirits stand around the throne of the absolute spirit, as the executors of its actualization, as the witnesses and adornment of its glory.

3. THE ABSOLUTE MIND. — Mind is absolute in so far as it returns from the sphere of objectivity to itself, to the ideality of cognition, to the knowledge of the Absolute Idea as the truth of all being. The subjugation of natural subjectivity through the observance of ethical and political laws, is the method by which the mind elevates itself to this pure freedom, to the knowledge of its ideal nature as the absolute. The first stage of the absolute spirit is *art*, the immediate intuition of the Idea in objective actuality. The second is *religion*, the certainty of the Idea as superior to all immediate reality, as the absolute power of being which subordinates to itself every thing particular and finite. The third is *philosophy*, the unity of the first two, the knowledge of the Idea as the absolute which is just as truly pure thought as it is immediately all reality.

(1) *Art*.—The absolute is immediately present to the sensuous intuition as the beautiful or as art. The beautiful is the appearance of the idea through a sensible medium (stone, color, tone, poetry); it is the idea actualized in the form of a limited phenomenon. To the beautiful (and to its subordinate kinds, the simply beautiful, the sublime, and the comic) two factors always belong, thought and matter; but both these are inseparable from each other; the matter is the outer manifestation of the thought, and should express nothing but the thought which inspires it and shines through it. The different ways in which matter and form are connected, furnish the different forms of art. In the symbolic form of art the matter preponderates; the thought presses through it, and brings out the ideal only with difficulty. In the classic form of art, the ideal has attained its adequate existence in the matter; content and form are absolutely suited to each other. Lastly, in romantic art, the mind preponderates, and the matter is a mere appearance and sign through which the mind everywhere breaks out, and struggles up above the material. The system of particular arts is connected with the different forms of art; but the distinction of one particular art from another depends especially upon the difference of the material.

(a) The beginning of art is *Architecture*. It belongs essentially to the symbolic form of art, since in it the sensible matter far preponderates, and it first seeks the true conformity between content and form. Its material is stone, which it fashions according to the laws of gravity. Hence it has the character of magnitude, of silent earnestness, of oriental sublimity.

(b) *Sculpture*.—The material of this art is also stone, but it advances from the inorganic to the organic. It gives the stone a bodily form, and makes it only a vehicle of thought. In sculpture, the material, the stone, since it represents the body, that building of the soul, in its clearness and beauty, disappears wholly in the ideal; there is nothing left of the material which does not serve the idea.

(c) *Painting*. — This is pre-eminently a romantic art. It represents, as sculpture cannot do, the life of the soul, the look, the disposition, the heart. Its medium is no longer a coarse material substratum, but the colored surface, and the spiritual play of light and shade ; it gives the *appearance* only of complete spacial dimension. Hence it is able to represent in a complete dramatic movement the whole scale of feelings, conditions of heart, and actions.

(d) *Music*. — This has nothing to do with relations of space. Its material is sound, the vibration of a sonorous body. It leaves, therefore, the field of sensuous intuition, and works exclusively upon sensation. Its sphere is the breast of the sensitive soul. Music is the most subjective art.

(e) Lastly, in *Poetry*, the tongue of art is loosed ; poetry can represent every thing. Its material is not the mere sound, but the sound as word, as the sign of a representation, as the expression of reason. But this material cannot be formed at random, but only in verse according to certain rhythmical and musical laws. In poetry, all other arts unite ; as epic, representing in a pleasing and extended narrative the figurative history of races, it corresponds to the plastic arts ; as lyric, expressing some inner condition of soul, it corresponds to music ; as dramatic poetry, exhibiting the struggles between characters acting out of directly opposite interests, it is the union of both these arts.

(2) *Philosophy of Religion*. — Poetry forms the transition from art to religion. In art the idea was present for the intuition, in religion it is present for conception. The content of every religion is the inward exaltation of the mind to the absolute, as the all-comprehending substance of existence which reconciles all antitheses, — the conscious unity of the subject with God. All religions seek a union of the divine and the human. This was done in the crudest form by —

(a) The natural religions of the oriental world. God is, with them, but a power of nature, a substance of nature, in comparison with which the finite and the individual disappear as nothing.

(b) A higher idea of God is attained by the religions of spiritual individuality, in which the Deity is looked upon as subject, — as an exalted subjectivity, full of power and wisdom in Judaism, the religion of sublimity; as a circle of plastic divine forms in the Grecian religion, the religion of beauty; as an absolute end of the state in the Roman religion, the religion of the understanding or of conformity to design.

(c) The revealed or Christian religion first establishes a positive reconciliation between God and the world, by beholding the actual unity of the divine and the human in the person of Christ, the God-man, and apprehending God as the self-externalizing (incarnate) Idea, which from this externalization eternally returns back into itself, *i.e.*, as the triune God. The intellectual content of revealed religion, or of Christianity, is thus the same as that of speculative philosophy; the only difference being, that in the one case the content is represented in the form of the representation, in the form of a history; while, in the other, it appears in the form of the notion. Stripped of its form of religious representation, we have now the standpoint of —

(3) *The Absolute Philosophy*, or the thought knowing itself as all truth, and reproducing the whole natural and intellectual universe from itself, having the system of philosophy for its development, — a closed circle of circles.

With Schelling and Hegel closes the history of philosophy. The philosophical developments which have succeeded them, and which are partly a carrying out of their systems, and partly the attempt to lay a new basis for philosophy, belong to the present, and not yet to history.

APPENDIX.



I.

REACTION AGAINST HEGEL.

THE claim of Hegelianism to be the completion of philosophy has not been historically justified. On the contrary, the rejection of Hegel's theories by the scientific world has been complete and striking. Even before his death the opposing tendencies of the age, which the sudden and brilliant success of his doctrines had rather hidden from sight than overcome, aided by numerous defections within the ranks of his own school, had materially weakened his influence ; and the reaction thus begun, rapidly advanced until, within less than thirty years, his authority was almost wholly destroyed. To-day, although his indirect influence in Germany and elsewhere is still vast, but few of his doctrines are generally admitted to be valid principles of science.

The grounds of this reaction are to be found, partly in the opposition of Hegelianism to the growing social, political, and religious radicalism of the present age ; but more fundamentally, in certain special internal weaknesses of that system itself. The most important of these are, in brief, the following two : (1) Hegel's philosophy was based upon a one-sided interpretation of Kant. In the *Logik* and *Naturphilosophie*, the idealistic element of Kant's system, the apriority and spontaneity of pure thought, was made superior to the corresponding realistic element, and posited as the ground from which this latter is to be logically deduced. But in this the

peculiar standpoint of Kant was altogether abandoned. For the entire significance of the *Critique* — if we are to believe Kant's own words — rests upon the fact that it posits these elements as coördinate, and their relation as that of reciprocal determination. It was, therefore, as a result of the supremacy which Kant still maintained over the German mind, inevitable, that when the real antagonism between the two systems should be clearly appreciated, a reaction toward the true Kantian theory would set in, which would also pass beyond this to an extreme position on its realistic side. This has, in fact, occurred, and it is one of the prime causes of the downfall of the Hegelian philosophy. (2) The central doctrine of Hegelianism, viz., that *knowledge* is possible through pure thought alone (which was the immediate result of this subordination of Kant's realism to his idealism), involved consequences which it is impossible for modern thought to admit. It involved, that is, on the one hand, the possibility of absolute knowledge, the possibility of realizing in thought the totality of those principles by means of which the essential being of all that is can be rendered intelligible and explicable; and, on the other, as an obvious inference from this possibility, the assumption that not only can the physical as well as the purely speculative sciences be determined *a priori*, but that the same *method* is applicable in both cases. But the first of these consequences is not only antagonistic to the insuperable realistic prejudices of the human mind, but is also a contradiction of the fundamental principles upon which the development of modern thought, since the time of Descartes and Bacon, has proceeded; while the falsity of the second is demonstrated by the history of the inductive sciences. It is, in fact, in this bold contradiction of the firmly established realism of modern thought, and especially of inductive science, that the chief cause of the reaction against Hegel is to be found. For the physical sciences the test of truth is conformity to the actual as determined by observation and experiment; and it was the impossibility of making

Hegel's physical theories conform to this test, that most clearly betrayed the inadequacy of his position. Other causes might be cited, but these two are in themselves a sufficient explanation of the anti-Hegelian movement.

These grounds for the reaction against Hegel also explain the more important developments of thought which have followed it. Its immediate effect, in Germany, has been the introduction of the greatest confusion into philosophy, and an apparent suspension of all continuous development of speculative thought. The abandonment of Hegel meant logically, the rejection, at least for the starting-point of philosophy, of those abstract conceptions whose logical connection had formed the ground of the entire development of idealistic speculation from Descartes to Hegel, and of which Hegelianism itself was the most perfect logical exposition. But when this standpoint was rejected no other historic tendency was left, except the empiricism of Locke, which the majority of Hegel's opponents were not prepared to adopt. Hence there resulted the widest individualism and eclecticism; each philosopher developed for himself an independent standpoint, based upon some special line of inquiry which seemed to him to promise valuable results. Of the numerous theories which have thus arisen, many, even the most original, are closely connected with some one of the more prominent of the Pre-Hegelian systems, — especially with Plato, Aristotle, Bruno, Spinoza, or Leibnitz; others are perpetuations, in special directions, of the doctrines of the Hegelian and Herbartian schools; while others still are attempts to return to the critical standpoint, or are expositions of empiricism and materialism. In this chaos of opinions, however, certain lines of thought, closely connected, as has been said, with the reaction against Hegel, can be traced, which not only exhibit a logical and consecutive development, but also express very clearly the underlying tendencies of cotemporary thought and formulate the problems of which the new epoch upon which philosophy is now entering must inevitably attempt the solu-

tion. Of these two will be briefly expounded in the following sections. The *first* originated in an attempt to construct a speculative system upon that part of Kant's theory which idealism rejected, *i.e.*, upon the conception of a thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself was posited by it as the absolutely real, as the ground of all being, and its relation to the subjective and objective world as that of substance to its accidents. In this it differs little from Spinozism. But in its discussion of this substance it advanced beyond the negative position of Spinoza, and treated it positively as a pure *activity*, as Force. It thus makes explicit the idea of *will* as not merely an ideal determination of thought but as essentially *the* principle of reality in mind and nature, — an idea which may be taken as the central speculative conception of the present age. We have, then, given as the fundamental characteristic of this movement speculative realism, and on the problem of which it proposes the solution, the relation between the will as a conscious activity and that activity or force which constitutes the substance of things. The *second* originated in that alliance between philosophical empiricism and physical science which began with Bacon, and which has resulted in the complete subordination of the former to the latter. It claims to limit all knowledge to the data of the sense, and therefore assumes toward all the higher problems of philosophy, the attitude of agnosticism. But the problem it proposes is one of great speculative import, *viz.*, the subsumption of the phenomena of mind under mechanical laws correlative to the mechanical laws of the phenomena of matter; in other words it asserts the conception of *mechanical connection* to be the starting-point of philosophy as well as of physics. Both these movements are, so far as they are yet developed, realistic and pantheistic (more strictly atheistic); and each is in a different way the logical opposite of Hegelianism, — the first, in that it exalts the thing-in-itself above the subject, and the will above the idea, and the second, in that it asserts the supremacy of the mechanical relations of things over the ideal

relations of thoughts. The first is represented by *Schopenhauer* and *Hartmann*. The second, which is a general movement of the age, is most clearly stated by French and English thinkers, the most prominent of whom are *Comte*, *J. S. Mill*, and *Spencer*, who reached their standpoint by a logical procession from Locke, and in entire independence of German philosophy.

The interesting speculative attempt of the American philosopher, L. P. Hickok, to reconcile the idealism of Hegel with the mechanical realism of Spencer by means of the conception of substance as force, thus uniting in one the leading speculative directions of the present age, will also be briefly noticed.

II.

SCHOPENHAUER.

THE attempt to introduce systematic unity into Kant's philosophy by rejecting one or more of its contradictory elements, was the starting-point of all subsequent speculative thought in Germany. By rejecting the thing-in-itself, and holding to the pure spontaneity of the Ego as the only reality, J. G. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel established a system of speculative idealism (*cf.* Sects. XLI., XLIII., XLIV., XLV.). On the other hand, by emphasizing the being of the object, Herbart developed an abstract realism (*cf.* Sect. XLII.). A third attempt to simplify Kant's theory, different from the Fichtian and Herbartian, yet closely allied to both, is that of *Arthur Schopenhauer*. Like the *Wissenschaftslehre*, Schopenhauer's system is a subjective idealism, but differs from it in resting, not on the spontaneity, but on the passivity of the subject. It is a sensuous rather than a

speculative idealism. On the other hand, it retains, in a modified form, the thing-in-itself, and arrives ultimately at a realism as rigid as that of Herbart.

Schopenhauer was born in Danzig, Feb. 22, 1788. His father was one of the principle merchants of that city. His mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, was a woman of considerable intellectual power, the friend and favorite of Goethe, and was once famous as a novelist. In 1809, Schopenhauer matriculated in the medical faculty of the University of Göttingen, and devoted himself to the study of the sciences. Later he took up the study of philosophy under the direction of the Kantian, G. E. Schulze, who advised him to study Plato and Kant, and avoid every other philosopher,—“advice which Schopenhauer never repented having followed.” In 1811 he went to Berlin, having been attracted thither by the fame of J. G. Fichte, in whom, however, he was disappointed, being repelled by his mannerism and obscurity. He took his degree at Jena in 1813, presenting as his graduating thesis a treatise on *The fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which is one of the best of his writings. The first part of his chief work, *The World as Will and Representation*, appeared in 1819; to this a second part was added in 1844. Returning (1820) to Berlin, he lectured as *privat-docent* during one semester, but was overshadowed by the fame of Hegel and Schleiermacher who were then teaching in the university. On the approach of the cholera (1831) he went to Frankfort, where he passed the remainder of his life in retirement. He died on the 22d of September, at the age of seventy-two. In Schopenhauer's personal character there is little that is estimable. He was a man of great intellectual power, but of a gloomy and passionate temperament, which was intensified by an hereditary tendency to hypochondria. His ill humor was also increased by the unmerited neglect with which all his works were, at first, received. During the last years of his life, however, the importance of his system was recognized, and he suddenly

became famous. His death, as he himself prophesied, was his apotheosis. As a thinker Schopenhauer ranks among the first of Post-Kantian philosophers, and as a writer, in perspicuity and brilliancy of style, he is not surpassed by any. (His other works are a *Theory of Vision and Colors*, in which Goethe's attack upon the Newtonian theory is defended: *Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, and *Parerga and Paralipomena*.)

Though professing to derive his philosophy directly from the Critique of Reason, Schopenhauer, like Fichte, subjects Kant's theory to a very one-sided interpretation. According to him Kant's most important contribution to philosophy was the separation of phenomena from things-in-themselves. The universe in space and time is, he asserts, as such, nothing but a representation, possessing in itself no independent reality: it is only when it is *perceived*. For the phenomenal, however, as its source and substance, there must be admitted a noumenon, a thing-in-itself; this was also the doctrine of Kant. But in the discussion of this thing-in-itself, says Schopenhauer, Kant made two radical mistakes. (a) He treats it realistically as an object-in-itself, as an objectively existing (particular) thing; whereas, according to his own showing, both the relation of subject and object, and the grounds of all particularity, space, and time, are wholly relative to the act of perception. The true doctrine is, that the object is absolutely, and not merely formally, as with Kant, conditioned by the subject. (b) He assumes that this object-in-itself is related to phenomena, as cause to effect; forgetting that, according to his own theory, causality also is a wholly subjective (ideal) category and can therefore have no valid transcendent application. The true thing-in-itself, on the other hand, according to Schopenhauer, is not an *object per se* but the Will, — not conscious, personal will, however, but will as a blind, unconscious force. Will is substance, the absolute; it alone is, and all things else are its manifestations. Since particularity exists only in the representation,

in phenomena, into this will, this eternal substance of things, no differences and distinctions can enter; it is "the one and all." If, therefore, on its idealistic side Schopenhauer's system is Kantian, it is on its realistic side a pantheism which must be classed with the systems of Giordano Bruno and Spinoza. In the interpretation of Kant's idealism, also, Schopenhauer departs widely from the peculiar principles of the *Critique*. He not only destroys Kant's elaborate deduction of the categories, reducing them all to that of causality, at the same time rejecting the *ideas of reason*, together with all the complicated arguments which Kant had elaborated for their exposition and defence as regulative principles of knowledge; but he even reduces causality itself to an *a priori* form of intuition coördinate with space and time. All spontaneity of thought in the Kantian sense is, therefore, with him abandoned: knowledge is limited, not simply to experience, — as with Kant, — but to that which is immediately intuited: sensation is asserted to be the source of all conceptions. His philosophy is thus, from this point of view, a complete empiricism. Schopenhauer thus wanders as far from the true Kantian position as did Fichte, though in the opposite direction. His theories of æsthetics and ethics are based upon his doctrine of the will, and, in their main features, are borrowed, as he says, the former from Plato and the latter from the speculations of the Buddhists.

I. *The World as Representation*. — The fundamental principle of Schopenhauer's theoretical philosophy is expressed in the propositions "The world is my representation," — "no object without a subject." This principle of the phenomenality of all particular existence, has, among modern philosophers, been most ably expounded by Berkeley, and to him Schopenhauer acknowledges his indebtedness. But, on the other hand, Schopenhauer claims that all previous idealists have erred in identifying phenomenality with subjectivity. The representation is not as they suppose wholly subjective; it is neither a subjective symbol of an

objectively-existing thing, nor a modification of the subject without any corresponding reality. On the contrary, the relation of subject and object exist only *in* the representation: they are the two correlative parts of which it is the unity; thus, while it is true that there is no object without a subject, it is equally true that there is no subject without an object. The word phenomenon or representation includes both terms as distinctions immanent in itself. In other words, the relation of subject to object itself contributes phenomenality. Subject and object both proceed from and are together the manifestation of the infinite substance or will, which in itself is neither subject nor object. The world is *my* representation; but *I* am only when I represent.

From this principle of the equal originality of subject and object is deduced the falsity of both materialism and spiritualism (*i.e.*, idealism as commonly understood). Materialism assumes that the object produces the subject, while (as with Fichte) spiritualism assumes that the subject produces the object. But the former is impossible because it makes the cognizing subject the product of that which exists only by and for its cognition; it is, moreover, an attempt to explain the immediate by the mediate, the more by the less known; and the latter is absurd since the asserted causal connection is itself possible only through that which it is adduced to explain, *i.e.*, through the relation of subject to object, or the representation. The truth is that mind and matter are correlative; they are properly one and the same thing viewed from different sides. The world philosophically considered is divisible, not into thought and extension, mind and matter, but into the *real* world or things-in-themselves (the Will), and the *ideal* world or the representation, which includes all phenomena both subjective and objective.

In the synthesis of the representation, however, subject and object, though equally original, are not strictly coördinate. On the contrary, the former holds to the latter the relation of the conditioning to the conditioned. The subject conditions

the object both “materially” and “formally,” — materially in that its existence is the necessary condition for the existence of the object — (the object is only *in* the subject) ; and formally in that the object is known only through relations which are contributed to it by the subject, or, in Kantian terms, through *a priori* forms of intuition ; that is, both the existence of the object as such and its mode of existence are determined through the subject. The subject is the “upholder” though not the creator of the world. Schopenhauer’s system is thus a transcendental idealism. The formal conditions of objectivity contributed by the subject are time, space, and causality. Time is the form of internal, and space of external phenomena, while causality is the form of all action and change. (The ideality of time, according to Schopenhauer, appears most clearly in the physical law of inertia. For the import of this law is that time of itself can produce no alteration of the states of a given body. But if time can *do* nothing, it can have its real being. A similar argument applies to space.) The subject as such is independent of time, space, and causality. Psychologically considered, time and space are the *a priori* conditions under which alone an object can exist for a subject, *i.e.*, they are the universal *a priori* forms of all representation. Metaphysically considered, they are the only *principia individuationis*, the universal conditions of particularity ; *this* is distinct from *that* only when it occupies a separate place or a different time. In themselves space and time have no point of union ; in time there is no co-existence, in space no sequence. The union of the two, as in motion and all physical action, is therefore only possible in a third, namely, causality or matter. Physical causation is with Schopenhauer identical with matter ; not with matter apprehended as the thing-in-itself, for, from this point of view it is identical with will, but with matter considered as the abstract *substratum* of action in general : matter in nothing but intuited causality. Causation is what the understanding recognizes as both the condition and essence of all dynamical action.

Through the intuition of causality, therefore, first arises the conception of a material universe in time and space; and since causality is universal, every thing, whether subjective or objective, must be material.

In its higher relations causality appears as the law of *sufficient reason*, which is the highest principle of cognition and therefore of all phenomenal existence. According to Schopenhauer this law expresses "the essential form of every object, the general kind and mode of all objective existence." That is, no phenomenon can exist independently, but for each there must be others, which are the ground of its existence, and of its existing just as it exists and not in some other way. Only when its ground is discovered does a phenomenon become intelligible. This principle of sufficient reason, says Schopenhauer, is *a priori*, since it is universal and necessary; it cannot be derived from experience, since it is the fundamental condition of experience. It is the ultimate "category" from which all the others can be derived. In its application to phenomena it assumes a four-fold form. (1) The ground or sufficient reason is *ratio fiendi* or ground of becoming (change). No event in the universe occurs or can be conceived as possible, except through the pre-supposition of certain antecedent events by which its being is wholly conditioned. In other words, the law of cause and effect, as commonly understood, is the universal and invariable law of phenomena, both subjective and objective. More particularly the ground of becoming is (a) *causality* in the more restricted sense of purely mechanical causation. From the law of causality thus apprehended follow the law of inertia and the indestructibility of matter, which, together with the laws of gravitation, cohesion, &c., are, according to Schopenhauer, *a priori* data of knowledge. (b) In the organic world it is *stimulation*, e.g., the growth of an organism is not, as the law of physical causation would require, exactly proportional to the light, heat, food, &c., with which it is supplied: these external conditions of life are *stimuli* rather than causes. (c) It is *motivation*. By

this is meant the incitement of an individual, by external inducements, to the attainment of objects distant in time or place. Motives are stimuli which affect the organism through the medium of consciousness. (2) The ground is *ratio cognoscendi* or *ground of knowledge*. Here the relation of cause to effect as it exists in the physical world is reversed, for the perceived physical effect becomes in cognition the ground (cause) of my knowledge of its antecedent cause. The ground as *ratio cognoscendi* relates wholly to the logical function of judgment. When a judgment rests upon a ground or sufficient reason, it is said to be true. According to Schopenhauer, there are four modes of truth in propositions: (a) *logical*, when a proposition is a valid conclusion from given premises, the ground of truth being in this case the formal accuracy of the deduction; (b) *empirical*, when the ground of the proposition is an immediate perception; (c) *transcendental*, when the proposition is grounded upon *a priori* relations of thought; (d) *metalogical*, when it is grounded upon the fundamental axioms of logical thinking, namely, the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. (3) The ground is *ratio essendi* or *ground of being*. This relates to the necessary relations involved in the *a priori* intuitions, time and space. Thus, for example, the ground of the equality of the angles of a triangle is the equality of its sides, and *vice versa*; the position of every point in space or time is determined by, or has its ground in, the positions of all other points, &c. The ground of being, thus, transcends the conception of change, of physical causation and logical sequence, and rests upon the eternal and immutable conditions of objective and subjective existence. (4) Lastly, the ground is *ratio agendi* or *ground of action*. With this we return to motivation, viewing it, however, not as before, objectively, but subjectively, as conscious *volition*. The will in itself, as substance, is free: but particular volitions are phenomena, and are therefore subject to the law of the ground. Volitions are determined by the strongest motive just as absolutely as are

physical effects by their causes. In fact it is in volition that the relation of causality is most clearly seen; for volition is the actual genesis, under the eye of internal intuition of an effect from its cause. "Motivation is causality viewed from within."

The world of particulars, then, metaphysically considered is a representation whose immanent (constitutive) forms are the relations of subject and object, time, space, and causality. Viewed from the standpoint of subjective cognition, representations can be divided into two classes, namely, *intuitive* and *abstract*. The faculties of intuitive cognition are the *sense* and *understanding*. Sense, as such, is mere receptivity, and of itself is inadequate to perception; only when the understanding immediately intuits in sensation a relation of causality does the world as object in space and time arise and perception become complete. This intuition of causality is the sole function of the understanding. The faculty of abstract thought or mediate cognition is *reason*, which like the understanding has only one function, that, namely, of forming conceptions. Reason is the source of all knowledge of the abstract, and, therefore, of all science in so far as this latter consists in the subsumption of the special under the more general. Schopenhauer's philosophy thus, apart from the assumed apriority of the forms of intuition, is a thorough-going empiricism.

II. *The World as Will*. — If the sole function of the subject were that of passive representation as above expounded, the only possible result for philosophy would be a phenomenalism which denies to phenomena any *real* ground, *i.e.*, nihilism. But the subject is not merely theoretical; it is also *practical*; it acts, it wills, and every such action or volition presupposes as its ultimate source an absolute activity which as such is altogether independent of the conditions of phenomenality. Particular *volitions*, it is true, since they are possible only through the conditions of particularity, space and time, exist only in the representation, and are therefore,

as above stated, subject to the law of the ground ; but in themselves as acts of *will*, as manifestations of an inner being of the subject (or as Schopenhauer otherwise expresses it, as related to man's intelligible character), they are absolute and uncaused. In this absoluteness of the will-in-itself, says Schopenhauer, the subject, by a transcendent act of cognition, — of which no account can be given, since it negates the law of the ground and is the ultimate point of knowledge, — recognizes its own substantiality ; it knows itself as not merely an empty phenomenon but as also substantial, as a thing-in-itself, as *will*. What then exactly is to be understood by this word *will* when used as identical with substance ? From the principle of individuation which asserts that all particularity, all distinctions, are possible only through space and time, *i.e.*, in the representation, it follows, *first*, that the will as substance cannot be *personal*, for personality implies the distinction of a (particular) subject from its objects. (The supposition of the existence of a personal God is, according to Schopenhauer, absurd, since it asserts the phenomenality of the absolute.) And, *secondly*, that the will as substance cannot have in itself, consciously or unconsciously, motives or ends toward which it acts : *i.e.*, it cannot be *volition*. “The Will as thing-in-itself lies outside the sphere of the law of the ground in all its forms, and is therefore absolutely groundless, although each of its manifestations is throughout subject to this law ; it is, moreover, free from all *multiplicity*, although its manifestations in time and space are innumerable.” “It is *one* : yet not as an individual or a conception is *one* : but as something which is independent of the condition of the possibility of multiplicity, *viz.*, the *principium individuationis*.” The only possible conception of it therefore, which Schopenhauer's theory of the world logically admits, is that of a pure spontaneity or blind force (though Schopenhauer objects, for various reasons, to the use of the latter term), acting absolutely, *i.e.*, from nothing toward nothing, — a conception, however, to which he did not

rigidly adhere. Volition is only one — though, indeed, the “clearest” — of the manifestations of Will.

That the will thus apprehended, is the substance of the subject cannot, says Schopenhauer, be proved: the fact that it is such is simply posited absolutely (by a sort of intellectual intuition which reminds us of Schelling), and is absolutely certain without any other ground. Admitting this to be true, the next step is to show that the will is also the substance of external objects, — that subject-in-itself and object-in-itself are one and the same. This would seem to follow readily from the principle of individuation, which would render the assumption of several substances an absurdity. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer prefers to base this doctrine upon analogical arguments, which constitute the weakest part of his system. Among external objects, he says, there is one, our body, which we know both as phenomenon and thing-in-itself. We perceive it externally as a part of the world in space and time: but we also perceive it internally, and this internal perception identifies it with will. We will to move and the body moves; in this act volition and movement are not cause and effect, but the same thing viewed from different sides. But if the body is will all things are will. Upon this slender basis of assumption and inaccurate logic he grounds his scheme of the universe. But the real difficulty and inner contradiction of Schopenhauer's theory of the will is seen when it is asked: How, if substance is pure activity, are we to account for particulars, for things, phenomena? What is the ground of the representation, or of cognition? To this question the answer of common sense is that the ground of cognition is in the objects cognized; we perceive particulars because antecedent to perception, there are particulars to be perceived. But for Schopenhauer this answer would seem to be wholly inadmissible. The law of individuation renders a mean between the absolutely indeterminate substance and the manifold of representation impossible. The transition from the unity of the will to the representative should be for him wholly inexplicable. Never-

theless he asserts that distinctions do arise in the will-substance directly, *i.e.*, without the mediation of consciousness, thus abandoning the principle of individuation, and passing from idealism to the most complete realism. Will is, he says, essentially striving, effort, "will-to-live," and thus tends ever to give itself expression in definite forms, to "objectify" itself. In this process of manifestation of will there are two stages, (1) *immediate*, (2) *mediate* objectification. All things as particular in space and time are objectified mediately, *i.e.*, through the medium of intelligence. But between the things of sense and the pure will stand the immediate objectifications of will, which are eternal "ideas," the absolute and immutable archetypes of which all perceived objects are imperfect copies. These "ideas" are distinctions immanent in the will, existing prior to and independently of all intelligence. Through these alone does the multiplicity of perceived objects become possible. They are therefore the ground of the manifoldness of the representation. Schopenhauer's answer, thus, like that of common sense, refers the differences of phenomena to real differences in the substance. Again, in his eagerness to depreciate the intellect and exalt the will he introduces yet another contradiction into his theory. The will, he says, has three stages of objectification, (1) the inorganic world, where it appears as gravitation, magnetism, &c. ; (2) the vegetable kingdom, where it appears as stimulation ; (3) the animal kingdom, where it appears as stimulation, and also in the higher forms as conscious motivation. Its highest objectification is the human *brain*, for it is through the medium of the brain that it passes over into representation. By its aid "arises at a stroke the world as representation with all its forms, object and subject, time, space, multiplicity, and causality." Intellect is a function of the brain ; even the *a priori* forms of intuition can be identified with its structure. But the brain is a particular thing, whose existence is determined by innumerable other particular things. If then, as Schopenhauer asserts, the brain is the condition of representation, not

only it, but the world as a whole must be allowed to be antecedent to the representation, *i.e.*, to be equally with the ideas *immediate* objectifications of will. But this contradicts his theory of objectification, and if admitted would be the annihilation of his whole system.

From the will's independence of space, time, and causality, follow at once its indestructibility and freedom. Its mode of being is an "eternal now," a *nunc stans*, which is called eternity. Death is an appearance, destruction an illusion; the eternal substance of things remains ever the same. The individual perishes; the species alone, the eternal idea is imperishable. Man, therefore, as an individual, as a conscious Ego, vanishes with the organism of which he is a product; the race, humanity, alone is immortal. The conscious will is reabsorbed into the universal unconscious will; "death is but the winking of an eyelid which obscures the sight." Substance and the representation are thus in all points antithetical; in itself the will is identical, indestructible, and free; in the representation it is infinitely diverse, changeable, and subject to the invariable law of causality.

III. *Æsthetics*. — Schopenhauer's theory of æsthetics is based upon his doctrine of ideas. Individual objects are not merely individual; each is representative of a species or class, the imperfect expression of a general type or idea in the will, which is the ground of its existence. Viewed thus in the light of the idea, the individual loses its phenomenal character, the accidents of space, time, and causality are stripped away, and it stands revealed in its absolute and immutable essence. This cognition of the idea or universal through the medium of the individual is the province of art. The true statue or painting is not a copy of nature as it is, but of nature as it would be if the ideas of which it is the objectification were adequately realized in it. As a mode of cognition, æsthetic thought must conform to the nature of its object. It cannot, therefore, be discursive. The idea is not an abstract conception subject to the law of the ground, but

a distinction immanent in the substance of things or will. The cognition of the idea must be intuitive. Art transcends all processes of reasoning, all science and reflection, and grasps its object immediately. The æsthetic intuition is thus independent of space, time, and the law of the ground. But how is this possible? how can the thinker transcend the laws of thought? Only, answers Schopenhauer, by losing his individuality. "In æsthetic contemplation the particular thing becomes the idea of its species, and the individual contemplating it becomes a pure subject of knowledge," *i.e.*, sinks back into the absolute. The ideas and the cognizing subject participate in the same nature and become identical; "the artist is himself the essence of nature, the will objectified." The state of mind which accompanies this mystical elevation of the subject above himself, is, according to Schopenhauer—who in this implicitly follows Kant—that of perfect repose. Æsthetic enjoyment is absolutely in itself and for itself: the moment the thought of external interest or advantage enters it vanishes. In this theory of æsthetics Schopenhauer endeavors to unite Plato and Kant. Plato's theory of ideas, he says, and Kant's things-in-themselves, the absolute realities to which no categories of empirical thought are applicable, have essentially the same meaning, though they express it in different ways. The clearest expression of what each intended to state is found in the object of art, the immediate objectification of will as idea.

IV. *Ethics*. — Schopenhauer's theory of morals is the part of his system which is most widely known, and which has exerted the greatest influence upon cotemporary life and thought. Nevertheless its significance for philosophy is but slight. The principles upon which it rests are briefly as follows. The will is essentially will-to-live; it is continually "rushing into life" urged on to self-objectification by the very essence of its own being. It is attended by the phenomenal world as a body by its shadow. Thus spring into being numberless individuals which struggle with one

another for existence. Each must realize its idea: but its efforts to this end are hindered by the efforts of all the rest. These ideas then never can be realized: there is everywhere only imperfection, mutual limitation and destruction, an eternal process of creation and annihilation. This universal unrest of nature is seen also in consciousness. In the latter the will appears as volition (with which are to be classed appetite and desire) in which the immanent idea is supplanted by the external motive. The sole object of conscious volition is gratification of the appetites and desires of the individual; it is a continuous effort to maintain his existence in the face of antagonistic natural forces and of opposing individuals. The conscious will is the absolutely selfish; it begins and ends with self. The gratification of desire, the attainment of the end of volition is happiness. The happiness of the individual therefore is the only motive to which the will is susceptible. But is happiness attainable? This question Schopenhauer answers in the negative. If the will were to attain its end, it would be reduced to a state of absolute repose, volition, appetite and desire would vanish, and the will, as will-to-live, be annihilated. The impossibility of gratification must therefore live in the very nature of the will-to-live. Upon this principle is based his doctrine of *pessimism*. If gratification is pleasure, the effort to attain it must be misery. Pain is disquiet, unrest; happiness, repose and peace. But unrest in the will is the ground of all existence. Pain, unhappiness, misery, are therefore the universal lot of all individuals, conscious or unconscious. Happiness is an unattainable ideal which ever urges man on to action but always eludes his grasp. The world is, then, absolutely bad, the worst possible. There is, however, a way out of this evil through freedom from the dominion of external motives, or *morality*. This freedom is to be attained only through what Schopenhauer terms the "negation of the will-to-live," the negation of all appetite, desire, and volition. Since the human will is in complete subjection to the causality of mo-

tives, the negation of desire is possible only through an act, analogous to the philosophic and æsthetic intuition, which transcends the finite and phenomenal and gives to the subject the freedom and repose of the absolute. The first stage in the negation of the will-to-live is the feeling of pity and compassion for others. In this sentiment the subject forgets his own selfish individuality, recognizes the substantial identity of all men, and responds to the demands of the common interest and welfare. Pity is the ground of justice and of all social morality. The second and highest stage of negation is the cessation of all volition. In this all thoughts of individual or social well-being disappear, and the subject experiences the blessedness of perfect repose. The highest morality is, then, the most complete asceticism. This theory is an attempt to reproduce the Buddhist doctrine of *nirvana*.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is thus a union of the transcendentalism of Kant and Fichte, the empiricism of Locke, the pantheism of Spinoza and Schelling, the idealism of Plato, and the pessimism of the Buddhists. The only point in which he has a claim to marked originality is the identification of substance and will. But in the development of this principle, as has been shown, he falls into open self-contradiction. In order to pass from the one substance, or Will, to the manifold representation, he is obliged to introduce into the will immanent motives which are the ground of its action. He thus applies to the will the conception of causality, which he at the same time asserts to be inapplicable to it. The attempt to reconcile this contradiction is the starting-point of Von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious*.

III.

HARTMANN.

CARL ROBERT EDUARD VON HARTMANN was born in Berlin, Feb. 23, 1842. His father was an officer of artillery in the Prussian army. Not finding the ordinary course of academic study suited to his tastes, Hartmann, after graduating with honor from the gymnasium, chose to follow his father's profession in preference to a course in the university. In 1865, however, a malady, from which he still suffers, obliged him to leave the service. Deprived thus of all hope of pursuing his chosen work, he turned to the study of philosophy, in which he had previously become interested through the reading of Hegel and Schopenhauer, and soon gave evidence of remarkable speculative power. In 1867 appeared his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, which at once gained wide recognition, and is in many respects the most remarkable of recent philosophical works. Since the publication of his masterpiece his literary activity has been unceasing; the most important of his later works being the *Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness* (published 1879), a theory of ethics grounded upon the speculative principles of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*.

Hartmann's system of philosophy is, like the speculative systems which preceded it, an attempt to determine the metaphysical principle of being, the ultimate ground and essence of the universe. Like those systems also, in its solution of this problem, it proceeds upon the monistic hypothesis that the essence of things and the essence of the Ego are one and the same, and that to know the former we need only to determine the latter; it differs from them chiefly in its answer to the question, *What is the essence of the Ego?* According to Hartmann, the two most important

answers to this problem given prior to his own are those of Schopenhauer and Hegel, and upon these his own theory confessedly rests. A brief statement of his criticism of these philosophers will, thus, indicate with sufficient clearness his historical standpoint and central doctrines.

With Schopenhauer the substance of the Ego and the metaphysical principle of being is the will; intelligence or reason being asserted by him to be wholly accidental or derivative. But the will *by itself*, says Hartmann, cannot be shown to be an adequate ground of being either for the Ego or for things. For taken in its bare abstractness, as pure activity, it is the absolutely limitless, aimless, irrational, from which reason, intelligence, activity according to design, and, in general, the world of concrete forms and agencies, can be derived only as a wholly inexplicable accident, or through a gross logical blunder. Will, as such, can be only the efficient cause of things and not the final cause. On the other hand, a similar result is reached if we take, with Hegel, intelligence or reason as the essential principle. Thought, the "absolutely rational," is undoubtedly a higher principle than will, the "absolutely irrational," and satisfies those problems for which will, as such, affords no solution. But, on the other hand, it is equally defective. For if will can give to itself no purpose (reason) or ground of activity, and is, therefore, wholly impotent, reason has no efficiency to realize itself; it must remain forever a pure, abstract, immutable idea utterly devoid of actuality. "The real," — Hartmann thus quotes from Schelling, — "is just that which cannot be constructed through pure thought." The Hegelian *Logic* which "traverses the Platonic sphere of the in-itself-existing idea," is, in general, valid within this sphere, but is utterly impotent to pass beyond it to reality; the idea, the rational ground of being, it has, but the *thing*, being itself, is beyond its grasp. Reason, thus, can be the final, but never the efficient cause of things. It is as impossible for reason to be the ground of the irrational (force, will), as for the irrational

to be the ground of reason. From these considerations Hartmann, in effect, argues that the true principle can be found only in the synthesis of these abstract opposites. In a word, his doctrine is, that reason and will are not derived one from the other, but are absolutely complementary, — two sides of one and the same thing. Apart from one another they are empty abstractions, ideal creations of the imagination; together they constitute the substance of all that exists. “The *real* is the willed idea, or the idea as content of the will.” In this union of idea and will, of end and activity, of final and efficient cause is given the substance and ground of all being. Hartmann’s standpoint may, thus, be completely characterized, as an attempt to reconcile the antithetical doctrines of Schopenhauer and Hegel by showing up their one-sided and complementary character.

The logical result of this theory of substance would seem to be the establishment of a self-conscious personality as the source of all being, *i.e.*, a pure theism. Hartmann, however, unconditionally rejects all such inferences from his theory. He follows Schopenhauer and all materialistic physiology in assuming that consciousness, and therefore personality, is altogether dependent upon organization, — a function of the brain. Without a brain there could be no *conscious* thought. If, therefore, we call the source of being a person, we must conceive him to be altogether blind and unconscious, and thus not a deity in the ordinary sense. The correct view of the world is not theism but pantheism. Hartmann’s conception of substance or the Absolute is, thus, completely stated, the union of *unconscious* intelligence and will, — or in one word, the *Unconscious*. He sees everywhere in the universe, in all physical processes, including the physiological grounds of consciousness, and in all the fundamental processes of thought, the effects of an unconscious agency working according to an immanent purpose or design. All things are manifestations of the Unconscious; it is the soul of the universe, the unseen and unseeing artificer who fashions forth

the myriad forms of objective and subjective existence ; in whom are all things, by whom all things. As possessing in itself both efficient force and directing idea, the Unconscious acts not only with physical, but also with logical necessity. It is, therefore, absolutely wise as well as omniscient ; it never hesitates, it never grows weary, it never errs. Space and time and all the phenomenal individuality which originates in them as *principia individuationis*, spring from it as forms of its objectification : in itself, however, in its essence, it is ever one and the same — an absolute *monos*. It is through this individuation, this realization of the Unconscious in particular forms, that consciousness, which is the rending apart of idea and will, originates. “ The salvation of the world depends upon the emancipation of the intellect from the will, which is possible only through consciousness ; this is the goal of the whole world-process.” In its effort to effect this emancipation, the unconscious idea builds up the world in space and time as an ascending series of forms from the inorganic to the organic, until the animal brain is reached, in which by some mysterious process (which Hartmann very naturally fails to make clear) the will meets with opposition, its separation from the idea is effected, and consciousness comes upon the scene. With consciousness comes also the feeling of pain, which is the dissatisfaction of the will, and is therefore possible only when as in consciousness the will meets with opposition. Pleasure, on the other hand, the satisfaction of will can never appear in consciousness ; the only approximation to pleasure possible is temporary freedom from pain. From this is deduced a thorough-going pessimism. The infinite wisdom of the Unconscious, it is true, makes it certain that the present world is the best possible, and thus justifies a relative optimism ; but though the best possible, it is equally certain that it is absolutely bad. This position is established not only *a priori*, but also *a posteriori* by a detailed enumeration of the evils of life. Misery is thus the inevitable attendant of consciousness. It must, however, for the present

be courageously borne ; in the future salvation will come ; the world-process will have been completed ; the Will will be satisfied, its activity will cease. and all will relapse into nothingness.

In the *Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness* Hartmann develops his theory of ethics. He recognizes in ethics an objective and subjective side, both of which are expressed by the three heads under which the theoretical portion of his work is divided, viz., (1) the springs of morality ; (2) the ends of morality ; (3) the ultimate ground of morality. The springs of morality are, (a) *taste*, which relates to the principles of harmony and perfection, and the ideal in conduct ; (b) *feeling*, e.g., love, compassion, duty ; (c) *reason*, which introduces the idea of the world as a system of ends, and is even more essential to morality than feeling itself. The objective ends which these subjective principles subserve are the general welfare of society and the advancement of universal culture. Why these objective ends are *obligatory*, i.e., why I *ought* to will the welfare and culture of others, can, according to Hartmann, be seen only when we penetrate to their ultimate metaphysical grounds, which are the essential identity of individuals and the absolute, and the ultimate aim of the world-process, i.e., that final redemption, or dissolution, which can be attained only through the complete development of consciousness, or perfect culture. Hartmann concedes freedom only to the unconscious, which as comprehending all conditions in itself is free from all external constraint.

A most noteworthy feature of Hartmann's system is his attempt to break away from the traditional *a priori* dogmatism of speculative thinking, and bring his philosophy into harmony with the spirit of the times by adopting the methods of empirical science. "Speculative results by inductive methods" is the motto which he has prefixed to the first volume of his great work. He has not, however (as F. A. Lange, among others, has pointed out), been altogether successful in realizing this praiseworthy aim. His object is to demonstrate

that all nature must, in the last resort, be interpreted teleologically, *i.e.*, that physical causes are not sufficient to account for the given facts, and that the Unconscious must be accepted as their ultimate ground. But physical science proceeds altogether upon the opposite assumption, viz., that the series of physical causes is unbroken. Whenever induction fails to disclose the physical antecedents of a given event, the conclusion of the physicist is, not that no such antecedents exist, but that the induction has been imperfect. In order, therefore, to demonstrate "inductively" the existence of the Unconscious, Hartmann has recourse to the mathematical theory of probability, by means of which he transforms the subjective uncertainty arising from the imperfection of the physical induction, into an argument for the objective existence of a non-physical cause. By examining in this way, the functions of the spinal chord and ganglia, voluntary and reflex movements, the curative power of nature, organic growth, sexual love, character, æsthetic judgments, &c., he shows that the probability of the existence of the Unconscious amounts to certainty. The obviously uncritical character of his method, however, renders his results almost valueless.

Hartmann's system is the last of the philosophies of the Absolute, and is marked by the same combination of profound insight and arbitrary hypothesis which characterizes them all. His attempt to reconcile Hegel and Schopenhauer is the most brilliant of recent speculative efforts; but by arbitrarily denying to the unity of being which he thus reaches the attribute of consciousness, he has robbed himself of the legitimate fruits of his philosophical acumen. His historical significance lies mainly in his surrender of speculative for empirical methods, which marks the admission by speculative thought of that supremacy of empiricism which has been already noted as a characteristic of cotemporary science. This characteristic will be more fully shown in the following sections.

IV.

COMTE.

THAT reduction of all science to natural science, and of all scientific methods to the objective methods of physics, which has been noted as the characteristic of the second movement to be considered, was first clearly set forth in the "Positive Philosophy" of *Auguste Comte*. Considered in itself, as a system of special doctrines, Comte's philosophy has little significance; that in it which is of value is borrowed from preceding thinkers, and that which is original is, for the most part, whether viewed from the standpoint of empirical science or of philosophy, both inaccurate and unimportant. In its general standpoint, however, it is now recognized as the exponent of an important, wide-spread, and aggressive movement of speculative thought, and as such it merits a place in the history of philosophy.

Comte was born at Montpellier, Jan. 19, 1798, and was educated at the Polytechnic School in Paris. He early fell under the influence of the socialist St. Simon, and it is largely to this, that the strong opposition to the social individualism of the eighteenth century, which appears in his writings, is to be attributed. By profession he was a teacher of mathematics, and labored in that capacity for several years at the Polytechnic School. From this position he was, in 1844, dismissed. The remainder of his life was passed in retirement. He died in 1857. His chief works are the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, which is a general exposition of his system; and the *Système de Politique Positive*, in which he develops in detail his sociological doctrines.

What the "positivism" of Comte is, can be best seen from his celebrated "law of the three stages," which contains the central conception of his system. This law, — which accord-

ing to Comte "has a solid foundation of proof, both in the facts of our organization and in our historical experience," — asserts that in its historical growth, intelligence, whether considered on the whole, or in the separate sciences in which it is manifested, necessarily passes successively through three different theoretical conditions or stages of development, viz., the *theological* or fictitious; the *metaphysical* or abstract; and the *positive* or scientific. In the theological stage the mind seeks for the essential nature of things, for their origin and purpose (first and final causes); that is, it endeavors to reach absolute knowledge. To this end it has recourse to anthropomorphism, and assumes that all phenomena are produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings similar to itself, or, as in monotheism, by a single supreme being. Theology, or religion in general, is thus, according to Comte, a theory of causality which asserts the ultimate cause or causes to be personal. In the metaphysical stage anthropomorphism, in the stricter sense, vanishes. The mind substitutes for supernatural beings abstract forces, which it takes for veritable entities, but which are, in fact, mere *negations* of the knowable; it assumes these "personified abstractions" to be inherent in all things and the sources or causes of all phenomena. The second stage is thus only a modification of the first. But in the highest or positive stage not only does anthropomorphism in all its forms disappear, but causality itself is removed, and the idea of *law* takes its place. All questions in reference to the How? and Why? are set aside, and the mind devotes itself to the observation and classification of phenomena as they are actually experienced, in their invariable relations of co-existence, succession, and resemblance. These *observed relations* of phenomena are the *laws* of phenomena; and by *law* is to be understood absolutely nothing but this. From the "positive" point of view, therefore, all explanation of facts, or science, is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and certain general facts, "the number of which continually

diminishes with the progress of science." There is no faculty of knowledge but sensuous perception. "Every proposition which is not ultimately reducible to the enunciation of a fact, particular or general, must be devoid of all intelligible meaning." All preceding theories of knowledge, all religion, theology, and metaphysic, are but ineffectual attempts to reach this highest phase of thought; and the aim of the Positive Philosophy is to show that the whole course of human thought and history has been a progress towards this goal.

If in this theory, we disregard the purely Comtean doctrine of the historical succession of the three "stages," positivism, viewed as a theory of knowledge, will be seen to be closely identical with the scepticism of Hume. But if it is considered as an exposition of the true *method* of philosophizing (and this is its real meaning), it will show a marked divergence from Hume's standpoint. In asserting that not only is all knowledge obtained by observation and generalization, but that every other attitude of the mind, every other mode of thought, is essentially *negative* — a mere negation of the conditions of thought, Comte, perhaps unconsciously, assumed a realistic position. Instead of approaching the problem of science subjectively as did Hume, he approached it objectively; his standpoint is not scepticism but something "*positive*," — *i.e.*, the *unquestioning* acceptance of facts just as they are objectively given, the absolute limitation of the mind's activity to the observation of the immediately given content of the sense, to phenomena. His method of philosophizing, therefore, is not, like Hume's, a sceptical critique of conceptions, but is merely an attempt to subordinate the phenomena of mind to general uniformities of relation, or *laws*. From this point of view the two thinkers are diametrically opposed. In this distinction is also given the ground of that universalization of physical methods mentioned above. The "*positive*" attitude and method of thought is precisely the distinguishing feature of physical science. By assuming this attitude, therefore, the Positive Philosophy broke down the

distinction which since the time of Bacon has existed between the methods of the mental and physical sciences, and merged the former wholly in the latter; in a word it reduced the science of mind to a special department of the science of biology. In this it has been followed by the majority of subsequent empiricists; and in this is to be found the direction of its chief influence upon the scientific thought of the age. This is the distinguishing characteristic of Positivism viewed as a general scientific standpoint, independently of its special Comtean form.

From this it is obvious in what sense Comte uses the word philosophy. Philosophy is, with him, simply a general theory of the special empirical sciences, — the determination of their common methods, general connections, and specific differences. The *Cours de Philosophie Positive* is merely an attempt to realize this conception and has little to do with the problems of philosophy rightly so called.

Of Comte's special doctrines nothing need be said. His historical law of the three stages and his classification of the sciences, which constituted, in his own opinion, his chief claim to originality, are now generally rejected as hasty and inaccurate generalizations. According to his own view of his work, the crown of his labors, the highest application of his theory, was his institution of the science of sociology and of the "religion of humanity." The consideration of these, however, and of their effect upon cotemporary life and thought, does not fall within the province of the present work.

The general principles which he thus laid down Comte did not seek to demonstrate or to carry to a complete systematic realization. He contented himself with asserting their validity and applying them in special cases. He indeed intimated that the complete development of the positive standpoint required the discovery of some most general law of phenomena under which all special laws might be subsumed; but he did not attempt this discovery himself. This attempt

was first made by *Herbert Spencer*, who, though differing widely from Comte in the details of his system, and denying that he is in any sense a Comtean, has nevertheless comprehended and developed more fully than any other the fundamental principles of Positivism. Historically Spencer is most closely connected with the English associational psychologists, a brief statement of whose doctrines will be given before passing to his system.

V.

THE ASSOCIATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

LOCKE had divided the content of consciousness into *simple* sensations and ideas (copies of sensations) as the *matériel* of cognition, the simple, original elements of thought; and *complex* ideas, which include all higher conceptions, and are compounds of simple ideas (Sect. XXVIII.). In the formation and combination of these complex ideas, according to this view, are involved all the processes of thought. But if this is admitted, it is clear that the problem of psychology, viz., the empirical determination of the laws of thought, becomes identical with this other, — to determine the laws of the formation and combination of complex ideas. What, then, it was soon asked, are these laws? Obviously, not modes of action immanent in the mind itself; for these can be conceived of only as conscious *rules* of action, or innate ideas, which Locke's theory expressly excludes. They must, therefore, be mere generalizations from the actual process as determined by observation and analysis: *i.e.*, they must be, ultimately, simply uniformities ("laws") in the succession or co-existence of sensations and ideas. Viewing the problem from this point of view, the Associationalists

asserted that all the laws of thought can be reduced to one universal law, viz., that of *association*, according to which two sensations or "ideas of sensation" which resemble each other or have been frequently perceived as co-existent or successive, become so intimately connected that they tend to appear together in consciousness, the thought of the one calling up the other. This fact of the mechanical connection of ideas through the relations of *contiguity* and *resemblance*, was considered a sufficient explanation of all the processes of conscious thinking and willing, and of the formation of general conceptions. Even those higher conceptions of the mind which are apparently original and simple were reduced to complex ideas by the analytical application of this law. Mental phenomena, it was asserted, may, as a result of frequent repetition under the law of association, form an intimate "chemical" union, "may merge into a compound in which the separate elements are no more distinguishable, as such, than oxygen and hydrogen in water," or the separate vibrations in a musical tone. Such an idea, though really complex, would appear in consciousness as simple and indivisible; and of this nature, say the Associationalists, are all the conceptions upon whose originality and simplicity philosophy grounds its metaphysical speculations. The law of association was thus conceived to be the ground of the unconscious formation of conceptions as well as of conscious thinking, and was thus raised to a position in the sphere of mind analogous to that of the law of gravitation in the physical world.

Upon this theory was established a flourishing and aggressive school of philosophy. (*David Hartley*, 1705-1757; *Joseph Priestly*, 1733-1804; *Erasmus Darwin*, 1731-1802; *James Mill*, 1773-1836; *John Stuart Mill*, 1806-1873; *Alexander Bain*, b. 1818.) The significance of Associationalism for speculative science is largely negative. It is actually what the Positive Philosophy was theoretically; it claims to be neither materialistic nor idealistic, to have nothing to do

with mind or matter in themselves, or with metaphysical problems of any sort, but only with "*facts*," *i.e.*, with phenomena. But on the other hand its import is positive, in that by claiming to demonstrate with the certainty of objective science, the empirical origin of the conceptions of substantiality, causality, &c., it takes away the only grounds upon which philosophy as a metaphysical science can rest. It also abolishes practical philosophy as a theory of freedom by reducing mind to a complicated mechanism, subject everywhere to objective laws. Its significance for the history of philosophy is, thus, equivalent to that of a dogmatic system.

VI.

HERBERT SPENCER.

ASSOCIATIONALISM may, then, be comprehensively defined as an attempt to bring the entire sphere of the subjective, — the origin and process of thought, — under the dominion of mechanical laws. In their attempts to realize this aim, however, all Associationists from Hartley to Bain began with the individual; *i.e.*, taking the human mind as one object among many, they endeavored to discover the special mechanical laws which govern it by virtue of its peculiar nature, just as the chemist unfolds the laws of chemical action, or the electrician those of electricity. But such special views rest upon the presupposition of the general idea which constitutes the ground of objective science as a whole, namely, that of a universal mechanical connection of all phenomena whatsoever; a conception, that is, of the universe as a whole, all of whose parts, whatever may be their specific qualitative differences, are bound together by definite and invariable quantitative relations, which can be formulated in general

laws, and which determine the order and development of the world with a strict causal necessity. Viewing the problem of Associationalism from the standpoint of this idea, it is clear that it can be solved, not by merely disclosing the special laws of consciousness,—though this is essential,—but rather by determining the relations of these special laws to the universal laws of the mechanical relations of things. The thinker who has approached the problem from this side, and by clearly formulating and developing its fundamental presuppositions has raised Associationalism to the rank of a philosophy, is *Herbert Spencer*.

(Spencer was born at Derby, Eng., April 27, 1820. He began life as a civil engineer, but early abandoned that profession for literary pursuits. He has now for many years devoted himself exclusively to the development of his system of philosophy.)

The object of philosophy, according to Spencer, is to deduce the fundamental principles of the special sciences (among which psychology and ethics rank as subordinate departments of biology) from the highest principle or — what is with him the same thing—the highest generalization which physical science can reach. This supreme generalization under which all the phenomena of matter and mind are to be subsumed is the law of *evolution*. The history of the universe is to be conceived as a process of development, beginning with an original chaotic or “homogeneous” condition of matter, from which, under fixed mechanical and dynamical laws, all the special arrangements of matter which now exist have been “evolved.” First in order of evolution is the formation of simple mechanical aggregates of atoms, *e.g.*, molecules, spheres, systems; then the evolution of more complex aggregates or organisms; then the evolution of the highest product of organization,—thought; and lastly the evolution of the complex relations which exist between thinking organisms, or society with its regulative laws both civil and moral. Between these stages there are no fixed lines of

demarkation; the passage from one to the other is *continuous*,—the transition from organization to thought being mediated by the nerve-system, in the molecular changes of which are to be found the mechanical correlates and equivalents of all conscious processes. From the psychological point of view, Spencer admits as the fundamental principle of mental development the law of association, of which, however, he like Hartley gives a physical explanation. In one important point, however, he differs from all previous Associationalists. He admits in opposition to the theory of Locke and J. S. Mill, that the experience of the individual is insufficient to account for all his ideas; necessary relations of thought and fundamental convictions of duty require for their origin an experience vastly more extended than the brief life of the individual. Instead, however, of referring, with Kant, these necessary ideas to a source distinct from experience, he endeavors to account for them by the physical law of *heredity*. The philosophy of evolution is thus, in a word, an attempt to account for all the existing phenomena of the universe in terms of the redistribution of matter and motion; and to show that the special laws of all classes of phenomena are only different cases of the elementary mechanical laws under which this redistribution takes place. Spencer, however, denies that his system is materialistic. Of matter and mind *per se*, he says, we know absolutely nothing; we know only phenomena and their laws. Of the “essence of things” we can say nothing, except that it is a “force” which manifests itself in phenomena, but in its essential nature is wholly transcendent. Materialism and idealism are, therefore, equally untenable. But materialism consists not so much in asserting the substantial identity of mind and matter, as in asserting that the laws which govern the phenomena of both are the same; and since this latter assertion is the basis of Spencer’s *Psychology* the term materialistic may justly be applied to his whole system.

To the realization of this vast scheme Spencer has devoted

himself with admirable courage and energy. Limiting the discussion to the origin and development of organisms, he projected more than twenty years ago a series of works which should be the complete application of the law of evolution to the phenomena of conscious and unconscious life. Of these there have appeared "*The Principles of Biology*," "*The Principles of Psychology*," the first part of the "*Principles of Sociology*," and a portion of the first part of the "*Principles of Morality*" ("Data of Ethics"). In addition to these he has published under the title of "*First Principles*" a general outline of his theory of evolution.

I. In stating Spencer's theory more in detail we have to consider, first, his doctrine of *the limits of knowledge*. By him as by the other Associationalists, the entire content of consciousness is assumed to consist of sensations and their "ideal" representatives, — *i.e.*, weakened or remembered sensations, — variously ordered and combined under the laws of association. He is, therefore, obliged to maintain that only that can be known which can be sensuously perceived or imagined, *i.e.*, adequately represented in a mental picture or image; that the test of cognizability is *conceivability*. This test he employs to determine the sphere of the "Unknowable" as opposed to the "Knowable." He divides conceptions into three classes. If all the details of a given object can be comprehended within a single representation, the conception of it thus formed is *complete*. When the magnitude or complexity of the object is so great that a complete conception of it is practically impossible, a *symbolic* conception of it may be formed by combining into a single representation several of its more prominent features. Such a conception, *e.g.*, our conception of the earth, may obviously be valid, for it may be representative or symbolic of a complete conception which in itself is entirely in harmony with the conditions of knowledge. If, however, a symbolic conception is such that no cumulative or indirect process of thought could enable us to realize the complete conception

which it symbolizes, it is clearly not in harmony with the conditions of thought, and may be called an "illegitimate conception" or "*pseud-idea*." Such ideas "are altogether vicious and illusive and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions." From this it follows that a valid proof of a given proposition is the inconceivability of its negation.

In classifying the content of consciousness under these three orders of conceptions, Spencer finds that to the first two belong all the derived or relative conceptions which constitute positive science; while to the last must be relegated the fundamental ideas of religion, God, Creative Power, First Cause, etc., as well as the ultimate abstractions, space, time, matter, and force, upon which physical science rests. These "ultimate religious and scientific ideas," therefore, constitute the sphere of the unknowable: they are *pseud-ideas*, their corresponding objects or complete conceptions being in fact inconceivable, unthinkable. This position Spencer grounds upon two arguments: *first*, upon the failure of every attempt to think the infinite or absolute: and *second*, upon the principle of the relativity of thought, which he holds not merely in the lower, Protagorean sense that each individual's knowledge is relative to the circumstances in which he is placed, but also in the higher sense that thought is in its nature a relation, — which indeed follows as an obvious corollary from the law of association. The principle of relativity is, in fact, the central principle of his system viewed from its subjective side.

The absolute and all that pertains thereto are thus dismissed to the limbo of the unknowable. Nevertheless Spencer is unwilling to deny all significance to the transcendent. "Besides the definite consciousness of which logic formulates the laws, there is," he says, "also an indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated." This "indefinite" cognition of the absolute is the substratum of all definite cognition. The very denial of our power to know *what* the absolute is, implies at least *that* it is. Moreover, this recognition of the

absolute is the basis of the law of relativity itself. For without the absolute the relative would have no meaning, or rather would itself become absolute. Hence, Spencer argues, we are obliged logically as well as by the facts of consciousness to admit the existence of the absolute. But in this argument, it is forgotten that if the absolute is the correlate of the relative it must be defined and known — at least as a conception — in precisely that degree in which the relative is defined and known. A still more weighty objection is the manifest absurdity which it involves, that, namely, of employing the law of relativity to demonstrate the existence of that which at the same time is declared to be incompatible with *all* relation.

Upon the ground of this indefinite consciousness of the absolute Spencer concedes a relative validity to religion, thus diverging widely from Comte. The entire content of religion consists in “ultimate ideas”: hence it can have no other validity than that which pertains to these ideas. But these, as we have seen, are valid only in so far as they symbolize the existence of an otherwise absolutely indefinite object. Religion, therefore, is justifiable only where it confines itself to the mere inarticulate worship of an “Unknown God”; it oversteps its limits wherever it makes positive assertions in reference to His nature and acts. Within these limits, however, its exercise is valid and indispensable.

II. Having thus, negatively, defined the limits of knowledge, Spencer passes to the positive side of philosophy, viz., the determination of *the laws of the knowable*. Since the spheres of the knowable and of objective science are co-extensive, the supreme law of the latter must at the same time be the highest principle of the former. As has been stated, the highest principle is the law of evolution. What then is evolution? In order to define it we must first distinguish it negatively from the ordinary conceptions of *progress*. By the latter is commonly meant a succession of events so ordered as to increase the sum of human happiness, *i.e.*, progress is always interpreted *teleologically*. Evolution, on

the contrary, consists not in such external results, but in a series of "internal" changes, which must be interpreted *physically* and not teleologically: in other words, evolution or true progress is not a movement toward a definite end which as final cause regulates and directs it, but is a purely mechanical development; it deals with nothing but matter and motion. This being understood, the positive definition of Evolution follows from the consideration of the changes which occur when the parts of a material mass pass from unity to variety of distribution. These are: (a) an advance from homogeneity to heterogeneity; (b) an advance from indefiniteness to definiteness; (c) increasing differentiation; (d) increasing integration. These four changes are simultaneous and complementary. Evolution, thus, is "*a change from an indefinite, incoherent heterogeneity to a definite, coherent homogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations.*" This formula includes all processes of development in nature and in mind. It is the highest generalization of science.

In every such "change in the arrangement of parts" (evolution) there are three factors implied, viz., matter, motion, and the force which produces motion; or more properly four factors, since motion is a synthesis of time and space. All processes, whether physical or mental, can be resolved into these elements. What these factors are in themselves it is impossible to say: they are modes of the Unknowable. We have, however, a relative knowledge of them gained from experience. But experience is itself a process of evolution. Hence, whatever may be true of them as objectively existing, it is impossible that from the subjective standpoint of knowledge these elements should be equally original. There must be some simple mode of consciousness from which, under the law of evolution, all others are derived. This simple mode is the perception of resistance to muscular effort, or *force*. Force is the ultimate element of both the knowable and unknowable; for as relatively known it constitutes the *real* content of knowledge, while in itself it is the correlate of

all experience, and must be held to be identical with the transcendent reality, the absolute, the unknowable itself.

Evolution must therefore be everywhere conditioned by the special laws which govern force in its empirical manifestation. These are the well known physical laws of: (1) the indestructibility of matter; (2) the continuity of motion; (3) the persistence of force; (4) the correlation and equivalence of forces; (5) the direction of motion; (6) the rhythm of motion. The laws of persistence and correlation are the corner-stone of evolution considered dynamically. Spencer is thus obliged to assume the correlation of physical and organic (including psychical) forces. Here, however, he admits that equivalence, *i.e.*, an exact quantitative relation, cannot be established. Between organic and psychical changes and their antecedent mechanical grounds, only “a qualitative relation that is indefinitely quantitative—quantitative only in so far as involving something like a due proportion between causes and effects”—can be shown to exist. This, however, he thinks, does not form an exception to the general law, but results merely from the complexity of the phenomena involved. The reality of the correlation must be accepted as an established fact; though *how* it takes place “is a mystery which it is impossible to fathom.” To the dynamical may be added certain other mechanical conditions of evolution, *viz.*: (1) the instability of the homogeneous; (2) the multiplication of effects; (3) the simultaneity of differentiation and integration; (4) tendency to equilibrium.

Evolution, however, does not cover all the facts of nature. Side by side with this evolution of definite forms, there exists a second antagonistic process, dissolution, which slowly undoes the work of the first, producing homogeneity from heterogeneity, indefiniteness from definiteness, disintegration from integration. Evolution and dissolution are correlative and inseparable. At present the former preponderates: but will it always do so? May there not be a limit at which evolution will cease, and dissolution, gaining the upper hand, reduce

the world of definite forms again to chaos? This question Spencer does not attempt to answer. He thinks it most probable, however, that the ultimate state of the universe will be that of perfect equilibrium between these processes,—a state of perfect rest.

In his “system of synthetic philosophy” Spencer applies these “first principles” to the explanation of the phenomena of the organic world including those of consciousness. In his discussion of these phenomena he advances everywhere, in conformity to the law of evolution, from the simple to the complex. The highest, *i.e.*, most complex manifestation of life is the moral consciousness; the science of *ethics* therefore forms the culmination of his system. Ethics rests upon *sociology*; for since it is the science of the laws which direct the actions of individuals to the attainment of the highest welfare of society as a whole, it must be determined by the laws of social progress or evolution, *i.e.*, by the natural conditions (laws) under which this highest welfare is attainable. Sociology, in turn, since society is a relation of *conscious* individuals, depends upon psychology, or the science of the constitution and growth of intelligence. And, lastly, since intelligence is a product of organization, psychology must rest upon the science of the laws of organization or *biology*. These sciences taken together—and in reverse order—represent the different aspects of one continuous process through which, under the mechanical presuppositions above stated, the highest social and spiritual activities of man have been evolved from the simplest organic germs. This scheme, even in its present partial execution, is too vast to be here described even in outline.

The importance of the Philosophy of Evolution is not to be measured altogether by the certainty of its premises or the accuracy of its logic. It is an attempt to render explicit the tacitly assumed principles of a new intellectual movement; it represents the ideal towards which empirical science is striving, rather than its clearly demonstrated results. Much in

it, therefore, is of necessity hypothetical. The objections to it are sufficiently obvious. Not only is the agnosticism with which it begins based upon untenable grounds, but its first principle, evolution itself, is as yet only an hypothesis, and unfit to be the ground of an *a priori* deduction of the universe; while the exact correlation of physical and psychical forces which it assumes is unsupported by scientific proofs. Its special arguments are also open to numerous objections; not infrequently the real points at issue are evaded by assumptions and false logic. But if we regard the idea which underlies it, and which may be valid even though Spencer's special doctrines are overthrown, we must admit that it has opened a course of speculative thought likely, in the end, to result in many radical changes in the methods and standpoint of philosophy.

VII.

HICKOK.

THE aim of the Philosophy of Evolution coincides very closely with that of the philosophy of Hegel; each attempts to show that the laws of the external and internal worlds are essentially identical. They approach this problem, however, from opposite sides. Hegel, starting with the spontaneity of thought, sought to show that the world is externally what the mind is internally. Spencer, beginning at the opposite pole, with the causal nexus of mechanism, asserts that the mind is internally what the world is externally. In the development of their respective standpoints, also, each finds the same insuperable obstacle, namely, the difficulty of making the transition from one term to the other. The question therefore arises: is this transition at all possible? and, if not, can

a single principle, a *tertium quid*, be found from which the laws of both the subjective and objective worlds can be derived? The attempt to answer these questions, forms the central point of Dr. Hickok's speculations. (Laurens P. Hickok was born at Bethel, Conn., Dec. 29, 1798; pastor at Kent and Litchfield, Conn.; Professor of Theology at Western Reserve College, O., and at Auburn Theological Seminary, N.Y.; President of Union College; and now (1880) living in retirement at Amherst, Mass.)

The key to the whole discussion is, according to Hickok, to be found in an accurate study of psychology in so far as this relates to the nature of knowledge. For the human mind, in all its attempts at science, can deal with nothing but what it finds given in itself either immediately, through experience (perception, reflection), or mediately through some faculty of knowledge which can transcend experience; and in either case the laws of the given content will be identical with the laws of the faculty through which it is cognized. In its effort to establish a universal philosophy, therefore, the mind must take as its first principle the highest principle of cognition, and this can be determined only psychologically.

Transferring, then, the problem into the sphere of psychology, we have to ask: what is involved in the process of cognition? The answer to this question is briefly as follows: (1) In cognition the mind must be *passive*. The diverse phenomena of the objective world and the various feelings, emotions, etc., which they induce in the subject, together with their relative positions in space and successions in time (laws of empirical science), must originate in a source distinct from the mind itself. (2) It must also be *active*. That the sensuous content is *given* is independent of the subject; but that it should be *perceived* is impossible, unless there is in the subject a capacity for spontaneously taking, as it were, the given content into itself. In other words, the consciousness of a sensation (affection of the organism) is not that sensation itself—as empiricism must logically as-

sume, but it is the mind's spontaneous assertion that the sensation *is*. This is even more clearly seen in the higher process of *thinking*. Thinking is that process whereby individual sensations are referred back to *things*, as their *qualities*, and things are connected together in a continuous experience by means of the relations of substantiality, causality, etc. In thinking, therefore, the given sensations are brought into a dynamical connection in which each is made to depend upon the others; and it is absurd to suppose that this reciprocal reference is involved in the mere sensation itself. On the contrary these relations must be contributed by the activity of thought.

These facts, says Dr. Hickok, enable us to answer the first of the questions propounded above. If the mind, as Spencer assumes, were, in cognition, purely passive; if cognition were merely the (inexplicable) consciousness of effects produced in the mind by an external force, there could be no higher principle of science than that of mechanical connection, and the Philosophy of Evolution would be thoroughly logical and convincing. And, similarly, if in cognition the mind were wholly active, if it generated from itself its entire content, or even merely absorbed into itself and transmuted into its own essence an externally given *material*, the supreme principle would be that of the spontaneous evolution of thought, and Hegel's system would be the only valid philosophy. But the facts of psychology show that not only is the mind both active and passive; but also that these two terms, passivity and activity, the mechanical and the logical, the external and the internal, are *complementary* factors in the union of which alone knowledge is to be found. If we begin with the external, nothing but externality can be logically deduced from it; from the juxtaposition of impenetrable atoms nothing subjective, no penetrability, intussusception, reference-to-itself can be derived; and if the internal is taken as the starting-point, no passage can be found from ideality, from a flux of ideas which are developed from and reabsorbed into one another,

to the stability and numerical identity of the units of the external world. The inadequacy of these two systems is therefore (at least primarily) the inevitable result of their one-sidedness. There can be no transition from the internal to the external, if we begin with either term as the first principle, and, therefore, none at all unless it be through something higher than either.

The second question, however, can be answered in the affirmative. A further analysis of knowledge shows, that above both sense and mere spontaneous thinking in relations (judgments) and general conceptions, there is a faculty of cognition, the Reason, which is competent to knowledge absolutely *a priori*, — which, though needing the *occasion* of experience, determines itself absolutely from itself, and thus rises above all the relations of experience whether subjective or objective, and beholds the transcendent grounds upon which the external and internal worlds, the mind's passivity and activity, both rest. Sense is determined wholly from without; spontaneous thought must act always under *conditions* imposed upon it by the sense; but Reason is an absolute *first*, — it determines and conditions itself, because it has its own content in itself; it knows itself and therefore has need of nothing other to complete its knowledge. Reason is an absolute One; it knows not through relations (like the understanding) and therefore finitely, but intuitively and therefore absolutely. In a word Reason is personality, — the self-conscious Ego, which is at the same time self-active will. Considered as a faculty of knowledge, Reason is that activity of the mind whereby it determines the *a priori* conditions of all experience, the absolute pre-requisites without which experience could never arise, and which determine the nature of the sensuous content — the mechanical relations which dominate it — as well as the validity and ground of the judgments of the understanding. Or, as Dr. Hickok expresses it, its province is to furnish the *sufficient reason* for experience. By using this faculty, he says, as the organon of philosophy, it is possible to mediate

the two terms which Spencer and Hegel find absolutely antagonistic; for instead of trying to explain experience from itself, — instead of making one factor in experience the logical *prius* of its correlate, — as do these philosophers, reason posits that which was before all experience and rendered it possible.

The way in which he effects this mediation is briefly as follows: As the highest ground of being Reason posits a person, God, the Absolute Reason. Through the absolutely free activity or self-limitation of God, — who by virtue of the fact that he is absolute reason is at the same time absolute and thus creative will, — there have been created certain mechanical “forces” which constitute the external world as it exists prior to consciousness, — the “thing-in-itself.” These forces occupy space (which, together with time, Dr. Hickok conceives to be the reason’s capacity for self-limitation *a priori*, and which, therefore, come into existence as definite *place* and *period* only through this self-limiting or creative act) and are punctual unities or atoms, formed from the interaction of opposing “antagonistic” and “diremptive” non-spatial “energies” (or acts of the divine will). These atoms form the substantial basis of the objective world, forming by their mechanical combinations all bodies both inorganic and organic, and determining by their actions and reactions the causal succession of events. Upon these mechanical forces has also been creatively superinduced a special vital force from the action of which organisms arise, and with them, for the first time, subjectivity, internality, sense, and understanding. At this point, therefore, the desired mediation must be shown, and this is done by positing, as a necessary dictum of Reason, that the internal must have been creatively adapted to the constitution of the external world. Thus, for example, the mind spontaneously judges that every quality must belong to a thing, that every event must have a cause, &c., and the material world, in fact, supports the validity of these judgments because it was created upon these principles.

The mere understanding, however, does not comprehend the reason for its action but simply judges unreflectingly. It is only when (as in man) reason has been added to understanding, and the subject has thus been raised to the theoretical standpoint of the Creator, that he comprehends the ground of the validity of these spontaneous judgments. Reason is neither subjective nor objective, internal nor external, but the higher unity, the transcendent ground of both. The details of this system cannot be here given.

In the ethical sphere Dr. Hickok makes a most important application of his principle of the reason. Freedom and therefore morality he asserts to be impossible unless the mind can give to itself an ultimate rule of action, superior to and distinct from the motives which originate in the physical and mental constitution. In its relation to the appetites, desires, inclinations, and affections the will is wholly passive; when two such motives conflict it always follows the line of least resistance. But reason furnishes it with a transcendent motive, viz., the absolute demand of reason that it be everywhere realized,—and thus gives it a true alternative, the possibility of a free choice. Morality consists in following the commands of reason instead of the constitutional impulses and desires. In this ethical demand of reason are found also the ground of the Divine creative energy, and of the stability of the universe.

Dr. Hickok's historical significance lies mainly in the fact that his system is the first thoroughly scientific attempt to make the starting-point of religion—the existence of a personal God—the first principle of philosophy. He is in earnest with theism; and endeavors to make its doctrines, not merely valid objects of faith, but also valid principles of science.

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
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